This paper focuses on a recently articulated, emergentist conception of ethical naturalism and its commitment to causal efficacy, or the idea that moral properties have causal powers, along with its supporting commitment to moral causation. After I reconstruct the theory, I explain how it offers some interesting theoretical benefits to moral realists in virtue of its commitment to causal efficacy. Then, after locating some examples of moral causation in support of this commitment, I present and respond to five objections to (...) such causation, which all threaten to undermine this support. Lastly, I consider a very serious problem that the theory faces in virtue of positing emergent moral properties as responsible for moral causation – namely, the problem of downward moral causation. I describe this problem in detail and argue that, as it stands, it does not spell doom for the theory. (shrink)

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain (...) that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges. (shrink)

Can our beloved cats and dogs love us back? This chapter aims to find a satisfactory theory of love that substantiates the claim that they can. It begins by reconstructing and critically evaluating recent attempts by scientists to show that dogs can love humans back. Although these attempts are argued to be unsuccessful, it is further argued that they illuminate the need for an adequate theory of love and offer us some plausible ideas about love that direct us to two (...) recent philosophical theories of love that support the idea that dogs can love humans back. These two theories are discussed in detail before it is argued that dogs, but not cats, seem capable of loving humans under these theories. These theory-based defenses of the belief that dogs can love humans back are then criticized on the grounds that the theories they use are unsatisfactory because they fail to capture three central truths about love. This leads to a third theory of love that, after some friendly amendments, is argued to be a tentatively adequate theory that provisionally vindicates the claim that dogs, but not cats, can love humans back. (shrink)

When we go to the doctor, he or she will not begin to treat us without taking our history – and not just our history but that of our parents and grandparents before us. The doctor will not see us u...

What is love? In this paper I argue that love is a psychological syndrome, or an enormously complex cluster of psychological attitudes and dispositions that’s accompanied by a corresponding set of symptoms that flow from it. More specifically, I argue that love is an affectionate loyalty that takes different shapes across cases and that manifests itself in some set of behavioral and emotional expressions, where this set of expressions also varies across cases. After laying down three theoretical constraints that viable (...) theories of love must satisfy, I sketch my syndrome theory of love in detail and then defend it. First, I argue that it has a strong yet defeasible claim to satisfying the three theoretical constraints. Then I defend my theory against two objections that target its extensional adequacy. I conclude that we have good grounds for being optimistic about the theory even though it calls for further development and scrutiny. (shrink)

This paper addresses the important questions of whether love is possessive and, if so, in what way is it possessive and in what ways is it not. It argues that love is possessive in the way that loyalty is possessive, but it is not possessive in the ways that property-owners are possessive of their mere property, abusers are possessive of their partners, jealousy is possessive of the object it fears losing, or obsession is possessive of its object. By doing so (...) it hopes to shed light on the nature of love as not only possessive, but as loyal and possessive in a loyal way rather than in other ways that might be confused with love. (shrink)

It’s a truism that love must always be for something. In technical terms, love must have an object. Yet we godless naturalists that disbelieve in all gods and any form of an afterlife, including reincarnation, must then be committed to cases of love without objects insofar as we deny the existence of objects that people genuinely love (namely, God and deceased loved ones). This commitment of ours thus seems inconsistent with the truism about love, and so it seems that we (...) godless naturalists must reject our current beliefs and accept that God and deceased loved ones exist after all. In this paper I explain how we should understand the truism about love needing an object and how, as a result, it doesn’t actually conflict with our commitment to cases of objectless love or demonstrate that we must accept that God and deceased loved ones exist. (shrink)

Well-intended natural resource policies that ignore the complexity of socio-ecological systems too often threaten local values and opportunities for sustainable development. Upland areas throughout Indonesia provide examples of complex socio-ecological systems experiencing rapid socio-economic and environmental transformations in response to interactions between development policies and local agendas. Broad natural resource policies influence socio-ecological systems in different ways. In some cases, there are converging national and local goals, while in others the goals of national policy conflict with local aspirations. This study (...) identifies how broadscale policies could respond to the unique characteristics of upland areas to optimise development outcomes and avoid unintended risks for people and the landscape. The theory of reflexive modernity is utilised to illustrate how two national policies, the Community Forestry initiative and the Irrigation Reservoir program, largely discount the complexity of local values in the uplands of Pagar Alam, Indonesia. We identify local farmer aspirations through an analysis of development narratives and relate how they are impacted upon by the two policies. Our findings indicate that dominant development goals and associated sustainability pathways diverge in a range of ways from local farmer values and aspirations. We suggest that policymakers take more consideration of four interacting elements, namely: local ecological traits; local values and institutions; the multiple development pathways; and exogenous market drivers that affect local development, to promote sustainability and increase the likelihood of achieving all desired policy outcomes. (shrink)

The author examines, in the context of Litwin and Stringer''s (1968) operationalization, the influence of social inclusion (organizational warmth and organizational identity) as a marketing ethics correlate. The results indicate that both organizational warmth and organizational identity underlie marketing professionals'' ethical behavior. Furthermore, the influence pattern for each variable is consistent witha priori hypothesis.

Claudian's panegyric for Olybrius and Probinus, the young consuls of 395, includes a passage describing Rome armed in the image of the goddess Minerva. Lines 83–90 read as follows: ipsa, triumphatis quae possidet aethera regnis,assilit innuptae ritus imitata Mineruae.nam neque caesariem crinali stringere cultu 85colla nec ornatu patitur mollire retorto;dextrum nuda latus, niueos exserta lacertos;audacem retegit mammam laxumque coercensmordet gemma sinum; nodus, qui subleuat ensem,album puniceo pectus discriminat ostro. 90.