Que reste-il a dire sur le Menon? Quel dialogue de Platon semble mieux connu? Une methode renouvelee permet seule de montrer que les passages les plus celebres ne nous ont pas livre tous leurs secrets, et que ceux sur lesquels le regard glisse doivent au contraire retenir l'attention. L'interpretation ici proposee refuse de separer forme et contenu: si Platon a ecrit des dialogues, et non des traites, il devait avoir ses raisons. Le sens d'un dialogue ne se limite pas a (...) celui des repliques d'un seul personnage. Socrate n'est pas le porte-parole de Platon. Platon ne parle jamais en son propre nom. C'est le dialogue tout entier qui est l'enseignement, dans son plan, dans ses personnages, dans sa mise en scene. Elle refuse de supposer le sujet du dialogue: personne ne sait ce qu'est la vertu. C'est le dialogue qui doit appprendre ce qu'elle est. Elle refuse de se laisser imposer des passages classiques - la torpille, la reminiscence - entre lesquels il n'y aurait que du remplissage. Elle refuse d'expliquer les choix de Platon pour tel personnage, telle date, telle situation, par le renvoi positiviste a des faits exterieurs a la pensee reflechie du philosophe. Elle refuse d'ignorer les recentes decouvertes sur l'enseignement oral de Platon et en retrouve les principales doctrines dans le contenu, mais aussi la forme du texte. Elle demontre ainsi sur l'exemple d'un dialogue la fecondite d'une methode applicable a l'ensemble de l'oeuvre ecrite de Platon. (shrink)

Venu du marxisme, dont il a constaté très tôt les impasses, Cornelius Castoriadis a voulu réinventer la révolution. Selon lui, la modernité voit s'affronter deux projets de société : celui d'une maîtrise rationnelle du réel et celui d'une autonomie de toutes et de tous. Le premier a donné des résultats désastreux en engendrant le règne de la technique et de l'économie. Le second reste encore à construire pour qu'advienne une société vraiment démocratique dans laquelle le peuple se gouverne lui-même, se (...) passant de toute classe dirigeante. Castoriadis a mis en lumière les origines de ce projet d'autonomie qui remontent à la Grèce antique. Il en a analysé les expressions modernes, de la révolution russe de 1917 aux révoltes des années 1960. Mais surtout, il en a examiné les conditions pour que se développe une politique émancipatrice aujourd'hui : auto-organisation des luttes, pratique de l'égalité et sens des limites. Ce projet d'autonomie n'est pas un programme clés en main. Il est un imaginaire autant qu'une expérience. Il est un horizon, celui d'une société consciente du fait que le pouvoir est l'affaire de tous. C'est cette réflexion multiforme et souvent complexe que présente et questionne ce livre qui offre pour la première fois une synthèse claire, accessible et percutante de la pensée politique de Castoriadis. (shrink)

Qui n'a souvenir de la grande palabre sur la philosophie africaine? Paulin Houtondji, Marcien Towa, Eboussi Boulaga, Niamkey Koffi et bien d'autres y ont valablement laissé du leur au point de s'imposer aujourd'hui comme des références incontournables de la philosophie d'Afrique. On est parfois tenté de songer à la fin de l'activité philosophique chez les Africains avec ceux-là. C'est justement à cette éventuelle fin que refusent de souscrire aussi bien le philosophe congolais Claver Boundja que l'équipe de jeunes philosophes ayant (...) tous pour ambition "de réouvrir à nouveaux frais le débat sur le développement en Afrique". L'à-propos quant à l'absence métathéorique que la théorie du développement de Boundja vient combler dans la philosophie contemporaine fait l'unanimité parmi les contributeurs. En outre, la théorie philosophique du développement de Boundja se démarque de la conception marxiste de celle-ci, dans la mesure où Boundja ancre la pensée philosophique fondamentale de type métaphysique dans la question du développement humain. Elle s'émancipe du volet socio-économique avec ses pesanteurs sociohistoriques pour interroger le bien-être non calculé de l'humain. Dans une herméneutique circonstanciée, les auteurs examinent le développement non pas en confinant celui-ci aux vues de Boundja, mais en l'ouvrant aux interrogations sur l'humain et ses conditions ou ses possibilités de réalisation de vie épanouie. C'est pourquoi Boundja est tantôt questionné, tantôt exploré comme atelier pour l'émancipation féministe, tantôt encore mis en dialogue avec Ebenezer Njoh-Mouellé, V.Y. Mudimbe non sans évoquer en filigrane, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, etc."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Les discours de la morale à l’époque moderne exigent d’être pensés aux confins d’une anthropologie des moeurs, de l’histoire et de la philosophie, de l’épistémologie et de la littérature. C’est ce qu’ont mis en lumière les recherches contemporaines portant aussi bien sur l’histoire des mentalités et sur les rapports entre anthropologie et littérature que sur la dimension éthique des pratiques artistiques et la pensée morale. Dans ce contexte, comment aborder la réflexion morale sous l’Ancien Régime sans s’intéresser à ses fondements (...) philosophiques, aux différentes définitions dont elle fait l’objet ou à ses prolongements artistiques et littéraires? Théologiens, philosophes, moralistes, artistes, hommes et femmes de lettres sont autant de figures de la République des Lettres qui prennent la plume pour interroger la topique des vices et des vertus, qui échappent progressivement au domaine religieux pour investir celui de la philosophie et devenir ainsi l’objet d’un questionnement général sur l’homme et sur l’idée d’humanité. Ces actes du onzième colloque « Jeunes chercheurs du CIERL « proposent un regard critique sur la frontière entre vice et vertu : d’une laïcisation à une relativisation de la morale, elle semble se faire de plus en plus ténue et poreuse, donnant ainsi à voir les effets de tension qui parcourent la réflexion morale, et ce, dès la Renaissance. (shrink)

At the risk of a tremendous over-simplification, I believe it is helpful to categorize views of Christianity which have appeared in the west in the last two hundred years into three major groups. First there are the unbelievers, those for whom Christianity is straightforwardly untrue, unknowable, or unbelievable . This group would include those who try to salvage some form of essentially humanistic religion as well as those who simply turn away from religious belief altogether, either to put their ultimate (...) hopes in political ideology, or science, or simply to attempt to limit themselves to hopes which are finite and non-ultimate in character. (shrink)

When the ancient Greeks looked up into the heavens, they saw not just sun and moon, stars and planets, but a complete, coherent universe, a model of the Good that could serve as a guide to a better life. How this view of the world came to be, and how we lost it (or turned away from it) on the way to becoming modern, make for a fascinating story, told in a highly accessible manner by Remi Brague in this wide-ranging (...) cultural history. Before the Greeks, people thought human action was required to maintain the order of the universe and so conducted rituals and sacrifices to renew and restore it. But beginning with the Hellenic Age, the universe came to be seen as existing quite apart from human action and possessing, therefore, a kind of wisdom that humanity did not. Wearing his remarkable erudition lightly, Brague traces the many ways this universal wisdom has been interpreted over the centuries, from the time of ancient Egypt to the modern era. Socratic and Muslim philosophers, Christian theologians and Jewish Kabbalists all believed that questions about the workings of the world and the meaning of life were closely intertwined and that an understanding of cosmology was crucial to making sense of human ethics. Exploring the fate of this concept in the modern day, Brague shows how modernity stripped the universe of its sacred and philosophical wisdom, transforming it into an ethically indifferent entity that no longer serves as a model for human morality. Encyclopedic and yet intimate, The Wisdom of the World offers the best sort of history: broad, learned, and completely compelling. Brague opens a window onto systems of thought radically different from our own. (shrink)

Chenu, M.-D. Foi, certitude et recherche.--Gilson, É. Réponse à Louis-Marie Régis, On some difficulties of interpretation.--Dubarle, D. Logique et épistémologie du signe chez Aristote et chez les Stoïciens.--Geiger, L.-B. Ce qui est, se dit en plusiers sens.--Owens, J. "Diversificata in diversis."--Cauchy, V. Être et connaître, l'irréductibilité de l'aristotélisme au platonisme.--Joós, E. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, de l'intentio intellectus, à l'intentio rei.--Murin, C. Pour une démystification de la "mort-de-Dieu" nietzschéenne.--Joós, E. Post-scriptum, la nouvelle scolastique de Louis-Marie Régis.--Landry, A.-M. Louis-Marie Régis, O.P., quelques dates (...) et faits marquants de sa vie.--Lettre d'Henri-Irénée Marrou à Louis-Marie Régis. (shrink)

This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world.

In this paper I defend the view that not only does Fear and Trembling espouse the teleological suspension of the ethical as a radical suspension and even possible violation of otherwise ethical duties, but also that Kierkegaard himself espouses it and carries the belief through his entire authorship. A brief analysis of Religiousness A suggests that Climacus made a dialectical error in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This error is corrected by Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard's own journals, and the correction makes possible a (...) full-blooded affirmation of the teleological suspension where Climacus failed. This reaffirmation can explain the shift from Climacus to Anti-Climacus on the topic of hidden inwardness as well as the shift from Climacus to Kierkegaard on the topic of religious suffering. It can also provide a legitimate Kierkegaardian alterative to positing a stage Merold Westphal (and not Kierkegaard) has termed Religiousness C. What we are left with is an uncompromisingly radical religious dialectic that gives every appearance of being exactly what Kierkegaard intended. (shrink)

This is a response to Tom McLeish's Boyle Lecture 2021 on the rediscovery of contemplation through science. Several implications are sketched: no single mind can encompass fully what there is to be known; we are likely to be unaware of the full range of what it is that is acting upon us or informing us at any given moment; and the universe that we encounter is a system of interaction and implication in which nothing is simply passive or lifeless.

How developing a more expansive, non-formal conception of reason produces richer ethical understandings of human situations, explored and illustrated with many real examples. In Re-Reasoning Ethics, Barry Hoffmaster and Cliff Hooker enhance and empower ethics by adopting a non-formal paradigm of rational deliberation as intelligent problem-solving and a complementary non-formal paradigm of ethical deliberation as problem-solving design to promote human flourishing. The non-formal conception of reason produces broader and richer ethical understandings of human situations, not the simple, constrained depictions provided (...) by moral theories and their logical applications in medical ethics and bioethics. Instead, it delivers and vindicates the moral judgment that complex, contextual, and dynamic situations require. Hoffmaster and Hooker demonstrate how this more expansive rationality operates with examples, first in science and then in ethics. Non-formal reason brings rationality not just to the empirical world of science but also to the empirical realities of human lives. Among the many real cases they present is that of how women at risk of having children with genetic conditions decide whether to try to become pregnant. These women do not apply the formal principle of maximizing expected utility (as advised by genetic counselors) and instead imagine scenarios of what their lives could be like with an affected child and assess whether they could accept the worst of these scenarios. Hoffmaster and Hooker explain how moral compromise and a liberated, extended, and enriched reflective equilibrium expand and augment rational ethical deliberation and how that deliberation can rationally design ethical practices, institutions, and policies. (shrink)

Augustus' account of the events of 28 and 27 b.c. is maddeningly vague. In part the problem is simply that his individual phrases are ambiguous, but a more fundamental difficulty is the very nature of the Res Gestae itself. The idea of publishing such a self-satisfied account of one's own doings is so alien to our modern sensibilities that we tend to read the Res Gestae as though Augustus were capable of saying almost anything. We have concluded too easily, therefore, (...) that at R.G. 34.1 Augustus is telling an outrageous lie, or at least an outrageous half-truth. After saying that he ended the civil wars, and acquired supreme power, Augustus claims to have handed over the state to the senate and the people of Rome. On the traditional reading this last claim is seriously misleading; Augustus may have handed over the state, but he fails to mention that the senate handed it back. (shrink)

The discussions were obscured by an initial misunderstanding. I made it clear from the outset that I was making here only the claim that " the principles of CM do not *entail* the existence of consciousness", not that "consciouness was *incompatible* with the principles of CM. This weak claim, namely that "CM does not entail C", I thought to be obviously true, and I had taken taken it as a secure starting point of the arguments in my paper "The Evolution (...) of Consciousness" [To appear in the proceedings of Tucson II, and available from my web site]. It was Sarfatti's mention of this point that launched this debate. Pat challenged my claim, which I repeatedly described as point of contention. Then at a relatively late stage (Sept25) Pat said that: "There seems to be basic flaw in Henry's logic throughout this discussion". He pointed out the difference between saying that "CM does not entail C" and saying that "CM is inconsistent with C", and said that he would happily concur with the first claim: At this point he said it was trivially true. So, at least in some first approximation, we had then come into agreement on the issue under discussion: we both agreed that the principles of CM did not *entail* the existence of consciousness. (shrink)

This research explores the making of physical models as a design process where that act of making 'models for'1 design intention is itself a rich field of speculation. These models for design intention are different to the models of design intention as they are less a finished and singular object, and more an instrument for thinking. The aim of this research is to explore the qualities of models for design intention through an engagement with the landscape in order to understand (...) making as a transformative and emergent process of space, time, material, technique, and the role of the observer. Making for design, the model as idea, seeks to both test and provide opportunities for the convergence of forces and relationships to be created and emergent. Fundamental to this notion is an understanding that the act of making is itself a continual re-making process. The reciprocity invoked by this action engages a rich field of criteria which are potent because of their schizophrenic nature. This paper will discuss my research through a number of projects and esquisses that have been explored during the course of this research which demonstrate the development of my position of making as a continual re-making of space. (shrink)

In “Understanding Demonstratives”, Gareth Evans bites the bullet regarding Rip van Winkle cases in cognitive dynamics: the fact that Rip sleeps for twenty years and completely loses track of time means he is unable to retain his original belief that “Today is a fine day”. In this paper, the author argues that Evans need not bite this bullet because there are resources in his account of the cognitive dynamics involved in belief retention developed in The Varieties of Reference to successfully (...) confront the challenge posed by the Rip van Winkle case. In particular, when we combine the two central elements of Evans’s cognitive dynamics – the skill of keeping track of one’s spatio-temporal location in addition to memory – it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that it is indeed possible for Rip to retain and re-express his original belief. (shrink)