At the risk of a tremendous over-simplification, I believe it is helpful to categorize views of Christianity which have appeared in the west in the last two hundred years into three major groups. First there are the unbelievers, those for whom Christianity is straightforwardly untrue, unknowable, or unbelievable . This group would include those who try to salvage some form of essentially humanistic religion as well as those who simply turn away from religious belief altogether, either to put their ultimate (...) hopes in political ideology, or science, or simply to attempt to limit themselves to hopes which are finite and non-ultimate in character. (shrink)
Upshot: Constructionism is an epistemology, a theory of design and a theory of learning. It addresses constructivist learning in individual and social environments where bricolage with digital expressive media plays an important role. This editorial situates constructionism within constructivist discourse, and discusses the potential for constructionism to play an identifiable and important role in a wider educational discourse and theory networking. In this framework, it provides a short synthetic review of the eight papers addressing constructionism from a diversity of perspectives.
Context: There is a growing recognition in consciousness science of the need for rigorous methods for obtaining accurate and detailed phenomenological reports of lived experience, i.e., descriptions of experience provided by the subject living them in the “first-person.” Problem: At the moment although introspection and debriefing interviews are sometimes used to guide the design of scientific studies of the mind, explicit description and evaluation of these methods and their results rarely appear in formal scientific discourse. Method: The recent publication of (...) an edited book of papers dedicated to the exploration of first-and second-person methods, Ten Years of Viewing from Within: The Legacy of Francisco Varela, serves as a starting point for a discussion of how these methods could be integrated into the growing discipline of consciousness science. We complement a brief review of the book with a critical analysis of the major pilot studies in Varela’s neurophenomenology, a research program that was explicitly devised to integrate disciplined experiential methods with the latest advances in neuroscience. Results: The book is a valuable resource for those who are interested in impressive recent advances in first- and second-person methods, as applied to the phenomenology of lived experience. However, our review of the neurophenomenology literature concludes that there is as yet no convincing example of these specialized techniques being used in combination with standard behavioral and neuroscientific approaches in consciousness science to produce results that could not have also been achieved by simpler methods of introspective reporting. Implications: The end of behaviorism and the acceptance of verbal reports of conscious experience have already enabled the beginning of a science of consciousness. It can only be of benefit if new first- and second-person methods become well-known across disciplines. Constructivist content: Constructivism has long been interested in the role of the observer in the constitution of our sense of reality, so these developments in the science of consciousness may open new avenues of constructivist research. More specifically, one of the ways in which the insights from first- and second-person methods are being validated is by recursively applying the methods to themselves; a practical application of an epistemological move that will be familiar to constructivists from the second-order cybernetics tradition. (shrink)
Does the practice of psychology make a significant and positive contribution to human welfare and the struggle for a good society? This book presents a reinvigorating look at psychology and its societal purpose, offering a bold new philosophical foundation from which professionals in the field can deeply examine their work.
In this paper I defend the view that not only does Fear and Trembling espouse the teleological suspension of the ethical as a radical suspension and even possible violation of otherwise ethical duties, but also that Kierkegaard himself espouses it and carries the belief through his entire authorship. A brief analysis of Religiousness A suggests that Climacus made a dialectical error in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This error is corrected by Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard's own journals, and the correction makes possible a (...) full-blooded affirmation of the teleological suspension where Climacus failed. This reaffirmation can explain the shift from Climacus to Anti-Climacus on the topic of hidden inwardness as well as the shift from Climacus to Kierkegaard on the topic of religious suffering. It can also provide a legitimate Kierkegaardian alterative to positing a stage Merold Westphal (and not Kierkegaard) has termed Religiousness C. What we are left with is an uncompromisingly radical religious dialectic that gives every appearance of being exactly what Kierkegaard intended. (shrink)
Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia '[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the (...) reasons why, he now thinks, his knowledge argument against materialism fails to prove the falsity of materialism [Jackson 2005. He argues that you can block the knowledge argument against materialism - but only if you tie yourself to a dubious doctrine called representationalism. We argue that the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of either representational or nonrepresentational materialism. It does, however, furnish both materialists and dualists with a successful argument for the existence of distinctively first-person modes of acquaintance with mental states. Jackson's argument does not refute materialism: but it does bring to the surface significant features of thought and experience, which many dualists have sensed, and most materialists have missed. (shrink)
Avant de qualifier la th?orie du 'radical' de Rosenzweig de messianisme, il me semble important de localiser le 'registre du sacrifice' dans ce syst?me de connaissance. Du reste, c'est la premi?re innovation de Rosenzweig par rapport? la tradition. Rosenzweig n'a ni essay? ni eu le temps de th?matiser en d?tail la figure du 'sacrifice' ou du korban comme le nom le plus g?n?rique d'une telle activit?. Tout ce que nous poss?dons se r?sume? quelques fragments r?partis sur plusieurs ann?es de correspondance (...) avec ses amis, auxquels Rosenzweig enseigne la pens?e du sacrifice et ses limites, et? quelques-unes de ses notes sur la difficult? de traduire et d'effacer le mot allemand Opfer. Cependant, depuis le tout d?but, lorsqu'il 'traduit' et 'pense' le sacrifice comme 'don' ou 'offrande', son effort est tout? fait transparent: Rosenzweig ne fait qu'interroger le rapprochement de Dieu ou d'Autrui. Pre nego se 'teorija o radikalnom' Franza Rosencvajga prepozna kao mesijanizam i mozda kao jedna komplikovana i sistematska zurba ka novom vremenu, cini mi se da je vazno da lociramo 'registar zrtvovanja' u ovom sistemu spoznaje. Uostalom, to je prva Rozencvajgova novina u odnosu na tradiciju. Rozencvajg nije ni pokusao niti je imao vremena da detaljno tematizuje figuru 'zrtvovanja' ili korban kao najopstije ime za ovu delatnost. Sve sto imamo jeste nekoliko fragmenata iz razlicitih godina u pismima prijateljima koje Rozencvajg poducava o granicama i smislu zrtvovanja, i nekoliko njegovih zabelezaka o teskoci prevodjenja i brisanja nemacke reci Opfer. Ipak, od samog pocetka, i kada on 'prevodi' i 'misli' zrtvovanje kao 'poklon' ili 'prinos', njegov napor je sasvim transparentan. Sve sto Rozencvajg ispituje jeste priblizavanje Bogu ili drugom. (shrink)
Sticker use is an increasingly popular part of daily messaging activity. However, little is known regarding the types, functions, and outcomes of sticker use in authentic online communications. To investigate these phenomena, we analysed sticker use in five small mobile-messaging-facilitated discussion groups initiated by students for course projects in an Asian university. The students used four types of stickers, among which ‘animated picture without text’ was the most frequent. Sticker functions fell into two main categories: as a tone indicator with (...) scope over a textual message, and as a stand-alone illocutionary act. Based on interviews with seven participants, we found disparities between the sender’s intention and the receiver’s interpretation for 34.7% of the stickers, but these disparities did not adversely affect the communication. Implications of the findings are discussed. (shrink)
In “Understanding Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that “Today is a fine day”. In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully (...) confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans’s cognitive dynamics – the skill of keeping track of one’s spatio-temporal location in addition to memory – it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief. (shrink)
Augustus' account of the events of 28 and 27 b.c. is maddeningly vague. In part the problem is simply that his individual phrases are ambiguous, but a more fundamental difficulty is the very nature of the Res Gestae itself. The idea of publishing such a self-satisfied account of one's own doings is so alien to our modern sensibilities that we tend to read the Res Gestae as though Augustus were capable of saying almost anything. We have concluded too easily, therefore, (...) that at R.G. 34.1 Augustus is telling an outrageous lie, or at least an outrageous half-truth. After saying that he ended the civil wars, and acquired supreme power, Augustus claims to have handed over the state to the senate and the people of Rome. On the traditional reading this last claim is seriously misleading; Augustus may have handed over the state, but he fails to mention that the senate handed it back. (shrink)
This research explores the making of physical models as a design process where that act of making 'models for'1 design intention is itself a rich field of speculation. These models for design intention are different to the models of design intention as they are less a finished and singular object, and more an instrument for thinking. The aim of this research is to explore the qualities of models for design intention through an engagement with the landscape in order to understand (...) making as a transformative and emergent process of space, time, material, technique, and the role of the observer. Making for design, the model as idea, seeks to both test and provide opportunities for the convergence of forces and relationships to be created and emergent. Fundamental to this notion is an understanding that the act of making is itself a continual re-making process. The reciprocity invoked by this action engages a rich field of criteria which are potent because of their schizophrenic nature. This paper will discuss my research through a number of projects and esquisses that have been explored during the course of this research which demonstrate the development of my position of making as a continual re-making of space. (shrink)
The discussions were obscured by an initial misunderstanding. I made it clear from the outset that I was making here only the claim that " the principles of CM do not *entail* the existence of consciousness", not that "consciouness was *incompatible* with the principles of CM. This weak claim, namely that "CM does not entail C", I thought to be obviously true, and I had taken taken it as a secure starting point of the arguments in my paper "The Evolution (...) of Consciousness" [To appear in the proceedings of Tucson II, and available from my web site]. It was Sarfatti's mention of this point that launched this debate. Pat challenged my claim, which I repeatedly described as point of contention. Then at a relatively late stage (Sept25) Pat said that: "There seems to be basic flaw in Henry's logic throughout this discussion". He pointed out the difference between saying that "CM does not entail C" and saying that "CM is inconsistent with C", and said that he would happily concur with the first claim: At this point he said it was trivially true. So, at least in some first approximation, we had then come into agreement on the issue under discussion: we both agreed that the principles of CM did not *entail* the existence of consciousness. (shrink)
Professor Vendler’s book is a notable recent addition to the Cornell Contemporary Philosophy Series, and it attempts to develop a more adequate, but still distinctly rationalistic, Cartesian perspective on ideas, thought, and speech by using the techniques of generative linguistics and of analytical philosophy. Initially, he elucidates the relationship between speech and thought by demonstrating that the former is an expression of the latter. He then distinguishes between the subjective and objective dimensions of thought by concentrating particularly on the concepts (...) of belief and knowledge. These analyses are followed by an acute inquiry into the learning and understanding of speech by reference to the native and acquired elements of knowledge. His investigations culminate in an explicit rejection of all forms of empiricism and behaviorism in philosophical psychology, most particularly the influential view propounded by Ryle in Concept of Mind. Furthermore, Professor Vendler’s study extends some insights of J. L. Austin, and he finds Wittgenstein’s understanding of language and speech to be incorrect because our knowledge of what a word means is "a function of, and is to be explained in terms of, understanding certain incomplete propositions.". (shrink)