Under what circumstances, and with what attitudes, should we make moral evaluations of others? I attempt to answer this question by examining a common vice connected with moral evaluation, judgmentalism (the disposition to derive satisfaction from making negative moral assessment of others because one believes one’s own moral worth is enhanced by the failure of others). A Christian view of judgmentalism is discussed, as well as the vice which is the opposite of judgmentalism, moral cowardice (the disposition to be so (...) adverse to making negative assessments of others that one avoids doing so even when such assessments are appropriate and warranted). (shrink)

This paper explores the question of whether there is a conceptual distinction between romantic love and friendship and whether such a distinction would support the normative conclusion that friends should not be lovers. Laurence Thomas has argued that, given an egalitarian conception of romantic love, there is no such distinction between romantic love and friendship. This paper shows that equally egalitarian alternatives to Thomas’s conceptions of love and friendship do suggest that friends should not be lovers. Moreover, the alternative view (...) of romantic love defended in the paper supports a link between romantic love and sexual exclusivity. (shrink)

As the perfect companion to introduction to ethics courses, Dell'Olio and Simon's reader includes the most influential ethical theories without overwhelming the beginning student. It contains a variety of readings encompassing contemporary and classic philosophers, male and female perspectives of both western and non-western ethical traditions, and readings in both theoretical and applied ethics as well as a section on 'living the good life.' Useful introduction with thought provoking study questions and suggestions for further readings accompany each chapter which make (...) it easier for students to understand and appreciate their reading. (shrink)

In "the nature of necessity" alvin plantinga says he does not know whether an individual's essence can be understood in purely qualitative terms. The aim of this article is to show that if essences are suchnesses then plantinga cannot use world-Indexed properties to escape the problems raised for transworld identity by the transitivity of the identity relation. The article concludes that plantinga cannot afford to be in doubt concerning whether essences are primitive.

Till We Have Faces is profitably read at three levels: for its surface story, as a crime drama, and as an exploration of the theological mystery of grace. By transposing the myth of Psyche into the mystery genre, Lewis prepares the reader for Orual’s unreliability as a narrator and lures the reader into the novel’s theological depths. Part Two of the novel contains a series of visionary labors which Lewis borrows from Lucius Apuleius but recasts as feats achieved jointly by (...) Orual and Psyche. The theological reading in this article finds textual support for rereading Part One of the novel as depicting Orual, by grace, unknowingly performing Psyche’s labors. Read thusly, the novel is a working out of Lewis’s belief that God can change the past—that grace can reach back into our histories and retell our story. By ascribing to the mutability of the past, Lewis sidesteps the dispute among various branches of Christianity over whether prevenient grace is both irresistible and salvific. An examination of four sources of grace in Orual’s life reveals that what would have been common grace in her life becomes salvific as it leads to her redemption. This exposition also shows the novel’s indebtedness to the many classical Greek sources to which Lewis alludes within it, as well as its affinity with some of the ideas of Simone Weil. (shrink)