Applied Christian Ethics addresses selected themes in Christian social ethics. Part one shows the roots of contributors in the realist school; part two focuses on different levels of the significance of economics for social justice; and part three deals with both existential experience and government policy in war and peace issues.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Keeping Faith with Human Rights by Linda HoganCarol S. RobbKeeping Faith with Human Rights Linda Hogan WASHINGTON, DC: GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2015. 240 PP. $29.95As her title suggests, the relationship between theological and secular traditions in human rights discourse is one important topic of Hogan's book. A second topic is the significant challenge to both theological and secular grounding of human rights norms coming from postcolonial, feminist, and (...) postmodern critics.Regarding the relationship between theological and secular traditions in human rights discourse, Hogan finds evidence of theological treatment of "rights" as early as jurisprudence of the twelfth century; early modern Calvinists then drew on classical and Catholic resources for rights talk. More recently, contemporary human rights discourse has come to function independently of theism as "the common language of humanity" (12). Some human rights theorists claim there is no longer any possible rapprochement with Christian tradition because human rights are grounded in liberalism, which has ruptured with Christianity. Some theologians concur, finding the limitations of liberalism so significant as to prohibit accommodation. Liberalism here means a conviction that human beings can construct an account of morality that is binding for all peoples and in all places, the content of which could be known through universal reason (38); it is furthermore a conviction that human persons are distinct, autonomous individuals whose social and political contexts, cultures, and religious beliefs should neither decisively construct nor constrict individuals' human rights (32).Despite these difficulties, Hogan believes there are good historical and theological reasons to "keep faith with human rights." During the last six decades, human rights discourse has welcomed the articulation of tradition-specific accounts of the grounding of human rights, some secular and some religious, satisfied that there are different ways of accounting for why human beings can be said to have universal rights. It has flourished as a result. The morality of [End Page 208] human rights becomes more durable when citizens draw upon their own communities' narratives and doctrines to make their case.The pluralist approach to justifying human rights theory and politics is consistent with the weight Hogan gives to postcolonial, feminist, and postmodern critiques of the liberalism undergirding the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, embedded in three main pillars of human rights discourse: the nature of personhood, the structure of moral truth, and the role of community. Regarding how the subject of human rights is constructed, she argues that the manner in which we understand our subjectivity is intimately connected with and dependent upon our respective world views, not a consequence of a universal account of human nature (86). On moral truth, Hogan argues that rationality is contingent and justification is always contextual, and yet we do not have to accept a relativist position in respect to truth (104). In her discussion of the role of community, it would have been appropriate to include consideration of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.Hogan encourages human rights theorists to pay serious attention to the critics of human rights, insofar as the political grounding for it appears to be fracturing, even as appeals to its protections are spreading. I recognize the appeal of many of the critiques of liberalism, yet I found myself asking, what besides the discourse would change in light of them? How would the formulation of the norms and their justifiability be changed? Hogan avoids projecting such consequences but warns the reader who acknowledges the need for pluralism that they will need a critical, genealogical approach to the traditions, one that recognizes the embeddedness of power struggles over who authorizes what and who gets included in the community's traditions.Carol S. RobbSan Francisco Theological Seminary and The Graduate Theological UnionCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The author gives a brief reconstruction of Mary Hobgood's position, then poses two responses-one, a reflection on justice as restitution, is directly related to the article; the other, reflection on the welfare system itself, constitutes a a musing about how to do social ethics. In closing, the author poses a question to those who are attempting to reflect morally on welfare policy, which includes Mary Hobgood, though the question is not directed to her personally: What kind of public policy is (...) appropriate to substantiate reproductive rights in an ecological age? (shrink)