11 found
Order:
  1. Mechanisms in psychology: ripping nature at its seams.Catherine Stinson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5).
    Recent extensions of mechanistic explanation into psychology suggest that cognitive models are only explanatory insofar as they map neatly onto, and serve as scaffolding for more detailed neural models. Filling in those neural details is what these accounts take the integration of cognitive psychology and neuroscience to mean, and they take this process to be seamless. Critics of this view have given up on cognitive models possibly explaining mechanistically in the course of arguing for cognitive models having explanatory value independent (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  2. From Implausible Artificial Neurons to Idealized Cognitive Models: Rebooting Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.Catherine Stinson - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):590-611.
    There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence, but hardly mentions methodological questions. There is also a growing body of work in philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from cognitive science. Here these discussions are connected. Insights developed in the philosophy of science literature about the importance of idealization provide a way of understanding the neural implausibility of connectionist networks. Insights from neurocognitive science illuminate how relevant similarities between models and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3. The absent body in psychiatric diagnosis, treatment, and research.Catherine Stinson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6).
    Discussions of psychiatric nosology focus on a few popular examples of disorders, and on the validity of diagnostic criteria. Looking at Anorexia Nervosa, an example rarely mentioned in this literature, reveals a new problem: the DSM has a strict taxonomic structure, which assumes that disorders can only be located on one branch. This taxonomic assumption fails to fit the domain of psychopathology, resulting in obfuscation of cross-category connections. Poor outcomes for treatment of Anorexia may be due to it being pigeonholed (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4. Raising an AI Teenager.Catherine Stinson - forthcoming - In David Friedell (ed.), The Philosophy of Ted Chiang. Palgrave MacMillan.
  5. Algorithms are not neutral: Bias in collaborative filtering.Catherine Stinson - 2021 - AI and Ethics 2 (4):763-770.
    When Artificial Intelligence (AI) is applied in decision-making that affects people’s lives, it is now well established that the outcomes can be biased or discriminatory. The question of whether algorithms themselves can be among the sources of bias has been the subject of recent debate among Artificial Intelligence researchers, and scholars who study the social impact of technology. There has been a tendency to focus on examples, where the data set used to train the AI is biased, and denial on (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6.  16
    Explanation and connectionist models.Catherine Stinson - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge. pp. 120-133.
    This chapter explores the epistemic roles played by connectionist models of cognition, and offers a formal analysis of how connectionist models explain. It looks at how other types of computational models explain. Classical artificial intelligence (AI) programs explain using abductive reasoning, or inference to the best explanation; they begin with the phenomena to be explained, and devise rules that can produce the right outcome. The chapter also looks at several examples of connectionist models of cognition, observing what sorts of constraints (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. A feeling for the algorithm: Diversity, expertise and artificial intelligence.Catherine Stinson & Sofie Vlaad - 2024 - Big Data and Society 11 (1).
    Diversity is often announced as a solution to ethical problems in artificial intelligence (AI), but what exactly is meant by diversity and how it can solve those problems is seldom spelled out. This lack of clarity is one hurdle to motivating diversity in AI. Another hurdle is that while the most common perceptions about what diversity is are too weak to do the work set out for them, stronger notions of diversity are often defended on normative grounds that fail to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  9
    Back to the Cradle: Mechanism Schemata from Piaget to DNA.Catherine Stinson - 2017 - In Marcus P. Adams, Zvi Biener, Uljana Feest & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Eppur Si Muove: Doing History and Philosophy of Science with Peter Machamer: A Collection of Essays in Honor of Peter Machamer. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Mechanism schemata are one of the least understood parts of MDC’s account of mechanistic explanation. Relatedly, there is a common misconception that there is no place for abstraction in MDC mechanisms. These two problems can be remedied by looking more carefully at what MDC say both in their 2000 paper and elsewhere about schemata and abstraction, and by following up on a comment of Machamer’s indicating that Piaget was the inspiration for schemata. Darden’s work on mechanism discovery reveals an important (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Searching for the Source of Executive Attention.Catherine Stinson - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):137-154.
    William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of “Cartesian error”. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Symposium on P. Koralus, "The Erotetic Theory of Attention".Philipp Koralus, Felipe De Brigard, Christopher Mole, Catherine Stinson & Sebastian Watzl - 2014 - Mind and Language Symposia at the Brains Blog.
  11. Mechanistic explanation in neuroscience.Catherine Stinson & Jacqueline A. Sullivan - 2017 - In Stuart Glennan & Phyllis McKay Illari (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 375-388.
    This chapter explores some of the ways that mechanisms are invoked in neuroscience and looks at a selection of the philosophical problems that arise when trying to understand mechanistic explanations. It introduces a series of historical case studies that illustrate how neuroscientists have depended on mechanistic metaphors in their efforts to understand the mind and brain, and how their mechanistic explanations have developed over time. The chapter highlights what contemporary philosophers have identified as the fundamental features of mechanisms and mechanistic (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark