En esta contribución ensayaremos una reflexión, desde las coordenadas de los estudios sobre ciencia, tecnología y sociedad (CTS), sobre el impacto de la pandemia del coronavirus en España. Estudiaremos la evolución de la percepción social en España sobre la vacunación contra la COVID-19 a la luz de los avances científicos e industriales en el desarrollo de las vacunas, las decisiones y debates políticos que acompañaron a la gestión de la crisis sanitaria y la cobertura mediática del proceso por parte de (...) los medios de comunicación. Para ello utilizaremos fundamentalmente los datos proporcionados por el Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) complementados, puntualmente, con datos ofrecidos por otras encuestas nacionales e internacionales, así como una amplia selección de noticias aparecidas en medios de comunicación que contribuyeron a configurar el imaginario público sobre la pandemia durante los meses previos y posteriores al inicio de la vacunación en España, que comenzó en nuestro país a finales de diciembre de 2020. Aunque este estudio exploratorio se basa en datos de encuestas y de medios, no pretende ofrecer un análisis descriptivo detallado, sino que su alcance se limita a una reflexión que pueda contribuir a comprender mejor el significado de la pandemia para las cambiantes relaciones C-T-S. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, vamos considerar o recente debate na metafísica da evolução, no que diz respeito tanto à persistência como à “mudança” em espécies biológicas, segundo a tese que considera a espécie como o agregado de indivíduos. Centrar-nos-emos na proposta de Thomas Reydon, que argumenta que em biologia, o termo “espécie” refere-se a duas entidades biológicas, por si denominadas evolverons e phylons, que desempenham vários papéis epistemológicos em pelo menos duas disciplinas diferentes, nomeadamente na biologia sistemática e na biologia evolutiva. (...) Em particular, analisamos criticamente a alegação de Reydon, que estas duas entidades biológicas geraram um problema para a tese que sustém a equivalência entre duas teorias de persistência, desenvolvidas pela metafísica analítica contemporânea: o tri–Dimensionalismo e tetra–Dimensionalismo. Neste artigo, pretende-se restaurar a tese da equivalência metafísica, recorrendo a uma tripla estratégia: promover a ideia de que os evolverons e os “phylons” são duas dimensões de uma mesma realidade; recorrer a uma noção menos problemática noção de endurantismo e, por último, destacar alguns problemas que surgem dos exemplos biológicos empregues por Reydon para basear o desenvolvimento dos seus argumentos. Palavras-chave : conceito de espécie, endurantismo, equivalência metafísica entre 3D e 4D, espécies biológicas sincrónicas e diacrónicas, persistênciaIn this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the species-as-individuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: three–dimensionalism and four–dimensionalism. In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance, and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments. Keywords : 3D / 4D metaphysical equivalence, endurantism, persistence, species concept, synchronic and diachronic biological species. (shrink)

History of Logic and Semantics offers a collection of studies on the development of the Aristotelian and terminist approaches to language, from the Boethian reception of Aristotle to the post-medieval terminism. These articles were also published in Vivarium, Volume 53, Nos. 2-4.

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to conduct a critical approach to the concept and traditional measurement of scientific culture on the basis of an analysis of the phenomenon of the social appropriation of the science, assuming a multidimensional outlook sensitive to its contextual and behavioural dimensions. The analysis will be carried out along with a revision of some statistical results coming from a recent opinion survey about public perception of science and technology in Spain.

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

It is in the Tractatus 6.31’s that Wittgenstein, according to our view, draws a fruitful discussion framework for raising the contemporary debate on scientific realism. We argue that Wittgenstein outlines here a two-sided approach to the logical status of the most general scientific propositions; an approach inconsistent both with a realist interpretation of the nature of scientific knowledge and with a conventionalist one. After briefly commenting on the historical context underlying Wittgenstein’s approach, and tentatively considering a possible extension of the (...) Tractarian approach (to idealized generalisations describing classes of physical systems), we defend that Wittgenstein’s sketchy approach has not been successfully extended and developed in the philosophy of science until the last decades. Such an achievement, weconclude, has been possible after the rejection of the propositional view of scientific knowledge underlying the very Wittgensteinian approach. (shrink)

La creciente literatura aparecida en los últimos años sobre innovación ha producido multitud de definiciones y clasificaciones de la misma en las que se reflejan disciplinas y tradiciones de origen, así como compromisos teóricos y prácticos. Distinguir entre innovación de productos o innovación de procesos, o diferenciar de acuerdo con el grado de novedad de los resultados de la innovación (o la “intensidad” innovadora) son algunas de estas estrategias taxonómicas. Aunque los enfoques más clásicos sobre innovación han obviado sistemáticamente los (...) aspectos sociales de la misma, recientemente ha aparecido una nueva categoría, la “innovación social”, etiqueta que engloba clases muy distintas de prácticas. En esta contribución analizaremos los distintos sentidos en los que se entiende la “innovación social” y defenderemos que una innovación apropiada ha de ser siempre una forma de innovación social. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} En esta presentación planteo una reflexión sobre un importante condicionante para la gobernabilidad en la actual sociedad del conocimiento: la participación ciudadana en las políticas públicas sobre ciencia y tecnología. Comenzaré con un bosquejo de lo que (...) entiendo genéricamente como “sociedad del conocimiento”. Defenderé los conceptos de sociedad del riesgo y de ciencia reguladora como necesarios para una compresión adecuada del carácter de esa “sociedad” y ese “conocimiento”. En función de este análisis, es posible detectar varios modelos de proyección futura para la sociedad del conocimiento con distintas condiciones de gobernabilidad. Sobre esta base, argumentaré que el nuevo papel del conocimiento en la transformación de la naturaleza y en la dinámica social, así como el creciente protagonismo de la sociedad civil en la vida pública, hace del involucramiento de los agentes sociales en la gestión del cambio científico-tecnológico una condición clave de gobernabilidad en la sociedad del conocimiento. (shrink)

This volume features essays that detail the distinctive ways authors and researchers in Spanish speaking countries express their thoughts on contemporary philosophy of technology. Written in English but fully capturing a Spanish perspective, the essays bring the views and ideas of pioneer authors and many new ones to an international readership. Coverage explores key topics in the philosophy of technology, the ontological and epistemological aspects of technology, development and innovation, and new technological frontiers like nanotechnology and cloud computing. In addition, (...) the book features case studies on philosophical queries. Readers will discover such voices as Miguel Ángel Quintanilla and Javier Echeverría, who are main references in the current landscape of philosophy of technology both in Spain and Spanish speaking countries; José Luis Luján, who is a leading Spanish author in research about technological risk; and Emilio Muñoz, former head of the Spanish National Research Council and an authority on Spanish science policy. The volume also covers thinkers in American Spanish speaking countries, such as Jorge Linares, an influential researcher in ethical issues; Judith Sutz, who has a very recognized work on social issues concerning innovation; Carlos Osorio, who focuses his work on technological determinism and the social appropriation of technology; and Diego Lawler, an important researcher in the ontological aspects of technology. (shrink)

This article describes and analyzes the process of institutionalizing studies on science, technology, and society in Cuba, and the social and academic circumstances in which these studies are implemented there. The authors give a brief account of how science and technology have evolved in Cuba over the last four decades. The authors argue that the promotion of science and technological innovation in Cuba has purposely taken the form of social innovation. The authors offer our view of how the changes and (...) demands on science, technology, and education can take advantage of the approaches and proposals of STS studies. The authors consider the traditions of thought that have influenced Cuban culture and construct a specific conceptual framework through which contemporary developments in STS are assimilated. Finally, on the basis of the above analysis, the authors describe experiences of the institutionalization of STS and their underlying objectives. (shrink)

This paper examines the analysis of judgements of belief that Wittgenstein offers in 5.54–5.5423 of the Tractatus. We offer an interpretation of these paragraphs wich also pays attention to 5.5423, usually forgotten. In our opinion, this interpretation fits with Wittgenstein’s doctrines, and makes clear that such non-genuine propositions are nonsense. These are not, as has sometimes been proposed, the propositions of psychology. In the second part of the article we give a detailed discussion of interpretations of these paragraphs which have (...) been offered previously. (shrink)

This volume features essays that detail the distinctive ways authors and researchers in Spanish speaking countries express their thoughts on contemporary philosophy of technology. Written in English but fully capturing a Spanish perspective, the essays bring the views and ideas of pioneer authors and many new ones to an international readership. Coverage explores key topics in the philosophy of technology, the ontological and epistemological aspects of technology, development and innovation, and new technological frontiers like nanotechnology and cloud computing. In addition, (...) the book features case studies on philosophical queries. Readers will discover such voices as Miguel Ángel Quintanilla and Javier Echeverría, who are main references in the current landscape of philosophy of technology both in Spain and Spanish speaking countries; José Luis Luján, who is a leading Spanish author in research about technological risk; and Emilio Muñoz, former head of the Spanish National Research Council and an authority on Spanish science policy. The volume also covers thinkers in American Spanish speaking countries, such as León Olivé, an influential researcher in ethical issues; Judith Sutz, who has a very recognized work on social issues concerning innovation; Carlos Osorio, who focuses his work on technological determinism and the social appropriation of technology; and Diego Lawler, an important researcher in the ontological aspects of technology. (shrink)

Qué duda cabe de que el ser humano es un ser emocional y que el amor es uno de los sentimientos conscientes que más influye en las conductas inmediatas y futuras. Podemos definir el amor como el afecto intenso hacia otra persona. ¿Cómo surge el amor en el ser humano? ¿Estamos preparados psicológicamente para amar o para ser amados? ¿Podemos educar para el amor?

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...) The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Under the influence of naturalistic approaches, contemporary philosophy of science tends to characterize scientific objectivity not by virtue of the individualistic following of rules or satisfying epistemic utilities, but as a property arising from the organisational features of groups. This paper presents a critical review of one such proposal, that of Helen Longino, probing some of its main features against the debate between Pasteur and Pouchet in mid-nineteenth-century France regarding the spontaneous generation of life. After considering some weaknesses and strengths, (...) it is argued that Longino’s social epistemology is only able to generate normativity by implicitly assuming a classic procedural notion of epistemic acceptability. The paper also aims to use this historical case to shed light on the complex, multidimensional nature of the dynamics of actual science, arguing both against purely epistemic and exclusively social approaches in a satisfactory meta-scientific explanation of controversies. (shrink)

In this volume, María Cerezo examines Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus as a response to some of Frege's and Russel's logical problems. In analyzing the tractarian conditions for the possibility of language, she explains the two main theories of the proposition in Tractatus : the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. Cerezo shows that Wittgenstein initially separates the account of the structure of a proposition from the explanation of its expression. However, contrary to his intention, the combination of these theories (...) creates new difficulties, since the requirements of each theory cannot be fully respected by the others. Cerezo also argues that Wittgenstein's theory of language cannot be fully understood unless attention is paid to his theory of expression and his doctrine of projection by the metaphysical subject. (shrink)