A common view of how-possibly explanations in biology treats them as explanatorily incomplete. In addition to this interpretation of how-possibly explanation, I argue that there is another interpretation, one which features what I term “explanatory strategies.” This strategy-centered interpretation of how-possibly explanation centers on there being a different explanatory context within which how-possibly explanations are offered. I contend that, in conditions where this strategy context is recognized, how-possibly explanations can be understood as complete explanations. I defend this alternative interpretation by (...) analyzing the explanatory value of simple physical models the nineteenth century developmental biologist Wilhelm His constructed for animal development. (shrink)

Environmental pragmatism is routinely characterised as an environmental philosophy that rejects the traditional values questions within environmental ethics. Critics of environmental pragmatism, in turn, complain that it cannot be characterised as an environmental philosophy, since it evades precisely the philosophical issues with which environmental philosophers are supposed to engage. This essay works to defend environmental pragmatism against the charge that it necessarily evades the central questions of environmental ethics. I argue that environmental pragmatism need not reject foundational questions regarding values (...) and nature; however, I contend that the meaningfulness of such questions to a pragmatist depends firstly on reframing them in terms of a valuing relation, and secondly on a turn to the insights of moral psychology. (shrink)

Roffe et al. develop a rather creative line of response to Pearson’s :475–492, 2010) critique of pattern cladisma response centering on a structuralist approach to the homology concept. In this brief reply I attempt to demonstrate, however, that Roffe, and Ginnobili, and Blanco subtly mis-characterize the target of Pearson’s critique. The consequence of this mischaracterization is that even though the structuralist framework may help make sense of pattern cladism, it does not undermine Pearson’s critique of it.

Drawing on posthumanist theories from geography, anthropology, and science and technology studies , this article argues that agency is shared unevenly between humans and nonhumans. It proposes that conceptualizing animals as agents allows them to enter history as active beings rather than static objects. Agency has become a key concept within history, especially since the rise of the “new” social history. But many historians treat agency as a uniquely human attribute, arguing that animals lack the cognitive abilities, self-awareness, and intentionality (...) to be agents. This article argues that human levels of intentionality are not a precondition of agency. Furthermore, it draws on research into canine psychology to propose that dogs display some degree of intentionality and self-directed action. The aim is not to turn dogs, or any other animals, into human-style agents nor to suggest that they display the same levels of skill, intentionality, and intelligence as humans. Instead, the objective is to show how dogs are purposeful and capable agents in their own way and to explore how they interact with human agents. The article particularly considers the agency of militarized dogs, especially those on the Western Front , to suggest how historians can use primary sources to uncover how individuals in the past have treated dogs as capable creatures and to capture some sense of dogs’embodied and purposeful agency. (shrink)

The notion of how-possibly explanations emerged with William Dray in response to Carl Hempel’s influential deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation. Dray’s aim was to distinguish explanations of states of affairs that might occur, in contrast to the aim of D-N explanations working to establish that states of affairs must actually occur. More recently, interest in how-possibly explanations has been particularly keen among philosophers of biology. One of the concerns philosophers of biology have focused on is whether how-possibly explanations are “complete” (...) explanations. Dray considered how-possibly explanations to be complete explanations, but the view that they are incomplete explanations became prominent with Robert Brandon’s articulation of successful adaptation explanation in evolutionary biology. According to Brandon, how-possibly adaptation explanations are incomplete, since they lack the requisite empirical evidence. Moreover, Brandon’s characterization of how-possibly explanation can be seen as having set the stage for thinking broadly about how-possibly explanations in biology. Echoing Brandon’s account for adaptation explanations, for example, David Resnik contends that how-possibly explanations are inherently incomplete, and yet they serve an important heuristic role throughout biology by setting out an agenda for future research. (shrink)

Environmental justice crucially depends on issues of distributive justice. However, absent from philosophical examinations of environmental justice has been careful consideration of the role exploitation should occupy in our moral evaluations of some cases the initially present as instances of environmental injustice. This paper seeks to both motivate the importance of understanding the significance exploitation has in select cases of environmental justice, as well as provide a conceptual framework for how to assess the ethics of those cases.

The paper addresses the question of whether heritability can be useful in establishing genetics as an explanation for an individual’s display of some trait or behavior. After reviewing the fundamental philosophical challenge to heritability—that heritability is a population level measure—an argument is presented for rethinking the role heritability occupies in both causal and explanatory claims. It is argued that heritability can be useful for genetically based explanations of individual traits, if the conditions for proper genetic explanation are modestly reconceived, and (...) the measure is seen as an evidential tool which conforms to standard methods for determining causal factors. (shrink)

In this essay, we set out to survey and critically assess various attitudes and understandings of reductionism as it appears in discussions regarding the scientific study of religion. Our objective in the essay is twofold. First, we articulate what we will refer to as three ‘meta-interpretative’ frameworks, which summarize the distinct positions one can witness in response to the explanations coming out of research within the new science of religion. Second, and more importantly, we seek to demonstrate that under no (...) sensible interpretation of the notion of ‘reduction’ do the explanations provide a basis for defending one of the meta-interpretative frameworks rather than another. (shrink)

Consciousness-based education and Maharishi Vedic science -- Consciousness-based education and education -- Consciousness-based education and physiology and health -- Consciousness-based education and physics -- Consciousness-based education and mathematics -- Consciousness-based education and literature -- Consciousness-based education and art -- Consciousness-based education and management -- Consciousness-based education and government -- Consciousness-based education and computer science -- Consciousness-based education and sustainability -- Consciousness-based education and world peace.

Annotation. There has never been a writer quite like Christopher Pearson. A BETTER CLASS OF SUNSET brings together Pearson's enduring columns and essays, chronicling the twists and turns of Australian cultural life over three intriguing decades. From climate change to homosexuality and the welfare of Indigenous Australians, Pearson was an unflagging champion of unfashionable causes, a conscientious objector to political correctness and a skilled dissector of muddle-headed arguments. They reveal a true man of letters with a rare literary voice; passionate, (...) moving and often very funny, Pearson's thinking seldom strays from his abiding principles. For all those who aspire to be members of what Pearson called Club Sensible, A BETTER CLASS OF SUNSET is an indispensible addition to the bookshelf. (shrink)

It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

It has been acknowledged in some philosophical quarters that of the titles that might significantly be bestowed upon Aristotle, not the least important is that of the Vanquisher of Parmenides. That is, it is accepted that the idea of the ‘potential’, which took form in the hands of Aristotle, is just the idea and the analysis which is necessary in order to steer safely between the horns of the Parmenidean dilemma. However, this status which tends to be accorded to Aristotle (...) seems to find little confirmation in modern thought, one outstanding feature of which is the volume of literature purporting to establish other solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma, especially as this dilemma is interpreted in the paradoxes of Zeno. All the attempts to answer Parmenides thus become in this way open to criticism; that is to say, the very multitude of the proposed solutions to the Parmenidean dilemma suggests that the only positive result is to make more clearly evident the range of problematic implications within the dilemma. Elucidation of this ‘problematicness’ tends to stand as a substitute for actual solutions. But modern wrestlings with the Parmenidean dilemma do nevertheless find a common and distinguishing ground precisely in their common dissatisfaction with the answer to Parmenides proposed by Aristotle—that is, the ‘raison d’être’ of modern ‘vanquishers of Parmenides’ is that there is, for some reason, a modern tradition of opposition to the idea of the potential. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to enquire whether the Aristotelian doctrine of the potential does in fact itself constitute a dilemma; in other words whether it is problematic in such a sense as to allow for dissatisfaction and objection, and to leave itself open to the criticism that its status as a solution is temporary and inadequate. In what precise sense can it still be said that Aristotle is the vanquisher of Parmenides? (shrink)

The metaphysical nature of homologies has been variously characterized as natural kind, individualist, and pluralist-pragmatic. In this essay, I aim to build on the work of proponents of a natural kinds ontology for homologies using Richard Boyd’s influential HPC account of natural kinds. I aim to advance this position by showing the unique fit of extending the HPC account to homologies, deflecting individualist critiques, as well as the pluralist-pragmatic alternative, showing that homologies have a determinate metaphysical character as kinds. As (...) an important extension of this position, I attempt to explain away how the mistaken metaphysics of the individualist, and derivatively the pluralist-pragmatic approach that contextually embraces it, can facilitate certain elements of biological practice. (shrink)

Despite government policy and initiatives for remote areas, indigenous people are amongst the most disadvantaged and do exhibit higher levels of unemployment in the Australian community. A number of commentators have suggested that better educational opportunities for this minority group will considerably improve their socio-economic status and employment opportunities. This myth is exposed in this article, which reports evidence from an educational–vocational programme for Yolngu who are the indigenous people of East Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory of Australia. The (...) Arnhem Learning Education and Regional Training programme is conducted, mainly at Nhunlunbuy, in partnership with Rio Tinto Alcan and the Charles Darwin University, with the primary objective of preparing indigenous people for mainstream sustainable jobs. The presented content suggests that while higher educational status is important, this sole strategy is unlikely to comprehensively address outstanding issues that are confronting indigenous people and their labour market concerns. (shrink)

The defining of 'image' as essentially that class of idea to which there is no object corresponding, springs from a commend able desire not to allow analysis to result in an incorrect conceptual multiplication of physical objects or situations. This result would be likely if the thinker succumbed to the temptation to consider that for every idea entertained there is somehow an objective physical situation corresponding. The simple calling of attention to the type of mental state signified by the word (...) 'imagining' is reckoned to be sufficient to guard against this danger. And so it is. But at the same time,- concentration upon this danger may easily lead to the consequent temptation to consider that there are some ideas which have no objects of reference whatever. This is just not the case. The true insight that some ideas have no objective physical situations corresponding to them does not imply that some ideas have no objects of reference unless it be assumed that all situations or states of affairs are physical. But then if this is true there can be no specific meaning at all for the word 'idea' since by it we imply at the very least some distinction from the physical as such; and in this case all attempts to distinguish 'idea' as over against 'object' break down. The presence of this dilemma is enough to demand a re-analysis of the original distinction. (shrink)

This special issue should go a long way towards increasing the understanding of Peirce’s semeiotic and its applicability for solving problems in legal studies. In fact, the New Science of Semiotics should result in developing a rigorous and systematic methodology for legal studies making it a true semiotic science which I suggest calling “jurisology.”.

Intelligent Design proponents consistently deny that science is rightfully governed by the norm of methodological naturalism—that independent of one’s actual metaphysical commitments regarding the natural/supernatural, a scientist, qua scientist, must behave as if the world is constituted by the natural, material world. This essay works to develop more fully a pragmatic justification for methodological naturalism, one that focuses on a number of key elements found in 17th and 18th century embryology.