Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, 20. Yüzyılın en önemli Türk şair ve düşünürlerinden biridir. İslami hareketin sembollerinden biri olmasına rağmen, popülaritesi sadece dindar kesimlerle sınırlı kalmamıştır. Ülke genelinde büyük bir üne kavuşmuş, farklı kültürel çevrelerden, değişik fikir akımlarına mensup hayranlara sahip olmuştur. Bu durum şairin ifadelerinin akıcılığı, edebi yeteneğinin gücü ve Türkçeyi hem şiir hem nesirde ustalıkla kullanmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Onun velûd bir yazar niteliğiyle çok sayıda ürün vermiş olması yazdıklarının edebi değerini düşürmemiştir. Ayrıca gençliğinden beri farklı gazete ve dergilerde makaleler yazmıştır. Otuz (...) yılı aşkın bir süre "Büyük Doğu" mecmuasını yayımlamıştır. Aynı isimle bir yayınevi kurmuş ve yaklaşık yüz kitap neşretmiştir. Şair olarak divanlar yayımlamasının yanı sıra hikayeler, romanlar, piyesler telif etmiş, fikri, ahlaki ve siyasi yazılar yazmıştır. Otuz yaşına kadar “bohem” diye tavsif ettiği bir hayat sürmüş, ruhi boşluktan kurtulamamıştır. Sonrasında bir vesileyle tanıştığı döneminin tanınan medrese alimi ve mutasavvıf Abdülhakim Arvasi’den etkilenmiştir. Böylece köklü bir fikri dönüşüm yaşamış, İslami dünya görüşünü benimsemiştir. Bu merhaleden sonra çok çeşitliliğe sahip edebi ürünlerinin tümünde inanç ve fikirlerini cesaretle savunmayı gaye edinmiştir. Muhalif bir kimlikle döneminin devlet ricaline alenen tenkitler yönetmekten çekinmemiştir. Bu uğurda ortaya koyduğu mücadele sebebiyle resmi kovuşturmalara maruz kalmış, defalarca hapis yatmıştır. Edebi faaliyetlerini, fikir kavgası niteliğinde icra etmiş, vefatına kadar da bu çizgisini sürdürmüştür. Tüm bu özellikleri birçok çevrede saygın bir mevkiye sahip olmasını sağlamıştır. Türk edebiyatındaki bu etkili konumuna rağmen Necip Fazıl, hala Arap okuyucusu tarafından nispeten bilinmemektedir. Arap araştırmacıların şaire dair teşekküre şayan değerli araştırmalar ve makaleler telif etmiş olmalarına rağmen eserleri henüz hak ettiği seviyede Arap okuyucusuna tanıtılabilmiş değildir. Burada Türkçeden Arapçaya tercüme faaliyetlerinin çok güçlü olmamasının etkisi akla gelebilir. Ancak başka Türk edebiyatçıların kitaplarının Arapçaya tercüme edildiği dikkate alındığında Necip Fazıl’ın eserleri özelinde bir eksiklikten bahsetmek yanlış olmaz. Her halükârda edebi eserleri Arapçaya çevirenler için yazarın ürünleri zengin bir servet mahiyetindedir. Biz de bu bağlamda Necip Fazıl’ın “Çile” adlı kitabından bazı şiirleri Arapça tahlil ederek manzum halde bu dile çevirdik. Manzumelerde klasik Arap şiiri kaidelerini dikkate aldık. Aynı şiirleri nesir olarak da çevirdik ve anlaşılmalarını kolaylaştırmak için kısa açıklamalar ekledik. Orijinal olduğunu düşündüğümüz bu çalışmamızla, Türk edebiyatı metinlerini Arapçaya çevirerek alana katkıda bulunanlar arasında yer almayı umuyoruz. (shrink)

Türkiye'de din eğitimi bilimi, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi'ndeki akademik disiplinler içinde doğmuş ve alanın ilk akademisyenleri bu fakültede yetişmiştir. Fakültenin açılışından uzun bir süre sonra kurulan Din Eğitimi Anabilim Dalı, yeni kurulan ilahiyat fakültelerinin din eğitimi akademisyenlerini yetiştirmede öncü rol oynamıştır. Bu makalede, alanında ilk ve lider olmasından dolayı Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi üzerine yoğunlaşılarak, din eğitiminin Türkiye'de bilimsel bir disiplin olarak gelişmesi tartışılmaktadır. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki mevcut din eğitiminin genel kurumsal görünümü ile ilgili bilgi verilmektedir. Araştırmada, din eğitimi bölümünün tarihsel (...) gelişimini ortaya koymak amacıyla Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi arşivleri incelenmiştir. İlk elden bilgiler, Yönetim Kurulu, Profesörler ve Fakülte Kurulu karar defterlerinden alınmıştır. Din Eğitimi Bölümü'nün karakteristik özellikleri, bilimsel yönelimleri ve katkıları incelenirken, bölümün akademisyenleri tarafından yürütülen bilimsel çalışmalar ve onların lisans ve lisansüstü öğrencilerine atıfta bulunulmuştur. In this article, the theoretical and practical contributions concerning the rise and development of religious education science, its basic characteristics, orientations and fields as an academic discipline in Turkey are discussed. Religious education made its first step into academic disciplines at the Ankara University Divinity Faculty. And first academicians in the field of religious education were taught at this faculty. Department of Religious Education, which was established after a long time, took the lead in educating religious education academicians in newly established divinity faculties. Moreover; the end of this article, information is given in relation to the general institutional appearance of religious education in nowdays Turkey. During the research, in order to reveal the historical development of department of religious education, archives of Ankara University Divinity Faculty were examined. First-hand information was derived from decision books of Administrative, Professors and Faculty Board. When exploring the characteristic features, scientific orientations and contributions of Department of Religious Education, the scientific works carried out by department’s academicians and their graduate and postgraduate students were referred to. (shrink)

In recent years, decision-making processes related to medical practices have undergone a change from physician paternalism towards patient autonomy. However, it has been put forward that this situation has changed into or strengthened the parent paternalism for children. Parental paternalism might bring along decisions of refusing the child’s treatment, in such a way to occasionally violate the health right of the child. Paternalistic attitude of parents may also cause physicians to direct towards defensive medicine practices and to display a tendency (...) of avoiding legal liability rather than the benefit of the patient. Coming to the decision of the parent on refusing the child’s treatment together defensive medicine approach of the physician and an environment, where the legal protection mechanisms for the child are not efficient enough, causes serious violations of health rights. International contracts and national law require the protection of the child’s best interest in all cases. In that case, parent’s decision on refusing treatment of the child should be restricted within the scope of the child’s best interest and healthy life right. (shrink)

The present article deals with the developments in Islamic theology in higher education in Europe with a focus on those in Germany. The main objectives of the study are to identify the developments regarding Islamic theology at European universities in recent years and to evaluate these developments in the context of the opportunities and problems. Since European states and nations, possessing Judeo-Christian-Western values, are in search of ways to enable Muslims to live in harmony with themselves due to the growing (...) Muslim share of the population throughout Europe. This issue has great importance for the future of Islam and Muslims in Europe. One aspect of these pursuits concerns the establishment academic programmes on/over Islamic theology at European universities. The question of “Is it possible to develop an interpretation of Islam that will live in harmony with European values?” is an important issue that is being focused on across Europe, especially in Germany. The academic studies of Islamic theology, addressing this question, started in the 2000s and has gained momentum over the past decade. Creating an understanding of Islam to live in peace with Western European values and educating people who will provide Islamic religious education and religious services within this scope are the main goals of the initiatives for introducing the Islamic theology programmes at European universities. The subject is addressed by the autobiographical methods in the light of many years of experience and the literature survey. (shrink)

Summary In the attempt to understand science, definition is not much of a help. Due to the ever growing complexity of science, no unique and universally valid set of defining criteria is available. Hence, certain distinctions are resorted to: science is both a body of tested knowledge and a method of inquiry. The latter, in turn, consists of two phases: discovery and confirmation. The writer argues that it is mainly in respect of its method that science can best be characterized (...) and distinguished from other types of inquiry. (shrink)

Temelini Harvard Üniversitesi’nde savunulan bir doktora tezinin oluşturduğu bu çalışma, Bizans hakkındaki Arap-İslam görüşünün yüzyıllar boyunca süren savaş, temas ve karşılıklı alışveriş ile geçirdiği evrim sürecinin bölgesel-tarihsel gelişmeler bağlamında izini sürmektedir. Kitap Giriş, Bizans’la karşılaşma, Bizans’ın karşısında durmak, İslam savunmada ve Yeni bir gerçeklik: Bizans’ı yeniden ziyaret başlıkları altında dört ana bölüm ve Sonuç kısmından oluşmaktadır. Başlıklardan da anlaşılacağı üzere, dört ana bölümün her biri nitelikleri belirgin dönemleri ele almaktadır. Bu yazıda da kitabın mevcut sistematiğine uyularak her bir kısım ayrı (...) ayrı ele alınmış, yazarın temel iddiaları özetlenmiş, seçme örnekler verilmiş ve tüm bunlar değerlendirilmiştir. (shrink)

This article has been designed in the context of the religious education needs of parents with orthopedically disabled children and their views on the content and method of this religious education. The aim of the study is to reveal the religious education needs of parents with orthopedically disabled children and their views on the content and method of religious education from a descriptive point of view. In this study, one of the qualitative research methods case study was preferred. The study (...) group consists of 20 parents determined by the maximum diversity sampling, one of the purposive sampling methods. The data were analyzed by coding according to the themes and titles determined in the context of the problematic of the study with the descriptive analysis method. As a result of the study, it was determined that parents need religious education based on the opinions of the parents. Parents suggested that the content of religious education for them could be in the form of the convenience in which religion provides for the disabled, the place of disability in religion, the test and the contribution of belief in the hereafter to the disabled. Parents think that it would be beneficial to provide them with religious education by preparing books and brochures on disability and by organizing religious education programs at home and in rehabilitation center. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...) “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue (...) of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism. (shrink)

In this article, I aim to present some of the reasons why consciousness is viewed as an intractable problem by many philosophers. Furthermore, I will argue that if these reasons are properly appreciated, then McGinn’s so-called mysterianism may not sound as far-fetched as it would otherwise sound.

Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of an experience but not the properties (...) of the experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly target the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the antifunctionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused of committing the fallacy of confusing the two. (shrink)

How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...) insist that perceptual experiences provide epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs about the external world as we pre-reflectively take it to be, then one should find a way of avoiding Cartesianism. Here are the two main aims of this paper: firstly, identify the premise that is doing the heavy-lifting work in the Cartesian thinking; and, secondly, formulate an adequate way of denying that premise. The adequacy I claim for my formulation of a way of denying the premise will roughly amount to this: the way I offer is not as susceptible to Cartesian traps as other apparently available ways of denying the premise are. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of (...) an identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s epistemic progress when she first experiences red has two different stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there is good reason to think that the first epistemic stage cannot be thus considered. (shrink)

Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the (...) subject’s intellectual abilities explain why a given proposition, p, is justified for her, and argues that, contra the orthodoxy, this proposal leads to explaining propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification rather than vice versa. In this paper, I argue for the following claims: (i) There are good reasons to think that Turri misidentifies “the orthodox view” and his objection thereby misfires, (ii) Even if we assume that Turri’s identification of the orthodox view is correct, his counter-examples to that view are far from being decisive, and (iii) Turri’s own proposal is not “an alternative” to the orthodox view but can be accommodated by it. (shrink)

This paper introduces a continuum microelectromagnetic theory (also called micromorphic electromagnetic theory), to discuss electromagnetic phenomena in bodies with microstructures. Balance laws of microelectromagnetic media of the first-grade are given. Constitutive equations are developed. The field equations are obtained . It has been shown that, this theory gives rise to several new vector and tensor waves. A theorem of conservation of energy (Poynting type) is proved. Dispersion relations are obtained for both vector and tensor waves. Relations of tensor waves to (...) microscopic phenomena (such as spin waves) are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.

In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.

In “A well-founded solution to the generality problem,” Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief’s being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim follows straightforwardly from (...) the unavoidability claim. The third one is what I call the basing solution claim: An appeal to the notion of basing relation is all we need to solve the generality problem for (process) reliabilism. In this paper, I will argue that the unavoidability claim and the basing solution claim are false and that the legitimacy claim might be true only in a qualified sense. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument (...) from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it. (shrink)

In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and clarify some of its main underlying assumptions. There are various responses to be found (...) in Klein’s works to this argument, and my aim is to show that none of those responses can be plausibly held without infinitism losing its title to being a genuine non-skeptical alternative. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.

Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, (...) a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience. Second, I claim that because of "the problem of random distribution," global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relation to capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance with Stalnaker's relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally, I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionist global supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic (...) is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic. (shrink)

The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.