The ecological approach to object pretend play, developed from the ecological perspective, suggests an action- and affordance based perspective to account for pretend object play. Theoretical, as well as empirical reasons, support the view that children in pretense incorporate objects into their play in a resourceful and functionally appropriate way based on the perception of affordances. Therefore, in pretense children are not distorting reality but rather, they are perceiving and acting upon action possibilities. In this paper, we argue for the (...) viability of an ecological theoretical framework to pretend object play which has been traditionally understood as a representational and metarepresentational ability. We discuss the origins and basic assumptions of the ecological approach to pretense. We layout details by presenting a qualitative analysis of a pretend play episode and discuss the results of an experimental study inspired by the ecological assumptions. We discuss pretend object play in the context of ecological work on tool use. We address the relationship between the enactive and the ecological approaches to pretend play, pointing out similarities as well as differences. We conclude that ecological and enactive approaches have shown that it is possible to challenge accepted interpretations and seek explanatory frameworks that could move the field in new directions. (shrink)

Ecological Psychology and Enactivism both challenge representationist cognitive science, but the two approaches have only begun to engage in dialogue. Further conceptual clarification is required in which differences are as important as common ground. This paper enters the dialogue by focusing on important differences. After a brief account of the parallel histories of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism, we cover incompatibility between them regarding their theories of sensation and perception. First, we show how and why in ecological theory perception is, crucially, (...) not based on sensation. We elucidate this idea by examining the biological roots of work in the two fields, concentrating on Gibson and Varela and Maturana. We expound an ecological critique of any sensation-based approach to perception by detailing two topics: classic retinal image theories and perception in single-celled organisms. The second main point emphasizes the importance of the idea of organism-environment mutuality and its difference from structural coupling of sensations and motor behavior. We point out how ecological - phenomenological methods of inquiry grow out of mutualism and compare Gibson’s idea of visual kinesthesis to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the lived body. Third, we conclude that Ecological Psychology and varieties of Enactivism are laying down different paths to pursue related goals. Thus, convergence of Ecological Psychology and Enactivism is not possible given their conflicting assumptions, but cross-fertilization is possible and desirable. (shrink)

We argue for the conclusion that intrinsic desires, at least, and every other propositional attitude having the world-to-mind direction of fit exclusively, are never found within consciousness. All desire-like states found in consciousness are experiences or exercises of imaginative capacities pertaining either to the desire or the content of the desire, but never the desire itself.

This print edition of Read's account of logical thought includes the original publication's diagrams and tables. In this excellent book, Read commences by offering an overview of past attitudes and definitions of logic. Individual chapters consider the various means by which logical processes are conceived and developed in the mind. Philosophical arguments, spatial reasoning and mathematical forms of logic are discussed in great depth, with illustrations appended where deemed necessary. Read, an academic and philosopher, employs his decades long experience of (...) teaching students about the logical disciplines to write a detailed and comprehensive accounts of logic's aspects. Throughout this work, he attempts to retain a clarity of expression which makes the concepts discussed understandable for readers previously unversed in the types of logical expression. Read also sets out the principles behind setting up a hypothesis, and highlights the common logical fallacies which crop up in human reasoning. Extensive attention is given to the process of syllogism, by which sound conclusions are drawn from the premises offered. Throughout the book, Read is attentive in defining and explaining the esoteric terminology native to logic. As well as allowing the reader swift comprehension of the various subtopics, this explanatory style confers improved flow to the book. At the conclusion we are offered many questions corresponding to each chapter: these are intended to test the reader's understanding, and enforce the mental habits of utilising logical and critical thought. First published in 1898 and subject to several editions with revisions and refinements thereafter, Logic Deductive and Inductive retains a good reputation among academics and logicians. Its successful balance between striking a concise introductory tone with an embrace of the core elements of the subject has served to preserve its popularity into the modern day. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)