Nos societes ont evolue au cours du XXe siecle selon un mode de developpement qui n'est tout simplement pas viable a long terme et qui provoquera de graves crises environnementales. Nous faisons presentement face au defi crucial de la survie de l'humanite, nous en sommes de plus en plus conscients. Aussi, mon propos ne consistera pas a enumerer toutes les catastrophes ecologiques qui nous menacent si nous persistons dans la voie du developpement non durable. Je veux plutot soulever une serie (...) de reflexions et suggerer quelques principes qui peuvent guider nos efforts pour amorcer les necessaires changements. J'expose donc dans cet ouvrage les elements de politique que j'estime souhaitables et realisables pour prendre le virage vers ce que j'appelle le Quebec vert et bleu. Scott McKay. (shrink)

This anthology provides an accessible introduction to East Asian Buddhism, focusing specifically on China, Korea, and Japan. It begins with a detailed historical introduction that includes an overview of the development of the various schools of Buddhism in East Asia and traces the transmission of Buddhism from Northwest India to China in the first century CE, and then to Korea and Japan in the fourth and sixth centuries CE. The first part of the book contains five chapters that offer creative (...) pedagogies that can help college professors infuse East Asian Buddhism into their courses. The second part includes six interdisciplinary chapters that explore thematic links between East Asian Buddhism and religious studies, philosophy, film studies, literature, and environmental studies. (shrink)

les détails relatifs à l’ordre spontané en attirant notre attention sur la réflexion sous-jacente qui se manifeste à travers tout ce processus évolutionnaire, ainsi que sur la nature de cet ordre spontané qui présente une dépendance de sentier. Le fait que la “magie” de l’ordre spontané ait été considérée comme un fait acquis a engendré une sorte de sous-investissement dans les recherches visant à approfondir la connaissance de ce qui anime les institutions émergentes “de l’action humaine mais non d’un dessein (...) humain”. Reconnaissant cet état de fait, Samuels a tenté de se “salir les mains” en se penchant de plus près sur le miracle de l’ordre spontané. Dans cet article, les auteurs font une analyse descriptive de la thèse de Samuels mais prennent aussi le temps de reconnaître que son travail se présente comme une formation hybride de l’oeuvre contractualiste de Buchanan et de l’oeuvre de Hayek dans le domaine de l’évolution sociale.Warren Samuels’ continues trying to “work out” the details of the spontaneous order by drawing our attention to the underlying deliberation present throughout this entire evolutionary process, as well as the path dependent nature of the spontaneous order. The taking for granted of the “magical” features of the spontaneous order has caused an under-investment in research attempting to get inside to examine what really drives the institutions emerging from “human action, but not of human design.” Recognizing this, Samuels has attempted to get his hands dirty by looking much closer at the miracle of the spontaneous order. In this piece the authors offer a descriptive analysis of Samuels’ thesis, while also taking the time to recognize Samuels’ work in political economy as a hybridization of Buchanan’s contractarian work and Hayek’s work in social evolution. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: L’«argument de la mort» de David Mackie prétend montrer que le critère psychologique de l’identité personnelle ne peut pas être adéquat, vu que les cadavres sont des gens et ne sont pourtant pas dotés de psychologie. Mackie soutient que les tenants du critère psychologique ne peuvent pas se contenter d’affirmer que le terme «personne» désigne tout simplement quelque chose qui a nécessairement des capacités psychologiques, car ce serait là, prétend-il, commettre une pétition de principe à l’encontre de sa position. (...) Et il prétend, de plus, que le langage ordinaire corrobore sa façon de voir. Je soutiens, cependant, que cet appui du langage ordinaire n’est guère concluant, et que la théorie psychologique a les ressources nécessaires pour rendre compte du discours sur les personnes mortes. (shrink)

Studies using Posner’s spatial cueing paradigm have demonstrated that participants can allocate their attention to specific target locations based on the predictiveness of preceding cues. Four experiments were conducted to investigate attentional orienting processes operating in a high probability condition as compared to a low probability condition using various types of centrally-presented cues. Spatially-informative cues resulted in cueing effects for both probability conditions, with significantly larger CEs in the high probability conditions than the low probability conditions. Participants in the high (...) probability conditions reported little or no awareness of cue–target probabilities after task completion. Our results provide support for an implicit learning account of the proportion valid effect under experimental conditions involving spatially-informative central cues and relatively short stimulus onset asynchronies. (shrink)

Aux Etats-Unis les gouvernements des Etats tout autant que le gouvernement fédéral jouent un rôle important dans le traitement des effets des sinistres naturels. Le gouvernement fédéral subventionne l’assurance-inondations pour les individus, les entreprises privées et les gouvernements d’Etats et locaux, et il affecte des fonds sur une base ad hoc pour reconstruire après de très importants sinistres naturels tels que de fortes inondations ou des tremblements de terre. Les gouvernements des Etats réglementent l’assurance-seïsme et l’assurance-ouragan en imposant à l’ensemble (...) des assurances et à certains de leurs utilisateurs de subventionner d’autres assurés. Cet article analyse les diverses formes d’implications gouvernementales dans l’assistance des sinistres et évalue de manière critique les arguments normatifs pour ces formes de participations et de réglementations. Il propose que le gouvernement fédéral se retire du marché de l’assurance-inondation et que les gouvernements des états arrêtent de réglementer les marchés d’assurance privés qui obligent des gens à subventionner l’assurance pour d’autres.Government at both the state and federal level in the United States has an extensive role in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. The federal government provides subsidized flood insurance to private individuals, businesses, and state and local government, and it appropriates f unds on an ad hoc basis for rebuilding after highly visible natural disasters such as large floods and earthquakes. State governments regulate earthquake insurance and hurricane insurance in ways that force the insurance industry and some of its customers to subsidize other policyholders. This essay details the various forms of government involvement in disaster assistance and critically evaluates the normative arguments for these forms of government involvement and regulation. It proposes that the federal government should withdraw from the flood insurance market and that state governments should stop regulating private insurance markets in such a way that some people are forced to subsidize insurance for others. (shrink)

Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In (...) a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants’ conclusion that “compassion” is a more adequate emotion than “sadness”. The emotion “sadness” is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion “compassion” is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. (shrink)

The five books of Artemidorus of Ephesus’ Oneirocritica (c. second century CE) constitute the largest collection of divinatory dream-interpretations to survive from Graeco-Roman antiquity. This article examines Artemidorus’ contribution to longstanding medico-philosophical debates over the ontological and epistemic character of such dreams. As with wider Mediterranean traditions concerning premonitory dreams, Greeks and Romans popularly understood them as phenomena with origins exterior to the dreamer (e.g. a visitation of a god). Presocratic and Hippocratic thinkers, however, initiated an effort to bring at (...) least some dream events within the body as interior processes of a physical soul, a bodily turn which ultimately engendered a split in thinking about the possibility and scope of prophetic and diagnostic dreams (e.g. Hippocrates Regimen 4, Aristotle On Prophecy in Dreams, Rufus of Ephesus, and Galen). Here, I examine the way that Artemidorus meant the Oneirocritica to address seriously questions about the origins of dreams and the powers of empirical science in two, related ways. We will see that his defense of oneirocriticism as a techne unfolds along two main axes. First, Artemidorus constructs a necessary veneer of scientific credibility by mobilizing the tropes and organizational strategies characteristic of contemporary technical literature. Secondly, he anchors that authority upon a materialist account of prophetic dreams as “semiotic movements of the soul.” As Price, S. 1986. “The Future of Dreams: From Freud to Artemidorus.” Past & Present 113: 3–36 and Harris-McCoy, D. 2012. Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica: Text, Translation, and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press observed, this explicit commitment to an empirical method of dream-interpretation resembles that of the Hellenistic medical ‘sect’ known as ‘Empiricists,’ who eschewed interest in theoretical etiology in favor of observation, comparison, and compilation of symptoms and outcomes. Pushing beyond similarity, I argue that Artemidorus not only deployed this method to defend empirically grounded accounts of dream-divination (cf. Cicero De div. 1), but endeavored to show that such a scientific method can be used to stabilize and corral productively the potentially infinite number of interpretations any dream-sign might bear without recourse to an underlying, causal theory. (shrink)

En 2018, première véritable année de la présidence de Trump, il devint parfaitement clair que la relation transatlantique était entrée dans une phase de profond désaccord, suscitant quantités de témoignages et de commentaires pessimistes dans la presse anglo-américaine. A partir de ce constat, l’article reconsidère l’étude du « transatlantique » en tant qu’aire géographique. Il aborde la manière d’appréhender le temps (la périodisation), l’espace (l’échelle) et la discipline (la méthodologie) afin de remettre en question les hypothèses classiques et d’ouvrir de (...) nouvelles voies pour la recherche, la formation identitaire et l’engagement émancipateur. (shrink)

En 2018, première véritable année de la présidence de Trump, il devint parfaitement clair que la relation transatlantique était entrée dans une phase de profond désaccord, suscitant quantités de témoignages et de commentaires pessimistes dans la presse anglo-américaine. A partir de ce constat, l’article reconsidère l’étude du « transatlantique » en tant qu’aire géographique. Il aborde la manière d’appréhender le temps (la périodisation), l’espace (l’échelle) et la discipline (la méthodologie) afin de remettre en question les hypothèses classiques et d’ouvrir de (...) nouvelles voies pour la recherche, la formation identitaire et l’engagement émancipateur. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty comme dans (...) celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit. Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre.Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze demandent « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? »La naïveté de la pensée et l’innocence de la questionLa philosophie doit reconnaître que son obligation pressante à l’égard de « l’histoire souterraine du problème du monde » implique qu’elle affronte les conditions de sa propre détermination. En d’autres termes, l’historicité (Geschichte) de la philosophie est l’histoire du « monde » en tant qu’il devient problématique. Mais ce devenir problématique « n’appartient pas à l’histoire (Historie) ». Dans la pensée de Merleau-Ponty (...) comme dans celle de Deleuze, est à l’oeuvre une historicité qui refl ète la genèse du problème du « monde » (image de la pensée) en tant que l’être problématique de l’ontogenèse. Je soutiendrai que Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze cristallisent la thématique qui est déjà en germe chez Fink : le problème du monde contraint la pensée à se confronter à sa pratique. Toute philosophie se trouve comme nue face à sa propre naïveté en cherchant un rapprochement avec le monde. Dans le retour vers le monde, le philosophe est contraint de mettre sa pensée en rapport avec la naïveté qui la nourrit (Husserl en est un exemple). Mais inversement, le philosophe doit admettre le rôle intrinsèque joué par la naïveté dans la pensée elle-même, dans sa pratique philosophique propre. Ce faisant, le statut philosophique de la naïveté se trouve confirmé. Le problème du monde est dès lors le problème philosophique de la construction d’un plan pour orienter notre pensée sur larelation entre la connaissance et l’être. Par là, on a identifi é le parallélisme épistémicoontologique structurant la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? », que posent et à laquelle répondent nos deux philosophes. C’est pourquoi la présente étude soutient que c’est par la répétition philosophique du chemin par lequel le « monde » prend le statut d’un problème ontologique qu’un seuil épistémologique se trouve exposé. Le monde requiert du philosophe qu’il retrouve la naïveté intrinsèque à l’engendrement du penser, qu’il apprécie le monde en tant que problème philosophique, concept opérationnel et acte authentiquement créatif. Nous devons donc redécouvrir ce qui est importait tant à Merleau-Ponty et à Deleuze : l’expressionnisme philosophique. Ainsi, reposer la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » constitue une répétition afi n de penser le problème du monde. Le défiposé par la naïveté contraint le philosophe à admettre lebesoin de réconcilier l’impuissance inhérente à la naïveté avec l’exigence insistante de surmonter cette impuissance d’une manière ou d’une autre et de rendre la pensée possible. Bref, ce texte cherche à dramatiser la manière dont les deux philosophes, chacun différemment, posent la question « Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? » comme une propédeutique à l’ontologisation de la pensée. C’est pourquoi je montrerai que ce qui motive leur insistance à revenir à cette question est le besoin de comprendre leur propre pratique en tant qu’expression d’une sorte d’intuition philosophique – une pure naïveté de la pensée, une stimulation de la créativité – et, ainsi, de saisir l’être du devenir libéré de toute prétention à représenter, communiquer, fi xer l’ontogenèse. Inversement, il faut reconnaître qu’une telle transformation du motif transcendantal de la philosophie requiert de la pratique philosophique qu’elle se place aux marges de ce qui est considéré comme « savoir ».Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze chiedono “Che cos’è la fi losofia?”L’ingenuità del pensiero e l’innocenza della domandaLa filosofia non può non ammettere che il suo insistente riferimento alla “storia sotterranea del problema del mondo” deve portarla ad affrontare le condizionedella sua propria determinazione. In altre parole, la storicità [Geschichte] che guida la filosofia è la storia del “mondo” in quanto esso diviene problematico. Ma questo problematico “‘divenire’ non appartiene alla storia” [Historie]. Implicita nel pensiero di Merleau-Ponty e di Deleuze è la scoperta di una storicità che rifl ette la genesi del problema del “mondo” (in quanto immagine del pensiero) come il problematico essere dell’ontogenesi. In questo modo, vorrei sostenere che Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze cristallizzano il germe tematico inizialmente formulato da Fink: il problema del mondo forza il pensiero ad affrontare il suo esercizio. Ogni filosofia rimane nuda di fronte alla propria ingenuità quando cerca una riconciliazione col mondo. Ritornando al mondo, un filosofo si ritrova obbligato a mettere il pensiero alla prova di quella stessa ingenuità che lo nutre (come mostra Husserl).Ma, inversamente, il filosofo deve confessare il ruolo giocato dall’ingenuità nel pensiero stesso, nella sua pratica filosofica. Così facendo, lo status filosoficodell’ingenuità resta confermato. Il problema del mondo è il problema filosofico della costruzione di un piano utile a orientare il nostro modo di pensare la relazione fra conoscenza e essere. Con ciò abbiamo identifi cato il parallelismo ontologicoepistemologico che struttura la domanda “Che cos’è la filosofia?”, così com’è posta e affrontata da Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze. Questo saggio, perciò, sostiene che è attraverso la ripetizione da parte del fi losofo del percorso mediante cui il mondo assume lo statuto di un problema ontologico che una soglia epistemologica viene dischiusa. Il mondo esige che il fi losofo trovi questa ingenuità intrinseca per generare il pensare nel pensiero, per considerare il mondo in quanto problema filosofico, in quanto concetto operativo e in quanto atto veramente creativo. Si potrebbe affermare che qui si scopre ciò che è importante per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze: una forma di espressionismo filosofico. Pertanto, la riproposizione della domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?” è una riproposizione, per il pensiero, del problema del mondo. La sfida dell’ingenuità costringeil filosofo a riconciliare l’impotenza relativa all’ingenuità con l’insistente esigenza di sormontare quell’impotenza, rendendo possibile, così, il pensiero stesso. In breve, questo saggio vorrebbe ‘drammatizzare’ il modo in cui entrambi i filosofi, in maniere distinte e divergenti, pongono la domanda “Che cosa è la filosofia?”, avviando in tal modo una sorta di propedeutica all’ontologizzazione del pensiero. Vorrei argomentare, dunque, che ciò che motiva la loro insistenza nel tornare sulla questione “Che cos’è la fi losofi a?” è il bisogno, per Merleau-Ponty e Deleuze, di comprendere il loro esercizio come espressione di una sorta di intuizione filosofica, una pura ingenuità di pensiero, uno stimolo alla creatività e, di conseguenza, una maniera per cogliere dell’essere del divenire libero da ogni pretesa di rappresentare, comunicare o arrestare l’ontogenesi. Per converso, riconosciamo immediatamente che una tale trasformazione della sua forza trascendentale richiede che la filosofia e il suo esercizio circoscrivano il proprio luogo ai margini di ciò che la filosofia considera propriamente come “conoscenza”. (shrink)

Dans l’avant-propos écrit en janvier 2009 de ce recueil de trois articles publiés aux États-Unis au cours de la dernière décennie du xxe siècle, Joan Wallach Scott définit sa démarche pour promouvoir une histoire théorique, politique et critique : « […] une Américaine, historienne de la France, trouve des résonances dans les écrits de philosophes et de théoriciens politiques qui travaillèrent dans des contextes différents, à des époques différentes et fantasme sur ce qui les rattache à elle [...

Nearly forty years ago I wrote to the editors of Liddell and Scott, pointing out that in Apoll. Rhod. I. 685 was a future, not as they thought of , but of , and that it was so explained e.g. by V. Magnien, Le futur grec . The correction, slightly muddled, is to be found in their Addenda, new Supplement, s.v. , but it seems to have escaped Dr. Giangrande and Mr. M. Campbell, not to mention Schwyzer e tutti (...) quanti, and should therefore perhaps be repeated here. (shrink)

Outil de « réflexion massive » dans le monde universitaire Outre-Manche et Outre-Atlantique depuis quelques décennies et le texte majeur de Joan Scott, le Genre n'est que récemment et partiellement entré dans l'université française et la recherche où il continue de déranger tout en s’institutionnalisant. Plutôt que tracer une chronologie déjà élaborée par d'autres, cet article propose une réflexion autour de deux expériences directement liées à ce numéro : la pratique du Genre au sein du CHCSC et les précédentes (...) publications de Diogène sur le sujet. (shrink)

Outil de « réflexion massive » dans le monde universitaire Outre-Manche et Outre-Atlantique depuis quelques décennies et le texte majeur de Joan Scott, le Genre n'est que récemment et partiellement entré dans l'université française et la recherche où il continue de déranger tout en s’institutionnalisant. Plutôt que tracer une chronologie déjà élaborée par d'autres, cet article propose une réflexion autour de deux expériences directement liées à ce numéro : la pratique du Genre au sein du CHCSC et les précédentes (...) publications de Diogène sur le sujet. (shrink)

This article critically interrogates contemporary forms of addiction medicine that are portrayed by policy-makers as providing a ‘rational’ or politically neutral approach to dealing with drug use and related social problems. In particular, it examines the historical origins of the biological facts that are today understood to provide a foundation for contemporary understandings of addiction as a ‘disease of the brain’. Drawing upon classic and contemporary work on ‘styles of thought’, it documents how, in the period between the mid-1960s and (...) the mid-1970s, such facts emerged in relation to new neurobiological styles of explaining and managing social problems associated with drug abuse, and an alliance between a relatively marginal group of researchers and American policy-makers who were launching the ‘War on Drugs’. Beyond illustrating the political and material conditions necessary for the rise of addiction neuroscience, the article highlights the productivity of neurobiological thought styles, by focusing on the new biological objects, treatments and hopes that have emerged within the field of addiction studies over the last several decades. (shrink)

In an important and widely cited paper, Zerilli, Knott, Maclaurin, and Gavaghan (2019) argue that opaque AI decision makers are at least as transparent as human decision makers and therefore the concern that opaque AI is not sufficiently transparent is mistaken. I argue that the concern about opaque AI should not be understood as the concern that such AI fails to be transparent in a way that humans are transparent. Rather, the concern is that the way in which opaque AI (...) is opaque is very different than the way in which humans are opaque. What matters is the degree to which the opaque processes of a class of decision makers are stable, uniform, and safe. The degree to which such processes have these features in humans is higher than the degree to which such processes have these features in opaque AI. And therefore we should require AI to be more transparent than humans. (shrink)

The tradition descending from Frege and Russell has typically treated theories of meaning either as theories of meanings, or as theories of truth conditions. However, propositions of the classical sort don't exist, and truth conditions can't provide all the information required by a theory of meaning. In this book, one of the world's leading philosophers of language offers a way out of this dilemma. Traditionally conceived, propositions are denizens of a "third realm" beyond mind and matter, "grasped" by mysterious Platonic (...) intuition. As conceived here, they are cognitive-event types in which agents predicate properties and relations of things--in using language, in perception, and in nonlinguistic thought. Because of this, one's acquaintance with, and knowledge of, propositions is acquaintance with, and knowledge of, events of one's cognitive life. This view also solves the problem of "the unity of the proposition" by explaining how propositions can be genuinely representational, and therefore bearers of truth. The problem, in the traditional conception, is that sentences, utterances, and mental states are representational because of the relations they bear to inherently representational Platonic complexes of universals and particulars. Since we have no way of understanding how such structures can be representational, independent of interpretations placed on them by agents, the problem is unsolvable when so conceived. However, when propositions are taken to be cognitive-event types, the order of explanation is reversed and a natural solution emerges. Propositions are representational because they are constitutively related to inherently representational cognitive acts. Strikingly original, What Is Meaning? is a major advance. (shrink)

An original interpretation of Merleau-Ponty on subjectivity, drawing from and challenging both the continental and analytic traditions.

In the middle of the twentieth century a dispute erupted between the chief architect of Logical Empiricism, Rudolf Carnap, and Logical Empiricism’s chief reformer, Willard van Orman Quine -- who was attempting to save what he took to be its main insights by recasting them in a more acceptable form. Though both eschewed metaphysics of the traditional apriori sort, and both were intent on making the investigation of science the center of philosophy, they disagreed about how to do so. Part (...) of the disagreement involved the nature of ontological disputes. The central documents in the debate are: (i) Quine’s 1948 article, “On What There Is,” which tells us how to discern ontological.. (shrink)

It is widely believed that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory of argumentation is vulnerable to the charge of relativism. This paper provides a more charitable interpretation of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s normative views, one that properly considers the historical trajectory of their work and a wider range of texts than existing interpretations. It is argued that their views are better characterized as a form of “contrastivism about arguments” than any kind relativism. This more accurate depiction contributes to ongoing efforts to revive interest (...) in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work as well as build bridges with trends in contemporary argumentation theory. (shrink)

_An original interpretation of Merleau-Ponty on subjectivity, drawing from and challenging both the continental and analytic traditions._.

Science and the originality of life -- Christian facticity -- Grasping life as a topic -- Ruinance -- The retrieval of history -- Facticity and ontology -- Factical speaking -- Rhetoric -- Sophistry.

Albert Einstein's bold assertion of the form-invariance of the equation of a spherical light wave with respect to inertial frames of reference became, in the space of six years, the preferred foundation of his theory of relativity. Early on, however, Einstein's universal light-sphere invariance was challenged on epistemological grounds by Henri Poincaré, who promoted an alternative demonstration of the foundations of relativity theory based on the notion of a light-ellipsoid. Drawing in part on archival sources, this paper shows how an (...) informal, international group of physicists, mathematicians, and engineers, including Einstein, Paul Langevin, Poincaré, Hermann Minkowski, Ebenezer Cunningham, Harry Bateman, Otto Berg, Max Planck, Max Laue, A. A. Robb, and Ludwig Silberstein, employed figures of light during the formative years of relativity theory in their discovery of the salient features of the relativistic worldview. (shrink)

Canada has followed the pattern of Benelux nations by legislating sufferingSuffering as the pivotal eligibilityEligibilitycriterionCriterion for euthanasiaEuthanasia/assisted death without requiring terminal prognosis as is needed in most permissive jurisdictions. This chapter will explore the relationship between sufferingSuffering and Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) and the ways in which sufferingSuffering is understood in the Supreme Court of Canada, the federal Criminal Code legislation and by health care assessors. Based on this analysis, we will argue that the resulting sufferingSufferingeligibilityEligibilitycriterionCriterion leaves the law (...) open to unintended forms of interpretation, thus instituting perhaps the most unbounded and risk-prone form of assisted death in the world. A review of the literature on sufferingSuffering, the wish to dieWish to die, and reasons for MAIDReasons for MAID requests found sufferingSuffering of severe illness to be frequently associated with unstable mental health, social, and existentialExistential variables that are often amenable to therapy or remediation. While sufferingSuffering remains a powerful motivating force to seek opportunities to relieve distress, its use as an eligibilityEligibilitycriterionCriterion for MAID has significant ambiguity in its’ characterization of ‘enduring’ and ‘irremediable’ and thus fails to protect against abuse for the vulnerable. (shrink)

This study renders the complex corpus of the Guodian texts into a more easily manageable form, incorporating the past several years of scholarly activity on these texts and providing them with a comprehensive introduction along with a complete and well-annotated translation into English.

I defend the view that moral properties are identical to properties that can be expressed without using moral vocabulary.

The paper is an attempt to explain what a transcendental argument is for Kant. The interpretation is based on a reading of the 'Discipline of Pure Reason', Sections 1 and 4 of the first Critique. The author first identifies several statements that Kant makes about the method of proof he followed in the 'Analytic of Principles' which seem to be inconsistent. He then tries to remove the apparent inconsistencies by focusing on the idea of instantiation and drawing a distinction between (...) the intension and the extension of a concept. Finally, the results are applied to the second 'Analogy of Experience' for the purposes of illustration. The paper should be seen as an attempt to provide an historical answer to a question that has been treated thematically in much of the recent literature. (shrink)

Two important debates have characterized mainstream epistemology in recent years. The first is the debate between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. The second is the debate over the details of a naturalized epistemology. Both debates have meant that traditional concepts of rationality and justification are now understood in a new light. Both debates have helped focus attention on the future direction of epistemology, its goals and its limitations.

Essays by 14 Levinas scholars provide a fresh acount of the argument and purpose of Emmanuel Levinas's major work, Totality and Infinity, drawing parallels between Levinas and other thinkers; considering Levinas's relationship to other disciplines such as nursing, psychotherapy, and law; and bringing this seminal text to bear on specific, concrete issues of present-day concern"--Provided by publisher.

Scott Yenor argues that David Hume's reputation as a skeptic is greatly exaggerated. In David Hume's Humanity, Yenor shows how Hume's skepticism is a moment leading Hume to defend a philosophy that is grounded in the inescapable assumptions of common life. Humane virtues reflect the proper reaction to the complex mixture of human faculties that define the human condition. These gentle virtues best find their home in the modern commercial republic, of which England is the leading example. Hume's defense (...) of both common life philosophy and humanity are, however, flawed by his secretly dogmatic assumptions about the nature of history and his Enlightened approach to religious teachings and psychology. This study makes the case for Hume's manner of grounding philosophy in common life is essential to any reinvigoration of the humanities. It ultimately holds that Hume's practice of that philosophy is seriously flawed, but that a more philosophic philosophy of common life is available. (shrink)

Cognitive science proposes that we have evolved to build mental maps of the world not according to its actual, physical nature, but according to what allows us to thrive. In other words, our individual and collective realities are fictions - carefully constructed to enable us to maintain our particular perspectives. It used to be that our fictions were rooted to reasonably solid things: to people, places and memories. Today, in an age of online personas, alternative truths, constant surveillance and an (...) increasingly hysterical news cycle, our realities are becoming more flimsy and more vulnerable than ever before. Ours is now a zoomed-in perspective, where the backstage is centre stage. We are both camera person and subject, with new powers and new weaknesses. Our personal and political spheres are dangerously merging. How will the form and grammar of our feelings have to change in this over-exposed environment? Should any of our stories remain secret? How are these phenomena changing the way we live? How do we maintain a sense of reality in an increasingly fantastic world? Picnic Comma Lightning is an innovative examination of the nature of reality in the twenty-first century, one that explores the key ethical, political and neurological forces contouring our inner selves, but also the old influences of grief and desire, memory and imagination. In it, award-winning author Laurence Scott provides a lively and accessible new philosophy for this epoch in Western civilisation, one that will change the way you see the world, and your place within it."--Publisher description. (shrink)

Ricœur lectured and wrote for over twenty years on negation (‘Do I understand something better if I know what it is not, and what is not-ness?') and never published his extensive writings on this subject. Ricœur concluded that there are multiple forms of negation; it can, for example, be the other person (Plato), the not knowable nature of our world (Kant), the included opposite (Hegel), apophatic spirituality (Plotinus on not being able to know God) and existential nothingness (Sartre). Ricœur, working (...) on Kant, Hegel and Sartre, decided that all these forms of negation are incompatible and also fatally flawed because they fail to resolve false binaries of negative: positive. Alison Scott-Baumann demonstrates how Ricœur subsequently incorporated negation into his linguistic turn, using dialectics, metaphor, narrative, parable and translation in order to show how negation is in us, not outside us: language both creates and clarifies false binaries. He bestows upon negation a strong and central role in the human condition, and its inevitability is reflected in his writings, if we look carefully. Ricœur and the Negation of Happiness draws on Ricœur's published works, previously unavailable archival material and many other sources. Alison Scott-Baumann argues that thinking positively is necessary but not sufficient for aspiring to happiness - what is also required is affirmation of negative impulses: we know we are split by contradictions and still try to overcome them. She also demonstrates the urgency of analysing current socio-cultural debates about wellbeing, education and equality, which rest insecurely upon our loose use of the negative as a category mistake. (shrink)

According to Pew Research studies, most Americans think religion always conflicts with science. The popular writings of scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Lawrence Krauss reinforce this idea, as do books by writers such as Christopher Hitchens and Daniel Dennet. Furthermore, the two versions of the enormously popular television show Cosmos, hosted by Carl Sagan in 1980 and Neil deGrasse Tyson in 2014, present a history of science in which religion has always acted as a barrier to scientific (...) development, with scientists frequently persecuted or even executed for their work. "Gods, Philosophers, and Scientists" shows that just because an idea is popular, doesn't mean it's correct. By examining the historical record from the time of the Ancient Greeks to today, readers are able to see that religion and science have been allies more often than enemies, and when conflict does occur it's too simplistic to view it as coming from something inherent to either science or religion. Instead, as with the case of Greek philosophy or the reception of Darwinian evolution, complex social forces are to blame, and in cases such as the infamous one of Galileo's conflict with the Catholic Church, clashing personalities are at least as important as those social forces. Anyone interested in the history of science or religion, who is curious about how science works, or who wants to have a better understanding of the world should read this book. (shrink)

We're in an ethical mess! -- Is there a moral law we can know? -- If we know what's right, can we do it? -- What does it mean to be human? -- Ethics in the marketplace -- Ethics in public life.

Starting at the beginning: what's so good about being good? -- Theological ethics: where does morality come from? -- Cultural views of morality: why can't we make up our own moral rules for ourselves? -- Making ethical decisions: when I'm in a moral dilemma, what do I do? -- Abortion: how can you say that a pregnant seventeen-year-old, for whom having the baby will ruin her life, is doing something wrong by having an abortion? -- Reproductive technologies: what do you (...) say to infertile couples about the hi-tech ways to have a baby? -- Genetics and biotechnology: what do you tell couples who want to use biotechnology to produce designer children? -- Death, dying, and assisted suicide: don't people have a fundamental right to die? -- Capital punishment: isn't the death penalty a barbaric holdover from uncivilized cultures that should be done away with today? -- War and morality: in view of the Bible's teaching to love your enemies, why isn't every Christian a pacifist? -- Sexual ethics: shouldn't people be able to love and have sex with whomever they choose? -- Christian ethics, economics, and the workplace: how does my work connect to my spiritual life and my service to God? (shrink)

The life fantastic -- Bedtime stories -- The end of things -- Optical disillusions -- Double vision -- Backstage pass -- Romance languages -- Fellow-feeling -- Bolts from the blue -- Final fantasies.

Prominent atheists claim the Bible is a racist text. Yet Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. read it daily. Then again, so did many ardent segregationists. Some atheists claim religion serves to oppress the masses. Yet the classic text of the French Revolution, What is the Third Estate?, was written by a priest. On the other hand, the revolutionaries ended up banning religion. What do we make of religion's confusing role in history? And what of religion's relationship to science? Some scientists (...) claim that we have no free will. Others argue that advances in neurobiology and physics disprove determinism. As for whispering to the universe, an absurd habit say the skeptics. Yet prayer is a transformative practice for millions. This book explores the most common atheist critiques of the Bible and religion, incorporating Jewish, Christian, and Muslim voices. The result is a fresh, modern re-evaluation of religion and of atheism. (shrink)

This book is a radical plea for the centrality of experience in the social and human sciences. Scott Lash argues that a large part of the output of the social sciences today is still shaped by assumptions stemming from positivism, in contrast to the tradition of interpretative social enquiry pioneered by Max Weber. These assumptions are particularly central to economics, with its emphasis on homo economicus, the utility-maximizing, instrumental actor, but they have infiltrated the other social sciences too. Lash (...) argues for a social sciences based not in positivism’s utilitarian a priori but instead in the a posteriori of grounded and embedded subjective experience. This features a politics of Hannah Arendt’s public sphere, which begins with the particular experience of Aristotle’s polis and moves - via Rome, Augustine and Kant - to a modernity that acknowledges the fragility of political worlds. Yet modernity is also a matter of technological experience and technological forms of life. Lash - starting from Aristotle’s technics and working through Turing’s and Shannon’s computer mediation – develops a novel account of technological experience, of how objects themselves experience. And here he finds a surprising convergence with Chinese cosmology’s ethos of dao, qi and li: the experience of the embedded multiplicity of the ‘ten thousand things’. This original book by a leading social and cultural theorist will be of interest to scholars and students across the social sciences, from sociology and cultural studies to anthropology and politics. (shrink)

I present a counterexample to Kirk-Giannini’s Dilemmatic Theory of gaslighting.

Modernism is both a contested aesthetic category and a powerful political statement. Modernist music was condemned as degenerate by the Nazis and forcibly replaced by socialist realism under the Soviets. Sympathetic philosophers and critics have interpreted it as a vital intellectual defence against totalitarianism, yet some American critics consider it elitist, undemocratic, and even unnatural. Drawing extensively on the philosophy of Heidegger and Badiou, Quilting Points proposes a new dialectical theory of faithful, reactive, and obscure subjective responses to musical modernism, (...) which embraces all the music of Western modernity. (shrink)

The brief, practical texts in the Essentials of Qualitative Methods series introduce social science and psychology researchers to key approaches to capturing phenomena not easily measured quantitatively, offering exciting, nimble opportunities to gather in-depth qualitative data. In this book, Scott D. Churchill introduces readers to existential phenomenological research, an approach that seeks an in-depth, embodied understanding of subjective human existence that reflects a person's values, purposes, ideals, intentions, emotions, and relationships. This method helps researchers understand the lives and needs (...) of others by helping identify and set aside theoretical and ideological prejudgments. About the Essentials of Qualitative Methods book series: Even for experienced researchers, selecting and correctly applying the right method can be challenging. In this groundbreaking series, leading experts in qualitative methods provide clear, crisp, and comprehensive descriptions of their approach, including its methodological integrity, and its benefits and limitations. Each book includes numerous examples to enable readers to quickly and thoroughly grasp how to leverage these valuable methods. (shrink)