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  1.  63
    On the Very Idea of a Robust Alternative.Carlos J. Moya - 2011 - Critica 43 (128):3-26.
    According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of (...)
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  2.  13
    The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Carlos J. Moya - 1990 - Polity Press.
    This new textbook is an exceptionally clear and concise introduction to the philosophy of action, suitable for students interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social sciences. Moya begins by considering the problem of agency: how are we to understand the distinction between actions and happenings, between actions we perform and things that happen to us? Moya outlines and examines a range of philosophical responses to this problem. He also develops his own original view, treating the analysis (...)
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  3. Moral Responsibility Without Alternative Possibilities?Carlos J. Moya - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (9):475-486.
    This paper is a critical comment on an article of David Widerker which also appeared in the Journal of Philosophy. In this article, Wideker held, against positions previously defended by him, that in was possible to design effective counterexamples, in the line initiated by Harry Frankfurt in 1969, to the so-called “Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. The core of my criticism of Widerker is to deny that agents, in his putative counterexamples, are morally responsible for their decisions, owing to the fact (...)
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  4. Moral Responsibility. The Ways of Scepticism.Carlos J. Moya - 2007 - Critica 39 (117):87-96.
     
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  5.  85
    Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility.Carlos J. Moya - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):3-20.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...)
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  6.  1
    The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Oxford: Polity Press.
    This new textbook is an exceptionally clear and concise introduction to the philosophy of action, suitable for students interested in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of social sciences. Moya begins by considering the problem of agency: how are we to understand the distinction between actions and happenings, between actions we perform and things that happen to us? Moya outlines and examines a range of philosophical responses to this problem. He also develops his own original view, treating the analysis (...)
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  7.  30
    On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction.Jennifer Hornsby, Carl Ginet, Kathleen Lennon & Carlos J. Moya - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):498.
  8.  32
    Free Will and Open Alternatives.Carlos J. Moya - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (45):167-191.
    In her recent book Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio develops a distinctive version of an actual-sequence account of free will, according to which, when agents choose and act freely, their freedom is exclusively grounded in, and supervenes on, the actual causal history of such choices or actions. Against this proposal, I argue for an alternative- possibilities account, according to which agents’ freedom is partly grounded in their ability to choose or act otherwise. Actual-sequence accounts of freedom are motivated by (...)
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  9.  28
    Alternativas, responsabilidad Y respuesta a razones.Carlos J. Moya - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):45-65.
    El objetivo del presente trabajo es defender el Principio de posibilidades alternativas (ppa) frente a dos recientes supuestos contraejemplos a éste, inspirados en el que diseñó, hace ya cuarenta años, Harry Frankfurt. Las tres primeras secciones resumen el estado de la cuestión. A partir de la cuar..
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  10.  39
    Doing One's Best, Alternative Possibilities, and Blameworthiness.Carlos J. Moya - 2014 - Critica 46 (136):3-26.
    My main aim in this paper is to improve and give further support to a defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt cases which I put forward in some previous work. In the present paper I concentrate on a recent Frankfurt case, Pereboom's "Tax Evasion". After presenting the essentials of my defense of PAP and applying it to this case, I go on to consider several objections that have been (or might be) raised against it and argue (...)
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  11.  46
    Boghossian's Reduction of Compatibilism.Carlos J. Moya - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:243-251.
    In his paper “What the externalist can know a priori”, Paul Boghossian rejects the compatibility between self-knowledge and content externalism by arguing that compatibilists are committed to the absurd view that a subject can know, by reasoning purely a priori, substantive truths about the world, such as that water exists. In this paper I try to show that Boghossian’s incompatibilist argument does not succeed. According to Boghossian, it is enough, for an externalist to reach the undesired conclusion, that she satisfies (...)
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  12.  13
    Externalism, Inclusion, and Knowledge of Content.Carlos J. Moya - 2003 - In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI Publications. pp. 773-800.
    In this paper I address the question whether self-knowledge is compatible with an externalist individuation of mental content. Against some approaches, I consider self-knowledge as a genuine cognitive achievement. Though it is neither incorrigible nor infallible, self-knowledge is direct, a priori (no based on empirical investigation), presumptively true and authoritative. The problem is whether self-knowledge, so understood, is compatible with externalism. My answer will be affirmative. I will defend this species of compatibilism against several objections, in particular those based on (...)
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  13.  99
    Justificación, causalidad y acción intencional.Carlos J. Moya - 1998 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 13 (2):349-365.
    Tanto las teorías causales como las teorías no causales de la acción consideran la relación de justificación entre razones y acción como una relación no causal, de caracter puramente lógico o conceptual. Según las teodas causales, la acción intencional ha de satisfacer, independientemente de la condicion de justificación, una condición adicional de causalidad. En este artículo se sostiene, en cambio, que el concepto de justificación es ya causal, de modo que no es necesario exigir un requisito causal independiente para entender (...)
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  14.  7
    Belief, Content, and Cause.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - European Review of Philosophy 2.
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  15.  5
    Belief, Content, and Cause.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - European Review of Philosophy 2:159-171.
    In some important papers, and especially in his 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', John Perry has argued that we should draw a clear distinction between two aspects of belief: its causal role in action, on the one hand, and its semantic content (the proposition that is believed), on the other. According to Perry, beliefs with the same semantic content (with the same truth conditions) may have a very different causal influence on the subject¿s action. In this paper, we show (...)
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  16.  48
    Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”.Carlos J. Moya - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):585-605.
    In a recent article, Robert Lockie brings about a critical examination of three Frankfurtstyle cases designed by David Widerker and Derk Pereboom. His conclusion is that these cases do not refute either the Principle of Alternative Possibilities or some cognate leeway principle for moral responsibility. Though I take the conclusion to be true, I contend that Lockie's arguments do not succeed in showing it. I concentrate on Pereboom's Tax Evasion 2. After presenting Pereboom's example and analyzing its structure, I distinguish (...)
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  17.  46
    Introduction: Responsibility for Action and Belief.Carlos J. Moya & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):81 – 86.
  18.  65
    Naturalism and Normativity. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 1996 - Theoria 11 (3):239-240.
  19.  33
    Naturalism and Normativity. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 1996 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 11 (3):239-240.
    Review of E. Villanueva (ed.), Naturalism and Normativity, Atascadero, Ridgeview, 1993.
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  20.  48
    Was Descartes an Individualist? A Critical Discussion of W. Ferraiolo's" Individualism and Descartes".Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):77-85.
    In his article 'Individualism and Descartes' (Teorema, vol. 16, pp. 71-86), William Ferraiolo puts into question the widely accepted interpretation of Descartes as an individualist about mental content. In this paper, I defend this interpretation of Descartes thought against Ferraiolo's objections. I hold, first, that the interpretation is not historically misguided. Second, I try to show that Descartes’s endorsement of anti-individualism would lead either to depriving skeptical hypotheses of their force or to rejecting the epistemological privilege of the first person. (...)
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  21.  69
    Reason and Causation in Davidson's Theory of Action Explanation.Carlos J. Moya - 1998 - Critica 30 (89):29-43.
    Davidson’s famous 1963 paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” contains, in nuce, the main lines of Davidson’s philosophy of action and mind. It also contains the seeds of some major problems of Davidson’s thought in these fields. I shall defend, following Davidson, that rationalization or reasons explanation is a species of causal explanation, but I will be contending, against Davidson’s approach, that causality is best viewed, in this kind of explanation, as an integral aspect of justification itself, and not as an (...)
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  22.  34
    Content, Meaning and Truth.Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):299 – 305.
  23. Ensayos Sobre Libertad y Necesidad.Josep E. Corbí & Carlos J. Moya (eds.) - 1997 - Valencia: Pre-Textos.
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  24. Ernst Cassirer. Stationen einer philosophischen Biographie. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):360-361.
    El neokantismo suele considerarse con frecuencia un apéndice poco significativo de la filosofía kantiana. Por esta razón, la contribución filosófica de los neokantianos ha sufrido en mucho tiempo una desatención inmerecida, aun cuando, por ejemplo, la escuela de Marburgo constituyó un interesante intento de superación de Kant. De todas formas, y afortunadamente, sí ha habido de cuando en cuando, expresiones de aprecio hacia los neokantianos, y, también, en particular, hacia la obra de Ernst Cassirer. A mediados de los sesenta, Paul (...)
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  25. Vértigo y equilibrio: los senderos del escepticismo.Carlos J. Moya - 2005 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 36:85-96.
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  26.  33
    La Nau Del Coneixement.Carlos J. Moya - 2004 - Theoria 19 (3):357-359.
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  27.  31
    Alvarez. 2010. Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 2011 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 26 (2):245-247.
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  28.  46
    Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action - by Maria Alvarez. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2):245-247.
  29.  42
    A Proposal About Intentional Action.Carlos J. Moya - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:55-63.
    In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The (...)
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  30.  22
    La nau del coneixement. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 2004 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3):357-359.
    Tras su prematura muerte, se ha escrito mucho sobre la personalidad filosófica y política de Josep Lluís Blasco. Siendo sin duda importantes y admirables estos aspectos, para mí fue sobre todo una persona amiga, buena y amable, en el sentido literal de este término, y cuya pérdida me ha producido un desconsuelo irreparable. Así, la redacción de estas líneas no es para mí un mero ejercicio profesional, sino un deber de gratitud y afecto.
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  31.  31
    Creencia, significado y escepticismo.Carlos J. Moya - 2004 - Ideas Y Valores 53 (125):23-47.
    Davidson’s antisceptical considerations, like Putnam’s, are transcendental in character: they start from facts that the sceptic has to accept, and are intended to show that those facts would not be such if the sceptical hypotheses were true. It is doubtful that these considerations are finally successful. However, I do not think that Davidson was really interested in a detailed refutation of scepticism. His interest focused instead on the context which gives rise to it: the Cartesian image of the relationships between (...)
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  32.  17
    Memoria y justificación: Hookway y Fumerton sobre el escepticismo.Carlos J. Moya & T. Grimaltos - 2000 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):203-210.
    En su artículo de 2000, Hookway pretende argumentar que el principio de justificación inferencial de Fumerton no tiene las consecuencias escépticas que Fumerton observa en él. Nosotros consideramos que Hookway está en lo cierto. Sin embargo, después de hacer algunos comentarios acerca de sus principales consideraciones a favor de esta tesis, desarrollamos una línea argumentativa independiente que refuerce esa misma conclusión.
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  33.  24
    Kinds of Reasons. An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. [REVIEW]Carlos J. Moya - 2011 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2):245-247.
  34.  21
    Alternatives, Responsibility and Reasons-Responsiveness.Carlos J. Moya - 2009 - Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):45-65.
    This paper is intended to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities against two recent putative counterexamples to it, inspired by the one that HarryFrankfurt designed forty years ago. The first three sections provide a summary of the state of the art. In the remaining sections, the counterexamples to pap o Widerker’s and Pereboom’s are successively presented and discussed. We hold that both examples breach at least one otwo conditions that are required in order to refute pap, namely, that the agent (...)
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  35.  16
    Sentimientos y teoría de la acción.Carlos J. Moya - 2001 - Isegoría 25:19-40.
    En el presente trabajo sostenemos que la concepción de la intencionalidad en la teoría de la acción más ampliamente aceptada en la actualidad hace difícil una comprensión adecuada del papel de las emociones en la génesis e interpretación de la acción. La asimilación de las emociones a actitudes intencionales descuida lo que cabría llamar su contenido emocional y pasa por alto importantes diferencias entre su contenido intencional y el de las actitudes intencionales paradigmáticas, como creencias, deseos e intenciones. Sugerimos, sobre (...)
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  36.  38
    Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism.Carlos J. Moya & Tobies Grimaltos - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):386-394.
    In his 2000 paper, Hookway intends to argue that Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification does not have the sceptical consequences that Fumerton sees into it. We think Hookway is right in holding this. However, after commenting on his main considerations for this thesis, we shall develop an independent line of argument which reinforces the same conclusion.
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  37.  20
    Memory and Justification: Hookway and Fumerton on Scepticism.Carlos J. Moya & Tobies Grimaltos - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):386 - 394.
  38.  35
    Libertad, responsabilidad y razones morales.Carlos J. Moya - 1997 - Isegoría 17:59-71.
    Sila elección está causada por factores ajenos a la voluntad del agente, la libertad y la responsabilidad moral parecen perder su base. Pero si la elección carece de causas, se convierte en un acto irracional y, con ello, irresponsable. La salida de este dilema consiste en advertir la importancia de las razones morales en la deliberación práctica. De acuerdo con la tesis central del presente trabajo, la sensibilidad hacia las razones morales es una condición necesaria de la libertad y la (...)
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  39.  12
    Razones Causadas: Nuevas Perspectivas.Carlos J. Moya - 2011 - In David Pérez Chico, Rodríguez Suárez & Luisa Paz (eds.), Explicar y Comprender. Plaza y Valdés Editores. pp. 231--255.
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  40.  11
    La naturalización de la responsabilidad moral.Carlos J. Moya - 2005 - In Tobies Grimaltós & Julián Pacho (eds.), La Naturalización de la Filosofía: Problemas y Límites. Editorial Pre-Textos. pp. 59.
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  41. The Regress-Problem: A Reply to Vermazen.Carlos J. Moya - 1996 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2).
    This paper is intended to meet some objections that Vermazen has raised about the treatment of the regress-problem in the author's book on the philosophy of action. This problem is shown to involve a skeptical claim about the very existence of actions as distinct from happenings. It is argued, against Vermazen's contention, that only one version of the problem is at work in that book and that, while Danto's basic actions, McCann's volitions and O'Shaughnessy's and Hornsby's tryings do not solve, (...)
     
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  42.  7
    Proper Beliefs and Quasi-Beliefs.Carlos J. Moya & Tobies Grimaltos - 2013 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 38 (4):14-26.
    In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some (...)
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  43.  8
    Presentación.Carlos J. Moya - 1996 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 16 (60/61):5.
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  44.  9
    Las emociones y la naturalización de la intencionalidad.Carlos J. Moya - 1994 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 28:227.
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