At the crossroads of poetry and philosophy: Francis Ponge and Maurice Merleau-Ponty The aim of the present article is to clarify the place of the sensitive dictionary in the work of Francis Ponge and to show how it denotes human's relationship to nature. To achieve that, we will use the body question as a measure of the human–nature relationship and apply the phenomenological method that Ponge took over from Merleau-Ponty. It should be noted that Merleau-Ponty rarely makes reference to Ponge's (...) poems, except for a few incisions in his Causeries. As for Ponge, he uses explicitly only the notion of phenomenological reduction to explain his project of sensitive dictionary. However, we will argue that there are many similarities of thought between the philosopher and the poet, which are still unexplored. (shrink)

"Francis Ponge, souvent qualifié de poète des choses ordinaires, écrit sur la chèvre, le savon, le crottin... Il tente ainsi, hors de tout procédé rhétorique et de toute technique poétique, d'entrer dans les choses comme telles ou telles qu'elles sont. Mais ce 'telles qu'elles sont', souvent nous en faisons un 'telles qu'elles nous paraissent être' à nous-mêmes, nous qui ne savons pas réellement rendre compte de la part sensible des choses. Comment comprendre alors cette immersion dans un univers sensible que (...) l'on sait par avance hors des choses? Cette immersion s'inscrit-elle dans une lecture philosophique de la réalité, une sorte de réduction phénoménologique merleau-pontienne, ou dans une vision naturaliste du monde faisant de la nature un principe fondamental, à la manière de la religion naturelle de Diderot ou de l'écriture naturaliste de Zola? Francis Ponge écrit-il pour montrer les lacunes du langage courant, ou au contraire pour mettre en place un autre langage? Écrit-il ou est-il dans une tentative d'écriture comme tous ces écrivains, tels Sarraute, Blanchot ou Beckett, qui résistent à l'écriture en écrivant?"--. (shrink)

This paper begins with a contrast between two different views about whether the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by vikalpa. For the Abhidharmakośa, the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by the svabhāva-vikalpa whose nature is vitarka; but for Yogācāra, the five sensory consciousnesses are without that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa because vitarka is regarded as belonging merely to the mental consciousness. My hypothesis for explaining such difference is that Yogācāra assigns that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa to mental consciousness rather than (...) to the five sensory consciousnesses. I then look for possible functions of vitarka-vicāra that could map to svabhāva-vikalpa: (a) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (b) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state; (c) nonconceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (d) non-conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state. I argue that the svabhāva-vikalpa in the Abhidharmakośa should map to (c) and (d), which in Yogācāra maps to mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) stipulated by Dignāga. This refers to the discernment of the shape of a cognitive object in the foreground against the background. I end this paper with some general observations about why Yogācāra maps the svabhāvavikapla to the mental consciousness, and about the different senses covered by the Buddhist notion of vikalpa, which is broader than the sense of "conceptualization" as we now understand it. (shrink)