What kind of education is needed for democracy? How can education respond to the challenges that current democracies face? This unprecedented Handbook offers a comprehensive overview of the most important ideas, issues, and thinkers within democratic education. Its thirty chapters are written by leading experts in the field in an accessible format. Its breadth of purpose and depth of analysis will appeal to both researchers and practitioners in education and politics. The Handbook addresses not only the historical roots and (...) philosophical foundations of democratic education, but also engages with contemporary political issues and key challenges to the project of democratic education. (shrink)

The first ever interdisciplinary handbook in the field, this vital resource offers wide-ranging analysis of health research regulation. The chapters confront gaps between documented law and research in practice, and draw on legal, ethical and social theories about what counts as robust research regulation to make recommendations for future directions. The handbook provides an account and analysis of current regulatory tools - such as consent to participation in research and the anonymisation of data to protection participants' privacy - (...) as well as commentary on the roles of the actors and stakeholders who are involved in human health research and its regulation. Drawing on a range of international examples of research using patient data, tissue and other human materials, the collective contribution of the volume is to explore current challenges in delivering good medical research for the public good and to provide insights on how to design better regulatory approaches. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology offers clear and comprehensive coverage of the main methodological debates and approaches within philosophy. The chapters in this volume approach the question of how to do philosophy from a wide range of perspectives, including conceptual analysis, critical theory, deconstruction, experimental philosophy, hermeneutics, Kantianism, methodological naturalism, phenomenology, and pragmatism. They explore general conceptions of philosophy, centred on the question of what the point of philosophising might be; the method of conceptual analysis and (...) its recent naturalistic critics and competitors; perspectives from continental philosophy; and also a variety of methodological views that belong neither to the mainstream of analytic philosophy, nor to continental philosophy as commonly conceived. Together they will enable readers to grasp an unusually wide range of approaches to methodological debates in philosophy. (shrink)

Book review of Richard A. Richards' The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis.

Social theory has a discovered and discoverable past and a complex, contested, dynamic, and anxious present. All of these adjectives save the last one-anxious-are reflected in various ways and with differing emphases throughout this handbook. I will say something about "anxious" below, but before doing so will offer a rationale for producing this multi-authored, two-volume overview reflecting the diversity of theory work in sociology and offering a sense of both where the discipline has come and where it is today. There (...) is no univocal answer to the question, What does social theory mean? Since the institutionalization of sociology in the academy and its development of subfields, theory has found a place in the overall educational structure of the discipline, in a manner akin to the way that methodology has. That is to say, both theory and methodology have been viewed in some fashion as essential to sociological inquiry, and thus relevant to all of the substantive subfields within it. At the same time, it became clear early on that consensus regarding the meaning of theory has proven elusive. As World War II came to an end and the rapid expansion in higher education was about to commence, Robert K. Merton (1945), the protégé of Talcott Parsons, claimed that six types of analysis had come to be described as sociological theory. Over six decades later, Gabriel Abend (2008) identified seven distinct though sometimes overlapping meanings attributed to theory-a figure that Omar Lizardo (2014) thinks is at the lower end of the actual number of different meanings. (shrink)

The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as (...) mere-Cambridge. The goal of this essay is to isolate the special type of relationality needed to explain what makes a property genuine. In the process, the author evaluates causal accounts of property-genuineness, and shows how the analysis presented is superior. (shrink)

The eagerly-awaited second volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access for the first time in English to major texts in ethics and political thought from one of the most fruitful periods of speculation and analysis in the history of western thought. Beginning with Albert the Great, who introduced the Latin west to the challenging moral philosophy and natural science of Aristotle, and concluding with the first substantial presentation in English of (...) the revolutionary ideas on property and political power of John Wyclif, the seventeen texts in this anthology offer late medieval treatments of fundamental issues in human conduct that are both conceptually subtle and of direct practical import. Special features of this volume include copious editorial introductions, an analytical index, and suggestions for further reading. This is an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, political science, theology and literature. (shrink)

The well-known formal semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), Lewis, and Gärdenfors The logic and 1140 epistemology of scientific change, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978, Knowledge in flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) all fail to distinguish between trivially and nontrivially true indicative conditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott :345–370, 1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test. In this paper, we refine Rott’s strengthened Ramsey Test and the corresponding analysis of explanatory (...) relations. We show that our final analysis captures the presumed asymmetry between explanans and explanandum much better than Rott’s original analysis. (shrink)

The well-known formal semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), Lewis, and Gärdenfors The logic and 1140 epistemology of scientific change, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978, Knowledge in flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) all fail to distinguish between trivially and nontrivially true indicative conditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott :345–370, 1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test. In this paper, we refine Rott’s strengthened Ramsey Test and the corresponding analysis of explanatory (...) relations. We show that our final analysis captures the presumed asymmetry between explanans and explanandum much better than Rott’s original analysis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 596-597 [Access article in PDF] Karl Ameriks, editor. The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 306. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $19.95. This recently published volume is a welcome and timely addition to the Cambridge Companion series. The past two decades have witnessed a renewed and now burgeoning interest in post-Kantian German (...) philosophy, notably among philosophers working in the continental and analytic traditions. Contributors to the volume reflect this diversity (actually, most work within the analytic tradition), and all are familiar and veteran scholars of Kant and German Idealism. The essays, as expected, are compact, but are tightly presented and clearly argued. The decision to devote a Cambridge Companion volume to a philosophical movement—a major exception, as most are aware, for the series—seems quite justified given the heretofore unacknowledged importance of the period and the global (at least among Anglo-American philosophers) misunderstanding from which it has suffered until recently. On both scores, this volume is a successful corrective. A short review precludes individual evaluation, however brief, of the essays in this fine collection, so I will limit my comments to a few general points.The essays are organized so as to provide the reader with a thorough introduction to the history of German Idealism construed broadly to include Kant, Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Maimon, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, the Romantics, and at least the trajectory of post-Hegelianism. The Romantics, particularly Novalis, Schiller, and Hölderlin, receive overdue and careful treatment—Charles Larmore's essay on Hölderlin and Novalis being, in this reviewer's judgment, one of the better contributions to the collection. Some authors retrace themes developed in their earlier scholarly work (especially Pinkard, Wood, Pippin, Beiser, and Bowie); however each essay almost without exception attempts to advance the scholarly discussion of the problems it explores. Paul Guyer's essay, for instance, fits this description: he offers a robust defense of Kantian dualism (e.g., intuition and concept, representation and thing in itself) against Hegelian objections which includes a fine analysis of the genesis of Kant's arguments. On the other hand, Guyer's essay, along with the contributions of Wood, Pippin, Pinkard, Larmore, and Bowie, might be more fruitful for readers more interested in philosophical problems engaged by the Idealists (e.g., moral and political autonomy, rational normativity). The collection begins with Frederick Beiser's skillfully condensed and informative essay on the unresolved tensions within Enlightenment philosophy (and the way in which those tensions, highlighted rather than resolved by the Pantheism controversy, helped set the agenda for what became the tasks of German Idealism) and ends with Karl Ameriks's fine essay on the complex legacy of Idealism in the works of Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard.One of the problems which occupied everyone in this period was rational authority, [End Page 596] namely, what would ground our normative theoretical and practical judgments and to what extent reason would provide either the foundation itself or access to this foundation. Most of the essays address this issue either directly or implicitly and accurately capture the diverse responses to this basic question and its implications for political philosophy—another central theme for the Idealist tradition. The problem of rational authority had been inherited from Rousseau, yet the Idealists explored the issue with an unparalleled thoroughness and urgency in the shadow of the French Revolution. Larmore does an exceptional job of articulating Hölderlin's and Novalis's critique of Fichtean self-consciousness, namely, that judgment itself must presuppose and draw upon a more basic unity (Absolute Being for Hölderlin and the Being of the I antecedent to self-awareness for Novalis) than the self-positing I, a unity which, as Larmore notes, underlies every cognitive attitude. Contributing to this general critique was the aesthetic holism of Hamann, Schiller, and Herder ably sketched by Daniel Dahlstromm. Central to the problem of rational authority is the contribution of Hegel, who took to heart Hölderlin's insistence on a more basic primordial unity... (shrink)

This admirable volume treats the period from Montaigne to Kant. As the editor, Donald Rutherford, promises in his Introduction, the volume reflects the broadly contextualist consensus among scholars in the field over the last few decades. Neither intellectual history nor abstract conceptual analysis, contextualist scholarship looks at the way philosophical ideas develop in concrete settings, within intellectual horizons, and in response to specific philosophical problems. Thus this Cambridge Companion is committed to the idea that a philosopher’s published works (...) must be read in connection with both his or her correspondences, drafts, and other papers, as well as in connection with the thinkers whose works constitute that philosopher’s intellectual environment and matrix. Simply put, contextualist historians of philosophy deny that philosophical work takes place in a conceptual or historical vacuum. Second, this collection reflects the expanding list of important thinkers, works, and issues in the period. The familiar authors Rutherford terms the “canonical seven” —Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz for the “rationalists” and Locke, Berkeley, Hume for the “empiricists,” all. (shrink)

John Wisdom studied ‘moral sciences’ in Cambridge under G. E. Moore and C. D. Broad. His first post as a teacher of philosophy was at St Andrew's University under F. G. Stout. His early books Interpretation and Analysis and Problems of Mind and Matter and a series of articles on ‘Logical Constructions’ in Mind 1931-33, later published as a book, belong to this time.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 118-119 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, editors. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xv + 307. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $21.95. Given the immeasurable influence of Augustine upon the Western tradition, a volume devoted to him in the Cambridge Companion Series (...) has been long overdue. Fortunately, the lacuna has been filled by a work that exhibits the quality of scholarship and clarity of presentation that has become a hallmark of this series. Ably edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, it will serve admirably as a guide for students and professionals alike, with much that is of interest to seasoned Augustine scholars.As Stump tells us in her introduction, the eighteen essays of the volume are loosely grouped according to eight topics. These are philosophy of religion, metaphysics and theology, philosophy of mind, theory of knowledge, philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, and Augustine's influence. As is apparent from this list, the essays cut a vast swath through Augustine's corpus, though they focus on what is of greatest interest to philosophers. In addition, since Augustine did not recognize a clean division between philosophy and theology, much that we now classify as theology gets attention as well.In keeping with the aim of the series, the character of the essays is, for the most part, expository. Each author takes pains to explain the outlines of Augustine's position on the particular topic under consideration, and most do so with considerable attention to the evolution of his thought and the context in which he wrote. Christopher Kirwan's essay, for example, not only traces the development of Augustine's philosophy of language from his early De magistro and De dialectica through his mature De doctrina Christiana, but highlights those areas in which the influence of Stoic dialectic can be detected. Similarly, John Rist's essay on faith and reason includes a discussion of the relation of Augustine's views on credibilia to the Platonic tradition, and Paul Weithman's essay on political theory examines Augustine's critique of Ciceronian ideals of political society. Thus, while systematic in their exposition, the essays give due recognition to the fact that Augustine's views evolved through continual reassessment of the antique heritage in light of changing concerns and circumstances, particularly an increasing concern to articulate the foundations of a new, scripturally inspired, vision of God, humanity, and society. [End Page 118]In addition to exposition and historical analysis, many of the authors use their essays as occasions for constructive philosophical engagement. Perhaps the best of these is Stump's essay. Noting the pervasive disagreement among interpreters over Augustine's doctrine of free will, she distinguishes three positions available to defenders of free will--compatiblism, common libertarianism, and modified libertarianism--in order to bring greater conceptual clarity to the interpretive task. She then shows that in his early work, De libero arbitrio, Augustine develops an essentially libertarian position (though which form he is committed to remains ambiguous), but that this account comes into tension with his views concerning the action of grace on the will as they were later developed in opposition to the Pelagians. In itself this is not a startling claim, but Stump's analytical skills enable her to identify precisely where the tension lies, and she suggests a way that Augustine could have resolved this tension without compromising his basic commitments.If there is any quibble to be had with the volume, it is that several of the essays are too compressed. Roland Teske's essay on the soul and William Mann's essay on evil, for example, run a mere seven and nine pages each. Though informative, given the centrality of these topics to Augustine's thought, they would have been more useful had they been expanded. Because of this, the most satisfying essays are those in which the authors stretch out. Scott MacDonald's piece on the divine nature is particularly good in this regard. In... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 442-443 [Access article in PDF] Steven Nadler, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche. Cambridge Companions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xi + 319. Cloth, $54.95. With his own Cambridge Companion, the seventeenth-century French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche has at last arrived in the English speaking world. As editor Nadler puts it, "Malebranche was widely recognized by (...) his philosophical and theological contemporaries... as an intellectual force to be reckoned with, a bold... synthesizer of... St. Augustine and Descartes and a systematic thinker of the first rank" (1). Yet until the relatively recent arrival of books or translations by scholars such as Nadler, McCracken, Jolley, Schmaltz, and Riley, Malebranche has largely been treated by Anglo-American scholars as merely the solitary proponent of the allegedly rather silly doctrine of occasionalism. The tide is now turning, and we may expect that over the next few years Malebranche's wide-ranging sophistication and significance will be more widely appreciated. Invaluable to that end will be Nadler's volume, which is of great interest both to those new to Malebranche and to seasoned scholars, for it presents accessible yet thorough introductions to Malebranche's many interesting doctrines—concerning self-knowledge, vision in God, continuous creation, occasionalism, theodicy, grace, freedom, morality, etc.—as well as raises important questions for future research. All of the essays Nadler has assembled are by well-known scholars, and all are worthwhile.The first point to make is that occasionalism—the view that God is the only true cause, and that finite substances lack all true causal power—was neither silly, nor was Malebranche its only proponent. As Nadler's own essay makes clear, the doctrine (or variations thereof) has roots in medieval philosophy as well as in Descartes, and was favored by other Cartesians preceding Malebranche, such as Cordemoy, la Forge, Geulincx, and Clauberg; further, Malebranche offered numerous distinct arguments for it, and, as evidenced in essays by Schmaltz, Rutherford, Kremer, and Riley, intended it to fit with his other metaphysical views in a complete and coherent system. Even if, as some of these same authors suggest, Malebranche failed to get everything to fit quite right, it's at least clear that the oft-raised charge that occasionalism was merely an ad hoc solution to the Cartesian mind-body problem is unjustified. There is of course room to disagree with certain details here: I've argued elsewhere, for example against Nadler, that despite evidence to the contrary Malebranche does not invoke continuous creation as an argument for occasionalism, and, in effect, against Kremer, that Malebranche can succeed in reconciling occasionalism and his conception of free will. But then the fact that scholars can disagree on points such as these is precisely evidence that Malebranche is a rich subject of study.Different essays have different virtues. Some are especially strong in philosophical analysis. Schmaltz provides penetrating analyses of Malebranche's doctrine that we see [End Page 442] all things "in God" as well as of related issues (such as the distinction between the intellectual and the sensible), and also traces their roots in or ramifications for thinkers such as Augustine, Descartes, Arnauld, and Regis; Kremer, too, does an impressive job disentangling the many discrete threads in Malebranche's theory of free will. Essays by Moreau and Riley are particularly useful for their overview or synthetic nature: Moreau presents the many points of contention in the decades-long dispute between Malebranche and Arnauld, while Riley makes explicit the implications that many of the doctrines discussed by other contributors have for Malebranche's moral theory (in the process perhaps implicitly supporting the claim that Malebranche's moral theory may be essential for understanding his metaphysics). Brown's and Robinet's contributions, the former detailing Malebranche's positive influence on or critical reception by figures such as Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, and Reid, the latter focusing on disputes between Malebranche, Arnauld, and Leibniz, are essential for those interested (as all should be) in working Malebranche into standard undergraduate courses on modern philosophy, and will also be... (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is now widely recognised alongside Wittgenstein as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. He redefined the central task of philosophy as the investigation of the nature of being, and has exerted a profound impact on literary theory, theology, psychotherapy, political theory, aesthetics, environmental studies, as well as mainstream philosophy. His thought has contributed to the recent turn to hermeneutics in philosophy and the social sciences, and to current post-modern and post-structuralist developments. The disclosing of his (...) deep involvement in the ideology of Nazism has provoked much debate about the relation of philosophy to politics. This volume contains both overviews of Heidegger's life and works and analysis of his most important work, Being and Time. In addition there are discussions of Heidegger's thought in relation to mysticism, traditional theology, ecology, psychotherapy and the philosophy of language. The volume also contains the first in-depth study of what has been called Heidegger's second greatest work, the Beitrage zur Philosophie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 571-572 [Access article in PDF] Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, editors. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xxx + 292. Cloth, $65.00. Paper, $23.00. The goal of the Cambridge Companion to Philosophy series has been to "dispel the intimidation" that students and non-specialists often experience when faced with the works of a (...) "difficult and challenging thinker" (i). Indeed, Emmanuel Levinas would qualify as such a thinker, whose work is firmly rooted in two traditions: (1) the admittedly abstruse and seminal phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and (2) Judaism, including the Talmudic tradition, the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig, as well as Levinas's experience with rampant anti-Semitism in twentieth-century Europe. The imminent danger in producing a collection with the express intent of making a challenging thinker accessible is that the force of the thought may become undermined by the process of simplification. The Cambridge Companion to Levinas, however, achieves its goal as a book that not only elucidates Levinas but also provides numerous essays that even the Levinasian scholar will find useful.Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi are directly responsible for the success of the Companion. These two editors have proven themselves as adept collaborators in the area of Levinasian philosophy with their earlier contribution to Indiana University Press's series Studies in Continental Thought: Re-reading Levinas (Simon Critchley and Robert Bernasconi, editors [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991]). This new cooperative effort offers essays that introduce Levinas's thought from the perspective of some of the many fields upon which he has had an influence including the philosophy of language, art, feminism, Judaism, phenomenology, and the philosophy of religion.Even with the many tangential fields to which Levinas's thought contributes, the Companion often refers to Derrida's metaphor which describes Levinas's work as a wave, the "same" wave, crashing on the beach with increasing demand. Derrida, however, is also partly responsible for the intensifying return of Levinas's work. Derrida's critique of Levinas's Totality and Infinity was the impetus behind Levinas's subsequent focus on language and the problematic of "how" one speaks of that which is outside being. Certainly, the Companion could have spent the majority of its pages outlining this philosophical, textual conversation, but such an explication would have compromised the accessibility of this introductory text to the non-specialists to whom this series caters. The editors, instead, chose to avoid Derrida's difficult critique while having a significant concentration of essays that deal with Levinas's philosophy of language. This allows neophyte students of Levinas to discover his intricate thought on language without necessary knowledge of the context as well as provide those scholars interested in the debate access to the most contemporary thought on the matter—at least from the Levinasian perspective. Readers are assured, then, that the Companion covers the difficult concepts of the speaking face from the early period to the later distinction of the "saying" and the "said," inspired by Derrida's critique.The Companion, unfortunately, seems one sided concerning an important aspect of Levinas's philosophy. Throughout his entire corpus, Levinas attributes his thought to the seminal work of Edmund Husserl, continually inviting his readers to begin again with Husserl's phenomenology. Rudolph Bernet contributes to this collection an outstanding analysis of Levinas's critique of Husserl, describing some of the departures that Levinas makes from Husserl's phenomenology. The rest of the Companion, however, makes note to downplay Levinas's positive indebtedness to phenomenology. Hillary Putnam promises to explain Levinas with a "minimum of reliance on any prior knowledge of the two great 'H's (Husserl/Heidegger)" (40). Adhering to her word, in an otherwise insightful essay, means that the phenomenological issue remains superficial. While it is never absent, Bernet's essay seems to have set the tone, placing Levinas in a position of opposition with Husserl with a minimum of discussion of what Levinas has called his adherence to the "spirit" of phenomenology. To the Companion's credit... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to Galileo ed. by Peter MachamerMartin CurdPeter Machamer, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Galileo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp xii + 462. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $19.95.The contributions fall into three main areas: Galileo’s work on mechanics, his defense of Copernicus, and his relationship with the church. The relative number of pages devoted to these topics is unusual: the ratio is (...) roughly 3 to 1 to 3.The papers on Galileo’s mechanics and physics are by William Wallace, Peter Machamer, Rivka Feldhay, Wallace Hooper, and Pietro Redondi. Wallace concentrates on unpublished manuscripts from Galileo’s early period, arguing that they reveal Galileo’s intense involvement with Aristotelian philosophy. As in his other writings, Wallace emphasizes the importance of the demonstrative regressus argument for Galileo’s thought, especially for Galileo’s later claim in the Dialogue to have demonstrated the earth’s motion from the phenomenon of the tides. Machamer offers an “Archimedean” [End Page 364] interpretation of Galileo, stressing the Galileo’s use of simple machines, especially the balance, as a model of intelligibility throughout his scientific work. According to Machamer, these machines functioned as something like a Kuhnian exemplar for Galileo, providing the element of necessity and picturability that Galileo deemed essential for scientific explanation. Feldhay explores the role of mathematics in Galileo’s science, arguing that Galileo began to diverge from the Jesuit-Aristotelian tradition once he gave up trying to understand the causes of accelerated motion and focused instead on its geometrical analysis in terms of degrees of velocity. In a useful discussion, Hooper follows the development of Galileo’s inertial mechanics, concluding that even in the Discourses (1638) it is unclear whether Galileo abandoned his pre-Newtonian notion of impetus as the sustaining cause of motion. Redondi examines the relationship of Galileo’s physics to his theology. While Redondi’s conclusion is clear—“Galileo’s physics required God”—his argument is hard to follow, ranging as it does over Galileo’s views on time, atomism, macroscopic and microscopic physics, and cosmogony.Only two articles are directly about Galileo and the Copernican theory but those two pieces, by William Shea and Noel Swerdlow, are models of clarity. Swerdlow focuses on Galileo’s telescopic discoveries 1610–13 while Shea covers the entire period up to the Dialogue of 1632. Unfortunately, this involves repetition of the material about the telescopic discoveries, including some diagrams and illustrations. Tighter editorial control might have avoided this duplication and allowed Shea to devote more time to the fascinating arguments in the Dialogue. What we have is fine, but more would have been better.On Galileo and the church, there are contributions from Ernan McMullin, Richard Blackwell and Marcello Pera. McMullin argues that the seeds of Galileo’s downfall in 1633 were sown in his Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615) in which Galileo endorsed a theory of scriptural interpretation remarkably similar to that contained in Augustine’s commentary on Genesis. McMullin finds a tension in that theory between regarding Scripture and natural science as mutually irrelevant while at the same time giving science priority over the literal reading of Scripture if and only if a demonstration has been provided. Once the demonstration principle was adopted, Galileo’s task of defending the earth’s motion against biblical literalism in the Dialogue became hopeless. Blackwell asks whether there could be another Galileo case in light of the Vatican’s admission of error in 1992. His answer is “Yes.” Blackwell reminds us that while in 1616 it was the Copernican theory that been tried and found heretical, in 1633 the sole issue was Galileo’s obedience to church authority. In Blackwell’s view, there remains the potential for conflict between the church’s “logic of centralized authority” and the democratic, pluralistic methods that give legitimacy to science. Pera, too, concludes that the possibility of conflict remains as long as the church insists that there are truths of faith, necessary for salvation, and those doctrines also have a factual content amenable, at least in principle, to scientific investigation.The book concludes with two pieces: a survey by Michael Segre of the evolution of Galileo’s... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 158-159 [Access article in PDF] Christopher Janaway, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 592. Cloth, $59.95. Schopenhauer's import as a original thinker has often been downplayed or underestimated by contemporary commentators and his philosophy is often examined only in light of his influence upon Nietzsche. This collection of thirteen essays assembled by (...) Christopher Janaway does much to overcome scholarly neglect of Schopenhauer by illustrating the original aspects of his thought as well as the widespread influence his philosophy has had. One gains from this book not only a solid introduction to Schopenhauer's major ideas but an appreciation of the significant contributions he made to the philosophical milieu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.In the first essay, Gunter Zöller examines how Schopenhauer's unique notion of selfhood fits into his overall "dual aspect" theory of the world as both will and representation. He also discusses Schopenhauer's conception of the self within the context of his claims regarding the negation of the will. The following article, by David Hamlyn, is also broad in scope and provides a comprehensive examination of Schopenhauer's epistemology in The World as Will and Representation. He looks at the various notions of knowledge that are employed in Schopenhauer's system and how they are determined by the different classes of objects of knowledge that Schopenhauer distinguishes. In the third essay F. C. White turns to Schopenhauer's earlier work, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle ofSufficient Reason. White runs through Schopenhauer's arguments regarding each of the four classes of objects which comprise the world as representation in the Fourfold Root. He reinforces the point made by Schopenhauer himself, that this is a text that can not be overlooked if one is to gain a sufficient understanding of his primary work. The Fourfold Root, like the rest of Schopenhauer's philosophy, is deeply engaged with the philosophy of Kant. This is the topic of the next article by Paul Guyer. Guyer gives a detailed summary and evaluation of Schopenhauer's appropriation and critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy. According to Guyer, Schopenhauer and Kant employ quite different methodologies, Kant's being thoroughly transcendental and Schopenhauer's more phenomenological. Also, Schopenhauer's phenomenological approach to epistemological questions often skews his interpretation and evaluation of Kant's transcendental arguments. [End Page 158]Christopher Janaway, in the first of his two contributions, turns the focus to Schopenhauer's famous metaphysical doctrine of the will. He provides a particularly illuminating discussion of Schopenhauer's conception of will as the "thing-in-itself." The thing-in-itself is also the subject of the next article by Noira Nichols. Despite his reputation for not significantly altering his major positions, Nichols argues that there is a distinct difference between Schopenhauer's earlier, more Kantian, conception of the thing-in-itself with his later, more mystical, conception. She attributes these conceptual shifts to the increasing influence of Eastern philosophy upon Schopenhauer's thinking. Schopenhauer's broad analysis of the concept of will includes complex aesthetic and moral theories which are addressed in the contributions by Cheryl Foster and David Cartwright. In her contribution, Cheryl Foster examines Schopenhauer's aesthetics by focusing on his views regarding the relationship of art and science, art and the limitations of the intellect, and the nature of artistic genius. Turning to Schopenhauer's moral theory, David Cartwright explicates Schopenhauer's "narrower" sense of morality as discussed in his often overlooked On the Basis of Morality, rather than focusing on the "higher metaphysical-ethical standpoint" exemplifed in the World as Will and Representation. Cartwright also attempts to demonstrate "... how Schopenhauer has contributed and could contribute to contemporary moral thought" (253).The next group of articles address the issue of Schopenhauer's pessimism. Dale Jacquette looks at Schopenhauer's understanding of the meaning of death in light of his pessimistic metaphysic. Included in Jacquette's study is an explanation of Schopenhauer's views on suicide and asceticism. Covering similar territory, Christopher Janaway... (shrink)

Boethius, though a Christian, worked in the tradition of the Neoplatonic schools, with their strong interest in Aristotelian logic and Platonic metaphysics. He is best known for his Consolation of Philosophy, which he wrote in prison awaiting execution. His works also include a long series of logical translations, commentaries and monographs and some short but densely-argued theological treatises, all of which were enormously influential on medieval thought. But Boethius was more than a writer who passed on important ancient ideas to (...) the Middle Ages. The essays here by leading specialists, which cover all the main aspects of his writing and its influence, show that he was a distinctive thinker, whose arguments repay careful analysis and who used his literary talents in conjunction with his philosophical abilities to present a complex view of the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand RussellPeter H. DentonNicholas Griffin, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 550. Cloth, $75.00. Paper, $26.00.It is a daunting task to conceive of a single companion to Bertrand Russell, who in life as in thought was never content with a single anything. Nicholas Griffin has brought his customary expertise to the (...) project, and in snaring fourteen other contributors to this volume, has produced a welcome addition to an academic's library of Russell materials.The shape of the volume, its contents and its presentation, however, unfortunately reflect the lopsided nature of current Russell studies. One hopes for a companion volume that has the breadth of the earlier volume edited fifty years ago by Paul Schilpp, but in vain. This book is overwhelmingly about Russell before 1918, almost entirely about philosophy of mathematics, epistemology and logic, and several of the pieces easily could have been included in a festschrift for Frege instead.What is included is well done, but to call it "the most convenient and accessible guide to Russell available" is to speak in comparative terms. To be fair, it sets out to focus on a narrow definition of Russell's contributions to modern philosophy, and the contributors accomplish this task. Ian Grattan-Guinness writes on "Mathematics in and behind Russell's Logicism, and its Reception," a subject that continues into "Bertrand Russell's Logicism" by Martin Godwyn and Andrew D. Irvine. The roots of analytic philosophy are of primary concern in this volume, so Richard L. Cartwright explores "Russell and Moore, 1898-1905" and Michael Beaney relates "Russell and Frege." "The Theory of Descriptions" by Peter Hylton sets up two pieces on "Russell's Substitutional Theory" (Gregory Landini) and "The Theory of Types" (Alasdair Urquhart), while Paul Hager's "Russell's Method of Analysis" leads into "Russell's Neutral Monism" (R.E.Tully) and "The Metaphysics of Logical Atomism" (Bernard Linsky).The next portion of the book expands the intellectual focus somewhat, with "Russell's Structuralism and the Absolute Description of the World" by William Demopoulos—perhaps [End Page 349] the best in a series of good papers—and "From Knowledge by Acquaintance to Knowledge by Causation" by Thomas Baldwin. Approaching the end of the book, Anthony Grayling's essay on "Russell, Experience, and the Roots of Science" remains firmly planted in the pre-1918 milieu, though his tentative commentary on Human Knowledge at least glimmers the extension of Russell's intellectual life into the post-Great War period.Effectively the entire second half of Russell's life is left to the final contributor, Charles Pidgen, for commentary. Author of Russell on Ethics, much of Pigden's short essay here ("Bertrand Russell: Moral Philosopher or Unphilosophical Moralist?") somewhat plaintively directs the reader to his book for an elaboration of why Russell is worth reading after 1918, at least on the subject of ethics. Of the other authors, only Hager (317) observes the extent to which Russell's post-War work mistakenly has been ignored.The book concludes with a selective bibliography. The audience, for the most part, is a specialist one, with only some essays accessible to the general reader. On that score, Griffin's introduction and his own essay, "Russell's Philosophical Background," are easily the most readable. At the risk of quibbling, I was disturbed by the uneven production of the book, as each author set his own standard for footnotes, endnotes and bibliography (creating a jumble of styles). Even within individual contributions, there are a number of inconsistencies in notation as well as typographical errors.By the end, I was left hoping there might be a second companion volume for Bertrand Russell, one that reflects what he spent the last fifty years of his life thinking, writing, and doing. In the absence of such material (which is of far greater popular interest today just as it was in Russell's lifetime), this book by itself is more of a companion to current Russell studies than to Bertrand Russell himself.Peter H. DentonThe University of WinnipegCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

The human imagination manifests in countless different forms. We dream the possible and the impossible. How do we do this so effortlessly? Why did the capacity for imagination evolve and seem to manifest uniquely in our species? This handbook reflects on such questions by collecting perspectives from leading experts. It showcases a rich and detailed analysis on how the imagination is understood across several disciplines of study, including anthropology, archaeology, medicine, neuroscience, psychology, philosophy and the arts. An integrated theoretical-empirical-applied (...) picture of the field is presented, which informs researchers, students and practitioners about the issues of relevance across the board. With each chapter, human imagination is explained - what it entails, how it evolved, and why it singularly defines us as a species. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.4 (2001) 596-597 [Access article in PDF] Karl Ameriks, editor. The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 306. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $19.95. This recently published volume is a welcome and timely addition to the Cambridge Companion series. The past two decades have witnessed a renewed and now burgeoning interest in post-Kantian German (...) philosophy, notably among philosophers working in the continental and analytic traditions. Contributors to the volume reflect this diversity (actually, most work within the analytic tradition), and all are familiar and veteran scholars of Kant and German Idealism. The essays, as expected, are compact, but are tightly presented and clearly argued. The decision to devote a Cambridge Companion volume to a philosophical movement—a major exception, as most are aware, for the series—seems quite justified given the heretofore unacknowledged importance of the period and the global (at least among Anglo-American philosophers) misunderstanding from which it has suffered until recently. On both scores, this volume is a successful corrective. A short review precludes individual evaluation, however brief, of the essays in this fine collection, so I will limit my comments to a few general points.The essays are organized so as to provide the reader with a thorough introduction to the history of German Idealism construed broadly to include Kant, Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Maimon, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, the Romantics, and at least the trajectory of post-Hegelianism. The Romantics, particularly Novalis, Schiller, and Hölderlin, receive overdue and careful treatment—Charles Larmore's essay on Hölderlin and Novalis being, in this reviewer's judgment, one of the better contributions to the collection. Some authors retrace themes developed in their earlier scholarly work (especially Pinkard, Wood, Pippin, Beiser, and Bowie); however each essay almost without exception attempts to advance the scholarly discussion of the problems it explores. Paul Guyer's essay, for instance, fits this description: he offers a robust defense of Kantian dualism (e.g., intuition and concept, representation and thing in itself) against Hegelian objections which includes a fine analysis of the genesis of Kant's arguments. On the other hand, Guyer's essay, along with the contributions of Wood, Pippin, Pinkard, Larmore, and Bowie, might be more fruitful for readers more interested in philosophical problems engaged by the Idealists (e.g., moral and political autonomy, rational normativity). The collection begins with Frederick Beiser's skillfully condensed and informative essay on the unresolved tensions within Enlightenment philosophy (and the way in which those tensions, highlighted rather than resolved by the Pantheism controversy, helped set the agenda for what became the tasks of German Idealism) and ends with Karl Ameriks's fine essay on the complex legacy of Idealism in the works of Feuerbach, Marx, and Kierkegaard.One of the problems which occupied everyone in this period was rational authority, [End Page 596] namely, what would ground our normative theoretical and practical judgments and to what extent reason would provide either the foundation itself or access to this foundation. Most of the essays address this issue either directly or implicitly and accurately capture the diverse responses to this basic question and its implications for political philosophy—another central theme for the Idealist tradition. The problem of rational authority had been inherited from Rousseau, yet the Idealists explored the issue with an unparalleled thoroughness and urgency in the shadow of the French Revolution. Larmore does an exceptional job of articulating Hölderlin's and Novalis's critique of Fichtean self-consciousness, namely, that judgment itself must presuppose and draw upon a more basic unity (Absolute Being for Hölderlin and the Being of the I antecedent to self-awareness for Novalis) than the self-positing I, a unity which, as Larmore notes, underlies every cognitive attitude. Contributing to this general critique was the aesthetic holism of Hamann, Schiller, and Herder ably sketched by Daniel Dahlstromm. Central to the problem of rational authority is the contribution of Hegel, who took to heart Hölderlin's insistence on a more basic primordial unity... (shrink)

This landmark handbook collects in a single volume the current state of cutting-edge research on the capability approach. It includes a comprehensive introduction to the approach as well as new research from leading scholars in this increasingly influential multi-disciplinary field, including the pioneers of capability research, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Incorporating both approachable introductory chapters and more in-depth analysis relating to the central philosophical, conceptual and theoretical issues of capability research, this handbook also includes analytical and measurement (...) tools, as well as policy approaches which have emerged in the recent literature. The handbook will be an invaluable resource for students approaching the capability approach for the first time as well as for researchers engaged in advanced research in a wide range of disciplines, including development studies, economics, gender studies, political science and political philosophy. (shrink)

In this introduction to Mikhail Bakhtin, Ken Hirschkop presents a compact, readable, detailed, and sophisticated exposition of all of Bakhtin's important works. Using the most up-to-date sources and the new, scholarly editions of Bakhtin's texts, Hirschkop explains Bakhtin's influential ideas, demonstrates their relevance and usefulness for literary and cultural analysis, and sets them in their historical context. In clear and concise language, Hirschkop shows how Bakhtin's ideas have changed the way we understand language and literary texts. Authoritative and accessible, (...) this Cambridge Introduction is the most comprehensive and reliable account of Bakhtin and his work yet available. (shrink)

We cannot understand contemporary psychology without first researching its history. Unlike other books on the history of psychology, which are chronologically ordered, this Handbook is organized topically. It covers the history of ideas in multiple areas of the field and reviews the intellectual history behind the major topics of investigation. The evolution of psychological ideas is described alongside an analysis of their surrounding context. Readers learn how eminent psychologists draw on the context of their time and place for ideas (...) and practices, and also how innovation in psychology is an ongoing dialogue between past, present, and anticipated future. (shrink)

It weighs in at a bit more than five pounds; its dimensions demand a cradle. Yet this book is a handsome and welcome achievement despite its bulk. Its reproduction of the 1922 text, its maps and photos of 1904 Dublin; its list of minor characters in Ulysses; its bibliography of scholarship, both old and new; its timeline of Joyce's life, and its exemplary detailed annotations of the text: everything, harvested from the best sources, has been brought together to create the (...) largest volume dedicated to Joyce scholarship ever produced—a book that celebrates the first printing of Joyce's masterpiece. Given its weight and size, its classroom utility is likely limited; given its monumentality, it is a proper hundred-year tribute.What is wholly original about the book's contents are the essays that preface each of the eighteen episodes of the masterpiece. That Joycean scholarship grows upon itself is amply demonstrated by the sophistication and weight of learning the eighteen writers can now display. Almost fifty years have passed since Clive Hart and David Hayman edited a volume with a similar aim. Each of the new essays reveals just how much more there is now to know and say about Ulysses, how much more there is to praise in how Joyce conceived the book, how much more there is to teach, and how unlikely it is that Joycean scholarship will ever be diminished in either its curiosity or its energy. Given the increasing complexity and density of such accumulated knowledge, it is a pleasure to witness the economy and precision shown by so many of the writers. In particular, Robert Spoo's writing about “Nestor,” Maud Ellmann's writing about “Lotus Eaters,” and Vicki Mahaffey's writing about “Nausicaa” demonstrate how concision can make for valuable illumination.But there is a problem with where these essays are positioned. Coming before each of the episodes they introduce, they might condition the mind of a reader new to Ulysses to look upon those episodes as no more than demonstrations of what the scholars think. Catherine Flynn, the book's editor, emphasizes the need of such professional interpretation when she describes the plight of anyone “struggling through Ulysses” and “the key challenges facing the reader.” She is right about how hard it is for any new reader to “get” the book, but the placement of the essays is at odds with her claim that “grappling with the novel's challenges, the reader is pushed toward one of the most important rewards of reading Ulysses: thinking independently.” The prefaces may well impede the reader from thinking independently.Professor Flynn's focus on challenge and difficulty is widely shared throughout the Joycean community and has become a fundamental preoccupation in Joyce scholarship. Taking Joyce's mastery as a given, many Joyceans assume a Talmudic stance in believing, to quote Spinoza, that “the intellectual love of a thing consists in understanding its perfections.” Facing the formidable Joyce, they turn and turn again to explication. They subscribe to the dictum that the youthful Joyce himself, perhaps self-mockingly, set down: “A man of genius makes no mistake. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery.” But is Ulysses free of error?Fritz Senn, writing about “Ithaca,” does not put himself in opposition to Joyce but in opposition to the presumed inerrancy of Joyce. He argues that the episode displays a troubling disjunction between what Joyce intended to do in the episode and what he did. Joyce told his friend Frank Budgen that in the episode “not only will the reader know everything and know it in the baldest and coldest way, but Bloom and Stephen thereby become heavenly bodies, wanderers like the stars at which they gaze.” But readers do not, indeed, get to know all they should, or see all they should see. Senn notes that they “learn next to nothing about Bloom's mother, his birthday, or the exact nature of his father's suicide, although they do learn a lot about such things as the junk in a drawer, the Dublin water supply system, and the addresses of Dublin shops.” Senn asks: “What does the meeting of the two characters amount to? Will it change Stephen so that he might become the author of the book he is in? Does Bloom find a son? Does he become the father that Stephen is supposed to be looking for? The impassive episode does not seem to answer, or to care.” But these are questions about which many a reader might care.Joyce named “Ithaca” as his favorite among the episodes. Senn demonstrates by his care and attentiveness that he too admires it. But by not limiting himself to dutiful reverence, he instead critically examines the Joycean text. His tribute to Joyce is both unsparing and generous.Equally attentive and yet incisive is Katherine O'Callaghan in her examination of “Sirens.” She recognizes the experimental daring of Joyce's strategy of “conveying music through language” in that episode. But her analysis, as penetrating as it is learned, does not leave the reader persuaded that the episode is entirely successful. As she observes, “the reluctance of the musical art to bend to the critical written voice” is a “stumbling block.”Another problematic experiment, “Oxen of the Sun,” which Joyce himself described as “the most difficult episode... both to interpret and to execute,” presents its commentator, Sarah Davison, with the task of explaining how its grandiose mixture of parody, plagiarism, and sheer celebration of myriad English prose styles over the centuries can function without, as she says, “wrongfooting and dissatisfying readers” who assume that the episode “enacts a historical progression only to find themselves disorientated by so many different echoes and cadences.”Were Joycean scholars more devoted to critical judgment than to explication—even when they are faced with the spectacular imposition of genius—the common reader would more likely find fellowship, and less intimidation, when reading a book that is not a sacred text but a human document, written with the extraordinary self-imposed challenges, as well as the problematic results, that only a most extraordinary human could make. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin was a central figure in twentieth-century political thought. This volume highlights Berlin's significance for contemporary readers, covering not only his writings on liberty and liberalism, the Enlightenment and Romanticism, Russian thinkers and pluralism, but also the implications of his thought for political theory, history, and the social sciences, as well as the ethical challenges confronting political actors, and the nature and importance of practical judgment for politics and scholarship. His name and work are inseparable from the revival of (...) political philosophy and the analysis of political extremism and defense of democratic liberalism following World War II. Berlin was primarily an essayist who spoke through commentary on other authors and, while his own commitments and allegiances are clear enough, much in his thought remains controversial. Berlin's work constitutes an unsystematic and incomplete, but nevertheless sweeping and profound, defense of political, ethical, and intellectual humanism in an anti-humanistic age. (shrink)