This research investigates how consumers’ ethical brand perceptions are affected by differentially valenced information. Drawing on literature from person-perception formation and using a sequential, mixed method design comprising qualitative interviews and two experiments with a national representative population sample, our findings show that only when consumers perceive their judgment of a brand’s ethicality to be pertinent, do they process information holistically and in line with the configural model of impression formation. In this case, negative information functions as a diagnostic cue (...) to form an unethical brand perception, irrespective of other positive information at hand. However, in the case where processing relevance of the un/ethical information provided is low, brand perception formation is algebraic, in which case positive information can counterbalance and neutralize the detrimental impact of brand misbehavior. Our findings extend existing research on consumer perceived ethicality as well as consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility and sustainability initiatives, which has so far assumed the asymmetric impact of negative information on ethical perceptions and consumer attitudes to be prevalent. We derive a range of academic and managerial implications and present a number of important avenues for future research. (shrink)
This article is incorrectly classified as Review Paper in the online and print publication. The correct classification for this article is Original Paper. The publisher apologizes for the inconvenience caused.
Does philosophical critique have a future? What are its possibilities, limits, and presuppositions? Bringing together outstanding scholars from various traditions, this collection of essays is the first to examine the forms of critique that have shaped modern and contemporary continental thought. Through critical analyses of key texts by, among others, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Habermas, Foucault, and Rancière, it traces the way critique has time and again geared itself towards new cultural, social, and political problems, shedding those of its (...) assumptions no longer deemed tenable. It is our hope that the many voices of critique that arise from the present volume will produce effects – new doubts, new insights, new challenges, or new resources – that none could have achieved on their own. (shrink)
Resumo Não há dúvida que tanto Kant como Hegel viram os seus respectivos trabalhos, como contribuições para aquilo que consideravam ser a “metafísica”. No entanto, a autora argumenta, que isto só deve ser compreendido, tendo presente, as concepções de metafísica de cada um dos autores. A autora, começando pela distinção implícita entre metafísica geral e metafísica especial na Crítica da Razão Pura, argumenta que Kant, Fichte, Schelling e Hegel comprometeram-se com uma investigação que, até essa altura, era do domínio da (...) metafísica geral. A autora, concentrando-se na noção de sistema de razão pura, tal como aludido na Crítica da Razão Pura, mostra, que os sucessores de Kant, interpretaram erroneamente a distinção kantiana entre crítica e sistema, o que permitiu elaborarem um sistema completo de razão pura, contrário àquilo que era intenção de Kant. Palavras-chave : Fichte, Hegel, idealismo alemão, Kant, metafísica, sistemaThere is no doubt that both Kant and Hegel saw their work as contributions to what they considered metaphysics proper. Yet what they meant by this, I argue, can only be understood by taking into account their own conception of metaphysics. Starting from Kant’s implicit distinction between general metaphysics and special metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason, I argue that Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel engaged in the investigation that used to be carried out in general metaphysics. Focusing on the notion of a system of pure reason intimated in the Critique of Pure Reason, I show, moreover, that Kant’s successors, while misinterpreting the Kantian distinction between critique and system, elaborated a method that made it possible to produce a complete system of pure reason, albeit one that differed from the system Kant had in mind. Keywords : Fichte, german idealism, Hegel, Kant, metaphysics, system. (shrink)
The majority of Dutch physicians feel pressure when dealing with a request for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. This study aimed to explore the content of this pressure as experienced by general practitioners. We conducted semistructured in-depth interviews with 15 Dutch GPs, focusing on actual cases. The interviews were transcribed and analysed with use of the framework method. Six categories of pressure GPs experienced in dealing with EAS requests were revealed: emotional blackmail, control and direction by others, doubts about fulfilling the (...) criteria, counterpressure by patient’s relatives, time pressure around referred patients and organisational pressure. We conclude that the pressure can be attributable to the patient–physician relationship and/or the relationship between the physician and the patient’s relative, the inherent complexity of the decision itself and the circumstances under which the decision has to be made. To prevent physicians to cross their personal boundaries in dealing with EAS request all these different sources of pressure will have to be taken into account. (shrink)
El objetivo de este artículo consiste en mostrar la importancia del concepto de libertad dentro del proyecto filosófico de Michel Foucault. a su vez, el eje que guiará esta investigación es el interrogante acerca de cómo este filósofo, especialista en las relaciones de poder y en el concepto de sujeto, ha pensado el concepto que nos proponemos trabajar. La cuestión es en indagar de qué manera la libertad emerge como un problema filosófico y se conecta con el eje del poder. (...) Nuestra hipótesis parte del supuesto de que es justamente a partir del análisis de las relaciones de poder que hallamos una manera de abordar la cuestión de la libertad. Para elaborar este punto, por tanto, es importante hacer dos cosas. Por un lado, reconstruir el concepto de libertad y, por otro, mostrar en qué medida este concepto nos ayuda a entender el vínculo entre ética y política dentro de las reflexiones de Foucault. (shrink)
Scholarly debates on the Critique of Pure Reason have largely been shaped by epistemological questions. Challenging this prevailing trend, Kant's Reform of Metaphysics is the first book-length study to interpret Kant's Critique in view of his efforts to turn Christian Wolff's highly influential metaphysics into a science. Karin de Boer situates Kant's pivotal work in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy, traces the development of Kant's conception of critique, and offers fresh and in-depth analyses of key parts of the (...) Critique of Pure Reason, including the Transcendental Deduction, the Schematism Chapter, the Appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, and the Architectonic. The book not only brings out the coherence of Kant's project, but also reconstructs the outline of the 'system of pure reason' for which the Critique was to pave the way, but that never saw the light. (shrink)
In this engaging, provocative, and highly original study, Karin de Boer offers an interpretation of key parts of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a preparation for an anticipated (and positive) system of metaphysics that is broadly Wolffian in character. In contrast to the lopsided scholarly focus on the negative results of Kant’s project—its “all-crushing” effect on traditional metaphysics—de Boer contends that the Critique is in fact the outgrowth of a longstanding ambition on Kant’s part to make metaphysics (...) into a science, that is, an organized body of a priori knowledge. In so doing, de Boer insists that Kant’s approach should not be taken to be that of a revolutionary overthrowing the ancien régime but instead that of a reformer who retains and works within an established (in this case Wolffian) framework by way of resolving metaphysics’ internal conflicts. In what follows, rather than offering a chapter-by-chapter summary, I will offer an overview of what I take to be the main line of argument in de Boer’s book, followed by a couple of critical remarks. (shrink)
Heidegger often stressed that the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time should be understood as a mere preliminary investigation. That this analysis indeed prepares the investigation into the relationship between time, the understanding of Being and ontology,can only become clear when some light is thrown on the never published third section ofBeing and Time. In this section Heidegger would have explicated in what sense time can be understood as condition of possibility for every kind of ontology. As ontology is (...) a specific possibility of human beings, this possibility must be based on the same basic structures as Dasein as such. In Heidegger's analysis of Dasein, the distinction between a proper and an improper mode of existence is understood as based on a different temporalisation of temporality. Improperness results from a temporal movement in which presentness takes the upper hand and determines the way Dasein understands beings, other people and itself. In the proper mode of existence on the other hand, not only presence, but the three ecstasies of time as a whole would constitute the openness of Dasein. Heidegger would have demonstrated in the third section that this same temporal difference also forms the condition of possibility for the improper and proper mode of ontology: the so-called metaphysics of presence and Heideggers own temporal ontology respectively.From the rather formal perspective of our interpretation, the different moments of the analysis of Dasein are read in view of their significance for the investigation into the essence of metaphysics. By doing so, the third section appears to be the aim of Heidegger's questioning and the 'missing link' between the analysis oí Dasein and the destruction of traditional metaphysics. When Being and Time is read with such a focus on the third section, the often used distinction between the early and the later Heidegger looses much of its sharpness, if not its relevance: it is already in Being and Time itselfthat Heidegger tries to decenter the human being in behalf of a temporality that constitutes meaningful openness as such. (shrink)
Hegel is most famous for his view that conflicts between contrary positions are necessarily resolved. Whereas this optimism, inherent in modernity as such, has been challenged from Kierkegaard onward, many critics have misconstrued Hegel's own intentions. Focusing on the Science of Logic, this transformative reading of Hegel on the one hand exposes the immense force of Hegel's conception of tragedy, logic, nature, history, time, language, spirit, politics, and philosophy itself. Drawing out the implications of Hegel's insight into tragic conflicts, on (...) the other hand, De Boer brings into play a form of negativity that allows us to understand why the entanglement of complementary positions always tends to turn into their conflict, but not necessarily into its resolution. (shrink)
Science is highly dependent on the technologies needed to observe scientific objects. In How Scientific Instruments Speak, Bas de Boer develops a philosophical account of instruments in scientific practice, focusing on the cognitive neurosciences. He argues for an understanding of scientific instruments as mediating technology.
The current crisis makes it clear that the financial sector has an ever greater impact on national and international politics. This development poses a challenge not only to Europe, but also to our philosophical understanding of the relationship between politics and the market. In order to use Hegel’s Philosophy of Right for the purpose of reflecting on this relationship, I begin by arguing that recent commentators, including Honneth and Pippin, unduly play down Hegel’s critique of the liberalist conception of freedom (...) as well as the conception of the state that follows from this critique. Turning to Hegel’s analysis of the relationship between civil society and the state, I submit that we can learn from Hegel that it is crucial for modern societies to let citizens pursue their own interests, but that a one-sided focus on this element threatens to undermine the society as a whole. This is the case if the political domain, which ought to be devoted to the long-term interests of the society as a whole, fails to sufficiently distinguish itself from the struggle between contending particular interests that characterizes civil society. (shrink)
From the time of his very first courses, Heidegger seeks to thematize the radically finite dynamic for human life. As he considers traditional metaphysics to be incapable of facing this finitude, he engages in a critical examination of its most fundamental presuppositions. This article attempts to elucidate Heidegger's critique by means of twodifferent detours. First I show that the idea of self-realization, which Aristotle understood to be the most perfect movement, is unable to account for the tragic, unstable and internally (...) divided structure of human life. Whereas the idea of self-realization determined the ensuing history of metaphysics — including Hegel — to a considerable extent, I understand Heidegger to develop against the background of this tradition a dynamic principle which allows us to conceive of every human striving as essentially threatene by the very principle that makes it possible. I then turn to Greek tragedy, especially to Oedipus Rex, to clarify this radically finite principle in terms of the essential structure of the tragic as such. The tendency of both human life and philosophy to turn away from this essentially tragic movement can be understood as the 'fall' which is inherent in all efforts of the human being to raise itself above itself. Heidegger's own thinking, on the other hand, can be characterized as a finite attempt to withstand this predominant tendency of western philosophy. (shrink)
In his early Jena System Drafts, Hegel elaborates a conception of time which is no longer thematized in later works such as the Encychpaedia. Hegel's early philosophy of nature bears not only on time insofar as it constitutes — together with space — the basic framework of the sciences, but also on the interiorization of time which occurs in the animal. This interiorization marks a decisive moment in the transition from nature to human consciousness, for it is here, in Hegel's (...) view, that time begins to enact itself as pure form of intuition. In this article I reconstruct Hegel's conception of this transition by sketching out the movement in which the pure concept unfolds itself in the element of exteriority and, within the limits imposed by that element, increasingly overcomes its self-externalization. According to Hegel's Jena texts, the concept initially determines itself as ether, space and time, reaches its turning point in the interiorization of time that occurs in the animal, and culminates in the distinction between the pure I and time which allows human consciousness to increasingly overcome its dependence on impressions caused by outward objects. I argue that this construction of the genesis of human consciousness sheds new light on Hegel's understanding of the relation between the pure concept and time, and hence on his philosophy as such. (shrink)
René Descartes, among others, tried to downplay the role of the human imagination by identifying man’s true inner nature with our rational thinking self, a view that according to many became central to the modern self-understanding. In the wake of the 20th-century critiques of this Cartesian view of man, imagination is finally making its comeback. What is often overlooked, however, is that for a long time imagination was deemed vitally important. This project takes a close look at philosophical theories of (...) the imagination in a crucial, but neglected, period in which it was still considered by many, for better or worse, to belong to human nature no less than reason (1350–1600). (shrink)
In 1974, Winfried Fauser published his edition of Radulphus Brito’s commentary on the third book of Aristotle’s De anima. This contribution continues his project by providing an edition of Brito’s commentary on the first book and the first third of the second book. An analysis of this part of the commentary shows that Brito developed some original views that had an impact on the fourteenth-century commentary tradition.
although mostly known to specialists nowadays, Kenelm Digby was a remarkable figure on the intellectual scene of the early seventeenth century. He has been described as “one of the most influential natural philosophers” of his time,1 and corresponded with many of the great scholars of his days, including Descartes, and the French pioneer of atomism, Pierre Gassendi. In the later years of his life, Digby, alongside men like Robert Boyle, became one of the founding members of the Royal Society.2Digby authored (...) one major work of philosophy: the Two Treatises of 1644. This work consisted of a long First Treatise on bodies, and a shorter, Second Treatise on the human soul. In the First Treatise, Digby argued... (shrink)
This article examines Gerald Odonis' view on the nature of place as found in his commentary on the Sentences (Sent. II, d. 2, qq. 3-5) and in an anonymous question (Utrum locus sit ultima superficies corporis ambientis immobile primum) extant in manuscript Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 4229. Both texts defend a thoroughly un-Aristotelian conception of place as three-dimensional space. Odonis not only deviates from Aristotle's definition of place as the inner surface of a surrounding body, but also from the positions of (...) his contemporaries, including fellow Franciscans. Despite some remarkable doctrinal similarities between Odonis' view and that of Renaissance innovators like Francesco Patrizi and Bernardino Telesio, it seems unlikely that Gerald played a role in the rise of new conceptions of place in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. An edition of the anonymous Quaestio de loco is given in an appendix. (shrink)
in a late note, dated 1797, Kant refers to the schematism of the pure understanding as one of the most difficult as well as one of the most important issues treated in the Critique of Pure Reason.1 His treatment of this theme is indeed notorious for its obscurity.2 As I see it, part of the problem is caused by the fact that Kant frames his discussion in terms that he could expect his readers to be familiar with, while he gradually (...) develops ideas that breach any traditional account of cognition. This holds for his references to the power of judgment and the related view that cognition is a matter of subsuming intuitions under concepts3 as well as for the suggestion that there is an initial gap between categories... (shrink)
In 1991, Benoît Patar published a set of anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. He argued that both works should be ascribed to John Buridan and, taken together, constitute the first of Buridan’s three series of lectures on De anima. Even though Patar’s proof of the authenticity of the commentaries has not been unanimously accepted, his attribution of the works to Buridan turned out to be persistent. This article examines the question of the authenticity of the two anonymous commentaries. It (...) argues that there is no conclusive reason to attribute the works to Buridan. The texts are closely related to works by Buridan, but they bear the same relation to commentaries written by Nicole Oresme. As a consequence, the works should be considered to be exactly what they are: anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, written in the same context and around the same time in which the commentaries by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme were also written. (shrink)
This book addresses universal tendencies of human vowel systems from the point of view of self-organisation. It uses computer simulations to show that the same universal tendencies found in human languages can be reproduced in a population of artificial agents. These agents learn and use vowels with human-like perception and production, using a learning algorithm that is cognitively plausible. The implications of these results for the evolution of language are then explored.