This paper examines accounts of the moral wrongness of killing persons in addition to determining what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the morality of killing persons about the equality of persons, and vice versa. I will argue that a plausible way of thinking about the moral wrongness of killing implies that the permissibility of killing innocent, nonthreatening persons depends on a person’s age. I address objections to this conclusion and discuss some potential implications of the view.
Some authors view the veil of ignorance as a preferred method for allocating resources because it imposes impartiality by stripping deliberators of knowledge of their personal identity. Using some prominent examples of such reasoning in the health care sector, I will argue for the following claims. First, choice behind a veil of ignorance often fails to provide clear guidance regarding resource allocation. Second, regardless of whether definite results could be derived from the veil, these results do not in themselves have (...) important moral standing. This is partly because the veil does not determine which features are morally relevant for a given distributive problem. Third, even when we have settled the question of what features to count, choice behind a veil of ignorance arguably fails to take persons seriously. Ultimately, we do not need the veil to solve distributive problems, and we have good reason to appeal to some other distributive model. (shrink)
El nominalismo es normalmente asociado con una concepción voluntarista de la ley natural, sobre todo por la asociación de ambas doctrinas en la obra de Guillermo de Ockham. Sin embargo, no existe una conexión necesaria entre tales doctrinas, y para mostrar aquello, se expondrá la doctrina de Thomas Hobbes al respecto. En este autor, el nominalismo filosófico, más extremo que el de Ockham, se encuentra asociado a una concepción totalmente necesitarista de la ley natural, hasta el punto de que puede (...) decirse que en Hobbes existe, en materia moral, una inversión de la doctrina ockhamista. En ambos casos hay recurso a Dios, pero en el caso de Ockham, para suministrar el contenido de la ley natural y, en el caso de Hobbes, para garantizar el carácter obligatorio de ésta. (shrink)
In 1929 and 1930 Wittgenstein holds some form of Phenomenology. This is a most surprising development of his thought. His Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published in 1921, represents a form of Philosophy radically opposed to Phenomenology. And yet, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," of 1929, and Philosophical Remarks, of 1930, each defends a form of Phenomenology, in the sense that in each one finds that Wittgenstein presents a version of the thesis that the phenomena of immediate experience are in some way central (...) to construal of meaningfulness. I study this period of Wittgenstein's Philosophy with the objective of clarifying his concern with the study of the phenomena. It will emerge that he holds not one, but rather two different forms of Phenomenology. "Some Remarks on Logical Form" gives voice to one conception of the phenomena and of their role in the determination of the rules which stipulate meaningfulness. Philosophical Remarks, on the other hand, contains a criticism of this view, as well as a different conception of the phenomena and of their role with respect to the rules of meaningfulness . It also emerges that the former kind of Phenomenology is very similar to the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the founder of Phenomenology. I will examine Wittgenstein's Phenomenology of 1929, its similarity with the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, his rejection of this conception, and his Phenomenology of 1930. (shrink)
I argue that the claim that all value is conferred is incompatible with the view that the capacity to set ends is unconditionally valuable. While this objection has been made, I offer a rebuttal and then a counterexample to the rebuttal. I also argue that, if all value were conferred, then the Kantian notion that moral wrongness consists in a practical contradiction is undermined.
In this paper, we try to expose the fundamental ideas at the basis of Jorge Millas’ axiology. First, we will expose synoptically the core of the legal philosophy that the Chilean thinker develops on his works on the subject, including his conception about philosophy in general , and about legal science in particular . Secondly, we will expose the epistemological suppositions of his legal philosophy , and his consequent conception of law’s essence , the legal rule and its foundation, and (...) the axiological theory that Millas develops on the basis of the distinction and relationship between “is” and “ought” . We conclude with a critical analysis that pretends to expose the strengths and weaknesses of the legal theory of this Chilean author. (shrink)