An anonymous vigilante attack by six women on an Auckland University lecturer in 1984 took place in the context of ongoing feminist reframing of rape and sexual abuse. Most feminists’ responses to this incident assumed the man's guilt and uncritically accepted the allegations made against him. This was not surprising in view of the prescriptive radical feminist hegemony that prevailed in New Zealand throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Recent feminist writings on sexual harassment have been more ready to grapple (...) with the complexities and ambiguities of issues of sexuality and pedagogy – a shift that enables women to have a wider range of responses to unwanted sexual attention. Some of the earlier and problematic radical feminist notions about rape and sexual abuse have been absorbed into the treatment discourse, with some distressing consequences. In 1988 an over-zealous Christchurch doctor believed she had detected signs of sexual abuse in fifty-six children at a health camp. Her intervention resulted in some girls being removed from their families, even though they denied they had ever been abused. One New Zealand doctor, a pioneer in sexual abuse work in this country, has published a book documenting developments in this area, and expressing grave misgivings about over-intervention and false allegations of abuse. There are persistent attempts to discredit her concerns. However, there is a groundswell of public disquiet over some aspects of sexual abuse work, which cannot be dismissed as backlash. (shrink)

L'ambition de ce livre est de fournir à la philosophie de Péguy l'"appareil" capable de manifester le plus fidèlement possible le "profond ordre intérieur" qui tient ensemble la multitude de textes qui a jailli génialement de sa plume. Loin de pointer les contradiction d'un homme, il s'agit alors de suivre la continuité et la cohérence d'un chemin, par-delà toutes les ruptures apparentes, qui se déroule selon un drame chrétien : L'état d'innocence, d'abord, la pureté de son combat socialiste et une (...) jeunesse saisie par l'événement de l'Affaire Dreyfus et tenue par la venue imminente de la cité harmonieuse ; la chute, ensuite, avec l'histoire de la décomposition du dreyfusisme et l'enfer du monde moderne ; le salut, enfin, avec le retour de la foi catholique et les nouvelles ressources que lui prodigue la vertu d'espérance. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Feminist Review Camille Guy argued, focusing on selected controversies in New Zealand and Australia, that radical feminists have had a prescriptive hegemony in defining issues of sexual abuse, and that this has resulted in injustices and a censorious climate in which people who disagreed were too intimidated to speak out. This article replies to Guy's assertions and, while disagreeing with much of her argument, also suggests that it does point to more broadly sig-nificant issues (...) for feminists trying to analyse and oppose sexual violences at the end of the twentieth century. These include the legacy of the western feminist sex wars in a frequently polarized set of approaches to sexual abuse controversies, and the usefulness of postmodern/poststructuralist theories in helping feminists to make sense of the increasing complexities of the relationship between the mass media and feminist discourses against rape and child sexual abuse. (shrink)

In this paper, I support a hybrid view regarding the metaphysics of worlds. I endorse Lewisian Modal Realism for possible worlds (LMR). My aim is to come up with a hybrid account of impossible worlds that provides all the plenitude of impossibilities for all fine-grained intentional contents. I raise several challenges for such a plenitudinous hybrid theory. My version of hybrid modal realism builds impossible worlds as set-theoretic constructions out of genuine individuals and sets of them, that is, as set-theoretic (...) constructions from parts and sets of parts of genuine Lewisian worlds. _Structured worlds_ are defined as sets of tuples: structured entities built out of Lewisian ‘raw material’. These structured worlds are ersatz worlds, some of which are impossible. I claim that propositions must be sets of worlds rather than members of sets. Once the construction is in place, I evaluate the proposal and show that my hybrid account is able to supply a plenitude of impossibilities and thus giving the resources to make all the hyperintensional distinctions we are looking for, whilst remaining Lewisian-conservative. (shrink)

We live in times where it is possible to control our emotions using biomedical means – for example by taking pills that make us feel better. This chapter discusses one worry about the biomedical enhancement of mood. It is a worry that seems to play an important role in more familiar objections to biomedical enhancement of mood, such as the objection that it would lead to inauthenticity. The worry is that the use of positive mood enhancers will corrupt emotional lives. (...) Ethical questions about the biomedical enhancement of mood are often really questions about our affective reasons. Negative emotions typically feel bad, positive ones typically feel good. Here our hedonic reasons come into direct competition with affective reasons. Those who entirely dismiss affective reasons, or at least think that negative affective reasons are extremely weak, are likely to see little problem with positive mood enhancers. (shrink)

John Rawls is frequently perceived as being an advocate for purely redistributive policies designed to mitigate the consequences of a capitalist economy — an assumption I challenge in this article. My objective is to elucidate the biased nature of this view and provide a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of the corporate landscape that a just society would entail within Rawls's framework. Through a meticulous examination of Rawls's delineation of economic regimes, I underscore the profound — and often unsuspected — (...) implications of liberal egalitarianism on corporate ownership and management. Rawls's proposition of a “property-owning democracy” posits that citizens should retain ownership of shares in companies throughout their lifetimes. Liberal socialism implies the nationalization of the means of production and the socialization of their management. (shrink)

It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between an expressivist account of normative discourse and a realist conception of normativity: more precisely, that expressivism and realism offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a (...) minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism. (shrink)

How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought (...) goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism. (shrink)

De la vie sociale à la vie politique, de la psychiatrie à l'agriculture, la normalisation décide de la forme de la pomme, de la psyché et du monde à travers l'imposition de ses modèles et de ses normes. Ce faisant, elle dessine les contours de la marge et de l'anormalité, monde sublunaire et dégradé. Car si les normes, explicites ou tacites, forment et conforment les êtres, les choses et les mots, c'est toujours accompagnée de son contraire que la norme constitue (...) ses objets. La plupart du temps en effet, les normes s'ordonnent à la logique des oppositions binaires qui déclinent leurs valeurs antagonistes, à commencer par celles du normal et de l'anormal. Nous sommes ainsi constitués par des normes qui, infiltrant tout, commandent notre être au monde, c'est-à-dire comment vivre, travailler, penser ou aimer pour participer à la normalisation générale, être normé, normatif et normal. Vagabondant à la marge, l'anomalie a ainsi très mauvaise réputation. Or, si l'anomalie n'est synonyme d'anormalité, voire de monstruosité que du fait d'une erreur étymologique, ce détournement du sens est le symptôme d'une provenance métaphysique plus profonde, selon laquelle hors des normes, théologiques, ontologiques ou logiques, il n'y a rien qui vaille. Il n'empêche que pour Georges Canguilhem, les anomalies biologiques peuvent correspondre à des mutations réussies, lesquelles instaurent alors une nouvelle normativité, tandis que pour Thomas S. Kuhn, les anomalies scientifiques (apparentées aux changements d'aspects étudiés par Ludwig Wittgenstein) sont à l'origine de réformes ou de révolutions. Avec Michel Foucault enfin, ce sont les anomalies littéraires, actes transgressifs, solitaires et précurseurs, qui anticipent le passage d'une épistèmê à une autre. Pluridisciplinaire, indisciplinée, à l'écart des normes mais aussi entre le normal et l'anormal, la puissance de transformation qui caractérise l'anomalie est donc telle qu'il devenait nécessaire et urgent de forger le concept d'anomalie créatrice. S'il est évident qu'il existe des anomalies esthétiques créatrices, cet ouvrage a ici pris un autre point de départ, cherchant à mettre au jour mais aussi à libérer et activer un concept dont on puisse, tôt ou tard, faire également un usage éthique et politique. (shrink)

Quoi que nous nous efforcions de penser, nous continuons d'appartenir à notre siècle par Les croyances les plus communes et, quand cela a lieu, par le fait tout aussi commun de ne plus croire - ou de ne pas donner notre confiance au monde. Nos pères se sont tant méfiés, ou ils ont été à ce point cyniques, que cette foi, entendue dans son sens large, semble nous être aujourd'hui interdite. À nous qui avons hérité de cette perte sans l'avoir (...) consommée, ne restent que les débris d'une tradition devenue muette. Or la foi est vitale, et pas seulement la croyance religieuse. Mais dans une époque désorientée, nous ne pourrons peut-être sauver que le désir de croire : rien ne nous dit que nous retrouverons la croyance. Le paradoxe veut que cette impuissance annonce un temps de dangereuse crédulité. Il nous faut donc tout réapprendre. C'est à cette tâche que la philosophie doit s'atteler en prenant le contrepied de son éternelle tendance : en se mettant en quête de croire aussi résolument qu'elle avait cherché à savoir. La traversée du nihilisme est à ce prix."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book brings together an introduction to the social sciences of religions - intended for the general public, which generally ignores them - in a critical essay in order to update them in the face of a current situation that strongly challenges them and will continue to do so. Indeed, the news of globalization imposes the confusing spectacle of a world of religions caught between the two extremes of forms so exclusivist that they justify violence, even terrorism, and such irenic (...) forms that they seek a spirituality fit to go beyond all borders, even religious ones. The place given to Islam in this way is explained, among other things, because during the conflicts of Salafist jihadist and certain branches of Sufism, it illustrates this contradiction in a particularly strong, but by no means exclusive way. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.

Abstract Do the central aims of epistemology, like those of moral philosophy, require that we designate some important place for those concepts located between the thin-normative and the non-normative? Put another way, does epistemology need "thick" evaluative concepts and with what do they contrast? There are inveterate traditions in analytic epistemology which, having legitimized a certain way of viewing the nature and scope of epistemology's subject matter, give this question a negative verdict; further, they have carried with them a tacit (...) commitment to what we argue to be an epistemic analogue of the reductionistic centralist thesis which Bernard Williams, in our view, successfully repudiates in ethics. In this essay, we challenge the epistemic analogue of the traditional but mistaken thesis. In offering an alternative to it which provides a comfortable home for the epistemic normativity which attends thick evaluative concepts, we align ourselves with what has been recently called the Value Turn in epistemology. From this perspective, we defend that, contrary to tradition, as influenced by centralist assumptions, epistemology does need thick evaluative concepts. Further, the sort of theories that will be able to give thick evaluative concepts an irreducible role in both belief and agent evaluation are adequately social epistemologies. What loosely refer to as second-wave of virtue epistemology is the widespread interest to provide a comfortable home for the role of thick normativity, as it is connected both with epistemic evaluation, and guidance. We recognize that, in breaking from centralism, there is a worry that a resulting anti-centralist theory will be reductionistic in the other direction, making the thick primary. We contend however that second-wave virtue epistemologies take different sources of social and epistemic value into account; they seek the 'right thickness' to ride with conception of epistemology and a field which due in part to virtue theory's resurgence, is today normative, diverse and expansive than was the traditional set of problems from which it emerged. (shrink)

Over the last decade, personalized medicine has become a buzz word, which covers a broad spectrum of meanings and generates many different opinions. The purpose of this article is to achieve a better understanding of the reasons why personalized medicine gives rise to such conflicting opinions. We show that a major issue of personalized medicine is the gap existing between its claims and its reality. We then present and analyze different possible reasons for this gap. We propose an hypothesis inspired (...) by the Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methodology. We argue that the fuzzy situation of personalized medicine results from a mix between idiographic claims and nomothetic methodological procedures. Hence we suggest that the current quandary about personalized medicine cannot be solved without getting involved in a discussion about the complex epistemological and methodological status of medicine. To conclude, we show that the Gadamer’s view of medicine as a dialogical process can be fruitfully used and reveals that personalization is not a theoretical task, but a practical one, which takes place within the clinical encounter. (shrink)

Suppose that there are objective normative facts and our beliefs about such facts are by-and-large true. How did this come to happen? This is the reliability challenge to normative realism. As has been recently noted, the challenge also applies to expressivist “quasi-realism”. I argue that expressivism is useful in the face of this challenge, in a way that has not been yet properly articulated. In dealing with epistemological issues, quasi-realists typically invoke the desire-like nature of normative judgments. However, this is (...) not enough to prevent the reliability challenge from arising, given that quasi-realists also hold that normative judgments are truth-apt beliefs. To defuse this challenge, we need to isolate a deeper sense in which normative thought is not representational. I propose that we rely on the negative functional thesis of expressivism: normative thought does not have the function of tracking normative facts, or any other kind of facts. This thesis supports an argument to the effect that it is misguided to expect an explanation of our access to normative facts akin to the explanations available in regions of thought that have a tracking function. We should be content with explanations of our reliability that take for granted certain connections between our psychology and the normative truths. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ethics of education and training, from an interdisciplinary perspective that is itself structurally embedded in the multi-referential nature of the education and training sciences. We draw on Daniel Sibony's conceptualization of the in-between as a professional position in education and training to consider ways of reconciling educational and training support and proximity with the realities of physical distance in digital interventions, all in an ethical way. We discuss the conditions under which support can be successfully (...) incorporated into distance learning (1), dialecticize presence and digital technology in education and training (2), and finally lay some groundwork for an ethics of benevolent digital support, based on the concept of authority and its mutations in hypermodern democracies (3). (shrink)

This paper examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy (§3), reinforceability (§4), non-detachability (§5), cancellability (§6), and calculability (§7). I argue (1) that conventional implicature is a clear non-starter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances (2) that generalised conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid but (3) that a non-implicaturist, and non-hybrid, alternative (...) might in fact be superior. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A la fin du XIXe siècle, alors que l'Europe assiste au retour triomphal de la métaphysique dont Henri Bergson est une figure de proue, sur le positivisme, l'Espagne de la Restauration bourbonienne fait figure de résistante. La répartition bipolaire de l'intellectualité espagnole, entre les conservateurs néo-thomistes et les réformateurs de plus en plus attirés par la psychologie scientifique notamment, rend le dialogue primordialement impossible avec le bergsonisme. Seul Leopoldo Alas, dit Clarin, tente alors de faire entendre la "philosophie nouvelle", dans (...) son pays. Après que le bergsonisme a été boudé durant ces premières décennies d'existence par l'Espagne, la crise théologique moderniste de 1907 précipite son entrée dans la péninsule. Les premiers acteurs "philosophiques" du bergsonisme sont anti-bergsoniens et catholiques. Cet anti-bergsonisme religieux se double d'un rejet politique, pendant la Grande Guerre, principalement lors de la visite diplomatique de Bergson à Madrid, en mai 1916. Parallèlement, les réformateurs, férus de pédagogie, qui ont créé en 1876 la Institucion Libre de Ensenanza, découvrent la conceptualité bergsonienne qu'ils intègrent progressivement, entre 1900 et 1930, dans leur nouvelle science psychopédagogique. Toutefois, les grands acteurs espagnols de la régénération métaphysique sont les littéraires, les poètes symbolistes, appelés "modernistes" dans ce pays, puis les avant-gardes esthétiques. Ce sont eux qui métabolisent le bergsonisme en une (méta-)physique intime et organique. Ce n'est que dans un second temps, dans les années 1910, et non sans obstacles, que les spécialistes espagnols de philosophie intègrent et diffusent le bergsonisme. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

Cet article se donne pour objectif de réfléchir à ce que la crise mondiale du Covid-19 a révélé de nos manières d’habiter les lieux où nous vivons, et parmi celles-ci, la pratique de la danse. La démarche adoptée ici est celle d’un dialogue entre trois courants philosophiques spécifiques : la phénoménologie, le pragmatisme et l’écoféminisme, au sujet de leur conception de l’expérience somatique, à la fois vécue, complexe et ordinaire. Nous cherchons ici les lignes communes à ces trois mouvements philosophiques, (...) dans le but d’esquisser une compréhensions nouvelle du corps, et par extension, une nouvelle approche de la danse par temps de crise pandémique. (shrink)

The commons is a concept increasingly used with the promise of creating new collective wealth. In the aftermath of the economic and financial crises, finance and money have been criticized and redesigned to serve the collective interest. In this article, we analyze three types of complementary currency systems: community currencies, inter-enterprise currencies, and cryptocurrencies. We investigate whether these systems can be considered as commons. To address this question, we use two main theoretical frameworks that are usually separate: the “new commons” (...) in organization studies and the “common good” in business ethics. Our findings show that these monetary systems and organizations may be considered as commons under the “common good” framework since they promote the common interest by creating new communities. Nevertheless, according to the “new commons” framework, only systems relying on collective action and self-management can be said to form commons. This allows us to suggest two new categories of commons: the “social commons,” which fit into both the “new commons” and the “common good” frameworks, and the “commercial commons,” which fit the “common good” but not the “new commons” framework. This research advances a new conceptualization of the commons and of the ethical implications of CCs. (shrink)

Normative naturalism holds that normative properties are identical with, or reducible to, natural properties. Various challenges to naturalism focus on whether it can make good on the idea that normative concepts can be used in systematically different ways and yet have the same reference in all contexts of use. In response to such challenges, some naturalists have proposed that questions about the reference of normative terms should be understood, at least in part, as normative questions that can be settled through (...) normative inquiry. In this paper I have two goals. First, I argue that these naturalist proposals do not yet allow for radical disagreement on normative matters, or at least do not explain how such disagreement is possible. Secondly, I argue that, in order to account for radical disagreement, naturalists should not only treat normative reference as a normative issue but also adopt a non-representationalist account of normative concepts, on which such concepts are individuated through their practical role. I illustrate this point by showing how a view that combines naturalism and expressivism about normative discourse can vindicate the elasticity of normative concepts, their referential stability, and the objectivity of normative truths. (shrink)

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of (...) our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts. (shrink)

The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...) second part of the paper asks what specific directions an expanded field of epistemology should take. While this is taken as an open question for debate, the expansion suggested here remains continuous with the analytic tradition, while also underlining the centrality of the acquired or ‘reflective’ intellectual virtues in meeting the burdens of the three arguments. Responsibilism, as here understood, is not a philosophical thesis so much as an orientation of commitment to clearing away philosophical assumptions that systematically obstruct recognition of the importance of empirically-informed research programs into the reflective virtues. (shrink)

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected (...) from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice. (shrink)

In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.

It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of realism on which realist theses are understood as (...) internal to moral discourse―is immune to this challenge, contrary to what some proponents of the moral argument have suggested, while robust non-naturalist realists might have good answers to all versions of the argument as well, at least if they adopt a certain stance on how to form metaphysical beliefs in the moral domain. (shrink)

透過莊子的人生哲學，引領我們進入「逍遙遊」的世界，在混亂無章的社會中，找回悠然自處的生活之道。 講到莊子，第一印象往往只是他輕鬆幽默的形象嗎？ 你知道莊子其實： 表達立場時，雖然輕描淡寫，卻讓人難以招架。 批評仁義，是因為對於仁義有更高的理想。 乍看消極遁世，實際上處處表達入世的關懷。 跟著老莊思想大家陳鼓應教授，深入了解莊子思想的精隨！ 「庖丁解牛」、「莊周夢蝶」、「螳螂捕蟬，黃雀在後」都是出自《莊子》的著名典故，而莊子與惠施在橋上那場「你不是我，怎麼知道我不曉得魚的快樂？」的精彩辯論，也是我們耳熟能詳的故事。在這些莊子寓言裡面，不僅 潛藏莊子對於人生、天地萬物的哲學思維，更是現代人面對忙碌、壓抑的社會，一帖解放人心的良方。 作者陳鼓應為研究老莊思想的大家，透過流暢的文字，結合自身的時代與人生感悟，深入淺出地剖析莊子哲學的精髓。在第一部分「莊子淺說」，介紹莊子的生活態度、生死觀與處世思想，談論莊子如何化除現實中的紛擾，追求 身心的自由。如同莊子「蝴蝶夢」中將人轉化為翩翩起舞的蝴蝶，比喻人類內心的自由，不受外在世界的束縛。相對於現代文學家卡夫卡（F. Kafka）《變形記》中的大甲蟲，象徵現代人的時間壓迫、空間囚禁與外界疏離感，讓我們能更深一層體會莊子的蝴蝶夢所代表的意涵。 第二部分「莊子思想散步」則彙整了作者自上世紀九○年代以來， 在兩岸三地發表有關莊子思想演講的內容，觸及莊子的審美意蘊、藝術心境等層面。其中更收錄了作者陳鼓應，與德國漢學家沃爾法特（Gunter Wohlfart）談到他們各自接觸莊子的人生經驗，以及透過莊子、老子的道家思想，表達他們對於將來的期許。其中談到莊子提倡破除自我中心的思想，正是現今自私自利的人類社會需要深切反省的課題。 一個人生活的體驗愈多，愈能欣賞莊子思想視野的寬廣、精神空間的開闊及其對人生的審美意境；一個人社會閱歷愈深，愈能領會莊子的「逍遙遊」實乃「寄沉痛於悠閒」，而其思想生命的底層，則未始不潛藏著深厚的憤激之情 。 ──陳鼓應.

Dancers and dance philosophers report on experiences of a certain form of sense making and bodily thinking through the dancing body. Yet, discussions on expertise and consciousness are often framed within canonical philosophical world-views that make it difficult to fully recognize, verbalize, and value the full variety of embodied and affective facets of subjectivity. Using qualitative interviews with five professional dancers and choreographers, I make an attempt to disclose the characteristics of what I consider to be a largely overseen state (...) of consciousness: embodied reflection. Dancers are familiar with this attentive bodily presence, which constitutes their work mode and heightens their abilities as experts. Detailed descriptions of their daily work at the theatre help us grasp the qualities and understand the enigmas of the absorbed state of bodily thinking. Husserl’s theories on reflection and Merleau-Ponty’s work on motoricity support our understanding of the structures behind embodied reflection. I believe it is a common human resource, and that whether we are experts or not, we all have the ability to reflect non-conceptually through bodily and/or affective activity. (shrink)

A revival of the dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry currently takes place in the best international journals of psychiatry. In this article, we analyse this revival and the role given to phenomenology in this context. Although this dialogue seems at first sight interesting, we show that it is problematic. It leads indeed to use phenomenology in a special way, transforming it into a discipline dealing with empirical facts, so that what is called “phenomenology” has finally nothing to do with phenomenology. (...) This so-called phenomenology tallies however with what we have always called semiology. We try to explain the reasons why phenomenology is misused in that way. In our view, this transformation of phenomenology into an empirical and objectifying discipline is explained by the role attributed to phenomenology by contemporary authors, which is to solve the problems raised by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (shrink)

In The Humanist Spirit of Daoism, Chen Guying presents a concise overview of his understanding of the meaning and significance of Daoist philosophy. Chen is a leading contemporary Chinese thinker and spokesperson for a new Daoist approach to existential and socio-political issues. He was born in mainland China in 1935, but after having resettled to Taiwan, he received his education there and was a student activist in the 1960s. He became famous in the Chinese-speaking world with his writings on Nietzsche, (...) Laozi and Zhuangzi. At present he is a Professor at Peking University. This volume collects representative essays from the past 25 years which not only outline Chen's interpretation of Daoism as a deeply humanist way of thinking and living, but also show how he employs this philosophy in a critique of totalitarianism and neo-imperialism. (shrink)

La question de la religion - de son essence, de sa fonction, de son origine - a été centrale dans la sociologie et l'anthropologie classiques. Pour la tirer des impasses et de la stagnation où elle est reléguée de nos jours, Camille Tarot propose ici un bilan critique des œuvres des meilleurs comparatistes, à travers leurs théories si contradictoires de la religion. Huit auteurs principaux sont soumis à examen : Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss, Mircéa Eliade, Georges Dumézil, Claude Lévi-Strauss, (...) René Girard, Pierre Bourdieu et Marcel Gauchet. L'important en la matière est d'abord d'esquiver les faux irénismes comme les querelles stériles ou haineuses, pour confronter les doctrines en profondeur et systématiquement. Ensuite, de déceler l'impensé et les refoulements que produit chaque cadre théorique, pour proposer le modèle ou l'idéal-type de la religion qui paraît le mieux fondé. Au fil de cet examen, il apparaît que l'essence du fait religieux est à rechercher à l'intersection du symbolique et du sacré, à comprendre à partir des fondations d'Emile Durkheim et de Marcel Mauss, complétées par les apports de René Girard. La possible fécondité du modèle qui se dégage ainsi s'atteste par sa capacité à relire les sources et à renouveler en profondeur les vieux problèmes des fonctions de la religion, qui n'avaient guère avancé depuis Emile Durkheim. (shrink)

So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...) theory of well-being (the desire-fulfilment theory). Fourth, I try to defuse the worry that objective-list theories are problematically arbitrary and show how the theory can and should be developed. (shrink)