Three visual habituation studies using abstract animations tested the claim that infants’ attachment behavior in the Strange Situation procedure corresponds to their expectations about caregiver–infant interactions. Three unique patterns of expectations were revealed. Securely attached infants expected infants to seek comfort from caregivers and expected caregivers to provide comfort. Insecure-resistant infants not only expected infants to seek comfort from caregivers but also expected caregivers to withhold comfort. Insecure-avoidant infants expected infants to avoid seeking comfort from caregivers and expected caregivers to (...) withhold comfort. These data support Bowlby’s (1958) original claims—that infants form internal working models of attachment that are expressed in infants’ own behavior. (shrink)

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named “dual‐character concepts.” Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual‐character concept “artist” has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of (...) cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual‐character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual‐character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual‐character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither “man” nor “woman” appeared dual‐character‐like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow‐up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored. (shrink)

In this commentary, I question the idea that positive illusions are evolved misbeliefs on the grounds that positive illusions are often maladaptive, are not universal, and may be by-products of existing mechanisms. Further, because different beliefs are adaptive in different situations and cultures, it makes sense to build in a readiness to form beliefs rather than the beliefs themselves.

This important handbook provides a comprehensive, authoritative review of achievement motivation and establishes the concept of competence as an organizing ...

This article explores the implicit theories of morality, or the conceptions regarding the patterns of stability, continuity and change in moral dispositions, both in lay and academic discourses. The controversies surrounding these conceptions and the fragmentation of the models and perspectives in metaethics and moral psychology endangers the pursuit of adequate operationalizations of morally relevant constructs. The current debate between situationists, who deny that character is an useful concept for understanding human behavior, which is better explained by contextual factors (Doris (...) 1998; Harman 1998) and dispositionists, who advocate the cross-situational stability of traits, is also present in the lay discourse, through the existence of competing commonsense ontological assumptions regarding the mutability or alterability of moral features, namely the implicit theories perspective (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu 1997). These personal theories are primary suspects in the affective and cognitive reactions to transgressions: the type of attended information in formulating evaluative judgments, the calibration of moral responsibility and blameworthiness, the assignment of retribution or reparatory recommendations to transgressors. In the second part of the study we attempt to advance toward a more fine-grained inspection of these lay beliefs, arguing that the construct of implicit theories of morality, as it is currently treated and measured, tends to be restrictive and oversimplifying. (shrink)

This article examines two issues related to essentialist beliefs, autonomy and education. The first issue concerns the conceptualization of the role of essentialist beliefs about selfhood in the development of a continually transformative relationship with oneself. We argue that Carol Dweck’s understanding of the regular causality of implicit beliefs about selfhood is too narrow, and that these beliefs are better understood as taking part in a complex relationship of belief. The second issue concerns the way that certain governmental aspects (...) of educational institutions might affect schools’ capacity to help students develop a healthy belief relationship with regard to identity essentialism. Our hypothesis is that further investment in teachers’ professional authority and attentional autonomy, which involves the creation of normative gaps, among other conditions, constitutes a key lever for creating schools in which non-essentialist beliefs are embodied, rather than explained or inculcated. (shrink)

Any first step in organisational adaptation starts with individuals’ responses and willingness (or otherwise) to change an aspect of themselves given the transcontextual settings in which they are operating (Bateson in Small arcs of larger circles: framing through other patterns, Triarchy Press, Axminster, 2018). This research explores the implications for organisational adaptation strategies when Artificial Intelligence (AI) is being embedded into the ecology of the organisation, and when employees have a dominant fixed or growth mindset (Dweck in Mindset: changing (...) the way you think to fulfil your potential. Robinson, London, 2017). Research participants were supplied with a single scenario based in 2030, where—as a result of Artificial Intelligence technology implementation—employees were going to be displaced. Using Torbert’s (Organizational wisdom and executive courage, New Lexington Press, San Francisco, 1998) ‘first, second and third person’ research theory, participants were asked to independently review their thoughts, sense, and image of the future from a fixed mindset position (considered to be the worst case), then from a growth mindset perspective (best case), and then do the same collectively. Five key findings are outlined which support the principle that having a growth mindset is a key component of adaptive capacity and futures literacy. The five key findings conclude that AI adaptation processes need to include compassion and authenticity, embodiment, fundamental needs and motivations, mutual learning and considering what lies beyond the edges of the organisation (Bateson in Small arcs of larger circles: framing through other patterns, Triarchy Press, Axminster, 2018). (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of Daryl Close’s “Fair Grades” . I dispute his view regarding the implications of accepting the purpose of grades as being fundamentally informational. I draw upon data identifying behaviors conducive to success and Carol Dweck’s work to argue for broadening what can be taken into account for a final grade. I argue that the informational purpose of final grades is preserved if we grade with an eye to encouraging general skills and dispositions conducive (...) to success. Also, grading as Close recommends will discourage learning whereas using grades to reinforce positive behaviors is a fulfillment of our responsibility to enhance learning. I also address Close’s claims that curved grading and grade penalties for academic dishonesty are unfair and argue that neither of these practices necessarily corrupts final grades. (shrink)

En éliminant ce qui était considéré comme inessentiel à la décision économique, les économistes ont éliminé la dimension humaine – on a enlevé la chair en ne laissant que des os. Pour revivifier et incarner ce squelette, je m’inspire de la psychologie sociale de Deci et Ryan, Dweck, et Bandura pour approfondir les fondements de la théorie de l’utilité et pour élargir les types de ressources dont disposent les individus, individuellement et en groupe, pour parvenir à leur bien-être. Leurs (...) théories reconnaissent que les effets de la société sur l’individu ne sont pas toujours bons. Leur compréhension nuancée de l’individu dans la société aide à mettre de la chair sur les os des agents économiques en plaçant ces agents dans la société, et suggère comment la société influence les agents et révèle comment les agents travaillent ensemble pour s’adapter et changer la société dans laquelle ils agissent. On développe un modèle qui incorpore certaines de ces caractéristiques et on analyse des exemples appropriés. Le comportement de l’individu n’est pas facilement caractérisé, mais son caractère humain essentiel, même économique, l’est. (shrink)

In Why We Cooperate, Tomasello addresses the problem of human uniqueness, which has become the focus for a lot of recent research at the frontier between the Humanities and the Life Sciences. Being both a developmental psychologist and a primatologist, Tomasello is especially well suited to tackle the subject, and the present book is the most recent one in a series of books and papers by himself and his colleagues. Tomasello’s basic position is squarely a dual-inheritance account, in which human (...) uniqueness is explained both through genetics and through culture. The main idea is that the phylogenetic specificity of humankind rests in its species-specific adaptation for sociability. The account offered by Tomasello contrasts human cooperation and altruism with nonhuman primate competition, and proposes that human altruism leads to shared intentionality. The evolutionary explanation Tomasello offers is that human ancestors were led through some kind of selection pressure to common foraging leading to collaboration and sharing. After outlining Tomasello’s position as it is described in the book, as well as the comments by Dweck, Spelke, Silk, and Skyrms which follow, I discuss Tomasello’s thesis, noting a few problems with his approach. These criticisms are based on his own work and on a number of his own other books and papers, as well as on other relevant work in the domain. (shrink)

In Why We Cooperate, Tomasello addresses the problem of human uniqueness, which has become the focus for a lot of recent research at the frontier between the Humanities and the Life Sciences. Being both a developmental psychologist and a primatologist, Tomasello is especially well suited to tackle the subject, and the present book is the most recent one in a series of books and papers by himself and his colleagues. Tomasello's basic position is squarely a dual-inheritance account, in which human (...) uniqueness is explained both through genetics and through culture. The main idea is that the phylogenetic specificity of humankind rests in its species-specific adaptation for sociability. The account offered by Tomasello contrasts human cooperation and altruism with nonhuman primate competition, and proposes that human altruism leads to shared intentionality. The evolutionary explanation Tomasello offers is that human ancestors were led through some kind of selection pressure to common foraging leading to collaboration and sharing. After outlining Tomasello's position as it is described in the book, as well as the comments by Dweck, Spelke, Silk, and Skyrms which follow, I discuss Tomasello's thesis, noting a few problems with his approach. These criticisms are based on his own work and on a number of his own other books and papers, as well as on other relevant work in the domain. (shrink)