First published in 1956, this volume constitutes an attempt to identify the moral basis of Burke's political thought. Given Burke's stated belief that contingent political systems are held together by an essential basis in moral principles, this can be seen as a problem of fundamental importance in gaining an understanding of his theories. The obvious difficulty of such an exposition consists in attempting to create common ground between abstract concepts and the mutability of the empirically observed world. The author meets (...) this difficulty with an approach based upon the subtle analysis of particular aspects in Burke's moral thought as they interact with the world. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, political theory, and the development of the British political system. (shrink)

The writings on Burke which I have found most useful are the following: J. MacCunn, The Political Philosophy of Burke, 1913. CE Vaughan, Studies in the..

Sara Parkin: The Positive Deviant: Sustainability Leadership in a Perverse World Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9319-1 Authors Cornelia Butler Flora, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Agriculture and Life Sciences, 317 East Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, IA 50011-1070, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863.

The prolonged neglect of Edmund Burke as a political thinker of the first rank appears to be at last coming to an end. In 1949 Ross Hoffman and Paul Levack broke new ground in their Introduction to the selection of writings and speeches which they published with the title Burke’s Politics. Their Introduction was the first serious attempt at a systematic exposition of the principles, moral and political, which inform the vast and miscellaneous variety of his writings, speeches and correspondence. (...) Now Mr. Charles Parkin explores in depth Burke’s political ideas as the expression of a moral philosophy of man and community. He calls his work an essay. It is a remarkable achievement that anything so brief should hold so much. (shrink)

Introduction Comparative psychology can generally be defined as the branch of psychology that studies the similarities and differences in the behavior of organisms. Formal definitions found in textbooks and encyclopedias disagree whether comparative psychologists restrict their work to the study of animals or include the study of human behavior. This paper offers an opinion on the major problem facing comparative psychology today – where we will find the next generation of comparative psychology students. Something must be done before we lose (...) access to an entire generation of psychology undergraduates. It is not enough to say that comparative psychology is being “absorbed” in other academic units such as “integrative biology”, “integrative study of animal behavior”, “evolutionary psychology”, “comparative cognition”, or “animal cognition.” Indeed, many of these topics are not primarily studied in psychology departments, wherein comparative psychology students have traditionally received joint training in the principles of behavior and comparative analysis, as applied to both humans and other animals. Consider, for example, the difference between comparative psychology and comparative cognition. Comparative cognition includes features of comparative psychology, but they are not identical. Comparative cognition represents a very specific theoretical position whose validity is based on certain suppositions such as the belief (by definition) that the internal cogni... (shrink)

-/- Table des matières Remerciements 1 -/- INTRODUCTION 2 -/- PREMIERE PARTIE LE VIVANT ET LA REVOLUTION SCIENTIFIQUE 7 -/- ONTOLOGIE DU VIVANT OU BIOLOGIE ? LE CAS DE LA RÉVOLUTION SCIENTIFIQUE 8 -/- Introduction 8 La vie et le vivant sont-ils des thèmes de controverse explicites dans la philosophie naturelle de l’âge classique ? 18 Machines de la nature, ferments et métaphysique chimique 28 Crisis, what crisis ? 42 Conclusion 45 -/- LE MÉCANIQUE FACE AU VIVANT 49 -/- Introduction (...) 49 Que signifie : réduire l’homme (ou le vivant) à l’automate ? 51 Qu’est-ce qu’un vivant ? Un mécanisme élargi 56 Le vivant structuro-fonctionnel 64 Conclusion : l’automate affectif 70 -/- UN MATÉRIALISME VITAL ? 73 -/- Introduction : matérialisme et corps 73 Ontologie matérialiste de la Vie ou constitution progressive de la biologie ? 74 Un matérialisme vital 78 Conclusion 84 -/- DEUXIEME PARTIE MATÉRIALISMES ET VIE 87 -/- DÉTERMINISME MENTAL ET NATURALISATION DE L’ESPRIT, DE LOCKE A DIDEROT 88 -/- Introduction 89 Le déterminisme à l’âge classique et son interprétation 89 L’Âme Matérielle et le Traité de la liberté de l’âme : un déterminisme cérébral 94 Locke : la détermination est une perfection 101 Collins : suspendre son vouloir, c’est encore vouloir 105 Diderot : les « causes propres à l’homme » 111 Conclusion 115 -/- LA METTRIE : LA MÉDICALISATION DE LA MORALE ET L’APPROCHE MATÉRIALISTE DU CORPS 117 -/- Introduction 117 Une morale médicale ? 117 La réduction médicale de la morale 120 L’épicurisme médical 125 Une éthique machinale 130 Conclusion 132 -/- DES MOLÉCULES « INTELLIGENTES » A L’ORGANISATION ÉMERGENTE : LE DÉBAT MAUPERTUIS-DIDEROT 134 -/- Introduction 134 Le contexte newtonien et leibnizien 137 L’argument de Maupertuis 139 La critique de Diderot 143 La réponse de Maupertuis 145 Conclusion : enjeux de la discussion 147 -/- UNE BIOLOGIE CLANDESTINE ? LE PROJET D’UN SPINOZISME BIOLOGIQUE CHEZ DIDEROT 150 -/- Introduction 150 Diderot et la biologie 152 Excursus : la naissance de la biologie 155 Spinozistes anciens et modernes 161 Spinozisme et spinosisme 166 Conclusion 168 -/- TROISIEME PARTIE VITALISME 170 -/- ORGANISATION OU ORGANISME ? L’INDIVIDUATION ORGANIQUE SELON LE VITALISME MONTPELLIÉRAIN 171 -/- Introduction : pour introduire au vitalisme de Montpellier 171 Machine et organisation 174 Le concept vitaliste d’organisation, entre Vie et vies 179 Quelle individualité organique ? 186 Organisation ou organisme 190 Conclusion 197 -/- LES ANALOGIES NEWTONIENNES DANS LES SCIENCES DE LA VIE AU XVIIIE SIÈCLE : VITALISME ET PROCÉDÉS EXPLICATIFS PROVISOIREMENT INEXPLICABLES 200 -/- Introduction 200 Le newtonianisme médical littéral 206 Les transpositions non-littérales de la méthode newtonienne : Buffon, Maupertuis et Hartley 212 Haller : une physiologie de « noms d’attente » 216 Le vitalisme du XVIIIe siècle, un « positivisme prudent » plutôt qu’une « métaphysique impénitente » 220 L’antimathématisme de Mandeville et de Diderot 233 Conclusion 240 -/- VITALISME ET VIVISECTION : APPROCHES VITALISTES DE L’EXPÉRIMENTATION ANIMALE 245 -/- Introduction 245 Considérations préliminaires sur le XVIIe siècle 248 L’École de Montpellier 251 Ménuret de Chambaud 255 Un intermezzo sur Diderot 260 Fouquet et Bordeu contre Haller 263 Conclusion 267 -/- LE CHARME DISCRET DU VITALISME SANS MÉTAPHYSIQUE, XVIIIe - XXe SIÈCLES 272 -/- Introduction 272 Vitalisme substantiel et vitalisme fonctionnel 274 Vitalisme et biologie 279 Conclusion 283 -/- QUATRIEME PARTIE ORGANISME ET BIOPHILOSOPHIE 285 -/- L’ORGANISME : CONCEPT HYBRIDE ET POLÉMIQUE 285 -/- Introduction 286 L’organisme, un hybride 287 L’organisme comme individualité 290 Organisme et organicisme 296 L’organisme vitaliste 301 Ontologie de l’organisme 303 Conclusion 305 -/- LE RETOUR DU VITALISME : CANGUILHEM ET LE PROJET D’UNE BIOPHILOSOPHIE 307 -/- Introduction 307 Un vitalisme passe-partout 308 L’organisme entre épistémologie et ontologie 312 Une métaphysique de l’oursin ? Bioexceptionalisme et biochauvinisme 313 Vitalisme versus mysticisme de la chair 317 Conclusion 323 -/- HOLISME, ORGANICISME ET BIOCHAUVINISME 327 -/- Introduction : organicismes forts et faibles 327 Le holisme et l’organicisme plurivoques 329 Deux remarques critiques au sujet de deux périls étrangement connexes de la théorie holiste-organiciste 333 Holisme, biochauvinisme et subjectivité 337 Conclusion 341 -/- CONCLUSION : LA PHILOSOPHIE DE LA BIOLOGIE AVANT LA BIOLOGIE 345 -/- Bibliographie 350 Index 404. (shrink)

La question du rapport de la pensée bachelardienne à la mathématique contemporaine a longtemps été éludée au profit exclusif d'une interprétation fautive. Un Bachelard formé à la physique et à la chimie qui n'auraitjamais donné sa véritable place à l'étude mathématique est l'interprétation qui prédomine depuis le colloque de Cerisy (1974). Le logicien Roger Martin affinne qu'il existe un silence coupable autour du problème des fondements (problématique ensembliste, axiomatique et logicisme). À partir d'une analyse serrée des textes, cette étude renoue (...) avec une image beaucoup plus juste d'un Bachelard pour qui la mathématique n'est rien de moins que « le sur-moi de la science ». (shrink)

Responding to claims to the contrary, this essay shows how liberal education, the education of critical exposure, indoctrinates students into a style of belief and belief formation. It argues that a common liberal view about what constitutes freedom from indoctrination is precisely the form of indoctrination feared by many conservative communitarians. While I support the style and procedures of liberal education, I argue that we cannot excise all indoctrinating components from it by semantic, logical or epistemic analyses of what indoctrination (...) or education means. (shrink)

Should engineering ethics be taught? Despite the obvious truism that we all want our students to be moral engineers who practice virtuous professional behavior, I argue, in this article that the question itself obscures several ambiguities that prompt preliminary resolution. Upon clarification of these ambiguities, and an attempt to delineate key issues that make the question a philosophically interesting one, I conclude that engineering ethics not only should not, but cannot, be taught if we understand “teaching engineering ethics” to mean (...) training engineers to be moral individuals (as some advocates seem to have proposed). However, I also conclude that there is a justification to teaching engineering ethics, insofar as we are able to clearly identify the most desirable and efficacious pedagogical approach to the subject area, which I propose to be a case study-based format that utilizes the principle of human cognitive pattern recognition. (shrink)

La Valeur inductive de la relativité est sans conteste l'ouvrage le plus méconnu de toute l'oeuvre «philosophique» de Gaston Bachelard. Au silence presque total, à l'absence de lectures, ne répondent que des interprétations du« premier genre», appuyées sur un certain ouï-dire discursif, mais qui font l'autorité des pseudo-standards. Les positions bachelardiennes sont ici confrontées à La Déduction relativiste d'Émile Meyerson. Le poids de l'analyse portera essentiellement sur un dépl(o)iement du dispositif bachelardien d'induction et de construction. L'appareillage « inductif » doit (...) être pensé sur le modèle électromagnétique, et la position «constructiviste» est toujours liée au travail de synthèse. Enfin, c'est une véritable métaphysique que semble dès lors devoir engendrer cette « pensée des sciences ». (shrink)

One does not have to share William Connolly's vitalist affiliations in order to have serious reservations about Ruth Leys's essay and response.1 Simple phenomenological concerns will do to make one suspicious of her core claim:From my perspective, intentionality involves concept-possession; the term intentionality carries with it the idea that thoughts and feelings are directed to conceptually and cognitively appraised and meaningful objects in the world. The general aim of my paper is to propose that affective neuroscientists and the new affect (...) theorists are thus making a mistake when they suggest that emotion or affect can be defined in nonconceptual or nonintentional terms.2I worry about the difficulty of defining the boundaries of a notion like conceptual, especially since on the next page Leys claims an equivalence between cognition and signification. There seems at least a tendency toward tautology in equating “nonconceptual” with “nonintentional,” as if one could be used to define the other. But then signification enters the picture, although criteria for signification involve simple recognition and do not implicate the awareness of logical connectives that seem necessary for conceptual and cognitive appraisal. And the Wittgenstein in me worries even more why Leys thinks that intentionality should be confined to only one set of traits despite the fact that a great variety of language games depend on something like intentional awareness. (shrink)

In Stig Hjarvard’s characterization, mediatization studies move beyond the positivist origins of the social sciences, as they must in order to avoid the fundamental contradiction between original commitments to classical determinism vis-à-vis human agency as acknowledged within mediatization studies. In order to sustain and enhance Hjarvard’s vision of the coherence between human agency and mediatization studies as a species of social science, I first sharpen these theoretical tensions by developing a robust account of human freedom as informed by Kant and (...) virtue ethics. I then adopt precise understandings of complementarity and epistemological pluralism as initially developed in Quantum Mechanics and subsequently by Karen Barad and Judith Simon as frameworks that can coherently conjoin contemporary social science with strong accounts of human freedom. The resulting coherency—or entanglement—between ethics and science implies new ethical responsibilities for social scientists as ‘virtuous agents’. (shrink)

Yang returns to the problem of referential ambiguity, addressed in the opening paper by Gleitman and Trueswell. Using a computational approach, he argues that “big data” approaches to resolving referential ambiguity are destined to fail, because of the inevitable computational explosion needed to keep track of contextual associations present when a word is uttered. Yang tests several computational models, two of which depend on one‐trial learning, as described in Gleitman and Trueswell’s paper. He concludes that such models outperform cross‐situational learning (...) models, thereby formalizing, reinforcing, and advancing the conclusions offered by Gleitman and Trueswell. (shrink)

There are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first‐person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self‐consciousness. Some suppose that when we encounter such disputes we have no choice but to abandon first‐person reflection in (...) philosophy of mind in favor of a third‐person methodology. Such reaction is unwarranted. A reasoned assessment of phenomenological disputes that relies on first‐person reflection is explained, illustrated, and advocated. (shrink)

This chapter reports the philosophy focusing mainly on just three foundational concerns. These are: the character of a phenomenological approach; its use to clarify the notion of phenomenal consciousness ; and its application to questions about a specifically sensory phenomenality and its ‘intentionality’ or ‘object-directedness’. Phenomenology involves the use of ‘first-person reflection’. The ways into the notion of phenomenality are elaborated. The ‘subjective experience’ conception of phenomenality uses a conception of experience on which this is something that coincides with the (...) subject's experience of it, and differs insofar as the subject experiences it differently. The conception of phenomenality combines subjective experience, subjective contrast, and subjective knowledge, elaborating on each of these to yield distinct but mutually reinforcing accounts. It then argues on phenomenological grounds that the character of sense experience makes it ‘objectual’ and susceptible to experiences of illusion and disillusion. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on Robert B. Pippin's Philosophy by Other MeansCharles AltieriRobert Pippin's book is terrific in many ways.1 He not only makes Hegel's aesthetic theorizing lucid; he makes it extremely attractive, especially in his account of how artists double the sensuous world so that an artwork embodies the presence of the spirit's labor. And he proposes a forceful case that Hegelian thinking can honor the contributions art makes to philosophy, (...) given that a major challenge for philosophy is to capture "its own time reflected in thought." Hence G. W. F. Hegel treats works of literature "not as examples of an ideal or moral commitment or the expression of general norms, but as criterial aspects of just what it could be to espouse or avow such a value or, more important, … for such a value to lose its grip on its adherents" (p. 222, emphasis added).The opening of his second essay, on J. M. Coetzee, elaborates this claim by making two assertions—"that fiction can be a distinctive form of thought, even a form of knowledge," and "that such knowledge is relevant to, has a bearing on, the sort of knowledge that philosophy, or at least some version of philosophy tries to achieve" (p. 240). Modern literature, in particular, offers this knowledge largely because it is obsessed with problems of self-reflection that are also basic to the age's philosophical concerns. Hegel shows that in modernity, self-consciousness must establish new imaginative relations between subjectivity and what seem objective conditions in order to address the inherent tensions and senses [End Page 234] of contradiction inevitable when persons face historical change on this large a scale. And Pippin's essays on literature show how significant, and how disturbing, the need for understanding these efforts at shaping identity can become.II want first to register the kinds of observations Pippin's approach can develop for particular works of art. Then we will have a framework for clarifying and assessing his arguments, in ways that his dealing with art, especially modern writing, may help us dialectically stage how his views can be sublated. Pippin performs a minor, yet brilliant, example of sublation in his essay on Immanuel Kant's hatred of tragedy. Kant's aversion is based on his belief that we "cannot make ethical sense" (p. 35) of how tragedy contradicts anything reason can assert. (And in denying the power of moral reasoning, tragedy also denies the presence of the divine in human life.) This observation then becomes a difficult dilemma for philosophy: either we dismiss tragedy or we expand what counts as philosophy. But Pippin finds in philosophy the expansion he needs by deploying Friedrich Nietzsche's argument against Kant: what we "need in our response to tragedy is not understanding but strength" (p. 36).The issue of tragedy deepens in Pippin's first essay on literature, about Henry James's What Maisie Knew, but largely because of what Pippin does not address. Pippin emphasizes how James thinks Maisie demonstrates to herself and to others that she can ultimately understand her position regarding her dangerously charming parents and caregivers. In Maisie's final choice to leave with her caregiver nurse, Mrs. Wix, she takes responsibility for her relationship to her entire social circle and demonstrates to its members her capacity to free herself from them. She thereby satisfies Hegel's demand that self-knowledge can reasonably be claimed only when one acts on that knowledge; and is capable, when challenged, of standing behind what she has determined. For she then accomplishes two feats. Her action presents self-knowledge not as a report of an inner state but as "a reflexive stance taken up for reasons in a social world" (p. 171). And it does so in a context of "social contestations" rather than settling for a limited projection of herself to herself (p. 164). However, I claim later that while James is certainly impressed by Maisie, her knowledge does not prevent the tragic consequence of dooming her to a life where her multiple virtues are not [End Page 235] likely to be realized. At times, literary texts show how self-knowledge... (shrink)

As time passed, I discovered with surprise that the important role I assigned to literature was not recognized by everyone.iThis essay constitutes one aspect of an overall project to spell out the implications for the literary arts of Wittgenstein's systematic distinction between acts of description that carry truth values and acts of expression that display states of mind and feeling but do not describe them. My full case will require a book. That is good news for me but bad news (...) for the present reader, since I feel I have to offer a painfully brief version of my overall theoretical position as a backdrop for what I will say about appreciation. Expressions elicit or solicit attunement rather than propose .. (shrink)

This article revisits Jeffrey Tulis’s The Rhetorical Presidency in the age of Trump, discussing the debates to which it originally responded, its core thesis and empirical evidence, as well as its impact on political science in the last three decades. The article’s second half turns to a recent critique of Tulis’s thesis by Ann C. Pluta, which manifests many of the misunderstandings that have persisted since The Rhetorical Presidency’s original publication. Habits of thought revealed in Pluta’s misunderstandings, I argue, are (...) emblematic of the political culture that is amenable to the simplistic yet politically effective appeals characteristic of rhetorical presidents like Donald Trump. Elements of the broader political-science world that are on display in Pluta’s article are symptomatic of political pathologies sustained and aggravated by the culture of the polity that political scientists inhabit and purport to study—the culture of the rhetorical presidency. (shrink)

Robust realism is defended by developing further the account in Inquiry 42 (1999), pp. 49-78 of how human beings make things and people intelligible. Incommensurate worlds imply a violation of the principle of noncontradiction, but this violation does not have the consequences normally feared. Given our capacities to make things intelligible, some things, like human action, are most intelligible when they are understood as contradictory (e.g. free and determined). Things-in-themselves need not have contradictory features for multiple orders of nature to (...) make sense. We can coherently suppose that both Western and Chinese science give two incommensurable and complete accounts of the functioning of the human body. Since things do not have contradictory properties, we would then have to suppose that, in the case of bodies, there are two independent functional orders. If this can be true for bodies, it can be true for the orders of nature as a whole. John Haugeland's account of systems and interfaces shows us how to make sense of necessary functional components of the universe. Finally, multiple realism makes more sense than Rorty's deflationary pragmatism because it explains how things can matter. (shrink)

Stasis is a process of classical rhetoric that identifies the core issue in a trial or a similar debate. Hermagoras of Temnos included the first comprehensive analysis of stasis in his second-century BCE treatise on rhetoric, now lost. Modern scholars tend to echo George Kennedy, who maintains that Hermagoras’ inspiration for the hierarchical structure of stasis is indeterminate. This article, however, employs scholarship in legal semiotics, including the work of Miklós Könczöl and Bernard S. Jackson, to argue that Hermagoras based (...) stasiastic structure on Aristotle’s first-figure syllogism. Ideally, knowledge of that structure can enhance modern applications of stasis. (shrink)

Standard test questions allow the questioner to confirm an answer as correct, displaying their greater epistemic authority over the answerer. But the instructional power of test questions may prompt their use even when that asymmetry is neutralized or reversed, and the recipient ought to know as much as, or indeed more than, the questioner. I describe how staff who support clients with intellectual impairment use what I call ‘recipient-side’ test questions, where the questioner claims final authority over matters in the (...) recipient’s experience, even though it is the recipient who has prior entitlement and access to it. When recipient-side test questions fail, questioners may revert to the standard test question asymmetry by hinting at, or openly asserting, their own epistemic authority. (shrink)