Kant famously claims that the table of the categories of freedom does not require explanation. Kant interpreters have been baffled by this claim, and the disagreement among the increasing number of studies in more recent years suggests that the table is not as straightforward as Kant took it to be. In this article I want to show that a coherent interpretation of the table depends essentially on a clarification of what have been taken to be three fundamental ambiguities (...) in Kants text is, I argue, rooted in a hybrid conception of practical rationality assumed by his interpreters. I believe the task of disambiguating the table in all three cases can be completed. But it will require spelling out Kant’s moral cognitivism in such a way that he emerges as holding what I will call a unitary account of practical rationality. (shrink)

This paper provides an account of Kant's categories of freedom, explaining how they fit together and what role they are supposed to play. My interpretation places particular emphasis on the structural features that the table of the categories of freedom shares with the table of judgements and the table of categories laid out by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this way we can identify two interpretative constraints, namely (i) that the categories (...) falling under each heading must form a synthetic unity whereby the third one derives from the combination of the other two. and (ii) that the first two categories falling under each heading must be morally undetermined and sensibly conditioned, while the third category is sensibly unconditioned and determined only by the moral law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: A general interpretation and close textual analysis of Kant’s theory of the categories of freedom (or categories of practical reason) in his Critique of Practical Reason. My main concerns in the paper are the following: (1) I show that Kant’s categories of freedom have primarily three functions: as conditions of the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be comprehensible as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. (2) I show that for (...) Kant actions, although qua theoretical objects they are always already constituted by means of the theoretical categories, qua practical objects (objects of reason in its practical use, i.e. objects qua possibly good or bad) they are constituted by means of the categories of freedom; and that it is only in this way that actions, qua phenomena, can be a consequence of freedom, and can be understood and evaluated as such. (3) Since Kant's presentation of his theory of the Categories of Freedom is extremely brief, Kant's parallel theory of the theoretical categories in his Critique of Pure Reason is used as a guide for the interpretation of the practical categories and their systematic relevance. (Translation by Alex Worsnip, reviewed and approved by the author.). (shrink)

: Kant speaks of our capacity to be “self-determining […] in certain […] laws holding firm a priori”. Here the “laws” refer to the categories of freedom introduced in KpV. The categories of freedom, then, are necessary for self-determination. I first explain how Kant employs the notion of determination in his theoretical philosophy. I then explain how the notion is utilized also in his practical philosophy, particularly in connection to the act of determining the forms of (...) willing that make morality possible. I conclude by answering the question, Why are the categories of freedom necessary for self-determination? Understanding why the categories of freedom are required for self-determination will also help clarify the nature and function of Kant’s categories of freedom, which have puzzled many scholars. (shrink)

In diesem Artikel versuche ich deutlich zu machen dass, und aus welchem Grund, Kant den Kategorien der Freiheit eine Doppelfunktion zugeschrieben hat. Es wird sich zeigen, dass die Kategorien der Freiheit nicht nur als die ratio cognoscendi von freien Handlungen innerhalb der Sinnenwelt fungieren, sondern auch geeignet sind, die Begriffe von Gut und Böse als echte moralische Relevanzregeln zu begründen; mit anderen Worten, sie eignen sich als Regeln dafür, wie Umstände und Ereignisse mit moralischer Wichtigkeit aufzuspüren und zu bewerten sind. (...) This paper attempts to bring to light and to justify the double task that Kant confers on the categories of freedom. It will be maintained that the categories of freedom do not only function as the ratio cognoscendi of free actions within the sensible world but they are also well appropriated to ground the concepts of the good and the evil as genuine rules of moral salience , that is to say, as rules of how to detect and appraise circumstances and deeds bestowed with moral significance. (shrink)

NOTE: The English translation is listed separately. ABSTRACT: A general interpretation and close textual analysis of Kant’s theory of the categories of freedom (or categories of practical reason) in his Critique of Practical Reason. My main concerns in the paper are the following: (1) I show that Kant’s categories of freedom have primarily three functions: as conditions of the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be comprehensible as free and (iii) to be (...) morally evaluated. (2) I show that for Kant actions, although qua theoretical objects they are always already constituted by means of the theoretical categories, qua practical objects (objects of reason in its practical use, i.e. objects qua possibly good or bad) they are constituted by means of the categories of freedom; and that it is only in this way that actions, qua phenomena, can be a consequence of freedom, and can be understood and evaluated as such. (3) Since Kant's presentation of his theory of the Categories of Freedom is extremely brief, Kant's parallel theory of the theoretical categories in his Critique of Pure Reason is used as a guide for the interpretation of the practical categories and their systematic relevance. (shrink)

Peter C. Hodgson explores Hegel's bold vision of history as the progress of the consciousness of freedom. Following an introductory chapter on the textual sources, the key categories, and the modes of writing history that Hegel distinguishes, Hodgson presents a new interpretation of Hegel's conception of freedom. Freedom is not simply a human production, but takes shape through the interweaving of the divine idea and human passions, and such freedom defines the purpose of historical events (...) in the midst of apparent chaos. Freedom is also a process that unfolds through stages of historical/cultural development and is oriented to an end that occurs within history (the 'kingdom of freedom'). The purpose and the process of history are tragic, however, because history is also a 'slaughterhouse' that shatters even the finest human creations and requires a constant rebuilding. Hegel's God is not a supreme being or 'large entity' but the 'true infinite' that encompasses the finite. History manifests the rule of God ('providence'), and it functions as the justification of God ('theodicy'). But the God who rules in and is justified by history is a crucified God who takes the suffering, anguish, and evil of the world into and upon godself, accomplishing reconciliation in the midst of ongoing estrangement and inescapable death. Shapes of Freedom addresses these themes in the context of present-day questions about what they mean and whether they still have validity. (shrink)

The paper inquires the category of _performance_ in Hannah Arendt. Her concept of the political eludes the tradition-inherited approach and subtracts the praxis from instrumental reason. Arendt revisits the political experiences of ancient Greek cities, where tragedy and assembly, theater and agora, provide the propitious space for action. She avoids the instrumental approach of _homo faber_, conceptualizes action as performance and shows its connaturality with the performing arts, to the detriment of the productive ones. In “What is Freedom?” Arendt (...) understands political freedom as a “worldly fact”, and assesses the Machiavellian _virtù_ as public excellence: as _performance on stage_. (shrink)

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction (...) of pure concepts of understanding and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason. The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”. (shrink)

Rather than approaching Kant's moral theory in the normal way through a consideration of The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and The Critique of Practical Reason, I do so from the perspective of an extended analysis of other aspects of his work that bear on his moral philosophy . Consideration of the Doctrine of Right suggests that the universal principle of Right Kant identifies is a restricted version of the CI applied to the limited domain of relations between persons (...) at issue in this context. Given that duties of Right deriving from this principle are also regarded as perfect ethical duties, an analysis of the nature and scope of the universal principle of Right can, I argue, be expected to be informative with respect to our understanding of perfect duties and the contradiction in conception from which these are said to derive. Allowing for the more limited scope of merely external duties of Right, analysis of these duties suggests that ethical duties of Right are obligations concerned with ensuring the capacity of rational agents to govern themselves on the basis of reason . This kind of analysis, I argue, is both confirmed and clarified by Kant's subsequent discussion of perfect and imperfect duties of virtue we owe to ourselves under the rubric of concerns with our moral health and moral prosperity. ;The resulting view is, I claim, a promising one that allows us to integrate the different treatments of duties in these two works and accommodate the various duties Kant discusses. In particular, understood in terms of the notions of moral health and prosperity, the concerns engendered here require careful consideration of the particular nature and psychology of human agency and yield a much more subtle and interesting account of duty and of the moral life than those typically associated with Kant. (shrink)

Freeride skiing is the fastest-growing sector of the skiing industry, but there are no studies analyzing its nature and values. First, we provide descriptions of freeride skiing and competitive freeride skiing, trying to analyzing the nature of these activities in comparison and contrast with conceptions of traditional sport and nature sport. Whilst freeride skiing must be seen in some sense as a nature sport, competitive freeride skiing is best seen within the category of traditional sport. However, these ‘new’ sports raise (...) questions about the adequacy of our current categories, leading us to our second task, which was to identify and discuss the values of freeride skiing. We identify freedom and creativity as primary values, which lead to a greater rapport with nature, and a greater attention to risk, danger and safety, as concomitant values. Finally, we briefly indicate further values of the activity, such as responsibility, community and preservation of the practice. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophers discuss the idea of freedom in terms of two distinctions: Berlin's famous distinction between negative and positive liberty, and Skinner and Pettit's divide between liberal and republican liberty. In this essay I proceed to recast the debate by showing that there are two strands in liberalism, Hobbesian and Lockean, and that the latter inherited its conception of civil liberty from republican thought. I also argue that the contemporary debate on freedom lacks a perspicuous account of (...) the various conceptions of freedom, mainly because it leaves aside the classic contrast between natural liberty and civil liberty. Once we consider both the negative/positive distinction and the natural/civil one, we can classify all conceptions of freedom within four basic irreducible categories. In light of the resulting framework I show that there are two distinct conceptions of republican liberty, natural and civil, and that the former is coupled with an ideal of individual self-control. (shrink)

Freedom of expression is one of the issues of concern to human societies in the contemporary world, because this issue is one of the most important basic rights of people in societies due to its special nature, and on the other hand, it is always in conflict with the authoritarian point of view. Islam accepts freedom of expression for everyone in the Islamic society, but it has specified limits and regulations for it. These restrictions and conditions, more than (...) cumbersome and intolerable regulations, are instructions for better use of freedom, which if not followed, not only the freedom of everyone in the society will not be realized, but also the category it will become anti-value and create cultural chaos. Imam Ali (peace be upon him), during his rule period, not only did not limit the freedom of expression, but also emphasized the expansion of this freedom. Based on Islam, since man is a free being, the privacy of his freedom must always be preserved; Therefore, freedom is the natural right of every human being and cannot be taken away from him. The practical life of Imam Ali (PBUH) and his advice to his agents in caring for freedom of expression in society and politics, bring its importance to the fore. Considering the importance of this issue, the purpose of this research is to study freedom of expression in Islamic teachings with emphasis on Nahj al-Balagha. Based on this, the related themes to freedom of expression have been extracted and explained from the point of view of Nahj al-Balagha, and conclusions have been presented in this regard. Contribution: This research showed that in the Islamic system, all citizens have the right to freedom of speech in ideological, political and social issues (according to the limits set by Islamic teachings and prevent the violation of Islamic values and other human values). These points are emphasized in Islamic teachings, especially in Nahj al-Balagha. (shrink)

This work provides a psychological perspective on globalization. It argues that multicultural experience may facilitate a merge of different cultural values, which forms a distinctively new state of mind. Experience with multicultural settings expands conceptual category boundaries, interrupts categorical thinking, and subsequently creates a new frame of thought. Studies identifying the important role of the multicultural experience in cognitive development and enhancement of creative abilities are presented to support this argument. The article questions the validity a of common critique that (...) globalization brings the world to the unified model of thought. It argues that this critique is an oversimplification of the matter caused by individuals' closed-mindedness and unreceptiveness to a new experience. (shrink)

John Rawls based his theory of justice, in the work of that name, on a ‘Kantian interpretation’ of the status of human beings as ‘free and equal’ persons. In his subsequent, ‘political rather than metaphysical’ expositions of his theory, the conception of citizens of democracies as ‘free and equal’ persons retained its foundational role. But Rawls appealed only to Kant’s moral philosophy, never to Kant’s own political philosophy as expounded in his 1797 Doctrine of Right in theMetaphysics of Morals. I (...) argue here that the structure of Kant’s political philosophy, with its categories of the innate right to freedom, private acquired right and public right, can clarify the relationship between Rawls’s two principles of justice and his scheme of basic liberties and primary goods. (shrink)

The surplus of impulses is a key category in Gehlen’s anthropobiology to understand the process of hominisation and humanisation. From the dedifferentiation of human instincts and the primitivisation of man’s anatomy, to the role of experience, institutions, and speech, the surplus of impulses is a source that flows between the inner and the outer, by feeding the action circle that whether translates in activity or is redirected inwards in order to become a movement of volitional constitution. The ambivalence in which (...) Gehlen deals with this function of freedom gives rise to a pessimistic and sacrificial idea of man. However, he posits certain basic elements of a hedonistic theory of speech from which we can better understand the stabilizing task of language as cornerstone of institutions. (shrink)

This is a philosophical book about the idea of human freedom in the context of Chinese philosophy on truth, the good, and beauty. The book shows that there is a coherent and sophisticated philosophical discourse on human freedom throughout the history of Chinese Philosophy in aesthetics, ethics, and epistemology. Feng Qi discusses the development of freedom in light of the Marxist theory of practice. In the history of philosophy, the relation between thought and existence, which is fundamental (...) to philosophy, has stimulated many debates. These debates, though they have assumed diverse forms in Chinese and Western philosophy, have eventually concentrated on three inquiries: the natural world (the objective material world); the human mind; and the concepts, categories, and laws that are representative forms of nature in the human mind and in knowledge. In Chinese philosophy, the three inquiries are summarized using three notions: qi (气 breath, spirit), xin (心 heart), dao (道 the Way). What relationship do the three notions have with each other? This book explores the way to human freedom through the divergent paths in Chinese philosophy. This book’s investigation of human activities brings the typical Chinese philosophical discourse from the cosmological realm into the realm of human beings as individuals. In this regard, the three inquiries can be described as being about real life, ideals, and individuals. (shrink)

Grammatical categories of English expressions are shown to differ with regard to the freedom we have in semantically interpreting their lexical (= syntactically simplest) expressions. Section 1 reviews the categories of expression we consider. Section 2 empirically supports that certain of these categories are lexically free, a notion we formally define, in the sense that anything which is denotable by a complex expression in the category is available as a denotation for lexical expressions in the category. (...) Other categories are shown to be not lexically free. Thus for those categories the interpretation of lexical expressions is inherently constrained compared to the interpretation of the full class of expressions in the category. (shrink)

Modern Indian nationalist thought has dealt with political ideas such as freedom, equality, liberty, democracy, so on and so forth. The idea of freedom received enough attention on the part of most of the modern Indian political thinkers. However, the idea of freedom as envisaged by the nationalist thinkers did not receive positive response from the other stream of modern Indian thought. Dalit-Bahujan political thinkers questioned the narration of freedom as propagated by the nationalist thinkers. Nationalist (...) thinkers aspired for universal values and at the same time reaffirmed ancient religious principles. Such effort was questioned and doubted by the other thinkers of modern India. Thus, one can find different narrations of freedom, such as social, economic and political. The social categories such as caste, class and gender became bases for their narration on the idea of freedom. The ideas and arguments of B. G. Tilak, M. K. Gandhi, Pandita Ramabai, Jyotiba Phule, B. R. Ambedkar E. M. S. Namboodripad and others would help in larger understanding of the idea of freedom. (shrink)

In the seven chapters constituting Khedrup Jé's presentation of mind and awareness, he primarily explains the full range of objects, including all phenomena that can be known, and object possessors, things that engage objects, such as consciousness and persons. In the first chapter, Khedrup Jé starts by explaining objects of knowledge. Chapter 2 gives an explanation of various non-valid awarenesses. Chapter 3 explains what it means to be a valid cognizer and divides valid cognizers into various categories. In chapter (...) 4, the first division, valid direct perceivers, is discussed. Chapter 4 further defines the four main categories of direct perceivers: sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceivers. In chapter 5, Khedrup Jé gives a brilliant elucidation of this essential teachings of the Buddha. The realizations of the path, explained in chapter 6, are results of valid cognizers. Direct realization of selflessness can only come about by having realized it in a conceptual manner-that is, by generating a valid inference realizing selflessness-first. How to generate this kind of inference is precisely explained in chapter 7. In order to give readers some sense of the two main authors involved here, Khedrup Jé Gelek Palsang and Purbu Chok Jampa Gyatso, whom we mainly rely on for additional explanations, brief biographies of these two eminent Buddhist scholars are given at the close of this introduction. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" [6] in an effort to clarify the essential features of attitudes that Strawson believes may be understood as reactive. I propose a definition of the reactive attitudes that outlines the various conditions that must be met in order to give rise to a given reactive attitude. I then expand upon Strawson's work by introducing two additional categories of reactive attitudes: self-reflexive reactive attitudes and second-personal reflexive reactive attitudes. (...) In addition to explaining the new categories of reactive attitudes that I seek to introduce, I also set forth reasons that lead me to accept such attitudes as reactive. Finally, I outline why I believe the self-reflexive reactive attitudes provide the foundation upon which all the other reactive attitudes rest. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine P. F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" [6] in an effort to clarify the essential features of attitudes that Strawson believes may be understood as reactive. I propose a definition of the reactive attitudes that outlines the various conditions that must be met in order to give rise to a given reactive attitude. I then expand upon Strawson's work (as captured in my definition of reactive attitudes) by introducing two additional categories of reactive attitudes: (...) self-reflexive reactive attitudes and second-personal reflexive reactive attitudes. In addition to explaining the new categories of reactive attitudes that I seek to introduce, I also set forth reasons that lead me to accept such attitudes as reactive. Finally, I outline why I believe the self-reflexive reactive attitudes provide the foundation upon which all the other reactive attitudes rest. (shrink)

The antithesis of nature and freedom is the central idea of Kant's philosophy. It is the direct expression of its postulated division of all existing things into the world of phenomena, which in their sum-total constitute nature, and its original foundation—the world of things in themselves, which lie beyond the categorial determinations of nature. Necessity and causal relations, like space and time, apply only to the world of phenomena; the world of things in themselves is free of these determinations (...) and, therefore, constitutes the realm of freedom—freedom from the intractable laws of nature. Thus, Kant, on the one hand, proves the unconditional subsumption of phenomena under the laws of nature, under the strictest determinism, and, on the other, insists just as decisively that freedom is the first, pretemporal link in the cause-and-effect chain of events. True, the existence of this original freedom is unprovable; it is unknowable, supersensible, and transcendent. But if we agree that there are not only phenomena but also things in themselves, then the conclusion about freedom is fully justified. If, on the other hand, we reject the existence of things in themselves, then we deny at the same time any possibility of freedom, for there are no exceptions in natural determinism. (shrink)

In this analysis of the problem of freedom from a humanistic-Marxist perspective, philosopher Kevin M. Brien draws on the full chronological spectrum of Marx's writings to reconstruct the mature Marx's view of freedom under three broad categories: freedom as a mode of being, freedom as transcendence, and freedom as spontaneity. While recognizing that many students of Marx have noted two distinctly different perspectives in early and late Marx, Brien interprets Marx's philosophy as a coherent (...) organic whole. He demonstrates that Marx's thought is principally and systematically an elaborated philosophical-scientific theory of freedom. New to this second edition is an extended postscript in which Brien provides critical responses to a number of published reviews of the first edition of his book. In addition, Brien also presents a humanistic-Marxist interpretation of spirituality. In so doing he identifies a potential revolutionizing agency in the context of the 21st century. Finally, an addendum shows how humanistic Marxism and Buddhism converge on the same basic values and mutually complement each other. This comparison serves to emphasize the viability of projecting a nontheistic spiritual dimension and shows that there is a genuine moral basis for common social action among adherents of different perspectives. This rigorously argued and deeply thoughtful analysis reveals the continuing relevance and promise of Marx's thought in the 21st century. (shrink)

In his earlier work on the System of Transcendental Idealism, which combined Naturphilosophie and transcendental philosophy, Schelling argued that it is only by becoming-art that philosophy can complete itself as a discipline. He proposed this formulation in response to Kant’s critical inventory of reason offering to reclaim philosophy from its entanglement in pre-critical or dogmatic traditions. But Kant avoided to ground reason in the notion of externality, the in-itself, which, owing to its pre-critical derivation, must give way to the a (...) prioris and categories of the understanding. Meanwhile, by renewing the problem of the in-itself via the self-positing ego, Fichte was the first to challenge the Kantian legacy. But the emphasis on subjectivity through its power of self-positing gave way to what in principle negates nature as the true ground of the initself; in Schelling’s description, the equivalent of the annihilation of nature. Comparatively, Schelling proposed to demonstrate the reverse, which is the extinction of the subject that has continued to nourish the reflexive standpoint of reason. To accomplish this end, Schelling invoked in his Philosophy of Art, one of the places in which he extended his discussion of the so-called identity-system, the concept of the ideal type, or rather, the destroyer of known world established by critical reason. (shrink)

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection , and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated . I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a (...) single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected , and that category (4) is protected speech. (shrink)

In the paper we discuss the problem of limitations of freedom in mathematics and search for criteria which would differentiate the new concepts stemming from the historical ones from the new concepts that have opened unexpected ways of thinking and reasoning. We also investigate the emergence of category theory and its origins. In particular we explore the origins of the term functor and present the strong evidence that Eilenberg and Carnap could have learned the term from Kotarbiński and Tarski.

From one of our most astute art critics, an impassioned and elegant book that questions the demand for art's political relevance or its need to deliver a message, and insists on its power to take us out of the everyday world, and its most important role: to excite, disturb, inspire or unsettle us. As more and more critics and enthusiasts insist that art needs to promote a particular idea or message, be it political or social, as a brand, a means (...) of education or entertainment, Jed Perl wants to remind us that the purpose of art lies not in our ability to define it, to place it in a context, whether a cause, an issue or an ideology. Instead the true power of art lies in its ability to shake our need for definitions, relevance or categories. He reminds us of the inherently uncategorizable nature of the artistic imagination, that a work of art is not merely a statement beamed out into the world, but the result of a dialogue between the artist and the tools and tradition of the medium, and that the fascination of the arts lies in their ability to be both dispassionate and impassioned. Perl explores the practices that are the foundation for the two catalysts of imaginative achievement: authority and freedom. He discusses the sense of vocation that give artists their purpose and focus, and how the interplay between authority and freedom underpin the creative process. (shrink)

Kant’s view that freedom is a “kind of causality” seems to conflict with his claim that the categories of the understanding – including causality – can only be applied objectively to sensible phaenomena, never to supersensible noumena, as freedom is only possible for the latter. I argue that only Kant’s theory of symbolic presentation, according to which the category of cause is applied merely analogically to freedom, can dispel this threatening inconsistency. Unlike it is commonly thought, (...) one cannot here use the category of cause in its unschematised form to think freedom as causality, for its mere logical significance does not suffice for the practical reality of freedom. Symbolic cognition in turn is not unschematised but indirect schematized presentation. Ultimately I will show that symbolic cognition is a necessary condition of moral agency – but not of morality itself – for without it we could not cognize and hence self-consciously use our freedom to act from the moral law. (shrink)

The main objective of this text is to show that for Karl Jaspers all authentic philosophy is an attempt to express subjectivity in terms of the intersubjective categories of intellect. Subjectivity is understood as a plane of individual experience which ultimately comes down to the consciousness of freedom. Intersubjectivity on the other hand is perceived as a plane of expression of this experience, which can boil down to language. For it is only through the mediation of language that (...) one can illuminate its own being – its connection to the world and transcendence. Thus, the rational expression of experience is the essential condition for self-comprehension of any subjectivity. Ultimately, however, any attempt of rational inquiry reveals itself as insufficient. The human being, in his or her, pursuit of self-comprehension has to reach the boundary of language-based expression and therefore the boundary of all reasoning, where rational knowledge must give way to direct but inexpressible experiencing of what is the absolute source of all being. Thus, in the end, silence is the only true expression of transcendence. (shrink)

Whether free speech is defended as a fundamental right that inheres in each individual, or as a guarantee that all of society's members will have a voice in democratic decision-making, the central role of expressive freedom in liberating the human spirit is undeniable. Freedom of expression will, as the essays in this volume illuminate, encounter new and continuing controversies in the twenty-first century. Advances in digital technology raise pressing questions regarding freedom of speech and, with it, intellectual (...) property and privacy rights. Campaign finance reform limits the formerly sacrosanct category of 'political speech'. Expressive liberties may face their greatest challenge from government efforts to thwart terrorism. The twelve legal scholars and philosophers whose work appears in this volume examine the history of free speech doctrine, its relevance to other social and personal values, and the radical critiques it has withstood in recent years. (shrink)

The article analyzes the key issues of the theology of the modern Greek theologian Chrysostomos Stumulis. Emphasizing the need for the development of Orthodox thought and a clear definition of its place and role in the modern world, the theologian raises issues that are a definite taboo not only for Orthodoxy, but for Christianity as a whole. The problem of the correlation of Eros love and Agape love acquires a new interpretation from theologian, which reveals new horizons for the creation (...) of the latest Christian anthropology. In this context, the view of the theologian is revealed on the relationship between the key anthropological categories of Christianity - faith, love and freedom. Violation of their interaction generates a distorted embodiment of these qualities, which necessitates degradation both of society and of man. The theologian emphasizes that the inability of the Church for millennia to boldly raise the question of the nature of Eros and give him a worthy place in the nature of incarnation limits both the Church and the understanding of Christ. Modern theological thought must respond to problems that are too acute in society, despite the fact that they can be a challenging task for Orthodoxy. The ability of theology to respond to them, generates a "high risk" theology, which has the determination to speak and show the morbidity of an idealized past, dare to point out that some aspects of universally accepted truths are obsolete. The formation of a culture of embodiment is the basis upon which the theologian develops the Theology of the Word of the Flesh. Spirituality, which denies incarnation, in the opinion of the author, appears as pastoral idolatry and leads to dehumanization of society. Understanding the culture of theology as a manifestation of the culture of the flesh, as an expression of all aspects of human life in the perspective of their transformations through the Person of the Incarnate, appears as a continuation and expansion of creation. Love requires the adoption of matter and the human body. Only in this sense disclosure of a human as a Person, in the full extent of his creative spirit. Holistic understanding and a fair assessment of love - eros describes it as an opportunity for revelation and knowledge of both human personality and divine. Violating questions of love, sexuality, desire and satisfaction, the theologian indicates that they have not only anthropological nature, but are a holistic manifestation of the essence of the church body. Consequently, the accusation of Eros by Orthodox theologians points to an inhuman society, full of objections and accusations in human existential self-consciousness. The theologian draws attention to the need for theological discourse in the 21st century in the context of the formation of modern anthropology, in the aspect of disclosure of its completeness, which was lost in the abolition of theology. (shrink)

The present article examines the theology of John Zizioulas with a view to understanding its coherence and viability for ecclesiology. Instead of treating his trinitarian theology, or his historical claims, I focus upon the basic themes of his personalistic ontology, especially the relationship between the ‘hypostasis’ and its ‘nature.’ I argue that Zizioulas's central concept of freedom rests upon an equivocation: he affirms both that freedom and being are identical, and that they are mutually exclusive. In conversation with (...) the philosophy of Levinas, I further argue that Zizioulas's proposal, as an ontology of communion, falls prey to the same reduction of being to thought that forms the central tenet of Western conceptions of subjectivity. In conclusion, I argue that both of these problems trade on a basic inability to account for grace as the fundamental reality of communion. Throughout my basic concern is to inquire into just what function the category of ‘being’ has in Zizioulas's theology, and to point out its surprising obscurity. (shrink)

In this article I argue not only for the value of hermeneutics today but also, and especially, how the crucial gesture of hermeneutics is that of changing the subject for the sake of our today. Surveying briefly the main lines of hermeneutical positions along its history and critiques, and connecting these critiques to the discrepancy between theory and practice, between interpretation and the need to change the world, the article proposes that our reality today, reshaped through globalization and the virtual, (...) is performed as a hermeneutics of history. The challenge for today’s hermeneutics is to work out categories for understanding the present as on-going in a world that tends to capture and distort more and more the meaning of freedom of thought. In the final section, I propose a hermeneutics of the on-going, of gerundive time, partially under the inspiration of Paul Celan, as a response that develops the meaning of the freedom of thought. A defense of nearness and how to think in narrow nearness to the on-going is discussed. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories : the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive (...) cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom. (shrink)

There is a very popular, very potent argument for the impossibility of undetermined free action---call it the naysayer's argument . The argument as I have formulated it is this: If an act is undetermined, it is impossible to account for the occurrence of that act. If it is impossible to account for the occurrence of an act, that act occurs by mere chance. If an act occurs by mere chance, that act falls under no one's control. If an act falls (...) under no one's control, that act is not free. Thus, if an act is undetermined, that act is not free. In this dissertation, I will delve into this argument, considering how the proponent of undetermined free action---the yeasayer---ought to respond. ;First, I will argue that in order to answer this question, one must reformulate the argument in terms of agent-controlled indeterminacy resolution . Once I have reformulated the argument in these terms, it will be clear that the yeasayer must respond to this argument by denying either: If an instance of indeterminacy resolution occurs, it is impossible to account for its occurrence. or If it is impossible to account for an occurrence, the occurrence occurs by mere chance. I will then consider which proposition the yeasayer ought to deny. ;I will argue that the yeasayer cannot refute the naysayer via a denial of and that he must deny . Indeed, he must affirm not only that there is a distinction between events that cannot be accounted for and those that occur by mere chance but that instances of agent-controlled indeterminacy resolution fall into the former category but not the latter. ;Once I have reached this conclusion, I will thoroughly explore the difficulties involved in affirming the thesis in question. I will argue that one's prephilosophical and metaphilosophical convictions determine whether one can reasonably affirm it. I will ultimately conclude that though the thesis is true, it is reasonable for the naysayer to deny it and, thus, that the naysayer cannot be refuted on his own terms. (shrink)