Mit praktischer Rationalität meint man heute meist eine pragmatische Rationalität in Bezug auf ein bedingt motiviertes und partikulär bestimmtes Tun. Eine moralische Nötigung dagegen ist nach Kant Ausdruck einer spezifisch praktischen Richtigkeit, begründet eine unbedingte Geltung und führt eine allgemeine Verbindlichkeit bei sich. Verbleibt man im handlungstheoretischen Rahmen einer empiristischen Ethik, ist nicht zu sehen, wie sich eine solch starke Form der Normativität begründen lassen sollte. Thomas orientiert sich in dieser Frage an der aristotelischen Urteilstheorie: Wenn sich zeigen lässt, unter (...) welchen Bedingungen es möglich, unmöglich oder notwendig ist, bestimmte Aussagen vernünftigerweise als wahr zu denken, dann lässt sich auch zeigen, unter welchen Bedingungen es möglich, unmöglich oder notwendig ist, bestimmte Handlungen vernünftigerweise als gut zu wollen. Die nähere Analyse macht deutlich, warum es genau drei Klassen von Prinzipien einer moralischen Nötigung gibt.Today, in most cases practical rationality is interpreted as a pragmatic rationality concerning a particular action and its conditional motives. According to Kant, however, a moral necessitation is the expression of a specifically practical rightness, it is the foundation of an unconditional claim of validity, and it implies a universal obligation. Remaining strictly within the framework of an empiricist ethics, one cannot see how such a strong form of norm-giving can be justified. Facing this question, Thomas takes his orientation from the Aristotelian theory of judgment: If it is possible to find out the conditions which make it possible, impossible or necessary to reasonably think of certain statements as true, then it is also possible to find out the conditions which make it possible, impossible or necessary to reasonably want certain actions as good. Further analysis elucidates the reasons why there are precisely three types of principles of a moral necessitation. (shrink)

: Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth (...) Argument. In the course of carrying out this investigation, I will show that challenging Phenomenal Externalism on phenomenological grounds is not as straightforward a task as it is commonly assumed to be. -/- . (shrink)

It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the ‘affective’ aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard to the (...) qualia theory, we argue that it fails to capture the sense in which pain 's affective phenomenology rationalises various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. Representationalism, in contrast, escapes both of these problems: it gets the order of explanation right and it explains how pain 's affective phenomenology can rationalise bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. For this reason, we argue that representationalism has a significant advantage in the debates about pain 's affective phenomenology. We end the paper by examining objections, including the question of what representationalists should say about so-called ‘disassociation cases’, such as pain asymbolia. (shrink)

This chapter articulates how people understand “microaggression” and offers a clarifying augmentation of that account. It attempts to define disability, and then talk through how analysis connects with the very few discussions of microaggressions within the context of disability. The chapter introduces the case of “Disabled But Not Really.” It leverages previous analysis to show how microaggressions’ mixed legibility is crucial to their role in maintaining an epistemology that polices disability in general and disabled people in particular. The chapter discusses (...) the ramifications this has for future analysis of both microaggressions and disability. It highlights the specific challenges faced by persons at the junction of multiple oppressed identities. Ontologically, the commitment is the rejection of the medical model of disability where “disabilities are just particular kinds of bodily malfunction”. The focus within that ontological analysis is primarily concerned with the social/political consequences of disability. (shrink)

The competing expressions of ideology flooding the contemporary political landscape have taken a turn toward the absurd. The Radiance Foundation’s recent anti-abortion campaign targeting African-American women, including a series of billboards bearing the slogan “The most dangerous place for an African-American child is in the womb”, is just one example of political "discourse" that is both infuriating and confounding. Discourse with these features – problematic intelligibility, disinterest in the truth, and inflammatory rhetoric – has become increasingly common in politics, the (...) press, and even the arguments made by ordinary folk. It is often criticized for its falsehood or its hurtfulness; however, these critiques tend to miss its pernicious potential. This essay characterizes this insidious discourse as purposeful nonsense. Part of the way that purposeful nonsense functions, we argue, relies on taking advantage of harmful stereotypes and denigrating narratives that are already present in our culture. Purposeful nonsense both draws upon harmful ideology and fortifies it. The effect is that members of oppressed social groups are confronted with disparaging ideology, while its authors are free to deny responsibility for it. Black feminist and intersectional analysis – particularly in the discussion of race, abortion, and reproductive justice – are useful in identifying and criticizing the harmful subtext in the Radiance Foundation’s billboard campaign. The notion of purposeful nonsense serves to extend the reach of these criticisms. Purposeful nonsense – disguised as merely logically confused discourse – is a key factor in maintaining an oppressive and unjust society; however, feminist, black feminist, and intersectional analysis contextualizes purposeful nonsense, potentially disrupting its harmful influence. We conclude that purposeful nonsense employs a variation on stereotype threat, a phenomenon in which being reminded of negative stereotypes about one’s social group causes stereotypical performance failures. We suggest that the notion of stereotype threat combined with intersectional analysis offers a fruitful avenue along which research on this sort of discourse might be expanded. (shrink)

A popular “Reductionist” account of personal identity unifies person stages into persons in virtue of their psychological continuity with one another. One objection to psychological continuity accounts is that there is more to our personal identity than just mere psychological continuity: there is also an active process of self-interpretation and self-creation. This criticism can be used to motivate a rival account of personal identity that appeals to the notion of a narrative. To the extent that they comment upon the issue, (...) proponents of narrative accounts typically reject Reductionist metaphysics that (ontologically) reduce persons to aggregates of person stages. In contrast to this trend, we seek to develop a narrative account of personal identity from within Reductionist metaphysics: we think person stages are unified into persons in virtue of their narrative continuity with one another. We argue that this Reductionist version of the narrative account avoids some serious problems facing non-Reductionist versions of the narrative account. (shrink)

I develop a new theory of properties by considering two central arguments in the debate whether properties are dispositional or categorical. The first claims that objects must possess categorical properties in order to be distinct from empty space. The second argument, however, points out several untoward consequences of positing categorical properties. I explore these arguments and argue that despite appearances, their conclusions need not be in conflict with one another. In particular, we can view the second argument as supporting only (...) the claim that there is not a plurality of categorical properties, and not the stronger claim that there are no categorical properties whatsoever. I then develop a new account of properties which capitalizes on this insight. (shrink)

One popular materialist response to the explanatory gap identifies phenomenal concepts with type-demonstrative concepts. This kind of response, however, faces a serious challenge: that our phenomenal concepts seem to provide a richer characterization of their referents than just the demonstrative characterization of 'that quality'. In this paper, I develop a materialist account that beefs up the contents of phenomenal concepts while retaining the idea that these contents contain demonstrative elements. I illustrate this account by focusing on our phenomenal concepts of (...) phenomenal colour. The phenomenal colours stand in a similarity space relative to one another in virtue of being complex qualities—qualities that contain saturation, lightness, and various aspects of hue as component elements. Our phenomenal concepts, in turn, provide a demonstrative characterization of each of these component elements as well as a description of how much of that element is present in a given phenomenal colour. The result is an account where phenomenal concepts contain demonstrative elements and yet provide a significantly richer characterization of the intrinsic nature of their referents than just 'that quality'. (shrink)

There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt to quantify the "feely" aspects of living in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies. This research is offered as part concession, part insistence on the reality of the "special" circumstances of living in raced bodies. While this move has the potential of making headway in debates about the character of racism and the unique nature of the harms of contemporary racism--through an analysis of stereotype threat research, microaggression (...) research, and the reception of both discourses--I will argue that this scientization of the phenomenology of race and racism also stalls progress on the most significant challenges for the current conversation about race and racism: how to listen and how to be heard. (shrink)

One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e., the strategy of claiming that (...) what were formerly thought of as distinct entities are actually a unified entity, partially considered. By evaluating its use in other debates, I uncover a multi-layered prima facie case against the use of the Partial Consideration Strategy in the dispositional/categorical properties debate. In closing, I describe how the Partial Consideration Strategy can be reworked in a way that would allow it to sidestep this prima facie case. (shrink)

According to memory foundationalism, seeming to remember that P is prima facie justification for believing that P. There is a common objection to this theory: If I previously believed that P carelessly (i.e. without justification) and later seem to remember that P, then (according to memory foundationalism) I have somehow acquired justification for a previously unjustified belief. In this paper, I explore this objection. I begin by distinguishing between two versions of it: One where I seem to remember that P (...) while also seeming to remember being careless in my original believing that P and the other where I seem to remember that P while not seeming to remember my past carelessness. I argue that the former case is the real challenge for memory foundationalism. After establishing the case of unforgotten carelessness as objection to memory foundationalism, I recast memory foundationalism in way that allows it to escape this objection. (shrink)

In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β‐ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β‐shapes/β‐sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β‐property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing‐in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three‐dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three‐dimensional object. Using this (...) new account, I re‐examine the phenomenological directness of visual experience and undermine an argument for skepticism about β‐property experiences. (shrink)

One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e., the strategy of claiming that (...) what were formerly thought of as distinct entities are actually a unified entity, partially considered. By evaluating its use in other debates, I uncover a multi-layered _prima facie_ case against the use of the Partial Consideration Strategy in the dispositional/categorical properties debate. In closing, I describe how the Partial Consideration Strategy can be reworked in a way that would allow it to sidestep this _prima facie_ case. (shrink)

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience supervenes upon its representational content. The phenomenon of blurry vision is thought to raise a difficulty for this position. More specifically, it is alleged that representationalists cannot account for the phenomenal difference between clearly seeing an indistinct edge and blurrily seeing a distinct edge solely in terms of represented features of the surrounding environment. I defend representationalism from this objection by offering a novel account of the phenomenal difference (...) between these two kinds of cases. (shrink)

This is the first book to offer a philosophical engagement with microaggressions. It aims to provide an intersectional analysis of microaggressions that cuts across multiple dimensions of oppression and marginalization, and to engage a variety of perspectives that have been sidelined within the discipline of philosophy. The volume gathers a diverse group of contributors: philosophers of color, philosophers with disabilities, philosophers of various nationalities and ethnicities, and philosophers of several gender identities. Their unique frames of analysis articulate both how the (...) concept of microaggressions can be used to clarify and sharpen our understanding of subtler aspects of oppression and how analysis, expansion, and reconceiving the notion of a microaggression can deepen and extend its explanatory power. The essays in the volume seek to defend microaggressions from common critiques and to explain their impact beyond the context of college students. Some of the guiding questions that this volume explores include, but are not limited to, the following: Can microaggressions be established as a viable scientific concept? What roles do microaggressions play in other oppressive phenomena like transphobia, fat phobia, and abelism? How can epistemological challenges around microaggressions be addressed via feminist theory, critical race theory, disability theory, or epistemologies of ignorance? What insights can be gleaned from intersectional analyses of microaggressions? Are there domain-specific analyses of microaggressions that would give insight to features of that domain, i.e. microaggressions related to sexuality, athletics, immigration status, national origin, body type, or ability. Microaggressions and Philosophyfeatures cutting-edge research on an important topic that will appeal to a wide range of students and scholars across disciplines. It includes perspectives from philosophy of psychology, empirically informed philosophy, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, disability theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy. (shrink)

Angesichts des vielfach diagnostizierten Ausmaßes der Zerstörung des Planeten Erde wird aktuell viel über die Notwendigkeit der Neuzusammensetzung des lebendigen Sozialen nachgedacht. Als Alternative zur klassischen Anrufung der Gesellschaft und den von ihr einzuleitenden Maßnahmen gegen den drohenden Untergang wird auf neu zu erschaffende Kollektive gesetzt, die sowohl menschliche als auch nichtmenschliche Akteure umfassen. Diese neuen Kollektive sollen sich durch Bündnisse, Symbiosen, Kooperationen, Assoziationen und Verträge konstituieren. Vergleichbar werden die im Detail verschiedenen, insgesamt aber posthumanistisch ausgerichteten Vorschläge, durch ihren gemeinsamen (...) Ausgangspunkt der verletzten Erde, für die Rettungsmaßnahmen in Gang gesetzt werden sollen: Bündnisse, die Gaia stiftet - im Angesicht der drohenden Gefahr! Im Mittelpunkt der Überlegungen von Lynn Margulis, Michel Serres, Bruno Latour und Donna Haraway, die im Folgenden diskutiert werden sollen, steht die Suche nach der Verbindung und Kooperation mit anderen als nur menschlichen Lebewesen. Die gesuchten Verbindungen, Verflechtungen und Versammlungen von menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Akteuren werden jedoch, so meine These, überwiegend im Sinne eines friedlichen Miteinanders ausbuchstabiert, während andere Formen der Verbindung dagegen, etwa durch stabile Gegnerschaft, andauernden Streit, stetige Auseinandersetzungen, vernachlässigt werden. Die während der Zusammensetzung der Kollektive notwendig werdenden Grenzziehungen und mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit auftretenden Konflikte um die Frage der Zugehörigkeiten werden weitgehend ausgeblendet zugunsten eines immensen Vertrauens in die Bereitschaft zur Versammlung und die Friedfertigkeit der Kollektivbildung. Mit anderen Worten: Während Kooperation, Verschmelzungen und Vermischungen überbetont werden, geraten Grenzziehungen, Konflikte und Kämpfe ins Hintertreffen. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the phenomenal character of visual experience is 'transparent' in that the phenomenal features of visual experience do not seem 'mental'. It is then claimed that this transparency speaks in favour of some theories of experience while speaking against others. In this paper, I advance both a negative and a positive thesis about transparency. My negative thesis is that visual phenomenal character is reticent in that it does not reveal whether it is mental or non-mental in (...) nature. This, in turn, means that, by itself, transparency does not speak in favour of (and against) the theories it is often thought to speak in favour of (and against). My positive thesis is that the phenomenon referred to as the 'transparency' of visual phenomenal character is best characterized in spatial, not mental, terms. (shrink)

The special and unique attitudes that we take towards events in our futures/pasts—e.g., attitudes like the dread of an impeding pain—create a challenge for “Reductionist” accounts that reduce persons to aggregates of interconnected person stages: if the person stage currently dreading tomorrow’s pain is numerically distinct from the person stage that will actually suffer the pain, what reason could the current person stage have for thinking of that future pain as being his? One reason everyday subjects believe they have a (...) substantially extended temporal existence stems from introspection—they introspectively experience their selves as being temporally extended. In this paper, I examine whether a Reductionist about personal identity can co-opt this explanation. Using Galen Strawson’s recent work on self-experience as a resource, I reach both a negative and a positive conclusion about the prospects of such a position. First, the relevant kind of self-experience—i.e., the introspective experience of one’s self as being a substantially temporally extended entity—will not automatically arise within a person stage simply in virtue of that stage being psychologically connected to/continuous with other person stages. Second, the relevant kind of self-experience will arise, however, in virtue of person stages weaving together their respective experiences, actions, etc. via a narrative. This positive conclusion points towards a new Reductionist position that focuses upon a narrative, and not mere psychological continuity, in attempting to justify the special attitudes we take towards events in our futures/pasts. (shrink)

Existentialist accounts maintain that visual phenomenal content takes the logical form of an existentially quantified sentence. These accounts do not make phenomenal content specific enough. Singularist accounts posit a singular content in which the seen object is a constituent. These accounts make phenomenal content too specific. My account gets the specificity of visual phenomenal content just right. My account begins with John Searle's suggestion that visual experience represents an object as seen, moves this relation outside the scope of the existential (...) quantifier and then replaces it with the relation of objects being ‘present as accessible’, as described by Alva Noë. (shrink)

One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In (...) contrast, we instead focus on the idea of “muddled” intuitions—i.e. intuitions that are misdirected and about notions other than the ones under discussion. We argue that the philosophically untutored are likely to have muddled intuitions and that professional philosophers are likely to have unmuddled intuitions. Although being umuddled does not, by itself, establish the reliability of the intuitions of professional philosophers, being muddled is enough to disqualify the intuitions of the philosophically untutored. We then turn to the charge that, despite being unmuddled, professional philosophers still have biased intuitions. To evaluate this charge, we switch focus from the general notion of biased intuition to the more specific notion of theory-laden intuition. We argue that there is prima facie evidence—in the form of the presence of conflicts of intuition—for thinking that at least some of the intuitions of professional philosophers are theory-laden. In summary, we conclude that that there is no clean and easy answer to the question of whose intuitions should matter. (shrink)

The standard formulation of quantum gauge theories results from the Lagrangian (functional integral) quantization of classical gauge theories. A more intrinsic quantum theoretical access in the spirit of Wigner’s representation theory shows that there is a fundamental clash between the pointlike localization of zero mass (vector, tensor) potentials and the Hilbert space (positivity, unitarity) structure of QT. The quantization approach has no other way than to stay with pointlike localization and sacrifice the Hilbert space whereas the approach built on the (...) intrinsic quantum concept of modular localization keeps the Hilbert space and trades the conflict creating pointlike generation with the tightest consistent localization: semiinfinite spacelike string localization. Whereas these potentials in the presence of interactions stay quite close to associated pointlike field strengths, the interacting matter fields to which they are coupled bear the brunt of the nonlocal aspect in that they are string-generated in a way which cannot be undone by any differentiation.The new stringlike approach to gauge theory also revives the idea of a Schwinger-Higgs screening mechanism as a deeper and less metaphoric description of the Higgs spontaneous symmetry breaking and its accompanying tale about “God’s particle” and its mass generation for all the other particles. (shrink)

Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience these objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access in a way that they don?t in conscious thought. In this paper, I introduce a couple of challenges that this ?Scene-Immediacy? of visual experience raises for traditional versions of Representationalism. I then identify a resource to which Representationalists can appeal in addressing these challenges: the low-detail fringe of visual experience. I argue that low-detail contents within (...) visual experience provide the mind with a rich access to additional high-detail information, an access that is not found in conscious thought. This access, in turn, speaks to the challenges raised by the Scene-Immediacy of visual experience. Robert Schroer is an Assistant Professor at the University of Minnesota at Duluth. (shrink)

To put it bluntly, Physicalism is the thesis that everything that exists is physical. Although Physicalism enjoys a great deal of popularity, two widely accepted theses, the physical sciences only tell us about the dispositional properties of the objects they study, and dispositional properties depend upon categorical properties, seem to guarantee that, under some sense of the word, the physical sciences are fated to give us an "incomplete" picture of what exists.In what follows, this challenge to Physicalism will be referred (...) to as "the challenge of categorical properties.". (shrink)

The crossing property is perhaps the most subtle aspect of the particle-field relation. Although it is not difficult to state its content in terms of certain analytic properties relating different matrixelements of the S-matrix or formfactors, its relation to the localization- and positive energy spectral principles requires a level of insight into the inner workings of QFT which goes beyond anything which can be found in typical textbooks on QFT. This paper presents a recent account based on new ideas derived (...) from “modular localization” including a mathematic appendix on this subject. Its main achievement is the proof of the crossing property from a two-algebra generalization of the KMS condition.The main content is an in-depth criticism of the dual model and its string theoretic extension. The conceptual flaws of these models are closely related to misunderstandings of crossing. The correct interpretation of string theory is that of a dynamic infinite component one particle space where “dynamic” means that, unlike a mere collection of independent free fields, the formalism contains also operators which communicate between the different irreducible Poincaré representations and set the mass/spin spectrum. Whereas in pre-string times there were unsuccessful attempts to achieve this in analogy to the O(4,2) hydrogen spectrum by the use of higher noncompact groups, the superstring in d=9+1, which uses instead (bosonic/fermionic) oscillators obtained from multicomponent chiral currents, is the only known solution of the dynamical infinite component pointlike field (or pointlike generated wave function) project. (shrink)

Environmental representationalism is the position that phenomenal differences between visual experiences are determined by the representational claims those experiences make about the surrounding environment. Afterimage and phosphene experiences are an important and widely cited objection to this position. In this paper, I defend environmental representationalism from this objection. In particular, I point out several ways in which typical environmental representationalist accounts of these experiences are lacking while developing a more satisfying account which focuses on how the visual system generates its (...) representations as well as on several of the unique temporally-extended features of afterimage/phosphene experiences. (shrink)

The article explores the relationship between visual culture and the fight for visibility and attention in contemporary society. It draws on a concept of visual culture which not only sees the rising significance of the visual and the proliferation of images as its defining traits, but also the fact that, today, people are—to a much higher degree—both consumers as well as producers of images. Based on this definition, it is argued that in visually oriented communication and media societies, the anthropologically (...) fundamental need for attention manifests itself as a fight for visibility which takes on the form of ever more extreme forms of public self-display. Furthermore, a portrait of two social figures—the star and the voyeur—will serve as further analysis and description of the social trends which can be tied to the emergence of today's visual culture. The article will close by discussing attention and visibility in terms of inclusion and exclusion and by proposing an analytical model for differentiating four modes of existence in a visual culture. (shrink)

The experience of looking at a tilted penny involves a “phenomenological doubleness” in that it simultaneously seems to be of something circular and of something elliptical. In this paper, I investigate the phenomenological doubleness of this experience by comparing it to another case of phenomenological doubleness––the phenomenological doubleness of seeing an object in a painting. I begin by pointing out some striking similarities between the phenomenological characters of these two experiences. I then argue that these phenomenological characters have a common (...) explanation. More specifically, I argue that the psychological mechanism that explains the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing an object in a painting can be extended to also explain the phenomenological doubleness of the experience of seeing a tilted penny. (shrink)

Recently I’ve been reflecting on the possibility that choices I’ve made and commitments I’ve accepted — choices and commitments like being part of the academy and treating philosophy as a productive way to pursue truths about race and racism — may have made me into Philosophy’s mammy. Confronted with a crystal-clear specter of myself as mammy, I stubbornly hold fast to the belief that my intellectual identity can be defended to all of my intellectual ancestors: my ancestors in the canon (...) of Western Philosophy, but also my intellectual foremothers and forefathers: Audre Lorde, Cherrie Moragua, Toni Morrison, Patricia Hill Collins, Cornel West, Charles Mills. Some of those to whom I owe an intellectual debt are more like cousins. Alongside philosophers like Kristie Dotson and Donna-Dale Marcano, among others, I occupy a very unique position. It is to them, perhaps, that I most need to give an account myself. I believe that I can give an earnest defense that is not simply self-serving, not an easy way out, and not a concession. The goal of this essay is to investigate this worry. What is revealed is not just the personal, social, and professional location of one particular philosophy; Perhaps surprisingly, I may be an inevitable event and valuable stage in the ongoing progress of Black Feminist Philosophy. (shrink)

It is shown that certain kinds of behavior, which hitherto were expected to be characteristic for classical gravity and quantum field theory in curved spacetime, as the infinite dimensional Bondi-Metzner-Sachs symmetry, holography on event horizons and an area proportionality of entropy, have in fact an unnoticed presence in Minkowski QFT.This casts new light on the fundamental question whether the volume proportionality of heat bath entropy and the (logarithmically corrected) dimensionless area law obeyed by localization-induced thermal behavior are different geometric parametrizations (...) which share a common primordial algebraic origin. Strong arguments are presented that these two different thermal manifestations can be directly related, this is in fact the main aim of this paper.It will be demonstrated that QFT beyond the Lagrangian quantization setting receives crucial new impulses from holography onto horizons.The present paper is part of a project aimed at elucidating the enormous physical range of “modular localization”. The latter does not only extend from standard Hamiltonian heat bath thermal states to thermal aspects of causal- or event-horizons addressed in this paper. It also includes the recent understanding of the crossing property of formfactors whose intriguing similarity with thermal properties was, although sometimes noticed, only sufficiently understood in the modular setting (Schroer in arXiv:0905.4006 (2009)). (shrink)

In this paper, I explore and defend the idea that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to our visual searches, responsibilities that are far more fine-grained and interesting than the trivial responsibilities to keep our eyes open and “look hard”. In order to have such responsibilities, we must be able to exert fine-grained and interesting forms of control over our visual searches. I present both an intuitive case and an empirical case for thinking that we do, in fact, have such (...) forms of control over our visual searches. I then show how these forms of control can be used to aim the visual beliefs that result from our searches towards various epistemic goals. (shrink)

The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color isa threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to allrealist theories of sensible qualities, including thecurrent leading realist theory: representationalism.I save representationalism from this threat by way ofa novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about theintrospective classification of sensible qualities of color.I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's abilityto extract fine-grained information about color fromthe environment, introspective classification of sensiblequalities of color is sensitive to features of context.I finish by (...) arguing for the superiority of mysolution over two alternative solutions: one by NelsonGoodman, the other by C.L. Hardin. (shrink)

A slew of conceivability arguments have been given against physicalism. Many physicalists try to undermine these arguments by offering accounts of phenomenal concepts that explain how there can be an epistemic gap, but not an ontological gap, between the phenomenal and the physical. Some complain, however, that such accounts fail to do justice to the nature of our introspective grasp of phenomenal properties. A particularly influential version of this complaint comes from David Chalmers (1996; 2003), who claims, in opposition to (...) the accounts of phenomenal concepts described above, that phenomenal concepts have primary and secondary intensions that coincide in all worlds. In this paper, I construct an argument that casts doubt upon Chalmers' claim. At the heart of this argument is an idea that Chalmers shows some affinity for: namely, that introspection doesn't reveal whether phenomenal properties are fundamental properties or whether they are derived from more basic protophenomenal properties. I argue that this claim implies that the primary and secondary intensions of our phenomenal concepts do not coincide in all worlds. In this way, I show that a plausible idea about the powers of introspection – an idea that Chalmers himself is drawn to – is a reason for rejecting the claim that phenomenal concepts have primary and secondary intensions that coincide in all worlds. (shrink)

The main topics of this second part of a two-part essay are some consequences of the phenomenon of vacuum polarization as the most important physical manifestation of modular localization. Besides philosophically unexpected consequences, it has led to a new constructive “outside-inwards approach” in which the pointlike fields and the compactly localized operator algebras which they generate only appear from intersecting much simpler algebras localized in noncompact wedge regions whose generators have extremely mild almost free field behavior. -/- Another consequence of (...) vacuum polarization presented in this essay is the localization entropy near a causal horizon which follows a logarithmically modified area law in which a dimensionless area (the area divided by the square of dR where dR is the thickness of a light-sheet) appears. There are arguments that this logarithmically modified area law corresponds to the volume law of the standard heat bath thermal behavior. We also explain the symmetry enhancing effect of holographic projections onto the causal horizon of a region and show that the resulting infinite dimensional symmetry groups contain the Bondi–Metzner–Sachs group. This essay is the second part of a partitioned longer paper. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that the (...) effects caused by the instantiation of a determinable property will also be caused by the instantiation of the determinates of that property—so instead of solving the problem of mental causation, the Subset Account ends up guaranteeing that the effects of mental properties (and all other types of determinable property) will be causally overdetermined! In this paper, I explore this objection. I argue that both sides in this debate have failed to engage the question at the heart of the objection: Given that both a determinable property and its determinates have the power to cause some effect (E), does it follow that both will actually cause E when the relevant conditions obtain? To make genuine progress towards answering this question, we need to take a serious look at the metaphysics of causation. With the debate properly reframed and issues about the metaphysics of causation front and center, I explore the question of whether the Subset Account is doomed to result in problematic causal overdetermination. (shrink)

This essay explores challenges that arise for professors who teach critical theory in our current climate of conservatism. Specifically, it is argued that the conservative commitments to non-revolutionary change and reverence for tradition are corrupted in our current political and intellectual climate. This corruption, called “ideological imperviousness,” undermines the institutional structures put in place to produce a functional educational environment that protects the interests of both professors and students. The result is an environment that imposes an unjust vulnerability on professors (...) and risks depriving students of the opportunity to acquire the critical skills necessary to combat their own vulnerabilities. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore and defend the idea that we have epistemic responsibilities with respect to our visual searches, responsibilities that are far more fine‐grained and interesting than the trivial responsibilities to keep our eyes open and “look hard.” In order to have such responsibilities, we must be able to exert fine‐grained and interesting forms of control over our visual searches. I present both an intuitive case and an empirical case for thinking that we do, in fact, have such (...) forms of control over our visual searches. I then show how these forms of control can be used to aim the visual beliefs that result from our searches toward various epistemic goals. (shrink)

What are physical objects like when they are considered independently of their causal interactions? Many think that the answer to this question involves categorical properties– properties that make contributions to their bearers that are independent of any causal interactions those objects may enter into. In this paper, I examine two challenges that this solution poses to Physicalism. The first challenge is that, given that they are distinct from any of the scientifically described causal powers that they happen to convey, categorical (...) properties will not qualify as being ‘physical’ properties. Given the right definition of ‘physical’, this challenge can be overcome. I argue, however, that the only way we can have a positive grasp of the nature of categorical properties is via ‘acquaintance’– a non-physical relation. This second challenge to Physicalism cannot be overcome.1. (shrink)

A depiction of the ancient Hebrew understanding of the human being must take into account the fact that the Bible does not contain a systematic anthropology, but unfolds the multiplicity of human existence inductively, aspectively, and in narrative fashion. In comparison to Greek body/soul dualism, but also in the context of body-(de-)construction and gender debates, this circumstance makes it a treasure trove of interesting, often contrasting recollections and insights with liberating potential. This assertion will be illustrated concretely in terms of (...) the nexus points of the human body (throat, heart, and womb), the relationship of humans to animals and angels, and the questions of the power and value of a human being. (shrink)

The main aim of this work is to relate integrability in QFT with a complete particle interpretation directly to the principle of causal localization, circumventing the standard method of finding sufficiently many conservation laws. Its precise conceptual-mathematical formulation as “modular localization” within the setting of local operator algebras also suggests novel ways of looking at general (non-integrable) QFTs which are not based on quantizing classical field theories.Conformal QFT, which is known to admit no particle interpretation, suggest the presence of a (...) “partial” integrability, referred to as “conformal integrability”. This manifests itself in a “braid-permutation” group structure which contains in particular informations about the anomalous dimensional spectrum. For chiral conformal models this reduces to the braid group as it is represented in Hecke- or Birman-Wenzl-algebras associated to chiral models.Another application of modular localization mentioned in this work is an alternative to the BRST formulation of gauge theories in terms of stringlike vectorpotentials within a Hilbert space setting. (shrink)

The adaptation of the Kramers-Kronig dispersion relations to the causal localization structure of QFT led to an important project in particle physics, the only one with a successful closure. The same cannot be said about the subsequent attempts to formulate particle physics as a pure S-matrix project.The feasibility of a pure S-matrix approach are critically analyzed and their serious shortcomings are highlighted. Whereas the conceptual/mathematical demands of renormalized perturbation theory are modest and misunderstandings could easily be corrected, the correct understanding (...) about the origin of the crossing property requires the use of the mathematical theory of modular localization and its relation to the thermal KMS condition. These new concepts, which combine localization, vacuum polarization and thermal properties under the roof of modular theory, will be explained and their potential use in a new constructive (nonperturbative) approach to QFT will be indicated. The S-matrix still plays a predominant role but, different from Heisenberg’s and Mandelstam’s proposals, the new project is not a pure S-matrix approach. The S-matrix plays a new role as a “relative modular invariant”. (shrink)

Wigner’s famous 1939 classification of positive energy representations, combined with the more recent modular localization principle, has led to a significant conceptual and computational extension of renormalized perturbation theory to interactions involving fields of higher spin. Traditionally the clash between pointlike localization and the the Hilbert space was resolved by passing to a Krein space setting which resulted in the well-known BRST gauge formulation. Recently it turned out that maintaining a Hilbert space formulation for interacting higher spin fields requires a (...) weakening of localization from point- to string-like fields for which the d = s + 1 short distance scaling dimension for integer spins is reduced to d = 1 and and renormalizable couplings in the sense of power-counting exist for any spin. This new setting leads to a significant conceptual change of the relation of massless couplings with their massless counterpart. Whereas e.g. the renormalizable interactions of s = 1 massive vectormesons with s \ 1 matter falls within the standard field-particle setting, their zero mass limits lead to much less understood phenomena as “infraparticles” and gluon/quark confinement. It is not surprising that such drastic conceptual changes in the area of gauge theories also lead to a radical change concerning the Higgs issue. (shrink)

Globally, one in eight people lacks access to potable water; more people die from unsafe drinking water than from all forms of violence, including war. A substantial body of research documents that the privatization of water – led by global financial institutions working in collusion with governments and corporations – does not lead to more people gaining access to safe water. In fact, the opposite is true: privatization leads to both higher cost and lower quality water. For the past century, (...) the dominant focus of transnational organizing has been “from the West to the rest,” and the frequent attention to movements in the global North has led to the neglect of transnational linkages between movements. Drawing on fieldwork conducted on three right to water movements that span three continents, this paper examines effortsto reclaim the water commons,and how struggles have been driven by grassroots movements demanding that democracy, transparency, and the human right to water are prioritized over corporate profit. As feminist scholars have pointed out, the “standpoint” offered by marginalized actors offers important insights into the operation of systems of power and the strategies of survival and resistance that less powerful actors adopt in order to survive and thrive. This paper explores how transnational movements around water and other basic rights engage with and learn from each other. (shrink)

This essay explores challenges that arise for professors who teach critical theory in our current climate of conservatism. Specifically, it is argued that the conservative commitments to non-revolutionary change and reverence for tradition are corrupted in our current political and intellectual climate. This corruption, called “ideological imperviousness,” undermines the institutional structures put in place to produce a functional educational environment that protects the interests of both professors and students. The result is an environment that imposes an unjust vulnerability on professors (...) and risks depriving students of the opportunity to acquire the critical skills necessary to combat their own vulnerabilities. (shrink)