Machery et al. (2004) reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications (see also Mallon et al. 2009). In a recent article, Genoveva Martı´ (2009) argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues (‘metalin- 10 guistic intuitions’) is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within (...) and across cultures has not been established. (shrink)

Machery et al. reported some preliminary evidence that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures, and they argued that if real, such variation would have significant philosophical implications. In a recent article, Genoveva Martí argues that the type of intuitions examined by Machery and colleagues is evidentially irrelevant for identifying the correct theory of reference, and she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference within and across cultures has not been established.To substantiate this criticism, Martí draws (...) a distinction between two types of intuitions: metalinguistic intuitions and what we will call ‘linguistic’ intuitions. Metalinguistic intuitions are judgements about the semantic properties of mentioned words, while, if we understand Martí correctly, linguistic intuitions are judgements about the individuals described in the actual and possible cases used by philosophers of language. These judgements would be expressed by sentences using words rather than mentioning them. An example might clarify this distinction. In Kripke's Gödel case, the judgement that the proper name ‘Gödel’ refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt is a metalinguistic intuition, since it is about the reference of the proper name ‘Gödel’; by contrast, the judgement that in this case Gödel should not have claimed credit for the incompleteness theorem is a linguistic intuition. Because Martí holds that only linguistic intuitions provide evidence for determining how reference is fixed and because Machery and colleagues used a question that elicited metalinguistic intuitions, she concludes that the variation in the relevant intuitions about reference …. (shrink)

L'intelligence économique constitue une nouvelle culture et une nouvelle pratique pour les acteurs économiques. Elle repose sur des actions de veille, de sécurité économique et d'influence. Elle répond à des modifications profondes de l'environnement global des entreprises. L'intelligence économique se structure aujourd'hui en une véritable profession et travaille activement à se doter d'un cadre déontologique.Business intelligence is a new culture and a new practice for economic actors. It is based on shares of watchkeeping, safety and economic influence. It responds to (...) profound changes in the global business environment. The intelligence structure is now a real profession and is actively working to develop an ethical framework. (shrink)

Analyse de la philosophie de Michel Foucault.

In Minimal Rationality, Christopher Cherniak boldly challenges the myth of Man the the Rational Animal and the central role that the "perfectly rational...

Sous l'impulsion d'associations militantes ou de politiques publiques, la ville se modifie. Le vert gagne du terrain. Plus profondément, plus durablement peut-ètre, l'environnement ordinaire des citadins contemporains est reconfiguré. Il se pare désormais d'une nouvelle esthétique urbaine, associée aux politiques de ville durable, d'urbanisme écologique... Cette esthétique transforme l'espace public. Son aspect ornemental réduit la ville et ses espaces à un décor vert, fabriqué par le capitalisme contemporain et la multiplication des innovations technologiques vertes. L'investissement des citoyens, sur un mode (...) participatif et productif, laisse place à une ville « jardinée », écologisée et gérée en partenariat. De nouvelles manières d'habiter les lieux urbains émergent peu à peu. De telles évolutions dessinent-elles les prémices d'une restructuration de l'espace social dans son ensemble? Comment des enjeux urbains condensent-ils une métaphore nouvelle de l'espace public? Spécialisée dans les questions d'environnement et d'esthétique, Nathalie Blanc est directrice de recherche au Cnrs Umr Ladyss Paris 7. (shrink)

v. 1 Depuis les origines jusqu'au VXII siècle.--v. 2. Philosophie du XVII et du XVIII siècle. Commencement du XIX siècle.--v. 3. Philosophie du XIX siècle (suite).

Souvent abordée par sa « micropolitique du désir », l’œuvre commune de Deleuze et Guattari est rarement sollicitée lorsqu’on s’interroge sur les problèmes classiques ou contemporains de la pensée politique : la forme-État, la souveraineté, le rapport de la violence et du droit, la guerre, le paradigme de la Nation et les recombinaisons qu’il a entraînées entre les idées de peuple, de citoyenneté et de minorité. En suivant la trajectoire conduisant du premier tome de Capitalisme et schizophrénie (1972) au second (...) (1980), ce sont pourtant tous ces problèmes qui se trouvent réélaborés, au fil d’une conjoncture de transition historique marquée par la fin des guerres de décolonisation, la transformation du capitalisme mondial, les recompositions aussi profondes qu’incertaines des forces de résistance collective. Encore faut-il, pour mesurer les prises de la pensée guattaro-deleuzienne sur les bouleversements de son temps, la confronter à ce qui fut son interlocuteur principal, le marxisme, à son champ épistémique (le matérialisme historique), à son programme critique (la critique de l’économie politique) et à sa grammaire politique (la lutte des classes). De ces pourparlers, trois hypothèses nouvelles se dégagent : celle d’un « Urstaat », incarnant un excès de la violence souveraine sur l’appareil d’État et sur ses investissements politiques ; celle d’une puissance de « machine de guerre », que les États ne peuvent jamais s’approprier que partiellement, et à laquelle ils peuvent eux-mêmes se subordonner ; celle d’un excès du « destructivisme » de l’accumulation capitaliste sur son organisation productive. Dans ce triple excès, la pensée politique de Deleuze et Guattari trahit le spectre de l’entre-deux-guerres qui la hante, mais qui la fait aussi communiquer avec les penseurs actuels de l’impolitique. S’y donnent à lire non seulement une nouvelle théorie politique, mais aussi un tableau de la pluralité des voies d’ascension à l’extrême-violence susceptibles de détruire la politique même et auxquelles les luttes contemporaines ne peuvent s’épargner de faire face. (shrink)

Este artículo retoma la cuestión del espacio en Gilles Deleuze. Examinamos al respecto tres motivos: un concepto original de cartografía, una teoría de las geografías afectivas, y un análisis de los vectores «territorializantes» y «desterritorializantes» que determinan las transformaciones de las identidades colectivas. A través de estos tres momentos, la espacialidad deviene en los trabajos de Gilles Deleuze la piedra angular de una renovación de la vocación crítica de la filosofía. Dejando de ser un objeto de reflexión entre otros, la (...) espacialidad se vuelve un esquema de pensamiento, una manera de plantear problemas y de construir conceptos, donde ya no se trata de construir una filosofía de la geografía, sino una «geofilosofía». (shrink)

This study takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them.

The coherence objection to the doctrine of the Incarnation maintains that it is impossible for one individual to have both the attributes of God and the attributes of a human being. This article examines Thomas Aquinas’s answer to this objection. I challenge the dominant, mereological interpretation of Aquinas’s position and, in light of this challenge, develop and defend a new alternative interpretation of Aquinas’s response to this important objection to Christian doctrine.

L'ouvrage tente d'éclairer les notions de valeurs et d'intérêts à partir d'une lecture de la Théorie des sentiments moraux d'A. Smith. Lecture qui nous conduit à réhabiliter la notion de travail commandé à l'encontre de celle de travail incorporé de D. Ricardo et K. Marx, à rapprocher l'analyse marxienne de la valeur et de l'exploitation de l'analyse smithienne centrée sur la sympathie et l'échange, à montrer que notre intérêt (self-love) est lié à l'intérêt que les autres nous portent, ce qui (...) nous éloigne de l'intérêt strictement égoïste de l'homo economicus. La découverte des neurones miroirs, socle neurobiologique de l'empathie, vient conforter notre analyse qui s'ouvre sur une nécessaire refondation de l'économie politique"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Texte écrit sous la Ve dynastie chinoise, celle des Han (202 av. J.-C.-220 apr. J.-C.), qui présente sous un angle nouveau des connaissances déjà anciennes, montre que tout savoir se place sous le signe du tao et que l'interrogation sur le tao est préalable à tout autre. Les différents savoirs sont donc utilisés dans le cadre de cette démonstration, et non comme une fin en soi.

Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports (...) a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion. (shrink)

Highlights of a difficult history -- The preliminary identification of our topic -- Approaches -- Bradley's protest -- James's disjunctive theory -- The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction -- Behaviourism and after -- Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century -- The underlying metaphysical issue -- Explanatory tactics -- The basic distinction -- Metaphysical categories and taxonomies -- Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds -- Adverbialism and levels of explanation -- Taxonomies and supervenience relations -- Rejecting the process : first view (...) -- Supervenience-failure -- The modal commitments of the process : first view -- The interference argument : a putative problem for adverbialist accounts -- Cognitive unison -- The problem with attitude based adverbialism -- Gilbert Ryle and Alan White -- White's argument against disposition-based adverbialism -- The cognitive unison theory -- Tasks -- Cognitive processes -- Potential service of a task -- Superordinate tasks -- Some features of the theory -- Divided attention -- Degrees of attention and merely partial attention -- The causal life of attention -- Mental causation -- How to respond to mental causation objections -- The causal role of attention -- Attention as an enabling condition -- Counterfactuals -- The causal relevance of attention per se -- Counterfactuals and causally relevant properties -- Objections to counterfactual analysis of causation and of causal relevance -- The extrinsicness of unison -- The privative character of unison and the problem of absence causation -- Causal exclusion -- Consequences for cognitive psychology -- Psychology and metaphysics -- The metaphysical commitments of the process-identifying project -- The diverse explanatory construals of current psychological results -- Reasons for deflation -- Inductively unreliable properties -- Questions without answers -- The positive payoff -- Philosophical work for the theory of attention -- Putting attention to philosophical work -- Attention and reference -- Attention and consciousness -- Prospects for optimism. (shrink)

Dans ce pays où, à la façon du Dictionnaire des idées reçues, il convient de tonner contre les méfaits de l’État jacobin, nul ne s’avise de savoir au juste comment celui-ci fonctionne ni ce qu’il fait. J’adopte en quelque sorte la position en miroir de l’idée reçue : je ne suis pas sûr de savoir ce qu’il faut penser de l’État en général, mais je sais empiriquement et en détails ce qu’il fait et comment il fonctionne. Je ne déduis pas (...) de proposition de réforme d’une théorie de l’État mais je tire de mon expérience l’idée d’une nouvelle façon d’agir ; je ne dessine pas la cité idéale mais je cherche ce qui pourrait faire revenir l’action dans l’institution. (shrink)

The English translation of the winner of the Victor Barbeau Prizeand finalist of the Governor General's Literary Award.

The ethics of autonomous cars and automated driving have been a subject of discussion in research for a number of years :28–58, 2016). As levels of automation progress, with partially automated driving already becoming standard in new cars from a number of manufacturers, the question of ethical and legal standards becomes virulent. For exam-ple, while automated and autonomous cars, being equipped with appropriate detection sensors, processors, and intelligent mapping material, have a chance of being much safer than human-driven cars in (...) many regards, situations will arise in which accidents cannot be completely avoided. Such situations will have to be dealt with when programming the software of these vehicles. In several instances, internationally, regulations have been passed, based on legal considerations of road safety, mostly. However, to date, there have been few, if any, cases of a broader ethics code for autonomous or automated driving preceding actual regulation and being based on a broadly composed ethics committee of independent experts. In July 2016, the German Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Alexander Dobrindt, appointed a national ethics committee for automated and connected driving, which began its work in September 2016. In June 2017, this committee presented a code of ethics which was published in German and in English. It consists of 20 ethical guidelines. Having been a member of this committee, I will present the main ethical topics of these guidelines and the discussions that lay behind them. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the historicity of love requires an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this through a consideration of ideas that were first put forward by Robert Kraut in “Love De Re” (1986). I also evaluate Amelie Rorty's criticisms of Kraut's thesis in “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds” (1986). I argue that Rorty fundamentally misunderstands Kraut's Kripkean analogy, and (...) I go on to criticize her claim that concern over the proper object of love should be best understood as a concern over constancy. This leads me to an elaboration of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical. I end with a further defense of the irreplaceability of the beloved and a discussion of the relevance of recent debates over the importance of personal identity for an adequate account of the historical dimension of love. (shrink)

This handbook article gives a critical overview of recent discussions of epistemic authority. It favors an account that brings into balance the dictates of rational deference with the ideals of intellectual self-governance. A plausible starting point is the conjecture that neither should rational deference to authorities collapse into total epistemic submission, nor the ideal of mature intellectual self-governance be conflated with (illusions of) epistemic autarky.

Christopher Hookway presents a series of essays on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1913), the 'founder of pragmatism' and one of the most important and original American philosophers.

Suppose you ask yourself whether your father's record collection includes a certain recording of The Trout and venture to find out. At that time, you embark on an inquiry into whether your father owns the relevant recording. Your inquiry is a project with a specific goal: finding out whether your father owns the recording. This fact about your inquiry generalizes: inquiry is a goal-directed enterprise. A specific inquiry can be individuated by the question it aims to answer and by who (...) aims to answer the question. Your inquiry into whether your father owns the recording differs from your inquiry into how many records your father owns because different questions are being asked. Your inquiry into whether your father owns the recording differs from my inquiry into whether he does because different people are inquiring. The goal of inquiry into a given question by an agent, α, can be characterized, neutrally, as α's having the answer to that question. I will here focus only on inquiries into whether questions and characterize the goal of inquiry into whether φ by α as α's having the answer to the question whether φ. (shrink)

This paper is built around a single, simple idea. It is widely agreed that there is a distinctive kind of awareness each of us has of his own bodily actions. This action-awareness is different from any perceptual awareness a subject may have of his own actions; it can exist in the absence of such perceptual awareness. The single, simple idea around which this paper is built is that the distinctive awareness that subjects have of their own mental actions is a (...) form of action-awareness. Subjects’ awareness of their own mental actions is a species of the same genus that also includes the distinctive awareness of bodily actions. More specifically, I claim. (shrink)

Conditionalization is a widely endorsed rule for updating one’s beliefs. But a sea of complaints have been raised about it, including worries regarding how the rule handles error correction, changing desiderata of theory choice, evidence loss, self-locating beliefs, learning about new theories, and confirmation. In light of such worries, a number of authors have suggested replacing Conditionalization with a different rule — one that appeals to what I’ll call “ur-priors”. But different authors have understood the rule in different ways, and (...) these different understandings solve different problems. In this paper, I aim to map out the terrain regarding these issues. I survey the different problems that might motivate the adoption of such a rule, flesh out the different understandings of the rule that have been proposed, and assess their pros and cons. I conclude by suggesting that one particular batch of proposals, proposals that appeal to what I’ll call “loaded evidential standards”, are especially promising. (shrink)

How does good combine with bad? Most creatures are neither so blessed as to only enjoy good nor so cursed as to only suffer bad. Rather, the good and bad they receive throughout their lives combine to produce their overall quality of life. But it’s not just whole lives that have combined good and bad. Many stretches within contain both positive and negative occurrences whose value is joined to form the overall quality of that span of time. In a single (...) morning someone might wake up, brush their teeth, stub their toe groggily lumbering down the stairs, and have a sip of coffee that’s tasty but so hot they burn their tongue. These events are good and bad for them to various degrees, and their value comes together to form an overall value for them of that morning. A single moment, even, can have combined value from distinct pockets of good and bad that occur simultaneously. The tastiness of the coffee is good, but the pain of the heat is bad. They combine to form an overall value of the sipping moment – negative if the pain outweighed the flavor. Thus, wellbeing and illbeing combine. But how? How can someone rightly chastise themselves for sipping the overly hot coffee when it was, in fact, good because it was tasty? To pose the question starkly, a life can be bad, even so bad to not be worth living, and yet it can have many instances of good, where these goods are, in themselves, pure of any negativity. But how can good make something bad? (shrink)

Deference principles are principles that describe when, and to what extent, it’s rational to defer to others. Recently, some authors have used such principles to argue for Evidential Uniqueness, the claim that for every batch of evidence, there’s a unique doxastic state that it’s permissible for subjects with that total evidence to have. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to assess these deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. I’ll show that these arguments only work given a particular kind (...) of deference principle, and I’ll argue that there are reasons to reject these kinds of principles. The second aim of this paper is to spell out what a plausible generalized deference principle looks like. I’ll start by offering a principled rationale for taking deference to constrain rational belief. Then I’ll flesh out the kind of deference principle suggested by this rationale. Finally, I’ll show that this principle is both more plausible and more general than the principles used in the deference-based arguments for Evidential Uniqueness. (shrink)

"Throughout history, some books have changed the world. They have transformed the way we see ourselves - and each other. They have inspired debate, dissent, war and revolution. They have enlightened, outraged, provoked and comforted. They have enriched lives - and destroyed them. Now Penguin brings you the works of the great thinkers, pioneers, radicals and visionaries whose ideas shook civilization and helped make us who we are. Plato's retelling of the discourses between Socrates and his friends on such subjects (...) as love and desire, truth and illusion, spiritual transcendence and the qualities of a good ruler, profoundly affected the ways in which we view human relationships, society and leadership - and shaped the whole tradition of Western philosophy."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Essentialists claim that at least some individuals or kinds have essences. This raises an important but little-discussed question: how do we come to know what the essence of something is? This paper examines Aristotle’s answer to this question. One influential interpretation (viz., the Explanationist Interpretation) is carefully expounded, criticized, and then refined. Particular attention is given to what Aristotle says about this issue in DA I.1, APo II.2, and APo II.8. It is argued that the epistemological claim put forward in (...) DA I.1 differs from that put forward in APo II.2 and II.8, contrary to what has been claimed by Explanationists, and that each of these distinct epistemological claims rests on a distinct non-epistemological thesis about essence. Consequently, an ‘Enriched Explanationist Interpretation’ is developed which takes into account both of the aforementioned elements in Aristotle’s epistemology of essence. The paper concludes by highlighting an insight the preceding exegetical discussion offers to contemporary essentialists seeking to explain how we come to know what something’s essence is. (shrink)

Le mot « héroïne » en grec apparaît assez tardivement dans la littérature comme dans les inscriptions (début du ve s. av. J.-C). Il s’agit de réévaluer l’apport des épopées homériques à la question de la définition d’un héros au féminin. Jusqu’ici, la problématique historique s’était orientée autour de la question de l’attestation chez Homère de cultes héroïques, phénomène particulièrement florissants au viiie s. av. J.-C., souvent associé à la diffusion des poèmes épiques. Une autre approche consistait à chercher dans (...) l’Iliade et l’Odyssée des traces de cultes rendus à des héros morts ou des preuves de l’existence chez Homère de la catégorie religieuse des demi-dieux. Le problème est ici renversé : partant des caractéristiques du héros homérique, l’objectif est de vérifier l’existence d’un héroïsme au féminin et de souligner les liens entre héroïnes et héros dans les épopées. (shrink)

A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that are independent of self-locating beliefs per se. In light of this, I propose a division of labor: we should address each of these issues separately before we try to provide a comprehensive account of belief updating. By way of example, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order (...) to accommodate these issues. Then, putting these other issues aside, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order to accommodate self-locating beliefs. Finally, I propose a constraint on updating rules, the "Learning Principle", which rules out certain kinds of troubling belief changes, and I use this principle to assess some of the available options. (shrink)

W. V. Quine famously defended two theses that have fallen rather dramatically out of fashion. The first is that intensions are “creatures of darkness” that ultimately have no place in respectable philosophical circles, owing primarily to their lack of rigorous identity conditions. However, although he was thoroughly familiar with Carnap’s foundational studies in what would become known as possible world semantics, it likely wouldn’t yet have been apparent to Quine that he was fighting a losing battle against intensions, due in (...) large measure to developments stemming from Carnap’s studies and culminating in the work of Kripke, Hintikka, and Bayart. These developments undermined Quine’s crusade against intensions on two fronts. First, in the context of possible world semantics, intensions could after all be given rigorous identity conditions by defining them (in the simplest case) as functions from worlds to appropriate extensions, a fact exploited to powerful and influential effect in logic and linguistics by the likes of Kaplan, Montague, Lewis, and Cresswell. Second, the rise of possible world semantics fueled a strong resurgence of metaphysics in contemporary analytic philosophy that saw properties and propositions widely, fruitfully, and unabashedly adopted as ontological primitives in their own right. This resurgence — happily, in my view — continues into the present day. -/- For a time, at any rate, Quine experienced somewhat better success with his second thesis: that higher-order logic is, at worst, confused and, at best, a quirky notational alternative to standard first-order logic. However, Quine notwithstanding, a great deal of recent work in formal metaphysics transpires in a higher-order logical framework in which properties and propositions fall into an infinite hierarchy of types of (at least) every finite order. Initially, the most philosophically compelling reason for embracing such a framework since Russell first proposed his simple theory of types was simply that it provides a relatively natural explanation of the paradoxes. However, since the seminal work of Prior there has been a growing trend to consider higher-order logic to be the most philosophically natural framework for metaphysical inquiry, many of the contributors to this volume being among the most important and influential advocates of this view. Indeed, this is now quite arguably the dominant view among formal metaphysicians. -/- In this paper, and against the current tide, I will argue in §1 that there are still good reasons to think that Quine’s second battle is not yet lost and that the correct framework for logic is first-order and type-free — properties and propositions, logically speaking, are just individuals among others in a single domain of quantification — and that it arises naturally out of our most basic logical and semantical intuitions. The data I will draw upon are not new and are well-known to contemporary higher-order metaphysicians. However, I will try to defend my thesis in what I believe is a novel way by suggesting that these basic intuitions ground a reasonable distinction between “pure” logic and non-logical theory, and that Russell-style semantic paradoxes of truth and exemplification arise only when we move beyond the purely logical and, hence, do not of themselves provide any strong objection to a type-free conception of properties and propositions. -/- Most of my arguments in §1 are largely independent of any specific account of the nature of properties and propositions beyond their type-freedom. However, I will in addition argue that there are good reasons to take propositions, at least, to be very fine-grained. My arguments are thus bolstered significantly if it can be shown that there are in fact well-defined examples of logics that are not only type-free but which comport with such a conception of propositions. It is the purpose of §2 to lay out a logic of this sort in some detail, drawing especially upon work by George Bealer and related work of my own. With the logic in place, it will be possible to generalize the line of argument noted above regarding Russell-style paradoxes and, in §3, apply it to two propositional paradoxes — the Prior-Kaplan paradox and the Russell-Myhill paradox — that are often taken to threaten the sort of account developed here. (shrink)

A critical interrogation of elements of Hobbes's political and natural philosophy and its capacity to enrich our understanding of the natural of democratic life.

Forms and Concepts is the first comprehensive study of the central role of concepts and concept acquisition in the Platonic tradition. It sets up a stimulating dialogue between Plato s innatist approach and Aristotle s much more empirical response. The primary aim is to analyze and assess the strategies with which Platonists responded to Aristotle s (and Alexander of Aphrodisias ) rival theory. The monograph culminates in a careful reconstruction of the elaborate attempt undertaken by the Neoplatonist Proclus (6th century (...) AD) to devise a systematic Platonic theory of concept acquisition.". (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to develop a novel virtue reliabilist account of justified belief, which incorporates insights from both process reliabilism and extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Like extant virtue reliabilist accounts of justi- fied belief, the proposed view takes it that justified belief is a kind of competent performance and that competent performances require reliable agent abilities. However, unlike extant versions of virtue reliabilism, the view takes abilities to essentially involve reliable processes. In this way, the proposed takes (...) a leaf from process reliabilism. Finally, I will provide reason to believe that the view compares favourably with both extant versions of virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism. In particular, I will show that in taking abilities to essentially involve reliable processes, the view has an edge over extant versions of virtue reliabilism. Moreover, I will argue that the proposed view can either solve or defuse a number of classical problems of process reliabilism, including the new evil demon problem, the problem of clairvoyant cases and the generality problem. (shrink)

Part One. Archi-violence: presupposition of the state -- Historical materialism and schizoanalysis of the form-state -- Capture: for a concept of primitive accumulation of state power -- Part Two. Exo-violence: hypothesis of the war machine -- Nomadology: hypothesis of the war machine -- The formula and the hypothesis: state appropriation and genealogy of war power -- Part Three. Endo-violence: the capitalist axiomatic -- The axiomatic of capital: states and accumulation on a global scale -- Becoming minorities: becoming revolutionary -- Conclusion. (...) Micropolitics did not take place. (shrink)

An adequate account of laws should satisfy at least five desiderata: it should provide a unified account of laws and chances, it should yield plausible relations between laws and chances, it should vindicate numerical chance assignments, it should accommodate dynamical and non-dynamical chances, and it should accommodate a plausible range of nomic possibilities. No extant account of laws satisfies these desiderata. This paper presents a non-Humean account of laws, the Nomic Likelihood Account, that does.

Le mot « héroïne » en grec apparaît assez tardivement dans la littérature comme dans les inscriptions. Il s’agit de réévaluer l’apport des épopées homériques à la question de la définition d’un héros au féminin. Jusqu’ici, la problématique historique s’était orientée autour de la question de l’attestation chez Homère de cultes héroïques, phénomène particulièrement florissants au viiie s. av. J.-C., souvent associé à la diffusion des poèmes épiques. Une autre approche consistait à chercher dans l’Iliade et l’Odyssée des traces de (...) cultes rendus à des héros morts ou des preuves de l’existence chez Homère de la catégorie religieuse des demi-dieux. Le problème est ici renversé : partant des caractéristiques du héros homérique, l’objectif est de vérifier l’existence d’un héroïsme au féminin et de souligner les liens entre héroïnes et héros dans les épopées. (shrink)