This paper reconstructs and discusses a proof of God’s existence by Anselm of Canterbury’s friend Ralph of Battle, developed in his recently edited De nesciente, a fictitious dialogue between a Christian and an atheist. Without precedent in antiquity and the Middle Ages, Ralph’s proof has never been examined in detail. It combines a “cogito” argument with a two-part cosmological argument. The paper first presents the textual basis and an exegetical interpretation of Ralph’s reasoning, classifies the parts of the proof historically (...) and systematically, and then compares these with the proofs of God’s existence as well as other arguments in Anselm’s Proslogion and Monologion. Finally, it points out some similarities between Ralph’s “cogito” argument and a passage in the Liber pro insipiente, which may suggest that this anonymous critique of Anselm’s Proslogion proof was authored not by Gaunilo, as traditionally thought, but by Ralph. (shrink)

This paper explores Thomas Aquinas’ and Richard Swinburne’s doctrines of simplicity in the context of their philosophical theologies. Both say that God is simple. However, Swinburne takes simplicity as a property of the theistic hypothesis, while for Aquinas simplicity is a property of God himself. For Swinburne, simpler theories are ceteris paribus more likely to be true; for Aquinas, simplicity and truth are properties of God which, in a certain way, coincide – because God is metaphysically simple. Notwithstanding their different (...) approaches, some unreckoned parallels between their thoughts are brought to light. (shrink)

Their contributions range from analyzing and defending classical conceptions of eternity (Boethius's and Aquinas's) to vindicating everlastingness accounts, and ...

In this paper, Anselm’s argument for the uniqueness of God or, more precisely, something through which everything that exists has its being is reconstructed. A first reading of the argument leads to a preliminary reconstruens with one major weakness, namely the incompleteness of a central case distinction. In the successful attempt to construct a more tenable reconstruens some additional premises which are deeply rooted in an Anselmian metaphysics are identified. Anselm’s argument seems to depend on premises such as that if (...) two things have the same nature, then there is one common thing from which they have this nature and in virtue of which they exist. Furthermore it appears that infinite regresses are excluded by the premise that if everything that exists is through something, then there is something through which it is “most truly”. (shrink)

Anselm of Canterbury’s so-called ontological proofs in the Proslogion have puzzled philosophers for centuries. The famous description “something / that than which nothing greater can be conceived” is part and parcel of his argument. Most commentators have interpreted this description as a definition of God. We argue that this view, which we refer to as “definitionism”, is a misrepresentation. In addition to textual evidence, the key point of our argument is that taking the putative definition as what Anselm intended it (...) to be – namely a description of a content of faith – allows getting a clear view of the discursive status and argumentative structure of Proslogion 2–4, as well as making sense of an often neglected part of the argument. (shrink)

Georg Cantor, the founder of set theory, cared much about a philosophical foundation for his theory of infinite numbers. To that end, he studied intensively the works of Baruch de Spinoza. In the paper, we survey the influence of Spinozean thoughts onto Cantor’s; we discuss Spinoza’s philosophy of infinity, as it is contained in his Ethics; and we attempt to draw a parallel between Spinoza’s and Cantor’s ontologies. Our conclusion is that the study of Spinoza provides deepening insights into Cantor’s (...) philosophical theory, whilst Cantor can not be called a ‘Spinozist’ in any stricter sense of that word.Keywords: Georg Cantor; Baruch de Spinoza; Infinity in philosophy and mathematics; Transfinite numbers; Set theory; Infinity and pantheism. (shrink)

Existence and uniqueness are standard questions in cases where definite descriptions are used. In his Proslogion Anselm of Canterbury uses definite and non-definite descriptions of God: He is “id/aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest” (and similar). While Anselm’s proof for the existence of God is widely discussed, including its relations to those famous descriptions, this is not the case for the question of uniqueness. Is there at most one perfect being or might there be more than one? ‘Of course there (...) can at most be one’, one might want to answer – but what reasons for this claim can be found in the Proslogion? In this celebrated work of philosophical theology, Anselm does not prove uniqueness explicitly. But one may try a proof “in the spirit of the Proslogion”. (shrink)

This volume brings together papers on the theory of reconstruction that pay attention to the humdrum exercise of everyday reconstruction and papers that develop reconstructions of Anselmian arguments with a view to the theoretical problems of reconstruction. We hope that this will provide the readers with an opportunity to assess the merits of the theoretical accounts in the light of the reconstructions and the merits of the latter in the light of the former.

Bernard Bolzano lebte von 1781 bis 1848, hauptsächlich in Prag. Er war ein bedeutender Philosoph, Mathematiker und Theologe. 1805 empfing er die Priesterweihe.

Unter ›Design-Argumenten‹ fasst man Argumente zusammen, die von der Existenz bestimmter struktureller Merkmale M der natürlichen, also nicht auf menschliches Handeln zurückgehenden Welt auf die Existenz eines nicht-menschlichen intelligenten Urhebers dieser Merkmale schließen. Da die strukturellen Merkmale M in der Regel eine bestimmte Zweckmäßigkeit und damit den Anschein einer Anpassung an bestimmte Ziele einschließen, wie man ihn von menschlichen Artefakten kennt, die für einen bestimmten Zweck gemacht sind, nennt man diese Merkmale auch › Design‹ und den erschlossenen Urheber einen ›Designer‹.

Logical reconstruction is a fundamental philosophical method for achieving clarity concerning the prerequisites, presuppositions and the logical structure of natural language arguments. The scope and limits of this method have become visible not least through its intense application to Anselm of Canterbury’s notorious proofs for the existence of God. This volume collects, on the one hand, reconstructions of Anselmian arguments that take account of the problems of reconstruction and, on the other hand, theoretical reflections on reconstruction with a view to (...) Anselm. We hope that this will allow the reader to critically assess the merits of the theoretical accounts in the light of the reconstructions and the merits of the reconstructions in the light of the theoretical accounts. In general, by considering the example of an outstanding thinker in one or the other way, this volume aims at advancing the methodology and the practice of logical reconstruction. The following remarks explain and motivate this undertaking: What purposes does logical reconstruction serve? What purposes does the reflection on logical reconstruction serve? In which ways can the practice and theory of reconstruction profit particularly from studying Anselm’s reasoning? How can the resulting problems be addressed? – Finally, a short overview over the contributions to this volume is offered. (shrink)