Kant actively struggles with the problem of how to conceive of God's creative action in relation to human freedom. He comes to the view that human freedom can only be protected if God withdraws in certain ways from the created world. The two pillars of Kant's mature philosophy - transcendental idealism and freedom - are in part shaped and motivated by Kant's need to provide a solution to his theological problem. The medieval and early modern theological tradition conceives of divine (...) action as unlike the action of any created being. When the creature acts, God directly causes this action, but without reducing the creature's freedom. Kant explicitly discusses and rejects this account of divine and human concursus. This rejection has significant and surprising ramifications for Kant's wider philosophy, explaining otherwise incomprehensible claims in his critical philosophy. Christopher J. Insole presents a definitive study in the history of ideas, engaging with a wide range of Kant's texts from 1749 until the early 1800s. Many of these texts have received little or no attention in Kant studies to date. Insole places Kant's thought in relation to numerous historical and traditional positions and illuminates these positions by a close engagement with recent debates in analytical philosophy and systematic theology. Kant is unrelentingly honest when grappling with the difficulty of relating divine and human freedom. This study, of Kant's theological struggle and legacy, goes to the heart of the problem in the modern reception of what the Christian tradition has affirmed about human freedom. As such, the book throws light on one of the defining fault-lines in modern theology and philosophy. (shrink)

The philosopher Kant is a key thinker in shaping our contemporary concept of morality, freedom, and happiness. This book argues that Kant believes in God, but that he is not a Christian, and that this opens up an important and neglected dimension of Western Philosophy.

Kant is clear that the concept of the 'highest good' involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own (...) sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge. (shrink)

I demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences (...) depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant's transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom. (shrink)

What tensions arise between philosophy of religion and theology? What strengths and weaknesses of analytical methods emerge in relation to strongly confessional philosophical theologies, or to Continental philosophies? Faith and Philosophical Analysis evaluates how well philosophy of religion serves in understanding religious faith. Figures who rarely share the space of the same book - leading exponents of analytic philosophy of religion and those who question its legacy - are drawn together in this book, with their disagreements harnessed to positive effect. (...) Figures such as Richard Swinburne and Basil Mitchell reflect on their life-long projects from a perspective which has not previously been seen in print. A wide range of approaches found in contemporary philosophy of religion are explored, including: reformed epistemology, 'traditional' metaphysical theory building, feminist methodologies, Wittgensteinian approaches, and American pragmatism. Considering the trends in philosophy of religion as they are interacting across continents, looking particularly at philosophical influences in North America, Britain, and Continental Europe, this book will appeal to students, scholars and general readers with an interest in philosophy of religion, theology, or analytical philosophy. (shrink)

Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant's transcendental idealism. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre‐critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the source of space, time and causation. Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcendental freedom. I show that Kant has significant theological difficulties (...) ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties. I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so‐called “neglected alternative”, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation. (shrink)

This article makes two key claims in succession. First of all, Kant’s own religious hope is significantly and studiedly distanced from the traditions of Christianity that he would have received, in ways that have not yet been fully, or widely, appreciated. Kant makes an ideal moral community the object of our religious hopes, and not the transcendent God of the tradition. Secondly, Kant nonetheless has a notion of transcendence at play, but in a strikingly different key to traditional Christianity. Both (...) concepts of transcendence, the Christian and the Kantian, deflate, in their own distinctive ways, our hopes for politics and history, in a way that can unsettle the certainties, and vanities, of both the traditional theologian and the secular Rawlsian. The Christian hope is not the same as Kant’s religious hope, which is distinct, in origin, depth and ambition from his more limited hope for politics. (shrink)

I am from eternity to eternity: God in Kant's early thought -- Whence then am I?: God in Kant's later thought -- Kant's only unsolvable metaphysical difficulty: created freedom -- Creating freedom: Kant's theological solution -- Interpreting Kant: three objections -- The dancer and the dance: divine action, human freedom -- Becoming divine: autonomy and the beatific vision.

The article considers the critique of political liberalism offered by the Radical Orthodoxy movement. The first part deals with the claim that the underlying framework for the “secular” human condition ‐which would include political liberalism‐ is ontological violence and ethical nihilism.The second part of the article deals with the charge that liberalism leads to a social atomism and individualism which can be overcome with the help of a participatory‐analogical theology. I consider the invocation to unity, participation and transformation to be (...) theologically incautious, and politically dangerous, in a way well understood by a tradition of political liberalism. (shrink)

This is a conversation held at the book launch for Christopher Insole’s Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to the Moral Law, hosted jointly, in November 2020, by the Centre for Catholic Studies, Durham University, and the Australian Catholic University. The conversation covers the claim made by Insole that Kant believes in God, but is not a Christian, the way in which reason itself is divine for Kant, and the suggestion that reading Kant can open up new possibilities for dialogue (...) between Christian thinkers and contemporary forms of secular religiosity. (shrink)

Taking into consideration analytical, continental, historical, post-modern and contemporary thinkers, Insole provides a powerful defence of a realist construal of religious discourse. Insole argues that anti-realism tends towards absolutism and hubris. Cutting through the tired and well-rehearsed debates in this area, Insole provides a fresh perspective on approaches influenced by Wittgenstein, Kant, and apophatic theology. The defence of realism offered is unusual in being both analytically precise, and theologically sensitive, with a view to some of the wider cultural, ethical and (...) political implications of the debate. (shrink)

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a ‘metaphysical fideist’. This involves looking at the notion of ‘truth as subjectivity’. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something (...) substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of ‘religious truth’.In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason‐exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense. (shrink)

I suggest some ways in which a certain type of ‘post-foundationalism’ has had a deleterious effect in theological ethics. Much ‘post-foundationalism’ is in truth still foundationalism, albeit less reflective and more permissive, leading to a balkanised plethora of foundationalist systems. Although Wittgenstein is critical of foundationalism, it is by applying Wittgensteinian insights that we are able to avoid some of the reductive and unipolar thinking that has characterised some recent theological discussion.

I track a strand of intellectualist theology, running from Kant’s pre-critical into his critical work, whereby the divine will is constrained in its creative activity by the divine understanding. I suggest that Kant’s intellectualist theology continues to do important work in his mature conception of transcendental idealism, transcendental freedom and autonomy. I consider briefly how this might impact upon theological ethics, particularly in relation to the conflict between Kantian secularists and religious believers. I conclude by asking whether Kant’s intellectualist theology—with (...) its Platonic strands—opens up possibilities for inter-faith dialogue. (shrink)

In his review of my book, Terry Godlove raises some robust objections to the exegesis of Kant that I present in my recent book, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: a Theological Problem (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I respond to these criticisms in this article. Properly to locate Godlove’s exegetical objections, I dedicate the first section to setting out the arc of the argument I trace. I then set out and treat in turn Godlove’s main objections to my (...) exegesis: that it depends upon an interpretation of transcendental idealism which makes the doctrine ‘flatly inconsistent and probably just silly’; that I neglect the most plausible account interpretation of Kant’s various statements about transcendental idealism; and that I ‘pick and choose’ supporting texts too narrowly, leading to an unbalanced presentation, which is too convenient to my thesis. I conclude with some general methodological reflections—stimulated by Godlove, but not aimed at him—about how historical philosophical texts are often treated. I express some anxieties about the principle of charity that underlies much current exegesis, and ‘rational reconstruction’ of historical texts, and I propose a case for what might be called ‘creative decomposition’ (not of the text, but of the self). (shrink)

This is the author’s reflections on formal responses, and a discussion, which took place at the book launch for Christopher Insole’s Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to the Moral Law, hosted jointly, in November 2020, by the Centre for Catholic Studies, Durham University, and the Australian Catholic University. Topics covered include: the aesthetic properties of Kant’s philosophy, the difference between the received Kant and the textual Kant, the theological hostility to Kant, Insole’s claim that Kant believes in God, but (...) is not a Christian. (shrink)

The Wittgensteinian claim that meaning is immanent to 'practices', influential in contemporary theology, is capable of two readings: the first takes `practice' to refer to the social activities of actual communities; the second implies no more than a way of going on that is in principle communicable. The first reading is palpably unattractive, both philosophically and exegetically; the second reading is much less ambitious, providing a plausible critique of empiricist theories of meaning. I suggest that it is the first implausible (...) reading that is often at work in theological appropriations of Wittgenstein, such as we find in Stanley Hauerwas. I fill-out this claim by exploring — with an ear to Scripture — the implications for ecclesiology of adopting either of the two readings. I conclude by raising the alarm about two dangers: of being too Wittgensteinian in some respects, and not Wittgensteinian enough in others. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:Ian Markham's, Critical Realism.

Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that (...) in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's "Thomism," I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy. (shrink)

Some theologians are inclined to regard realism with hostility or indifference. I do not present an argument for realism, but for why realism matters, and what is at stake.First of all, I separate the heart of realism from gratuitous doctrines which are too often associated with it. Religious realism is the claim that truth is independent of our beliefs about truth, and that we can in principle hope to have true beliefs about God. Realism is not intrinsically concerned with the (...) existence of ‘objects’, with natural theology or rational justification.I then show that even thinkers who are hostile or indifferent to religious realism so defined, usually make an implicit appeal to a similar realism in the sphere of ethics.To establish that realism matters in religion as well as ethics I draw an analogy with realism/anti‐realism about persons, to show that anti‐realism makes mutually risk‐taking and courageous relationships impossible. I go on to argue that far from it being a realist who is obsessed with rational certainty, this is one of the worst vices of the anti‐realist, who cannot bear there to be a gap between her beliefs and reality.I conclude that the most vital feature of religious realism is not certainty of belief, but the opposite – the acknowledged risk that all our hope could be in vain. In closing the possibility on this risk, the anti‐realist demonstrates an unfaithful and uncourageous movement of thought. (shrink)

kant famously rules out the possibility of any knowledge of God’s existence or non-existence.1 In denying the possibility of knowledge about God, Kant departs from his rationalist sources, and from his own earlier position. Leibniz, Wolff, Locke, Crusius, Meier, and Baumgarten all assert that we can have knowledge of the existence and properties of God.2 Although he finds that there is an absence of evidence sufficient for knowledge about God’s existence, or non-existence, this is not, for Kant, a disordered or (...) regrettable deficit. Indeed, Kant finds it “providential” that God has not permitted such knowledge. Kant even tells us that we should “thank heaven”... (shrink)

Some theologians are inclined to regard realism with hostility or indifference. I do not present an argument for realism, but for why realism matters, and what is at stake.First of all, I separate the heart of realism from gratuitous doctrines which are too often associated with it. Religious realism is the claim that truth is independent of our beliefs about truth, and that we can in principle hope to have true beliefs about God. Realism is not intrinsically concerned with the (...) existence of ‘objects’, with natural theology or rational justification.I then show that even thinkers who are hostile or indifferent to religious realism so defined, usually make an implicit appeal to a similar realism in the sphere of ethics.To establish that realism matters in religion as well as ethics I draw an analogy with realism/anti‐realism about persons, to show that anti‐realism makes mutually risk‐taking and courageous relationships impossible. I go on to argue that far from it being a realist who is obsessed with rational certainty, this is one of the worst vices of the anti‐realist, who cannot bear there to be a gap between her beliefs and reality.I conclude that the most vital feature of religious realism is not certainty of belief, but the opposite – the acknowledged risk that all our hope could be in vain. In closing the possibility on this risk, the anti‐realist demonstrates an unfaithful and uncourageous movement of thought. (shrink)

I suggest that in Kant’s conception of autonomy, we have a faithful variant of a perennial philosophical conception of divinity, distinctively re-configured by Kant’s own preoccupations and system, but still recognisably oriented around some philosophical conceptions of the divine, which have their origins in deep classical wells, with dreams and memories of thought-thinking-itself, and joyously diffusing itself, generating plenitude and harmony. If this is correct, then we might find that the most interesting dialogue in the realm of ‘public theology’ is (...) not necessarily between Christianity and secularism, but between Christianity and a latent pagan religious philosophy, that draws upon a perennial strand of Platonism in Western philosophy. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:Ian Markham's, Critical Realism.

I evaluate the plausibility of how broadly ‘Wittgensteinian’ approaches to the philosophy of religion: looking in the first half of the essay at the account such approaches give of the meaning of religious utterances, and in the second half at the account given of the required justification for believing such utterances. As regards the meaning of religious utterances I distinguish weak and strong Wittgensteinian theses, supporting the former but refuting the latter. Turning to Wittgensteinian approaches to the justification of religious (...) beliefs I argue that although some beliefs are ‘groundless’ in a way that makes them an unquestionable feature of our conceptual landscape, anything as interesting as a religious belief can not be ‘groundless’ in the relevant sense . Finally I argue that only Wittgensteinian approaches can capture the meaning and justificatory requirements of religious beliefs for a minority of ‘believers’: but that this minority is important. (shrink)

John Hick uses a distinction between the formal and the substantial properties of the Real an sich, the noumenal God. Hick claims that substantial properties, such as 'being good' or 'being personal', cannot be ascribed to the Real an sich. On the other hand, according to Hick, formal properties -- such as 'being such that none of our concepts apply' -- can be predicated of the Real an sich. I argue, first of all, that many of the properties Hick ascribes (...) to the Real an sich are hard to interpret as anything but substantial, unless we adopt a highly arbitrary substantial/formal distinction. Secondly, I argue that it is never possible to ascribe only formal properties to the Real an sich, since the correct framing and application of formal properties involves a prior knowledge of some substantial properties. I show that the predication of formal properties involves having more knowledge than we need for the application of substantial properties. I conclude that Hick's practice is better than his theory, and that by dispensing with the formal/substantial distinction, he would enable his doctrine of God to stand on more respectable and theological grounds. (shrink)

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a ‘metaphysical fideist’. This involves looking at the notion of ‘truth as subjectivity’. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something (...) substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of ‘religious truth’.In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason‐exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense. (shrink)

I evaluate the plausibility of how broadly ‘Wittgensteinian’ approaches to the philosophy of religion: looking in the first half of the essay at the account such approaches give of the meaning of religious utterances, and in the second half at the account given of the required justification for believing such utterances. As regards the meaning of religious utterances I distinguish weak and strong Wittgensteinian theses, supporting the former but refuting the latter. Turning to Wittgensteinian approaches to the justification of religious (...) beliefs I argue that although some beliefs are ‘groundless’ in a way that makes them an unquestionable feature of our conceptual landscape, anything as interesting as a religious belief can not be ‘groundless’ in the relevant sense (of being invulnerable to attack). Finally I argue that only Wittgensteinian approaches can capture the meaning and justificatory requirements of religious beliefs for a minority of ‘believers’: but that this minority is important. (shrink)