Nobody doubts that culture plays a decisive role in understanding human forms of life. But it is unclear how this decisive role should be integrated into a comprehensive explanatory model of human behaviour that brings together naturalistic and social-scientific perspectives. Cultural difference, cultural learning, cultural determination do not mix well with the factors that are normally given full explanatory value in the more naturalistic approaches to the study of human behaviour. My purpose in this paper is to alert to some (...) of the theoretical vulnerabilities or concerns that the cross-cultural study of mind and behaviour might entail. I classify these theoretical concerns into three, loosely defined, categories: epistemological, ontological and ethical. The first have to do with what in anthropology was once labelled as ‘butterfly collecting’. What kind of supplementary, or additional, general theoretical knowledge do we produce when we add to the research different, particularistic, culturally determined, ways of knowing? Ontological concerns refer to the underlying reality that those ways of knowing are meant to disclose. If there are so many ways of knowing the world, where is the reality to be known? Ethical concerns are those entailed in the forms of ‘othering’ that unqualified cross-cultural research is likely to produce in research participants. (shrink)

The point of departure of this paper is Penrose's definition of conscious action as that in which stimulus and response are linked by a non‐algorithmic relationship, which Penrose defines as ‘understanding’. My purpose is to explore the nature of this understanding by means of a two‐step process. The first step is provided by Tononi's Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. This theory provides us with a quantitative measure of conscious states that we need to transform into qualitative meaning. In the second (...) step, we obtain this qualitative meaning with the help of the structuralist theory of mind. From this perspective, meaning originates in the set of qualitative contrasts that define the alternative courses of action that might have been implemented. Work on the analogy between quantitative bits and qualitative binary oppositions does not solve the hard problem of consciousness, but it might help to reformulate it in a new, productive way. (shrink)

Nobody doubts that culture plays a decisive role in understanding human forms of life. But it is unclear how this decisive role should be integrated into a comprehensive explanatory model of human behaviour that brings together naturalistic and social-scientific perspectives. Cultural difference, cultural learning, cultural determination do not mix well with the factors that are normally given full explanatory value in the more naturalistic approaches to the study of human behaviour. My purpose in this paper is to alert to some (...) of the theoretical vulnerabilities or concerns that the cross-cultural study of mind and behaviour might entail. I classify these theoretical concerns into three, loosely defined, categories: epistemological, ontological and ethical. The first have to do with what in anthropology was once labelled as ‘butterfly collecting’. What kind of supplementary, or additional, general theoretical knowledge do we produce when we add to the research different, particularistic, culturally determined, ways of knowing? Ontological concerns refer to the underlying reality that those ways of knowing are meant to disclose. If there are so many ways of knowing the world, where is the reality to be known? Ethical concerns are those entailed in the forms of ‘othering’ that unqualified cross-cultural research is likely to produce in research participants. (shrink)

Within Emile Littreés classification of Hippocratic works, class ten consists of three lost works, two of which appear to have been treatises on the treatment of serious wounds and on the extraction of arrows. The sources for their titles—Erotian, Galen, an eleventh-century Arabic MS and the twelfth-century MS Vat.graec.276–disagree on minor points, but it is clear that they are all referring to the same works.

Philip Melanchthon, humanist and colleague of Martin Luther, is best known for his educational reforms, for which he earned the title Praeceptor Germaniae. His most influential form of philosophical writing was the academic oration, and this volume, first published in 1999, presents a large and wide-ranging selection of his orations and textbook prefaces translated into English. They set out his views on the distinction between faith and reason, the role of philosophy in education, moral philosophy, natural philosophy, astronomy and astrology, (...) and the importance of philosophy to a true Christian, as well as his views on Classical philosophical authorities such as Plato and Aristotle and on contemporaries such as Erasmus and Luther. Powerfully influential in their time, inspiring many Protestant students to study philosophy, mathematics and natural philosophy, they illuminate the relationship between Renaissance and Reformation thought. (shrink)

Philip Melanchthon, humanist and colleague of Martin Luther, is best known for his educational reforms, for which he earned the title Praeceptor Germaniae. His most influential form of philosophical writing was the academic oration, and this volume, first published in 1999, presents a large and wide-ranging selection of his orations and textbook prefaces translated into English. They set out his views on the distinction between faith and reason, the role of philosophy in education, moral philosophy, natural philosophy, astronomy and astrology, (...) and the importance of philosophy to a true Christian, as well as his views on Classical philosophical authorities such as Plato and Aristotle and on contemporaries such as Erasmus and Luther. Powerfully influential in their time, inspiring many Protestant students to study philosophy, mathematics and natural philosophy, they illuminate the relationship between Renaissance and Reformation thought. (shrink)

_A comprehensive introduction to the life and work of Aristotle._.

La creencia religiosa es una creencia «ordinaria» en un mundo o unos seres «extraordinarios». ¿Cuáles son los medios ordinarios que nos llevan a creer en la existencia de lo extraordinario? ¿Por qué creemos en lo que no entendemos? ¿Por qué tenemos creencias irracionales? Creencias irracionales no son creencias (necesariamente) falsas, sino contraintuitivas: son creencias que contradicen la idea de realidad que usamos en nuestra vida cotidiana. A partir de las aportaciones de las grandes voces de la antropología (Frazer, Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss), (...) la sociología (Durkheim, Weber), la lingüística (Saussure) y el psicoanálisis (Freud, Jung), esta obra ofrece una antropología de las creencias que no plantea lo irracional como patológico ni el análisis correspondiente como una terapia: el autor no quiere curar a nadie de sus creencias irracionales; simplemente, las quiere explicar. (shrink)

What are the theoretical implications of a universal genealogy? After the demise of relativism in kinship studies, there is much to be gained by joining old formal-structural analysis of kinship to recent cognitive-evolutionary approaches. This commentary shows how the logic of kinship terminologies, specifically those of the Seneca-Iroquois, can be clarified by looking at the relationship between opposite-sex/same-sex sibling pairs.

I accept the main thesis of the article according to which representation of knowledge is more basic than representation of belief. But I question the authors’ contention that humans' unique capacity to represent belief does not underwrite the capacity for the accumulation of cultural knowledge.

Lo que suele llamarse la existencia de Dios parece ser un problema que insiste en el pensamiento occidental. Asumir dicha existencia a través de categorías que permitan objetivarla parece descansar en paradojas que obturan su consistencia, de manera que la insistencia de dicho problema permite reconocer la presencia de un exceso. Este exceso será considerado como una huella de aquello que excede, sin determinar una figura. Abordaje que se llevará a cabo en la intersección de dos discursos que abordan, cada (...) uno a su manera, el asunto del estatuto de este tipo de huella: el psicoanálisis y la teología. Dicha intersección opera a través de un elemento común, el cuerpo como localización de un Otro, del que la única noticia que nos es remitida es la concavidad de su ausencia. Desde este lugar común podría pensarse un espacio donde el problema de la existencia de Dios adquiera una consistencia que es apropiada al mismo, en concordancia con la textura de su propio “cuerpo”. (shrink)