Herman Philipse's massive work undertakes to interpret and critique the work of Martin Heidegger within the full range of the often inscrutable philosopher's corpus, and claims to be the first such work ever to incorporate the expanse of Heidegger's work in a unifying interpretive elucidation. Philipse draws from Heidegger's earliest work to his 1927 masterpiece Being and Time, through the Kehre, or turn, in his thought, in which he moves from the formal rigor of his seminal work to enlist a (...) mythical-mystical-poetic language to revive and transform the Aristotelian question of being. Given that the secondary literature in Heidegger scholarship has ballooned into the thousands of texts, Philipse makes a bold statement in claiming to be the first to offer a paninterpretive account of Heidegger's work. (shrink)

As the Nietzsche industry continues to thrive, offering Zarathustra zealots everything from coffee table photography books to quasi-fictional accounts of Nietzsche’s mad dance into insanity and posterity, Daniel Conway offers a sober account of Nietzsche’s late writings, choosing to address quite seriously the shrill excesses that mark Nietzsche’s work from 1885–8. Conway undertakes to present Nietzsche’s own decadence and inheriting readership as evidence of the failure of his later project. Nietzsche embarks on voyages toward terrible seas, seeking to unsterilize wisdom (...) and set his revaluation of values in motion by announcing his presence as “dynamite”; Conway exposes Nietzsche’s later works as just that, a tremendous power with erratic and often misguided aim. Whereas Kaufmann, Schacht, and others defend Nietzsche’s thought as apolitical, and gloss over or ignore altogether the vitriol and self-aggrandizement of Nietzsche’s last five works, Conway treats Nietzsche’s critique of modernity in light of Nietzsche’s self-referential motif. Unfortunately, Nietzsche crumbles under the burden of such scrutiny, as he emerges as the decaying embodiment of those upon whom he sets. Conway portrays Nietzsche as a cunning strategist who employs various techniques to obfuscate his own enervation. Nietzsche here is cast as the self-avowed decadent whose descent is marked by his solicitation of discipleship, and who knows full well that those worthy heirs will turn on him in an act of perfidy. The shameless shepherding of flatterers, reprobates, and misfits signals his decadence; Nietzsche recruits scions from the fringes of society instead of fostering his militia from within the latently noble ranks. Resuscitating the modern community is rejected as a futile project for Nietzsche; he casts himself as the neo-Christ figure whose immediate audience, owing to their own decadence, has a flash point too high for Nietzsche to ignite. The modern pilot light has been snuffed out, Nietzsche concedes, and a new one must be lit. (shrink)

Sheridan Hough provides a careful examination of Friedrich Nietzsche’s ample use of metaphor throughout his corpus, and concludes that the active, muscular thought associated with Nietzsche is evenly countered by receptive imagery which imbues his work with an elevated balance. The duplicity of Nietzsche’s images, fecund with layers of significance, culminates most evidently in the two most scrutinized themes in Nietzsche scholarship, the eternal return and the Ubermensch. Hough offers a unique interpretation of these tropes, proffering the concept of the (...) Ubermensch as a unique moment of the free spirit, contrasted with a destined, elevated, or evolved ideal of man. The Ubermensch and eternal return converge in an artistic moment, replete with the perpetual process of self-overcoming and value transformation. (shrink)

In the spirit of twentieth century philosophers who personally participate in the interplay of their social and political ideology, Hannah Arendt gives an account of the onus of profound personal liberty and how persons might limn solutions to vexing social situations. Nevertheless, Arendt employs B-movie imagery as an analogue for what she sees as our overwhelming immersion in “the social,” the enveloping force which enervates our personal freedom and acts as a dehumanizing, depoliticizing force. “The Blob” acts as a juggernaut (...) against which we are powerless to affect social change. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s portrait of Arendt’s political thought acknowledges that this sort of imagery and hypostacization has deep flaws, especially in light of Arendt’s exhortations to challenge social structures and to guard against personal inauthenticity. Pitkin concludes that “The Blob” is nothing but the construct of persons wishing to divest themselves of choice and freedom, and offers that the problem of social indolence and apathy can be remedied through thoughtful activism and community minded self-legislation. (shrink)

Arthur Schopenhauer is generally known in two ways: as an abrasive misanthrope whose derision of Hegel was thought to stem from professional envy, and as the philosophical progenitor of Nietzsche, who early on could not praise Schopenhauer enough, but later famously distanced himself from his mentor, much as he did from Wagner. Since he was linked with such eclipsing figures, it is not surprising that the caricature of Schopenhauer as the recluse who made a career of spewing venom and spite (...) remains his prevailing image. Those familiar with Schopenhauer or Nietzsches encounter with Schopenhauer, however, know him as a valuable contributor to many recent schools of philosophy and whose thought touched not only Nietzsche but other influential figures in philosophy and psychology as well. Christopher Janaway presents us with a cross section of essays that serve as both an introduction to Schopenhauers main themes and an offering of recent scholarship and interpretation of his work. Janaway, quoting Rudolf Malter, introduces Schopenhauers writings as an explication of a single notion: the world is the self-knowledge of the will. The rest of the text examines the manifold themes in that pithy characterization; not only do metaphysics and epistemology receive their due, but Schopenhauers ethics and aesthetics are exposed as derivative themes from that central claim. (shrink)

John Russon offers an engaging analysis of Hegel’s notion of embodiment, which, though not given priority in the Hegelian corpus, affords an enriching understanding of Hegel’s notion of sociality. Admittedly, Hegel does not offer those attempting to derive from his work a philosophy of embodiment a wealth of resources. Moreover, his few remarks on the body do not seem to fulfill his own philosophic criteria and aims, and so fail to offer an entirely self-developing position concerning human embodiment. However, Russon (...) casts Hegel as being an heir to the Aristotelian notion of personhood as a confluence of soul and body, and argues for the notion of Geist as the Idealist analogue to Aristotle’s concept of soul/psychology. Russon portrays Hegel as not only furthering Aristotle’s psychology, but also as emerging from the Scholastic and Enlightenment duality of mind or soul and body to act as a precursor of the postmodern account of discursivity as performativity. Embodiment remains, according to Russon, an explication of numerous levels of expression, socialization and habituation. Hegel’s concept of embodiment parallels Aristotle’s in abiding by an internal principle of self-explication, in which personal identity requires and is defined by self-expression. Russon argues that embodiment and self-expression are coextensive; embodiment is discursivity, in which our nature, habits, and express communication reflect and build upon our inherited and internalized culture and institutional relationships. (shrink)