Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) konzipiert menschliche Erkenntnis als kreative, asymptotische Assimilation: Auf kreative Weise verähnlichen sich Menschen in Erkenntnisprozessen Denkunabhängigem, ohne diesen Verähnlichungsprozess je zum Abschluss bringen zu können. Obwohl menschliche Erkenntnis als kreativ charakterisiert wird, verliert sie nicht die Welthaftung. Obwohl sie asymptotisch verläuft, führt sie nicht zu Pessimismus und einem Ablassen von Erkenntnisbemühungen überhaupt. Cusanus macht die beiden Kernaspekte seines Modells menschlicher Erkenntnis trotz einiger systematischer Unschärfen im Rahmen eines massvollen Erkenntnisoptimismus kompatibel. Die vorliegende Monographie befasst sich mit diesem (...) Modell in zwei Hinsichten. Zunächst wird seine systematische Gestalt über das cusanische Oeuvre hinweg untersucht. Die zu diesem Zweck herangezogenen Werke sind De docta ignorantia, De coniecturis, Idiota de mente, De beryllo und das Compendium. Im Anschluss werden dann zentrale epistemologische Anfragen eingehender betrachtet und historisch kontextualisiert: Cusanus' Intellektverständnis, seine Stellung zu species-Theorien von Erkenntnis, seine Wahrheitsauffassung und sein Modell menschlichen Weltbezugs. Vergleiche mit den Positionen von Aristoteles und Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin und Dietrich von Freiberg, Anselm von Canterbury sowie John McDowell machen dabei sowohl die Eigenheiten von Cusanus als auch seine Verhaftung in der epistemologischen Tradition sichtbar. (shrink)

In the late Middle Ages, Nicholas of Cusa renders human cognition as creative, asymptotic assimilation—humans creatively approach their objects of cognition without ever fully reaching them. Questions about measuring are an important part of Nicholas’ model of cognition in two regards: On the one hand, he explicitly calls human cognition a ‘measuring’, moving the concept into the centre of attention. On the other hand, measuring in the sense of evaluating epistemic activities is an issue for Nicholas. He describes humans as (...) living images of god who ‘enfold’ the ideas of all things within themselves in a specific way. They measure, i. e. judge, their epistemic activities looking at what they enfold. However, Nicholas provides little information about what exactly that means. He is thus threatened with a serious epistemological problem: the lack of a satisfying criterion of epistemic activities. In my paper, I discuss options of how to deal with this problem. After briefly describing Nicholas’ notion of human cognition and what he has on offer regarding a criterion of epistemic activities, I try to clarify what ‘enfolding the ideas of all things’ can mean. Presenting and discussing two plausible interpretations of this expression—a static and a dynamic one—sheds light on possible answers Nicholas can give as well as the limitations these answers are confronted with. (shrink)

Despite being one of the major figures in late medieval thought and being the subject of numerous studies, certain topics concerning the Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa remain in need of further investigation. One of these is an aspect of his theory of cognition: his account of sense perception. It is our aim in this study to systematically look at his scattered remarks on the topic and make a number of suggestions as to the nature of his thought on how we (...) come to know external things. It is not our purpose to offer a comprehensive account of his theory of cognition. Our focus in this article is on his account of perception and the specific claim that Nicholas develops a model whereby reason operates together with the senses in perceptual experience. Despite being tentative our claim is grounded on suggestions found in the scholarship on Cusanus; but these suggestions remain quite vague and in need of exploration. In this article, we closely examine the textual evidence and develop our claim based o... (shrink)