Perin argues that theSceptic is engaged in the search for truth and that since this is so, the Sceptic aims to satisfy certain basic rational requirements.

The Academics offered an argument from twins or perceptually indiscernible objects and an argument from dreams or madness in support of the indiscernibility thesis: that every true perceptual impression is such that some false impression just like it is possible. I claim that these arguments, unlike modern sceptical arguments, are supposed to establish mere counterfactual rather than epistemic possibilities. They purport to show that for any true perceptual impression j, there are a number of alternative causal histories j might have (...) had which would not have resulted in any change in the way in which j represents its object. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction The Structure of Skeptical Arguments The Arguments of the Ancient Skeptics Reasons for Doubt vs. Reasons for Suspending Judgment Two Puzzles References and Further Reading.

This paper takes up two questions. Is there a sense in which the Sceptic as described by Sextus Empiricus is detached from himself? Does this self-detachment by itself make the Sceptic’s way of life undesirable? I sketch two conceptions of self-detachment, and then conclude that the Sceptic faces a dilemma: either he is more detached from himself than the non-Sceptic or he is vulnerable to a non-standard version of the apraxia objection.

In response to Tad Brennan’s critical notice of The Demands of Reason, I offer further arguments in defense of the distinction between appearance and belief, the claim that truth for its own sake is the Pyrrhonist’s goal, and the centrality of the rationalist interpretation of Sextus’s work.