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Christopher Peacocke
Columbia University
  1. A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension. Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and (...)
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  2. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
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  3. Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
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  4. The Realm of Reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
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  5. A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
     
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  6.  56
    Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (4):603.
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  7.  51
    The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
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  8.  95
    Truly Understood.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
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  9.  4
    The Primacy of Metaphysics.Christopher Peacocke - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, and the ways you think about them? Christopher Peacocke argues that meaning is never prior to metaphysics - to the nature of the world. He shows that this view holds for a wide range of topics, including magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects such as numbers.
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  10. Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
  11. Between Instrumentalism and Brain-Writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
  13. New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
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  14.  73
    Thoughts: An Essay on Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - Oxford, England: Blackwell.
  15. Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level 1.5.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):101-123.
  16. Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
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  17. Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1981 - Synthese 49 (2):187-217.
  18. Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381-388.
  19.  6
    Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):636-640.
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  20. Colour Concepts and Colour Experience.Christopher Peacocke - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):365-82.
  21. Depiction.Christopher Peacocke - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):383-410.
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  22.  80
    Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, Interpretation.Christopher Peacocke - 1979 - Clarendon Press.
    INTRODUCTION The philosophy of action and the philosophy of space and time may well seem to be unconnected areas. I will argue that in each of these areas ...
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  23. Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  24. Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Christopher Peacocke - 2006 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a (...)
     
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  25.  34
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Christopher Peacocke - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):263.
  26. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.
     
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  27. Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:43-88.
  28. Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Philosophical Issues. MIT Press. pp. 43-88.
  29. How Are A Priori Truths Possible?1.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.
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  30. Imagination, Experience, and Possibility.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - In John Foster & Howard Robinson (eds.), Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration. Oxford University Press.
  31. What is a Logical Constant?Christopher Peacocke - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (9):221-240.
  32. Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
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  33. Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
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  34. Necessity and Truth Theories.Christopher Peacocke - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):473 - 500.
  35. Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 2015 - In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 357-388.
    I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
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  36. Perceptual Content.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - In J. Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
     
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  37. XI—Externalist Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1):203-230.
  38. Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic (...)
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  39. Entitlement, Self-Knowledge, and Conceptual Redeployment.Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96:117-58.
  40. Content, Computation, and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (3):227-264.
  41.  44
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge, and Conceptual Redeployment.Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):117-58.
  42. The a Priori.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  43.  11
    Holistic Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):106-118.
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  44. Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - In T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 163.
  45. Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
     
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  46. Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):751-760.
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  47.  43
    The View From Nowhere.Christopher Peacocke - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):772-774.
  48. Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
    : This paper has five theses, which are intended to address the claims in Jerry Fodor's paper. The question arises of the relation between the philosophical theory of concepts and epistemology. Neither is explanatorily prior to the other. Rather, each relies implicitly on distinctions drawn from the other. To explain what makes something knowledge, we need distinctions drawn from the theory of concepts. To explain the attitudes mentioned in a theory of concepts, we need to use the notion of knowledge. (...)
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  49.  15
    Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly's position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
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  50. Deviant Causal Chains.Christopher Peacocke - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):123 - 155.
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