Vom Autor Christian Mockel wird der von Goethe, den Lebensphilosophen (Dilthey, Chamberlain, Spengler) und dem Phanomenologen Husserl behauptete Zusammenhang von Anschaulichkeit der Erkenntnis und Sinnstiftung des Wissens herausgearbeitet. Es werden sowohl die Kritik an der abstrakten Verstandestatigkeit als auch die sich auf sie berufenden wissenschafts- und kulturkritischen Uberlegungen thematisiert, wobei sich erstaunlich weitgehende Parallelen zwischen den drei Denkstilen zeigen. Demgegenuber bricht die Symbolphilosophie Cassirers mit dieser die Anschauung favorisierenden philosophischen Tradition, indem sie sowohl der Absage an die Abstraktion als (...) auch der Aufwertung der unmittelbaren Anschauung als Erkenntnisverfahren widerspricht. Der Autor weist auf, wie sich Cassirer bei aller geteilter Kritik am uberkommenen Verstandesdenken der Grundaussage "`Anschauungsverlust = Sinnverlust"' entschieden entgegenstellt. Bei alledem arbeitet die Studie Goethes Beitrag zu den in Frage stehenden systematischen Problemen heraus und richtet ihr Augenmerk auf die Bemuhungen der Lebensphilosophen, Goethe als "`Kronzeugen"' sowohl fur das Propagieren der Anschauung als auch fur die vehemente Verstandes- und Wissenschaftskritik zu erschliessen. Dagegen dient Cassirers Bezugnahme auf Goethe dem Bekenntnis zu der fur eine kulturelle Sinnstiftung als unerlasslich erachteten rationalen Wissenschaft. (shrink)

Diese Konstellation dient Möckel als Anregung für den erstmals geführten Nachweis, daß der Vernunft und Rationalität verpflichtete Ernst Cassirer sein Philosophieren bereits im Frühwerk konsequent auf das »irrationale« Leben bezieht ...

The decisive occasion for the following paper was the discovery, during the editorial work, of the expression “symbolische Ideation” (symbolic ideation) in theposthumous manuscript of Ernst Cassirer, “Prägnanz, symbolische Ideation”. The occurrence of this expression raises one more time the question of the relation between Cassirer and the system of concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. The present research gets to the conclusion that Cassirer uses the concept of “symbolische Ideation” (symbolic ideation) in a sense which basically expresses his own philosophical position, (...) rather than Husserl’s, who links the “symbolische Ideation” with the term “Ideation”, meaning the unmediated self-giveness of the General, of the Identical. But still, one can also discover some common points between Cassirer and Husserl. (shrink)

Phenomenological philosophizing is practiced out of a sense of responsibility for contemporary culture, which is experienced as existing in a profoundcrisis. The first part of this contribution contains a systematization of the theory of crisis, a theory developed in many of Husserl's works: the description of the main phenomena of the consciousness of crisis, the explanation of crisis with regard to its causes, and the demands raised in order to overcome the crisis of scientific culture (»reflection«). Husserl's teachings on crisis (...) are placed into close relation with his idea of science and science's Greek origin, an origin from which, according to Husserl, modern science has tragically distanced itself. It is argued, however, that Husserl was not at all a philosopher of decline or decay. The second part of this contribution represents an attempt to provide a critical and complex answer to the question as to the modern relevance and usefulness of Husserl's theory of crisis. (shrink)

This contribution deals with Ernst Cassirer's appreciative attitude to the philosophical anthropology of his time and its self-conception. The question of the relationship between Cassirer's philosophical anthropology and his philosophy of culture with its basis in the theory of symbolism presuppose or explain one another is investigated on the basis of four critical points. The unpublished texts on the subject (ECN 6) and in particular the concluding remarks revolve around the question of the interrelationship between the biological and the symbolic (...) or cultural dimensions of human existence. The final demonstration of six possible anthropological »constants« of human existence serve to supplement the methodological discussion with substantive issues. (shrink)

The following text analyses the essays Cassirer made in his published articles and in his manuscripts of the exile period in order to dismiss the possibility of a unique science based on the physical causality (Wiener Kreis) and thus to assert the autonomy and specificity of the Kulturwissenschaft. In the same time, it guards against the identification of cultural knowledge and historical knowledge (Windelband, Rickert). The specific way to build concepts within the Kulturwissenschaften targets the objective relation between the Particular (...) and the General and is to be found in the consideration of the form or stylebased on the experience of the expression (Ausdruckserleben). History or biology offers fruitful analogies to the understanding of the concepts or methods of Kulturwissenschaft. (shrink)

"La Lógica pura, la idea de la Gramática pura y el problema de una filosofí­a del lenguaje en las Investigaciones Lógicas" Una de las cuestiones centrales que hasta hoy en dí­a se siguen debatiendo en torno a la recepción de las Investigaciones Lógicas, se refiere a la relación entre pensamiento y lenguaje, entre significado y expresión lingí¼í­stica, entre percepción y juicio, entre Lógica y Gramática que estableció en el debate con G. Frege y A. Marty, entre otros. El autor se (...) ocupa de las influencias -en parte directas o indirectas- que ha dejado la obra de Husserl sobre la lingí¼í­stica moderna, la filosofí­a del lenguaje del siglo XX y la filosofí­a analí­tica del lenguaje. "The pure Logic, the pure Grammar's idea and the problem of a philosophy of the language in the Logical Investigations". One of the central questions that until today is continued debating around the reception of the Logical Investigations, it refers to the relationship between thought and language. between meaning and linguistic expression, between perception and judgement, between Logic and Grammar that Husserl settled down in the debate with G. Frege and A. Marty, among others. The author is in charge of the influences -direct or indirectly- that has left the work of Husserl on the modern linguistics, the philosophy of the language of the XX century and the analytic philosophy of the language. (shrink)

In order to answer the question formulated in the title, we firstly need to point out some theoretical constraints. A lot of parallels allow us to speak about a‘philosophy of symbolic structures’ or, better, about a ‘philosophy of structural symbolic systems’ in Lévi-Strauss theory. This is possible only if we establish an equivalence between the concepts ‘Form’ and ‘Structure,’ as they are used by Lévi-Strauss and Cassirer. The orientation of this implicit philosophy of Lévi-Strauss is not that of a philosophy (...) of culture based on a philosophical-anthropological reflection (as it is the case with Cassirer), but a scientific research of concrete primitive societies, together with their empirical cultures and their unconscious, hidden laws of formation. (shrink)

No presente artigo serão discutidas algumas abordagens e explicações comparativas dedicadas à moderna teoria da linguagem, que podem ser encontradas tanto no filósofo neokantiano do símbolo Ernst Cassirer como nos linguistas estruturalistas Nikolaj Trubetzkoj e Roman Jakobson, que frequentemente se referem a Ferdinand de Saussure. Com esta finalidade, recorreremos a conceitualizações inovadoras usadas em comum no pensamento filosófico da primeira metade do século XX, tais como forma, estrutura, sistema, sinal, sentido ou significação e expressão, que determinam as respectivas teorias da (...) linguagem. Entre outras coisas, as evidências provam que certos novos princípios de pensamento e terminologias são avanços em diferentes disciplinas científicas e meios culturais, sem que seus descobridores ou representantes se refiram uns aos outros, ou mesmo que conheçam uns aos outros. (shrink)

Neukantianismus, Phanomenologie und Kulturphilosophie: Die Forschungsinteressen Christian Mockels sind vielfaltig. Seine Arbeiten zu Max Adler, Edmund Husserl und Ernst Cassirer sowie seine editorische Tatigkeit als Herausgeber des Cassirer-Nachlasses haben dazu beigetragen, eine Vielfalt von Themenbereichen und philosophischen Kreisen miteinander zu verknupfen. Eine Philosophie der Kultur und der Gesellschaft als systematische Einheit auszufuhren und sie in der pragmatischen Richtung einer politischen Philosophie auszubauen: darin sieht Christian Mockel die Relevanz einer Philosophie, die sich zwar als Wissenschaft versteht, doch uber die (...) theoretische Dimension hinaus das Projekt der Aufklarung als Selbstverstandnis des freien Menschen zu verwirklichen anstrebt. In seiner jahrzehntelangen Tatigkeit als Hochschullehrer an der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin hat Christian Mockel viele Wissenschaftler*innen aus allen Kontinenten beraten und bei ihren Recherchen unterstutzt. Diese Festschrift greift die Themen seiner Forschung auf und zeigt zugleich die Diversitat der Interessen seiner Schuler*innen und Kolleg*innen, die ihm mit diesem Band Dank aussprechen und seine Arbeit wurdigen mochten. (shrink)

Die unter dem Titel Husserlsche Phanomenologie neu aufgelegte und von zehn auf siebzehn erweiterte Sammlung der zwischen 1995 und 2014 entstanden bzw. verstreut veroffentlichten Beitrage des Autors bieten Einblicke in systematische Probleme phanomenologischen Philosophierens, in Husserls Bezugnahme auf Vorlaufer und Ideengeber seines "Neuanfangs" der Philosophie und in dessen Rezeption sowohl durch "Schuler" als auch durch Philosophen, die sich der phanomenologischen Richtung selbst nicht zurechnen. Der erste Schwerpunkt der Beitrage liegt auf den mit der Lebensphilosophie geteilten intuitiven Erkenntnisverfahren, dem Bestehen auf (...) dem anschaulichen Charakter allgemeiner Gegenstande und einer entsprechend motivierten Wissenschaftskritik. Der zweite Schwerpunkt widmet sich Husserls Bezugnahme auf historische "Vordenker" (Platon, Leibniz) und auf die zeitgenossische Lebensphilosophie (Scheler, Dilthey, Spengler) und deren Kulturkritik. Die Beitrage des dritten Schwerpunktes gehen der originellen Interpretation phanomenologischer Ansatze bzw. Begrifflichkeiten bei Schulern (Spet) und bei Vertretern des Marburger Neukantianismus (Natorp, Cassirer, M. Adler, N. Hartmann) nach, die die Phanomenologie wertschatzen, sich mit ihr aber nicht identifizieren. Eine Besonderheit der zum Wiederabdruck gebrachten Beitrage ist darin zu sehen, dass in ihnen immer auch der Beziehung Cassirers und seiner "Philosophie der symbolischen Formen" zur Husserlschen Phanomenologie nachgegangen wird. Christian Mockel studierte Philosophie in Skt. Petersburg, promovierte und habilitierte an der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, wo er als apl. Professor fur Philosophie lehrt, hatte Gastprofessuren in Maputo und Hamburg inne, ist langjahrig mit phanomenologischen Studien und mit Cassirer-Forschung bzw. der Edition seines Nachlasses befasst, seit 2014 als Herausgeber der "Nachgelassenen Manuskripte und Texte.". (shrink)

This book examines the epistemic function of perception and the relation between language and conceptual thought, and provides new ways of conceptualizing the Buddhist defense of the reflexivity thesis of consciousness: namely, that each cognitive event is to be understood as involving a pre-reflective implicit awareness of its own occurrence.

The classic programme of conceptual engineering (Cappelen, Herman. 2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Eklund, Matti. 2021. “Conceptual Engineering.” In The Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited by Justin Khoo, and Rachel Sterken, 15–30. London: Routledge) envisages a two-stage ameliorating process. First, we assess ‘F’ and determine what the term should express. Second, we bring it about that ‘F’ expresses what it should express. The second stage gives rise to a (...) practical challenge: the implementation challenge. Engineering advocates need to explain by what means they can implement specific conceptual changes in the natural language shared by a community – a feat Herman Cappelen (2018. Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020; “Conceptual Engineering: The Master Argument.” In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, edited by Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett, 132–151. Oxford: Oxford University Press) argues to be beyond our understanding and control both on an externalist and on an internalist meta-semantics. I devise a new answer to the implementation challenge. Enlisting the influential theory of social norms by Cristina Bicchieri, I argue that engineering social norms in Bicchieri’s technical sense amounts to an effective, specific, and feasible means to implement specific conceptual change, at least on internalist premises. I also argue that Bicchieri’s social norms are an essential addition to the more familiar conventions and moral norms when it comes to conceptual engineering. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you’re uncertain about basic normative principles? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order:" norm: e.g., obey the most probable norm or maximize expected choiceworthiness. But what if you’re uncertain about second-order norms too—must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty appears doomed to a vicious regress. This paper aims to rescue second-order norms from the threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the claim (...) some philosophers have made that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on all agents regardless of their normative beliefs. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order norms, thus closing off any question of how agents should respond to normative uncertainty. Rather, we can head off the threat of regress by ascribing external force to a single second-order norm: the enkratic principle. (shrink)

This paper maps out various options for thinking about two issues: the structural relationship between practical wisdom and the moral virtues, and the various functions of practical wisdom. With the help of a case study of the virtue of honesty, three main concerns are raised for what I call the Standard Model of practical wisdom. Two other models, the Socratic Model and the Fragmentation Model, are also critically evaluated. I end by taking seriously an eliminativist approach according to which the (...) trait of practical wisdom does not exist. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent debate (...) on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Humean Laws for Human Agents presents cutting-edge research by leading experts on the Humean account of laws, chance, possibility, and necessity. A central question in metaphysics and philosophy of science is: What are laws of nature? Humeans hold that laws are not sui generis metaphysical entities but merely particularly effective summaries of what actually happens. The most discussed recent work on Humeanism emphasizes the laws' usefulness for limited agents and uses pragmatic considerations to address fundamental and long-standing problems. The current (...) volume develops and critically examines pragmatic Humean accounts, with innovative new work on the epistemology of laws and chance, the problem of induction, counterfactuals, special science laws, and a Humean account of essence. Taken together, the papers provide a roadmap for developing pragmatic Humeanism and connate views, setting the agenda for future research. (shrink)

How should you decide what to do when you're uncertain about basic normative principles (e.g., Kantianism vs. utilitarianism)? A natural suggestion is to follow some "second-order" norm: e.g., "comply with the first-order norm you regard as most probable" or "maximize expected choiceworthiness". But what if you're uncertain about second-order norms too -- must you then invoke some third-order norm? If so, it seems that any norm-guided response to normative uncertainty is doomed to a vicious regress. In this paper, I aim (...) to rescue second-order norms from this threat of regress. I first elaborate and defend the suggestion some philosophers have entertained that the regress problem forces us to accept normative externalism, the view that at least one norm is incumbent on agents regardless of their beliefs or evidence concerning that norm. But, I then argue, we need not accept externalism about first-order (e.g., moral) norms, thus closing off any question of what an agent should do in light of her normative beliefs. Rather, it is more plausible to ascribe external force to a single, second-order rational norm: the enkratic principle, correctly formulated. This modest form of externalism, I argue, is both intrinsically well-motivated and sufficient to head off the threat of regress. (shrink)

A pioneer in the field, Christian Metz applies insights of structural linguistics to the language of film. "The semiology of film . . . can be held to date from the publication in 1964 of the famous essay by Christian Metz, 'Le cinema: langue ou langage?'"--Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Times Literary Supplement "Modern film theory begins with Metz."--Constance Penley, coeditor of Camera Obscura "Any consideration of semiology in relation to the particular field signifying practice of film passes inevitably through a (...) reference to the work of Christian Metz. . . . The first book to be written in this field, [ Film Language ] is important not merely because of this primacy but also because of the issues it raises . . . issues that have become crucial to the contemporary argument."--Stephen Heath, Screen. (shrink)

Most people who are regular consumers of psychoactive drugs are not drug addicts, nor will they ever become addicts. In neurobiological theories, non-addictive drug consumption is acknowledged only as a “necessary” prerequisite for addiction, but not as a stable and widespread behavior in its own right. This target article proposes a new neurobiological framework theory for non-addictive psychoactive drug consumption, introducing the concept of “drug instrumentalization.” Psychoactive drugs are consumed for their effects on mental states. Humans are able to learn (...) that mental states can be changed on purpose by drugs, in order to facilitate other, non-drug-related behaviors. We discuss specific “instrumentalization goals” and outline neurobiological mechanisms of how major classes of psychoactive drugs change mental states and serve non-drug-related behaviors. We argue that drug instrumentalization behavior may provide a functional adaptation to modern environments based on a historical selection for learning mechanisms that allow the dynamic modification of consummatory behavior. It is assumed that in order to effectively instrumentalize psychoactive drugs, the establishment of and retrieval from a drug memory is required. Here, we propose a new classification of different drug memory subtypes and discuss how they interact during drug instrumentalization learning and retrieval. Understanding the everyday utility and the learning mechanisms of non-addictive psychotropic drug use may help to prevent abuse and the transition to drug addiction in the future. (shrink)

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk (like Pascal's Mugging), and intolerably paradoxical in cases like the St. Petersburg and Pasadena games. In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, stochastic dominance reasoning can capture most of the plausible implications of expectational reasoning while avoiding most of its pitfalls. Specifically, given sufficient background uncertainty (...) about the choiceworthiness of one's options, many expectation-maximizing gambles that do not stochastically dominate their alternatives "in a vacuum" become stochastically dominant in virtue of that background uncertainty. But, even under these conditions, stochastic dominance will not require agents to accept options whose expectational superiority depends on sufficiently small probabilities of extreme payoffs. The sort of background uncertainty on which these results depend looks unavoidable for any agent who measures the choiceworthiness of her options in part by the total amount of value in the resulting world. At least for such agents, then, stochastic dominance offers a plausible general principle of choice under uncertainty that can explain more of the apparent rational constraints on such choices than has previously been recognized. (shrink)

This article examines the methodology of a core branch of contemporary political theory or philosophy: “analytic” political theory. After distinguishing political theory from related fields, such as political science, moral philosophy, and legal theory, the article discusses the analysis of political concepts. It then turns to the notions of principles and theories, as distinct from concepts, and reviews the methods of assessing such principles and theories, for the purpose of justifying or criticizing them. Finally, it looks at a recent debate (...) on how abstract and idealized political theory should be, and assesses the significance of disagreement in political theory. The discussion is carried out from an angle inspired by the philosophy of science. (shrink)