Explication is the conceptual cornerstone of Carnap’s approach to the methodology of scientific analysis. From a philosophical point of view, it gives rise to a number of questions that need to be addressed, but which do not seem to have been fully addressed by Carnap himself. This paper reconsiders Carnapian explication by comparing it to a different approach: the ‘formalisms as cognitive tools’ conception. The comparison allows us to discuss a number of aspects of the Carnapian methodology, as well as (...) issues pertaining to formalization in general. We start by introducing Carnap’s conception of explication, arguing that there is a tension between his proposed criteria of fruitfulness and similarity; we also argue that his further desideratum of exactness is less crucial than might appear at first. We then bring in the general idea of formalisms as cognitive tools, mainly by discussing the reliability of so-called statistical prediction rules, i.e. simple algorithms used to make predictions across a range of areas. SPRs allow for a concrete instantiation of Carnap’s fruitfulness desideratum, which is arguably the most important desideratum for him. Finally, we elaborate on what we call the ‘paradox of adequate formalization’, which for the Carnapian corresponds to the tension between similarity and fruitfulness. We conclude by noting that formalization is an inherently paradoxical enterprise in general, but one worth engaging in given the ‘cognitive boost’ it affords as a tool for discovery. (shrink)
It is well known that reductio ad absurdum arguments raise a number of interesting philosophical questions. What does it mean to assert something with the precise goal of then showing it to be false, i.e. because it leads to absurd conclusions? What kind of absurdity do we obtain? Moreover, in the mathematics education literature number of studies have shown that students find it difficult to truly comprehend the idea of reductio proofs, which indicates the cognitive complexity of these constructions. In (...) this paper, I start by discussing four philosophical issues pertaining to reductio arguments. I then briefly present a dialogical conceptualization of deductive arguments, according to which such arguments are best understood as a dialogue between two participants—Prover and Skeptic. Finally, I argue that many of the philosophical and cognitive difficulties surrounding reductio arguments are dispelled or at least further clarified once one adopts a dialogical perspective. (shrink)
Argumentation is important for sharing knowledge and information. Given that the receiver of an argument purportedly engages first and foremost with its content, one might expect trust to play a negligible epistemic role, as opposed to its crucial role in testimony. I argue on the contrary that trust plays a fundamental role in argumentative engagement. I present a realistic social epistemological account of argumentation inspired by social exchange theory. Here, argumentation is a form of epistemic exchange. I illustrate my argument (...) with two real-life examples: vaccination hesitancy, and the undermining of the credibility of traditional sources of information by authoritarian politicians. (shrink)
Since at least the 1980s, the role of adversariality in argumentation has been extensively discussed within different domains. Prima facie, there seem to be two extreme positions on this issue: argumentation should never be adversarial, as we should always aim for cooperative argumentative engagement; argumentation should be and in fact is always adversarial, given that adversariality is an intrinsic property of argumentation. I here defend the view that specific instances of argumentation are adversarial or cooperative to different degrees. What determines (...) whether an argumentative situation should be primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative are contextual features and background conditions external to the argumentative situation itself, in particular the extent to which the parties involved have prior conflicting or else convergent interests. To further develop this claim, I consider three teloi that are frequently associated with argumentation: the epistemic telos, the consensus-building telos, and the conflict management telos. I start with a brief discussion of the concepts of adversariality, cooperation, and conflict in general. I then sketch the main lines of the debates in the recent literature on adversariality in argumentation. Next, I discuss the three teloi of argumentation listed above in turn, emphasizing the roles of adversariality and cooperation for each of them. (shrink)
Au cours des dernières décennies, les travaux portant sur les pratiques humaines réelles ont pris de l'importance dans différents domaines de la philosophie, sans pour autant atteindre une position dominante. À ce jour, ce type de tournant pratique n'a cependant pas encore pénétré la philosophie de la logique. En première partie, j'esquisse ce que serait une philosophie de la logique centrée sur l'étude des pratiques, en insistant en particulier sur sa pertinence et sur la manière de la conduire. En deuxième (...) partie, j'illustre cette approche centrée sur les pratiques au moyen d une étude de cas : le rôle joué par les langages formels en logique, en particulier dans les pratiques des logiciens. Ma thèse est que les langages formels jouent un rôle opératoire fondamental dans le travail des logiciens en tant que technologie pratique du crayon et du papier, génératrice de processus cognitifs - et qui plus spécifiquement vient contrebalancer certains de nos schémas cognitifs « spontanés » peu adéquats à la recherche en logique. Cette thèse sera appuyée sur des données empiriques venant de la recherche en psychologie du raisonnement. Avec cette analyse j'espère montrer qu'une philosophie de la logique centrée sur l'étude des pratiques peut être fructueuse, en particulier si elle est complétée par les réflexions méthodologiques nécessaires.In different subfields of philosophy, focus on actual human practices has been an important approach in recent decades. But so far, no such practice-based turn has yet taken place within the philosophy of logic. In the first part of the paper, I delineate what a practice-based philosophy of logic would look like, insisting in particular on why it can be relevant and how it is to be undertaken. In the second part, I illustrate the proposed practice-based approach by means of a case-study: the role played by formal languages in logic, in particular in the practices of logicians. I argue that formal languages play a fundamental operative role in the work of logicians, as a paper-and-pencil, hands-on technology triggering certain cognitive processes—more specifically, countering some of our more 'spontaneous' cognitive patterns which are not particularly suitable for research in logic. I substantiate these claims with empirical data from research in the psychology of reasoning. With this analysis, I hope to show that a practice-based philosophy of logic can be a fruitful enterprise, in particular if accompanied by much-needed methodological reflection. (shrink)
Thomas Bradwardine makes much of the fact that his solution to the insolubles is in accordance with Aristotle's diagnosis of the fallacy in the Liar paradox as that of secundum quid et simpliciter. Paul Spade, however, claims that this invocation of Aristotle by Bradwardine is purely "honorary" in order to confer specious respectability on his analysis and give it a spurious weight of authority. Our answer to Spade follows Bradwardine's response to the problem of revenge: any proposition saying of itself (...) that it is false says more than does Bradwardine's proposition saying of it that it is false, and so follows from that other proposition only in respect of part of what it says, and not simpliciter. (shrink)
I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics, amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic behaviour of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such as two-dimensional matrices and (...) the distinction between the context of formation and the context of evaluation of utterances. (shrink)
According to a widespread view in medieval scholarship, theories of supposition are the medieval counterparts of theories of reference, and are thus essentially extensional theories. I propose an alternative interpretation: theories of supposition are theories of properties of terms, but whose aim is to allow for the interpretation of sentences. This holds especially of Ockham’s supposition theory, which is the main object of analysis in this paper. In particular, I argue for my intensional interpretation of his theory on the basis (...) of two key-phrases in his Summa Logicae: ‘denotatur’ and ‘propositio est distinguenda’. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of his theory as a set of instructions to be carried out in order to generate the possible readings of (certain) sentences. (shrink)
Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of truth (...) because both are committed to the thesis, fatal for both, that every sentence signifies/implies its own truth. I close with remarks on Greg Restall's recent model-theoretic formalization of Bradwardine's theory of truth. (shrink)
I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William of Ockham. I compare different parts (...) of Ockham's Summa Logicae, namely III-4 (on fallacies), and the final chapters of part I and first chapters of part II (on supposition). I conclude that there is overlap of conceptual apparatus and of goals (concerning propositions that must be distinguished) in Ockham's theories of supposition and of fallacies, but that the respective conceptual apparatuses also present substantial dissimilarities. Hence, theories of supposition are better seen as an addition to the general logical framework that medieval authors had inherited from ancient times, rather than the replacement of an ancient tradition by a medieval one. Indeed, supposition theories and fallacy theories had different tasks to fulfil, and in this sense both had their place in fourteenth century logic. (shrink)
Permutation invariance is often presented as the correct criterion for logicality. The basic idea is that one can demarcate the realm of logic by isolating specific entities—logical notions or constants—and that permutation invariance would provide a philosophically motivated and technically sophisticated criterion for what counts as a logical notion. The thesis of permutation invariance as a criterion for logicality has received considerable attention in the literature in recent decades, and much of the debate is developed against the background of ideas (...) put forth by Tarski in a 1966 lecture (Tarski 1966/1986). But as noted by Tarski himself in the lecture, the permutation invariance criterion yields a class of putative ‘logical constants’ that are essentially only sensitive to the number of elements in classes of individuals. Thus, to hold the permutation invariance thesis essentially amounts to limiting the scope of logic to quantificational phenomena, which is controversial at best and possibly simply wrong. In this paper, I argue that permutation invariance is a misguided approach to the nature of logic because it is not an adequate formal explanans for the informal notion of the generality of logic. In particular, I discuss some cases of undergeneration of the criterion, i.e. the fact that it excludes from the realm of logic operators that we have good reason to regard as logical, especially some modal operators. (shrink)
In earlier work, I have presented an interpretation of Obligationes as logical games of consistency maintenance; this interpretation has some advantages, in particular that of capturing the multi-agent, goal-oriented, rule-governed nature of the enterprise by means of the game analogy. But it has as its main limitation the fact that it does not provide a satisfactory account of the deontic aspect of the framework—i.e. of what being obliged to a certain statement consists in. In order to remedy this shortcoming, this (...) paper argues for the more encompassing thesis that Obligationes can be viewed as a theory of rational dialogical practices, in particular concerning the management of one's discursive commitments. The main inspiration for this interpretation comes from R. Brandom's inferentialist, normative pragmatism, but more generally, it relies heavily on a dialogical conception of logic. I argue that it offers a more compelling account of several aspects of the obligational framework, in particular the role of doubting responses and the ubiquity of obligational vocabulary in the context of scientific discourse in the medieval tradition. (shrink)
Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of 'meanings', which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a Bradwardinian (...) theory of sentential meaning as it emerges from his treatment of liar sentences, exploring where it requires more thorough elaboration if it is to be a fully developed theory of sentential meaning. (shrink)
In what follows, I analyze Ralph Strode's treatise on obligations. I have used a hitherto unpublished edition of the text (based on 14 manuscripts) made by Prof. E.J. Ashworth. I first give a brief description of Strode's text, which is all the more necessary given that it is not available to the average reader; I also offer a reconstruction of the rules proposed by Strode, following the style of reconstruction used in my analysis of Burley's and Swyneshed's rules elsewhere—that is, (...) essentially based on the idea that obligationes can be viewed as logical games. In the second part, I address Strode's explicit arguments contra Swyneshed. In the third part, I discuss Strode's epistemic and pragmatic approach to obligationes. (shrink)
In [Dutilh Novaes, Medieval-obligations as logical Games of Consistency maintenance, synthese, (2004)], I proposed a reconstruction of Walter Burley’s theory of obligationes, based on the idea that Burley’s theory of obligationes could be seen as a logical game of consistency maintenance. In the present paper, I intend to test the game hypothesis on another important theory of obligationes, namely Roger Swyneshed’s theory. In his treatise on obligationes [edited by P.V. Spade, cf. Spade History and philosophy of Logic 3(1982) 1-32], Swyneshed (...) introduced significant modifications to the general framework of obligationes. To compare the two theories, I apply the same formal apparatus used in the previous paper. It will become patent that Swyneshed’s theory is considerably different from Burley’s, among other reasons because the dynamic aspects that play a major role in the latter are simply not present in the former. My conclusion is that Swyneshed’s version of obligationes is not directed towards consistency maintenance, but rather towards inference recognition, and that it is, from a game-theoretical perspective, less interesting a theory than Burley’s. (shrink)
Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.
As a discipline, logic is arguably constituted of two main sub-projects: formal theories of argument validity on the basis of a small number of patterns, and theories of how to reduce the multiplicity of arguments in non-logical, informal contexts to the small number of patterns whose validity is systematically studied . Regrettably, we now tend to view logic 'proper' exclusively as what falls under the first sub-project, to the neglect of the second, equally important sub-project. In this paper, I discuss (...) two historical theories of argument formalization: Aristotle's syllogistic theory as presented in the "Prior Analytics", and medieval theories of supposition. They both illustrate this two-fold nature of logic, containing in particular illuminating reflections on how to formalize arguments . In both cases, the formal methods employed differ from the usual modern technique of translating an argument in ordinary language into a specially designed symbolism, a formal language. The upshot is thus a plea for a broader conceptualization of what it means to formalize. Pode-se dizer que, enquanto disciplina, a lógica é caracterizada por dois subprojetos: teorias formais da validade de argumentos, baseadas em um número reduzido de esquemas e padrões formais, e teorias de como reduzir a multiplicidade de argumentos em contextos informais, não lógicos, ao pequeno número de padrões formais cuja validade é estudada de maneira sistemática no âmbito do primeiro subprojeto. O segundo subprojeto corresponde à noção de formalização de argumentos. Infelizmente, a tendência atual é de considerar como sendo a lógica propriamente dita exclusivamente o que se encaixa no primeiro subprojeto, em detrimento do segundo subprojeto, igualmente importante. Neste artigo, duas teorias históricas sobre a formalização de argumentos são analisadas: a teoria da silogística apresentada por Aristóteles nos "Primeiros Analíticos" e teorias medievais da suposição. Ambas ilustram o caráter duplo da lógica, que envolve dois subprojetos distintos, e contêm reflexões sofisticadas sobre como formalizar argumentos. Em ambos os casos, os métodos formais utilizados se diferenciam dos métodos atuais de tradução de um argumento em linguagem vernacular para um simbolismo especialmente formulado, ou seja, uma linguagem formal. Em conclusão, o artigo pode ser visto como a defesa de uma conceitualização mais abrangente do que significa 'formalizar' um argumento. (shrink)
In [Dutilh Novaes, Medieval-obligations as logical Games of Consistency maintenance, synthese, ], I proposed a reconstruction of Walter Burley's theory of "obligationes", based on the idea that Burley's theory of obligationes could be seen as a logical game of consistency maintenance. In the present paper, I intend to test the game hypothesis on another important theory of "obligationes", namely Roger Swyneshed's theory. In his treatise on "obligationes" [edited by P.V. Spade, cf. Spade History and philosophy of Logic 3 1-32], Swyneshed (...) introduced significant modifications to the general framework of "obligationes". To compare the two theories, I apply the same formal apparatus used in the previous paper. It will become patent that Swyneshed's theory is considerably different from Burley's, among other reasons because the dynamic aspects that play a major role in the latter are simply not present in the former. My conclusion is that Swyneshed's version of "obligationes" is not directed towards consistency maintenance, but rather towards inference recognition, and that it is, from a game-theoretical perspective, less interesting a theory than Burley's. (shrink)
Albert of Saxony is now recognized as one of the most significant fourteenth-century philosophers—as evidenced, for example, by the entry dedicated to him in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that his reputation is still somewhat overshadowed by the two giants of fourteenth-century nominalism, William of Ockham and John Buridan. Albert's work is often discussed in the context of more extensive analyses of these two authors, which might be seen as suggesting that the significance of (...) his views is secondary. More importantly, the idea that he was not an original thinker but merely a "follower" of Ockham or Buridan is still widespread.The translation into English of Albert's .. (shrink)
In my previous work on Ockham’s theory of supposition, I have argued that it is best understood as a theory of sentential meaning, i.e., as an apparatus for the interpretation of sentences. In this paper, I address the challenge posed to this interpretation of Ockham’s theory by the existence of different kinds of supposition in mental language through the lenses of Ockham’s theory of angelic communication. I identify two potentially problematic implications of Ockham’s account of mental language as allowing for (...) different kinds of supposition: the existence of non-significative supposition in mental language; and the possibility of ambiguous mental sentences. I then turn to angelic communication and examine these two issues from that point of view, concluding that there cannot be non-significative supposition in mental language, but also that there may still be room for sentential ambiguity in mental language. (shrink)