Foreword, by A. P. Brogan.--Retrospective introduction, by C. D. Leake.--Ethicogenesis, by C. D. Leake.--A philosopher's reply to a scientist's ethic, by P. Romanell.--A scientific versus a metaphysical approach to ethics, by C. D. Leake.--A naturalistic versus a positivistic approach to ethics, by P. Romanell.--A naturalistic logic with metaphysics, by P. Romanell.--Science implies freedom, by C. D. Leake.

1. The ethics -- 2. The logics -- 3. The esthetics.

Chauncey D. Leake (1896–1978) occupies a unique place in the history of American bioethics. A pharmacologist, he was largely an autodidact in both history and philosophy, and believed that ethics should ideally be taught to medical students by those with philosophical training. After pioneering work on medical ethics during the 1920s, he helped to lay the groundwork for important centers for bioethics and medical humanities at two institutions where he worked, the University of California-San Francisco and the University (...) of Texas Medical Branch-Galveston. Understanding Leake’s role in American bioethics requires navigating a number of paradoxes—why he was described respectfully in his time but largely forgotten today; how in the 1920s he could write forward-looking pieces that anticipated many of the themes taken up by bioethics a half-century later, yet played largely a reactionary role when the new bioethics actually arrived; and why he advocated turning to philosophy and philosophers for a proper understanding of ethics, yet appeared often to misunderstand philosophical ethics. (shrink)

The idea that plants have minds can sound improbable, but some widely respected contemporary scientists and philosophers find it plausible. It turns out to be rather tricky to vindicate the presumption that plants do not have minds, for doing so requires getting clear about what plants can do and what exactly a mind is. By connecting the most compelling empirical work on plant behavior with philosophical reflection on the concept of minds, _Plant Minds _aims to help non-experts begin to think (...) clearly about whether plants have minds. Relying on current consensus ideas about minds and plants, Chauncey Maher first presents the best case for thinking that plants do _not_ have minds. Along the way, however, he unearths an idea at the root of that case, the idea that having a mind requires the capacity to represent the world. In the last chapter, he defends a relatively new and insightful theory of mind that rejects that assumption, making room for the possibility that plants do have minds, primarily because they are alive. (shrink)

Aristotle’s biological teleology is rooted in an epigenetic account of reproduction. As such, it is best interpreted by consequence etiology. I support this claim by citing the capacity of consequence etiology’s key distinctions to explain Aristotle’s opposition to Empedocles. There are implications for the relation between ancient and modern biology. The analysis reveals that in an important respect Darwin’s account of adaptation is closer to Aristotle’s than to Empedocles’s. They both rely on consequence etiological considerations to evade attributing the purposiveness (...) of organisms to chance. Two implications follow: Darwinian explanations of adaptation are as teleological as Aristotle’s, albeit differently; and these differences show how deeply resistant Aristotle’s version of biological teleology is to descent from a common ancestor. (shrink)

We trace the history of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, and of genetic Darwinism generally, with a view to showing why, even in its current versions, it can no longer serve as a general framework for evolutionary theory. The main reason is empirical. Genetical Darwinism cannot accommodate the role of development (and of genes in development) in many evolutionary processes. We go on to discuss two conceptual issues: whether natural selection can be the “creative factor” in a new, more general framework (...) for evolutionary theorizing; and whether in such a framework organisms must be conceived as self-organizing systems embedded in self-organizing ecological systems. (shrink)

Examination of moral issue in contemporary life ethical questions for Christians.