Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)
In this paper I critically examine Michael Moore's views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moore's views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions can make us responsible in overdetermination (...) cases. I go on to provide an account of how this may be possible. (shrink)
Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)
This essay explores some possibilities brought by the question about philosophy’s utility for science. We point to some arguments in favor of the importance of philosophy for science in general and Behavior Analysis in particular. We argue that philosophy is the consciousness of science. Without philosophical consciousness, science incurs epistemological naiveties; it uncritically defends scientific neutrality; it risks turning into a mere technique in the service of ideologies that endangers science’s existence. As the philosophy of Behavior Analysis, Radical Behaviorism can (...) play the role of conscience of that science. (shrink)
‘Scientific dishonesty’ implies the fabrication, falsification or plagiarism in proposing, performing or reviewing research or in reporting research results. A questionnaire was given to postgraduate students at the medical faculties in Sweden who attended a course in research ethics during the academic year 2008/2009 and 58% answered (range 29%–100%). Less than one-third of the respondents wrote that they had heard about scientific dishonesty in the previous 12 months. Pressure, concerning in what order the author should be mentioned, was reported by (...) about 1 in 10 students. We suggest that all departments conducting research should have a written policy about acceptable research behaviour and that all doctoral students should be informed of the content of this policy. Participants in the research groups concerned should also be required to analyse published articles about scientific dishonesty and critically discuss what could be done about unethical conduct. (shrink)
Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)
Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appealing to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)
Human dignity is grounded in basic human attributes such as life and self-respect. When people cannot stand up for themselves they may lose their dignity towards themselves and others. The aim of this study was to elucidate if dignity remains intact for family members during care procedures in a children’s hospital. A qualitative approach was adopted, using open non-participation observation. The findings indicate that dignity remains intact in family-centred care where all concerned parties encourage each other in a collaborative relationship. (...) Dignity is shattered when practitioners care from their own perspective without seeing the individual in front of them. When there is a break in care, family members can restore their dignity because the interruption helps them to master their emotions. Family members’ dignity is shattered and remains damaged when they are emotionally overwhelmed; they surrender themselves to practitioners’ care, losing their self-esteem and self-respect. (shrink)
The most successful coach in college basketball history shares his complete coaching philosophy and demonstrates how to apply it to the leadership and team-building challenges in one's professional and personal life, emphasizing the three key principles of Play Hard, Play Smart, and Play Together.
Diante das dificuldades do dualismo pulsional de Freud, o presente artigo levanta a hipótese de que seria possível compreender a diferença entre pulsão de vida e pulsão de morte em termos de empírico e transcendental. Essas categorias permitiriam pensar que o organismo, e em particular o aparelho psíquico, tem duas funções que poderiam ser, metodologicamente, diferenciadas: uma função transcendental de destruição e uma função empírica de construção.
Some philosophers have claimed that causally determined agents are not morally responsible because they cannot make a difference in the world. A recent response by philosophers who defend the compatibility of determinism and responsibility has been to concede that causally determined agents are incapable of making a difference, but to argue that responsibility is not grounded in difference making. These compatibilists have rested such a claim on Frankfurt cases—cases where agents are intuitively responsible for acts that they couldn’t have failed (...) to perform. This essay argues, first, that the intuitive plausibility of the idea that responsibility is grounded in difference making is not completely put to rest by Frankfurt cases, even if those cases successfully show that responsibility is not grounded in difference making in the sense of access to alternative possibilities of action. It then goes on to develop a different compatibilist strategy, one according to which responsibility is grounded in difference making, but the type of difference making it is grounded in does not require access to alternative possibilities. Indeed, it is a form of difference making that is clearly compatible with determinism. (shrink)
What is the relationship between moral responsibility and causation? Plainly, we are not morally responsible for everything that we cause. For we cause a multitude of things, including things that we couldn't possibly foresee we would cause and with respect to which we cannot be assessed morally. Thus, it is clear that causing something does not entail being morally responsible for it. But, does the converse entailment hold? Does moral responsibility require causation? Intuitively, it does: intuitively, we can only be (...) morally responsible for things that we cause. (shrink)
Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)
In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)
There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)
Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)
Long known solely as fascism s precursor, Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) re-emerges in this volume as a versatile thinker with a colossally diverse posterity whose continuing relevance in Europe is ensured by his theorization of the ...
Este artigo é parte do estudo de doutorado que investigou a concepção de currículo na obra de Dermeval Saviani. O levantamento da produção do autor permitiu-nos identificar que a mesma se concentra, prioritariamente, em quatro grandes áreas: estrutura e política educacional; filosofia da educação; história da educação e teoria pedagógica. Tomamos para análise, neste artigo, as contribuições no campo da filosofia da educação. Concluímos que o autor articula pressupostos ontológicos, gnosiológicos, axiológicos e teleológicos, sustentando uma concepção histórico-crítica de currículo a (...) partir de uma sólida concepção filosófica. (shrink)
Este texto apresenta resultados de um levantamento sobre os principais autores que tratam sobre a epistemologia da educação física e suas principais contribuições no desenvolvimento da pesquisa sobre a formação profissional. A síntese apresentada integra a pesquisa: “A produção do conhecimento sobre a formação profissional em educação física: realidade e perspectivas superadoras”. Apontamos que os balanços teóricos das produções científicas da área estão provocando a busca de maiores níveis de qualidade nas novas pesquisas. Concluímos que as avaliações epistemológicas são pertinentes (...) como referência básica para novos estudos sobre a formação profissional no campo de Educação Física, Esporte e Lazer. (shrink)
Over the years, two models of freedom have emerged as competitors: the alternative-possibilities model and the actual-sequence model. This paper is a partial defense of the actual-sequence model. My defense relies on two strategies. The first strategy consists in de-emphasizing the role of examples in arguing for a model of freedom. Imagine that, as some people think, Frankfurt-style cases fail to undermine the alternative-possibilities model. What follows from this? Not much, I argue. In particular, I note that the counterparts of (...) Frankfurt-style cases also fail to undermine the actual-sequence model. My second strategy of defense consists in revitalizing the original motivation for the actual-sequence model, by revamping it, isolating it from claims that do not fully capture the same idea, and arguing that it can be developed in a successful way. (shrink)
The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)
RESUMO O presente artigo apresenta uma semântica baseada nas atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição por uma sociedade de agentes para lógicas inspiradas no First Degree Entailment de Dunn e Belnap. Diferente das situações epistêmicas originalmente usadas em E, as atitudes cognitivas não coincidem com valores-de-verdade e parecem mais adequadas para as lógicas que pretendem considerar o conteúdo informacional de proposições “ditas verdadeiras” tanto quanto as proposições “ditas falsas” como determinantes da noção de validade das inferências. Após analisar algumas lógicas (...) associadas à semântica proposta, introduzimos a lógica E B cuja relação de consequência semântica subjacente - o B-entailment - é capaz de expressar diversos tipos de raciocínio em relação às atitudes cognitivas de aceitação e rejeição. Apresentamos também um cálculo de sequentes correto e completo para E B.ABSTRACT In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acceptation and rejection entertained by a given society of agents for logics inspired on Dunn and Belnap’s ‘First Degree Entailment’. Distinctly from the original epistemic situation of E, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and it seems more suitable for logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions “said to be true” as well as propositions “said to be false” as determinants of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated with the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic E B, whose underlying semantic entailment relation - the B-entailment - is able to express several kinds of reasoning towards the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. Acorrect and complete sequent calculus for E B is also presented. (shrink)
South Carolina State College was founded in 1896. As one of the Black institutions taking advantage of the Second Morrill Act of 1890, a large portion of the college's limited financial resources, its energies, and its programs were devoted to training students in agriculture, home economics, vocational trades, and in the education of teachers. These curriculums were considered appropriate for young Black men and women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.When the civil rights movement began to challenge (...) segregation in education in South Carolina in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the state's white leaders responded quickly and effectively by creating graduate and law programs at State College. To preserve the racial status quo and segregation in education, Governor James F. Byrnes subsequently raised funds, including one-half million dollars from the Rockefeller sponsored General Education Board, to improve long neglected facilities at State College. A sizable portion of the funds were devoted to the agricultural program.While the defense of “separate but equal” education by Byrnes and others ultimately failed, the changes fostered at State College did dramatically improve the institution in the 1950s and 1960s and brought a shift in its mission away from its traditional focus on rural and agricultural education for Black youngsters. By 1966, the college was nominally integrated. Paradoxically, in 1971 with enrollments declining and fewer students interested in pursuing agriculture as away of life, the agriculture program was discontinued. (shrink)
Ana‐Carolina Gutiérrez‐Xivillé präsentiert eine neue Lesart zu Kants Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Während ältere Studien die kantische Ethik als bloße Ausarbeitung von bereits in den 1760er Jahren vorliegenden Begriffen lesen, zeigt diese Studie eine Neubestimmung des Freiheitsbegriffs und bietet eine gewandelte Sicht auf das Verhältnis zwischen „Moralvermögen“, „moralischem Gefühl“ und „Moralprinzip“. Gutiérrez‐Xivillé betrachtet die Texte weder isoliert noch monolithisch. Ihre aus einem analytischen und einem exegetischen Moment bestehende Methode erfasst Kants bekannte Schriften ebenso wie in jüngerer Zeit neu (...) edierte, wenig erforschte Materialien. Dabei offenbaren sich strukturelle Brüche, die wegweisend von einer frühen Moralkonzeption in eine spätere überleiten. Die Ethik Kants erweist sich als Ergebnis eines allmählichen Heranreifens über mehrere Stationen hinweg. (shrink)
In early hominins, there possibly was high selective pressure for the development of reciprocal mother and child vocalizations such as proposed by Falk. In this context, temporoparietal-prefrontal networks that participate in tasks such as working memory and imitation may have been strongly selected for. These networks may have become the precursors of the future language areas of the human brain.
field: Issue 8 Embodying an Anti-Racist Architecture comprises essays, articles, podcasts, drawings, designs, the cover image, and a film. ‘This Call to Action' is a document borne from dialogue, and as such derives its power from the activism that collaboration and cooperation engender. -/- Asma Mehan, Carolina Lima, Faith Ng’eno, and Krzysztof Nawratek discuss white hegemony across different geopolitical and academic spaces, mindful of the nuances of using English as their shared yet borrowed language. -/- .