A persistent ancient tradition has it that a man named Lycambes promised his daughter Neoboule in marriage to the poet Archilochus of Paros, that he subsequently refused Archilochus, and that the poet attacked Lycambes and his daughters with such ferocity that they all committed suicide. When we reflect that the iambographer Hipponax drove his enemies Bupalus and Athenis and Old Comedy a man named Poliager to suicide, that the ancestress of iambos, Iambe, killed herself, and that all these suicides, like (...) those of Lycambes and his daughters, took the form of hanging, we will not take too seriously the ending of the story of Archilochus' relations with Lycambes and his family. However, it seems now to be generally accepted, at least among English-speaking scholars, that the whole Lycambes tradition is to be rejected. The present note seeks to demonstrate that this extreme scepticism is misguided. I shall begin with a survey of Archilochus' references to Lycambes and his family to ascertain how far the indirect tradition is consistent with the surviving fragments. Lycambes appears to have played a consistent role in Archilochus, as far as the fragments allow us to see. In fr. 38 he appears as the father of two daughters , in fr. 33 as the father of at least one daughter. In fr. 71 his role cannot be determined. But in fr. 54, if his name is correctly restored in v. 8, he may again figure as the father of a daughter, for a female is mentioned in the fragment, whether for good or ill. If his patronymic is correctly supplied in fr. 57.7, it may be significant that the letters πατρ occur in the same verse. (shrink)

The title is unashamedly plagiarized from Stephen Todd's excellent book, The Shape of Athenian Law. The plagiarism is slightly misleading, however, since my interest is in law as enactment while Todd's title expresses his interest in law as system . The issue I wish to address is the formulation of written laws in Athens during the late archaic and classical period, specifically the balance between procedural and substantive law. Substantive law deals with rights, obligations, offences, etc. Its role is to (...) define behaviour which is required, allowed, or prohibited. These are what Hart terms ‘primary rules’. Procedural law, on the other hand, deals, as the name suggests, with the administration of justice, that is with jurisdiction, process, etc. Hart's term for these is ‘secondary rules’. The two cannot be separated quite as neatly as I have suggested, of course. A procedural law can scarcely avoid mentioning the offences or rights whose punishment or protection it regulates, while a substantive law may need to address issues such as jurisdiction. This is therefore an issue of orientation, not a simple binary division. However, as a broad basis for classification it is of value. (shrink)

Pindar's Eighth Olympian celebrates the victory of Alkimedon of Aigina in the boys' wrestling at Olympia in 460. This victory was the sixth won by a member of this family . The absence of detail about most of these victories suggests that the family had had little success in the great Panhellenic competitions and that the majority were won at minor festivals. However, one of the remaining five victories was certainly won in one of the four festivals which made up (...) the periodos. In lines 15–18, after preparatory generalizations about the diversity of paths to achievement, all with divine aid, Pindar describes the path of achievement, and the source of divine aid, which features in the victor's family: Tιμσθενες, μμε δ' κλρωσεν πτμος Zην γενεθλωι. ς σ μν Nεμαι πρπατον, 'Aλκιμδοντα δ πρ κρνου λ៹φωι θκεν 'Oλυμπινκαν. Timosthenes, in your case fate allotted you to Zeus as your family god, who made you pre-eminent at Nemea and Alkimedon Olympic victor by the Hill of Kronos. (shrink)

It is a truism of modern discussions of Athenian law and oratory that the Athenians regarded adultery as a more heinous offence than rape. This consensus has been challenged in a valuable paper by E. M. Harris. But although Harris has successfully placed in question a number of assumptions about this area of Athenian law and ethics, I wish to argue that the traditional position is in its broad outlines correct. In this as in so many aspects of Athenian law (...) it is difficult to make firm statements. Firstly, for the Athenian system as a whole we lack evidence for many issues of legal prescription and procedure for the period before the restoration of the democracy, and our evidence is frequently lacunose even for the period after the restoration. As a result we are presented with a ‘snapshot’ of the Athenian system at a particular stage in its development and are rarely able to trace chronological developments in detail and frequently unable to trace them in broad outline. A further result of this ‘snapshot’ effect is a false impression of coherence. Legislative measures belonging to different periods are likely to present themselves as the result of an integrated design rather than the product of accretion. Finally, and most importantly, our sources distort. Occasionally they provide information on the laws and on legal procedure in passing, in order to contextualize an argument or narrative; but in general they are presenting us with information in an attempt to persuade. (shrink)

This paper addresses itself to two transitional passages in Pindar which are frequently misunderstood. In both we appear at first sight to have an awkward change of direction, with the myth terminated abruptly and the following item of praise merely juxtaposed. In reality, both transitions are effected smoothly, and the same technique is employed in both odes.

The banker Pasion, father of the notorious fourth-century litigant and politician Apollodoros, some of whose speeches have survived under the name of Demosthenes, was originally a slave; freed by his owners, he made a substantial fortune from banking and subsequently received Athenian citizenship for his generous gifts to the city. At [Dem.] 59.2 we are given a paraphrase of the decree which enfranchised him: 'Aθηναον εναι Πασωνα κα κγνους τος κενου ‘[the Athenian people voted] that Pasion and his descendants should (...) be Athenian’. In common with inscriptions recording grants of citizenship, and unlike Roman military diplomata, the decree appears to have ignored Pasion's wife Archippe. The silence of the decrees of enfranchisement is echoed in the literary sources, with the result that we have no explicit testimony to the legal status of the wife of an alien who was granted Athenian citizenship. M. J. Osborne assumes that the status of the wife was in no way affected by the grant; she remained an alien. D. Whitehead has argued that in such cases the wife's status was indeterminate; in the event of the death of her first husband she might find herself married either to an Athenian citizen or to an alien, whereupon her status would be defined according to that of her husband. This article will argue that Archippe's status was unaffected by Pasion's receipt of citizenship, that is, that she remained a metic. I shall then proceed to consider the question of the implications of the difference in status of Pasion and Archippe subsequent to his enfranchisement for the legal basis of the relationship between them, and finally draw a tentative conclusion about the date of Pasion's receipt of citizenship. (shrink)

Douglas Macdowell, one of the most distinguished students of Greek oratory, law and comedy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, was for 30 years Professor of Greek at Glasgow University. He was elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 1993 and was also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Obituary by Chris Carey.

Among the departures from the direct tradition in Thucydidesü quotation of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo at 3.104, perhaps the most interesting is line 171. The MSS of the Hymns give ET-iotacism). The majority of Thucydidesü MSS give, but is corrected by a second hand in FJ and by the first hand in H to. Each tradition exists in blissful ignorance of the other. In Aristidesü quotation of lines 169–72, the MSS in general agree with the direct tradition of the (...) Hymns:. But the reading in R is a correction. The original reading, which has been erased, was. Aristides, who as his introductory remark shows is quoting from Thucydides, appears to have read in his text of Thucydides, but this has been replaced at some stage in the tradition by ; the MSS tradition of Aristides has been ’corrected’ from the direct tradition of the Hymns. If Aristides had in his text of Thucydides, the corrected reading of FJH is not the. (shrink)

Among the departures from the direct tradition in Thucydidesü quotation of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo at 3.104, perhaps the most interesting is line 171. The MSS of the Hymns give ET-iotacism). The majority of Thucydidesü MSS give, but is corrected by a second hand in FJ and by the first hand in H to. Each tradition exists in blissful ignorance of the other. In Aristidesü quotation of lines 169–72, the MSS in general agree with the direct tradition of the (...) Hymns:. But the reading in R is a correction. The original reading, which has been erased, was. Aristides, who as his introductory remark shows is quoting from Thucydides, appears to have read in his text of Thucydides, but this has been replaced at some stage in the tradition by ; the MSS tradition of Aristides has been ’corrected’ from the direct tradition of the Hymns. If Aristides had in his text of Thucydides, the corrected reading of FJH is not the. (shrink)

The simile in Sappho fr.96 LP has been the subject of much discussion. I should like to add to this discussion yet another suggestion, which I hope will commend itself by its simplicity. The fragment opens with a mention of Sardis and a reference to a female there whose thoughts stray to Lesbos. This female honoured the addressee of the poem like a goddess, and delighted in her song. But now she is among the Lydians. Here the simile begins.

The first strophe opens with a wish and a syntactical problem:εἴ μοι ξυνείη φέροντι μοῖρα τὰν εὔσεπτον ἁγνείαν λόγων ἔργων τε πάντων,…The sentence is often interpreted as though φέροντι were φέρειν: ‘may it be my destiny to possess’. However, for this meaning the infinitive is clearly required; there is no valid parallel for the use of the participle supposed here. Burton offers: ‘may a share of life be my companion provided that I win or possess purity’; purity is a precondition (...) for life. This interpretation is possible but improbable, for the use of μοῖρα as a synonym for βίος would be obscure in this context. It is altogether easier to interpret with Kamerbeek: ‘would that Destiny were with me when I ’; the chorus hopes for the favour of fate, provided that this is earned by purity of word and deed. The hope thus embraces an intention to avoid all impurity of word or action. Against this interpretation it has been objected that μοῖρα is a constant presence, not a helpful power which might desert. However, συνεῖναι is attested with the sense ‘favour’ ; and the notion that fate may favour individuals or groups is attested. (shrink)

My purpose in this note is to examine the evidence for the witness's oath of disclaimer in the Athenian lawcourts. This is an issue on which modern discussions tend to be brief for want of ancient evidence. However, although our ignorance on matters of detail relating to the exomosia remains, and is likely to remain, profound, I believe that we can, by a careful reading of the limited evidence which is available, draw a number of more or less confident conclusions (...) about the form and content of the oath and the degree of restriction it imposed on witness and litigant. The lexicographers have the following to say on pressures applied to recalcitrant witnesses: Polydeukes 8.37: τóν δ' ο βονλóμενον μαρτρεν κλτενον το μαρτνρεν πρρστιθντεσ δι δ ατóν μαρτνρεν ζομóσασθαι σ οκ εíδεíη μ χιλíασ ποστíνειν. κλητεσθαι μν ον στí καλεíσθαι εíσ μαρτνρíαν, κκλητεεεσθαι δ τó δíκην óφεíλειν πí τπí τι τσ χιλíασ καταβαλεíν. (shrink)

The use of Web 2.0 technologies in the classroom is becoming more widespread, as educators begin to recognise their use as effective learning and teaching tools. Web 2.0 facilitates new modes of social interaction that offer the potential to enrich university educational activities. New roles, structures and activities can be enabled, engendering new forms of creativity and increasing the availability of and extent of access to information. Yet in achieving this, such platforms shift the traditional boundaries between educators and their (...) students, between personal and professional lives, raising issues of integrity and pedagogy in unexpected ways. This paper reflects on three personal narratives to examine some of these challenges; the authors conclude by highlighting concerns that universities need to address. (shrink)

This volume brings together eighteen articles which examine erôs as an emotion in ancient Greek culture. Taking into account all important thinking about the nature of erôs from the eighth century BCE to the third century CE, it covers a very broad range of sources and theoretical approaches, both in the chronological and the generic sense.