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  1. Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science.Christopher Pollard - 2014 - Discipline Filosofiche 24 (2):67-90.
    What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and (...)
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    What is Original in Merleau-Ponty’s View of the Phenomenological Reduction?Christopher Pollard - 2018 - Human Studies 41 (3):395-413.
    Despite the recent increase of interest in the work of Merleau-Ponty there is still a persistent tendency to overlook the uniqueness of the philosophical position he advances in Phenomenology of Perception. In this article I present a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the phenomenological reduction that explains how it is original. I do this by contrasting his presentation of the reduction with that of the early Husserl, highlighting how his emphasis on the phenomenology of the ‘perceived world’ leads him to (...)
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  3. Merleau-Ponty’s Conception of Dialectics in Phenomenology of Perception.Christopher Pollard - 2016 - Critical Horizons 17 (3-4):358-375.
    Although the fact that Merleau-Ponty has a dialectical approach in Phenomenology of Perception has been discussed in recent Anglophone readings, there has not been an explicit clarification as to how his varying usages of the term hang together. Given his repeated references to Hegel and to dialectics, coupled with the fact that dialectics are not part of the Husserlian phenomenology or Heideggerean existentialism from which Merleau-Ponty draws so much, the question of just what he does with the idea of dialectics (...)
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  4. Is Merleau-Ponty’s Position in Phenomenology of Perception a New Type of Transcendental Idealism?Christopher Pollard - 2014 - Idealistic Studies 44 (1):119-138.
    It has recently been suggested that Merleau-Ponty’s position in Phenomenology of Perception is a unique form of transcendental idealism. The general claim is that in spite of his critique of “Kantianism,” Merleau-Ponty’s position comes out as a form of transcendental idealism that takes the perceptual processes of the lived body as the transcendental constituting condition for the possibility of experience. In this article I critically appraise this claim. I argue that if the term “idealist” is intended in a sufficiently similar (...)
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