Le réexamen des trois fragments d’embléma provenant de l’étage de la maison IV B du Quartier du théâtre à Délos montre qu’ils ne peuvent appartenir à un seul Éros en vol, comme cela avait été proposé lors de leur publication. La mise en série de plusieurs parallèles connus en Italie permet de reconstituer le sujet de la scène – des Érotes jouant avec un lion entravé – et de proposer une nouvelle interprétation pour le fragment C (patte de lion plutôt (...) que bras d’Éros). On ne connaît pas le lieu de fabrication de cet embléma, mais l’origine alexandrine de son thème iconographique est avérée, et il constitue un nouveau témoignage des relations que l’île entretenait avec la capitale lagide. (shrink)

À partir de trois angles d’emblemata portés par d’épaisses plaques de mortier, l’étude envisage l’iconographie, la technique et l’usage de trois panneaux mosaïqués (fin iie‑début ier s.) découverts à Délos. Deux d’entre eux proviennent d’un sanctuaire (Kynthion, Samothrakeion) et le troisième d’une maison. Celui du Kynthion représente un visage qui n’avait pas été reconnu jusqu’ici. Aucun de ces trois panneaux figurés n’a été fixé dans un pavement ou une paroi. L’examen de ces documents conduit à reconnaître l’existence de panneaux mosaïqués (...) – des pinakes – éléments mobiliers dont les correspondants en peinture sont connus depuis longtemps. Les sources iconographiques et textuelles peuvent venir à l’appui de cette interprétation des vestiges. (shrink)

Un édifice mis au jour à Plytra (Laconie) présente une superposition de trois pavements réalisés à l’aide de diverses techniques (mosaïque d’éclats de pierre de chant, d’éclats de pierre polychromes, opus tessellatum), ainsi qu’un pavement en opus figlinum et tesselles irrégulières. Leur décor est comparable aux mosaïques de Sparte et de Gytheion, cités proches de Plytra. La publication de ces pavements est l’occasion d’étudier la variété des techniques employées par les mosaïstes dans le sud du Péloponnèse durant l’époque hellénistique et (...) l’époque impériale. Si ces techniques ne sont pas inconnues dans le reste de la Grèce, l’emploi d’éclats polychromes et/ou de tesselles irrégulières pour la réalisation de décors géométriques, végétaux mais aussi figurés, semble caractéristique des ateliers du Péloponnèse. (shrink)

La picturalisation de la mosaïque, à partir de la fin du ive siècle, se traduit par l'utilisation d'un nombre croissant de couleurs pour exprimer les jeux d'ombres et de lumières et donner ainsi l'illusion du volume. À cette fin, les mosaïstes ont utilisé, outre des matières naturelles, des matériaux artificiels comme la céramique, mais aussi le verre, la faïence et la peinture qui n'ont pas toujours été signalés dans les publications. Notre propos est donc d'en étudier, à partir de l'examen (...) des mosaïques déliennes, l'emploi selon les types de motifs et de décors, de présenter des observations techniques sur la fabrication de ces tesselles et de les replacer au sein des autres productions de verre et de faïence, enfin d'examiner l'apport de ces observations à l'histoire de la mosaïque hellénistique. (shrink)

Other beliefs, other funerary practices : the two states of Tomb 2 in the necropolis of Anfouchi at Alexandria. The cemetery of Anfouchi at Alexandria, of the Lagid period, is characterised by a mix of Greek and Egyptian elements, both in terms of the architecture of the tombs and of their decoration. Since their discovery, several scholars have pondered the reasons for this multicultural character and the ethnic origin of the occupants. It will be shown here that Tomb 2, the (...) best known of the cemetery, passed through two successive states : initially in “ Greek style”, it went through a second “ Egyptian” phase, which entailed modifications to the architecture and the decoration. This second phase is explained by a change in the religious beliefs and the funerary practices (mumification). One may reflect upon the social group of the new occupant. (shrink)

In an earlier study of the utilisation of the materials in the mosaics of Delos we were able to show the variety and brilliance of colour obtained by using tessera of glass and faïence and painting over some of them. The cleaning of the large mosaic in the House of the Jewels now allows us to complete these observations. For a better understanding of how colour was used in the Hellenistic mosaics of pictorial style, it will be helpful to extend (...) this work of analysis and restoration to other mosaic floors belonging to the same stylistic trend: two Delian mosaics with Dionysiac themes and two Hellenistic mosaics in Egypt (the one signed by Sophilos and a copy of it discovered at Thmuis). Our perception of the colours of these mosaics is in fact considerably falsifîed by the altération of the materials. The result of the restoration of the original colours has been to reestablish these mosaics within the technical and stylistic context of hellenistic mosaics and painting. (shrink)

L'article constitue la publication du décor peint des deux tombes de la nécropole de Kom el-Chougafa à Alexandrie. Ces deux tombes, creusées dans les parois d'une salle du second hypogée de Kom el-Chougafa, sont connues depuis le début du siècle, mais leur décor peint, en majeure partie effacé, n'a pu être rendu visible que récemment grâce à l'emploi de la lumière dans le spectre ultraviolet. Chaque tombe est constituée d'une niche qui se compose d'un sarcophage, surmonté de trois parois, et (...) d'un plafond. L'ensemble des parties était recouvert d'un enduit peint. La surface des trois parois est divisée en deux registres : le registre supérieur porte des peintures de style égyptien, tandis que le registre inférieur porte des peintures de style grec. Les scènes égyptiennes représentent, de gauche à droite, l'offrande du faucon (promesse d'immortalité), l'embaumement d'Osiris et la résurrection du dieu. Les scènes grecques, quant à elles, représentent, toujours de gauche à droite, Perséphone cueillant des fleurs avec ses compagnes, l'enlève ment de Perséphone, son retour du monde des morts vers celui des vivants. La correspondance des deux séries de scènes superposées est évidente, comme les têtes de Méduse et de Bès sur la partie/supérieure des pilastres. Différente du « style mixte » — personnages de style grec inclus dans une scène égyptienne — qui caractérise certaines représentations funéraires de l'Alexandrie impériale comme du Fayoum, cette combinaison iconographique est unique. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

In his celebrated masterpiece, Symposium, Plato imagines a high-society dinner-party in Athens in 416 BC at which the guests - including the comic poet Aristophanes and, of course, Plato's mentor Socrates - each deliver a short speech in praise of love. The sequence of dazzling speeches culminates in Socrates' famous account of the views of Diotima, a prophetess who taught him that love is our means of trying to attain goodness. And then into the party bursts the drunken Alcibiades, the (...) most popular and notorious Athenian of the time, who insists on praising Socrates himself rather than love, and gives us a brilliant sketch of this enigmatic character. The power, humour, and pathos of Plato's creation engages the reader on every page. This new translation is complemented by full explanatory notes and an illuminating introduction. (shrink)

Why do moral people so often fail to act morally? Standard scientific answers point to poor moral judgment (based on deficient character development, reason, or intuition) or to situational pressure. I consider a third possibility: a relative lack of truly moral motivation and emotion. What has been taken for moral motivation is often instead a subtle form of egoism. Recent research provides considerable evidence for moral hypocrisy—motivation to appear moral while, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral—but very (...) little evidence for moral integrity—motivation to actually be moral. The lack of truly moral motivation may, in turn, be linked to a lack of truly moral emotion, at least in response to violation of certain moral standards. (shrink)

"This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.

forthcoming in R. Cameron, B. Hale and A. Hoffmann (ed.s), The Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford University Press. Presents a concept-grounding account of modal knowledge.

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

I argue that acknowledging Hume as a doxastic naturalist about belief in a deity allows an elegant, holistic reading of his Dialogues. It supports a reading in which Hume's spokesperson is Philo throughout, and enlightens many of the interpretive difficulties of the work. In arguing this, I perform a comprehensive survey of evidence for and against Philo as Hume's voice, bringing new evidence to bear against the interpretation of Hume as Cleanthes and against the amalgamation view while correcting several standard (...) mistakes. I ultimately isolate the interpretation of Philo's Reversal at the end of the Dialogues as of paramount importance, and show how my naturalistic interpretation makes this, and other notoriously difficult passages, unproblematic. (shrink)

Philosophers of biology typically pose questions about individuation by asking “what is an individual?” For example, we ask, “what is an individual species”, “what is an individual organism”, and “what is an individual gene?” In the first part of this chapter, I present my account of the gene concept and how it is used in investigative practices in order to motivate a more pragmatic approach. Instead of asking “what is a gene?”, I ask: “how do biologists individuate genes?”, “for what (...) purposes?”, and “do their practices of individuating genes serve these purposes?" In the second part of this chapter, I propose that we use this approach when analyzing concepts of organisms and biological individuals. Following philosophical pragmatism, I argue that we should abstain from attempts to situate individuation of Darwinian individuals or of holobionts in a philosophy of nature. Instead, we should analyze practices of individuating organisms in terms of three-place relations between the world, ideas, and human purposes and actions. I conclude with three lessons: an ontological, an epistemological, and a meta-philosophical lesson, which I suggest, apply to philosophy of science generally and to philosophy and metaphysics at large. (shrink)

In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.

Alasdair MacIntyre explores some central philosophical, political and moral claims of modernity and argues that a proper understanding of human goods requires a rejection of these claims. In a wide-ranging discussion, he considers how normative and evaluative judgments are to be understood, how desire and practical reasoning are to be characterized, what it is to have adequate self-knowledge, and what part narrative plays in our understanding of human lives. He asks, further, what it would be to understand the modern condition (...) from a neo-Aristotelian or Thomistic perspective, and argues that Thomistic Aristotelianism, informed by Marx's insights, provides us with resources for constructing a contemporary politics and ethics which both enable and require us to act against modernity from within modernity. This rich and important book builds on and advances MacIntyre's thinking in ethics and moral philosophy, and will be of great interest to readers in both fields. (shrink)

This third edition offers increased coverage of sustainability and more chances for illustration and discussion of ethics in the messy day to day practicalities ...

This edition of Martin Ostwald's revised version of J. B. Skemp's 1952 translation of _Statesman_ includes a new selected bibliography, as well as Ostwald's interpretive introduction, which traces the evolution in Plato's political philosophy from _Republic_ to _Statesman to Laws_--from philosopher-king to royal statesman.

The question I wish to explore is this: Does idealism conflict with common sense? Unfortunately, the answer I give may seem like a rather banal one: It depends. What do we mean by ‘idealism’ and ‘common sense?’ I distinguish three main varieties of idealism: absolute idealism, Berkeleyan idealism, and dualistic idealism. After clarifying what is meant by common sense, I consider whether our three idealisms run afoul of it. The first does, but the latter two don’t. I conclude that while (...) Moore’s famous common sense critique is sound against external world skepticism, against Berkeleyan idealism and dualist idealism it is unavailing. (shrink)

The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to (...) potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world.Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

A revolutionary new theory and call to action on animal rights, ethics, and law from the renowned philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum.

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas . van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and secondly in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.