Results for 'ByCatherine Z. Elgin'

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  1.  24
    Williams on truthfulness.ByCatherine Z. Elgin - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):343–352.
    "Williams on Truthfulness" is a review of Bernard Williams's Truth and Truthfulness. It argues that Williams explicates truthfulness as a thick concept that depends on but diverges from a mere propensity to utter truths. Besides conveying an understanding of the complex virtue of truthfulness, it thus shows why thick concepts are not simply descriptive concepts overlaid with expressive glosses.
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  2. Catherine Z. Elgin.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 26.
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  3.  36
    Catherine Z. Elgin: True Enough.Paul Teller - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):675-680.
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  4. Catherine Z. Elgin, With Reference to Reference. [REVIEW]Jenefer Robinson - 1984 - Philosophy in Review 4:22-24.
     
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  5. Catherine Z. Elgin, With Reference to Reference Reviewed by.Jenefer Robinson - 1984 - Philosophy in Review 4 (1):22-24.
     
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  6.  8
    [Book review] considered judgment. [REVIEW]Z. Elgin Catherine - 1998 - In Stephen Everson (ed.), Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 108--4.
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  7.  18
    Catherine Z. Elgin, Considered Judgment:Considered Judgment.Mark Timmons - 1998 - Ethics 108 (4):805-808.
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  8. True Enough, by Catherine Z. Elgin.John Bengson - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):256-268.
    True Enough, by ElginCatherine Z. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2017. Pp. 352.
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  9. Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences Reviewed by.Douglas Arrell - 1990 - Philosophy in Review 10 (8):313-316.
     
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  10. Considered Judgment. By Catherine Z. Elgin.G. Wells - 2001 - The European Legacy 6 (5):701-701.
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  11.  15
    Das wissen Von Holmes und Watson eine kritische auseinandersetzung mit C.z. Elgins thesen zur epistemischen wirkung der dummheit.Elke Brendel - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1):89-103.
    C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...)
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  12.  9
    Das wissen Von Holmes und Watson eine kritische auseinandersetzung mit C.z. Elgins thesen zur epistemischen wirkung der dummheit.Elke Brendel - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1):89-103.
    C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...)
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  13.  5
    Das Wissen von Holmes und Watson: Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit C.Z. Elgins Thesen zur epistemischen Wirkung der Dummheit.Elke Brendel - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1):89-103.
    C.Z. Elgins Argumente zur Unbrauchbarkeit des Wissensbegriffes für epistemologische Untersuchungen und die damit begründete Ersetzung des Wissensdurch den Verstehensbegriff werden anhand einer Analyse der Funktion von Begriffsexplikationen zur Bildung wahrer gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen zurückgewiesen. Die Verwendung grober Begriffskategorien, die mit einer Reduktion der Irrtumsmöglichkeit und somit einer leichten Bildung vieler gerechtfertigter Überzeugungen einhergeht, erweist sich nur vordergründig als epistemischer Vorteil für die Laien, da die so gewonnenen Uberzeugungen kognitiv weniger gehaltvoll sind, Experten aber neben den feineren gewöhnlich auch über die groben (...)
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  14.  12
    Die praxis-interne Normativität des Sprechens, Denkens und Handelns: Replik zum Beitrag von Catherine Z. Elgin.Günter Abel - 2018 - In Astrid Wagner & Ulrich Dirks (eds.), Abel Im Dialog: Perspektiven der Zeichen- Und Interpretationsphilosophie. De Gruyter. pp. 499-512.
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  15.  37
    Philosophie de la danse.Beauquel Julia, Carroll Noel, Elgin Catherine Z., Karlsson Mikael M., Kintzler Catherine, Louis Fabrice, McFee Graham, Moore Margaret, Pouillaude Frédéric, Pouivet Roger & Van Camp Julie (eds.) - 2010 - Aesthetica, Presses Universitaires de Rennes.
    En posant avec clarté des questions de philosophie de l’esprit, d’ontologie et d’épistémologie, ce livre témoigne à la fois de l’intérêt réel de la danse comme objet philosophique et du rôle unique que peut jouer la philosophie dans une meilleure compréhension de cet art. Qu’est-ce que danser ? Que nous apprend le mouvement dansé sur la nature humaine et la relation entre le corps et l’esprit ? À quelles conditions une œuvre est-elle correctement interprétée par les danseurs et bien identifiée (...)
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  16.  24
    Reconceptions In Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, by Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin.Harvey Siegel - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):710-713.
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  17. "Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences": Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin[REVIEW]Malcolm Budd - 1989 - British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (4):367.
     
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  18.  10
    Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):724-734.
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  19.  20
    True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Science relies on models and idealizations that are known not to be true. Even so, science is epistemically reputable. To accommodate science, epistemology should focus on understanding rather than knowledge and should recognize that the understanding of a topic need not be factive. This requires reconfiguring the norms of epistemic acceptability. If epistemology has the resources to accommodate science, it will also have the resources to show that art too advances understanding.
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  20.  16
    Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.
    I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.
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  21.  8
    Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Princeton University Press.
    Philosophy long sought to set knowledge on a firm foundation, through derivation of indubitable truths by infallible rules. For want of such truths and rules, the enterprise foundered. Nevertheless, foundationalism's heirs continue their forbears' quest, seeking security against epistemic misfortune, while their detractors typically espouse unbridled coherentism or facile relativism. Maintaining that neither stance is tenable, Catherine Elgin devises a via media between the absolute and the arbitrary, reconceiving the nature, goals, and methods of epistemology. In Considered Judgment, she (...)
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  22.  40
    Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1997 - Cornell University Press.
    In Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, Catherine Z. Elgin maps a constructivist alternative to the standard Anglo-American conception of philosophy's ...
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  23. True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.
    Truth is standardly considered a requirement on epistemic acceptability. But science and philosophy deploy models, idealizations and thought experiments that prescind from truth to achieve other cognitive ends. I argue that such felicitous falsehoods function as cognitively useful fictions. They are cognitively useful because they exemplify and afford epistemic access to features they share with the relevant facts. They are falsehoods in that they diverge from the facts. Nonetheless, they are true enough to serve their epistemic purposes. Theories that contain (...)
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  24.  90
    Considered Judgment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1996 - Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
    The book contains a unique epistemological position that deserves serious consideration by specialists in the subject."--Bruce Aune, University of Massachusetts.
  25. Understanding and the facts.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):33 - 42.
    If understanding is factive, the propositions that express an understanding are true. I argue that a factive conception of understanding is unduly restrictive. It neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. For science uses idealizations and models that do not mirror the facts. Strictly speaking, they are false. By appeal to exemplification, I devise a more generous, flexible conception of understanding that accommodates science, reflects our practices, and shows a sufficient but not slavish sensitivity (...)
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  26.  97
    Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World?Nelson Goodman & Catherine Z. Elgin - 1986 - Critical Inquiry 12 (3):564-575.
    Predictions concerning the end of the world have proven less reliable than your broker’s recommendations or your fondest hopes. Whether you await the end fearfully or eagerly, you may rest assured that it will never come—not because the world is everlasting but because it has already ended, if indeed it ever began. But we need not mourn, for the world is indeed well lost, and with it the stultifying stereotypes of absolutism: the absurd notions of science as the effort to (...)
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  27. ``Is Understanding Factive?".Catherine Z. Elgin - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 322--30.
  28. Emotion and Understanding.C. Z. Elgin - 2008 - In G. Brun, U. Dogluoglu & D. Kuenzle (eds.), Epistemology and Emotions.
  29.  3
    With Reference to Reference.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1983 - Hackett Publishing Company.
    "Systematizes and develops in a comprehensive study Nelson Goodman's philosophy of language. The Goodman-Elgin point of view is important and sophisticated, and deals with a number of issues, such as metaphor, ignored by most other theories." --John R. Perry, Stanford University.
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  30. Persistent Disagreement.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford University Press.
     
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  31. Fiction as Thought Experiment.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2014 - Perspectives on Science 22 (2):221-241.
    Jonathan Bennett (1974) maintains that Huckleberry Finn’s deliberations about whether to return Jim to slavery afford insight into the tension between sympathy and moral judgment; Miranda Fricker (2007) argues that the trial scene in To Kill a Mockingbird affords insight into the nature of testimonial injustice. Neither claims merely that the works prompt an attentive reader to think something new or to change her mind. Rather, they consider the reader cognitively better off for her encounters with the novels. Nor is (...)
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  32. From knowledge to understanding.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 199--215.
     
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  33.  99
    The Function of Knowledge.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):100-107.
    Human beings are epistemically interdependent. Much of what we know and much of what we need to know we glean from others. Being a gregarious bunch, we are prone to venturing opinions whether they are warranted or not. This makes information transfer a tricky business. What we want from others is not just information, but reliable information. When we seek information, we are in the position of enquirers not examiners. We ask someone whether p because we do not ourselves already (...)
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  34.  24
    Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.
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  35.  32
    The Semantic Foundations of Philosophical Analysis.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-21.
    I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To beFis to beG’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes somethingFalso makes itG. This approach is hyperintensional and possesses desirable logical and modal features. In particular, these sentences are reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, and if they are true, then they are (...)
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  36. Understanding: Art and Science.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1993 - Synthese 95 (1):13-28.
    The arts and the sciences perform many of the same cognitive functions, both serving to advance understanding. This paper explores some of the ways exemplification operates in the two fields. Both scientific experiments and works of art highlight, underscore, display, or convey some of their own features. They thereby focus attention on them, and make them available for examination and projection. Thus, the Michelson-Morley experiment exemplifies the constancy of the speed of light. Jackson Pollock's "Number One" exemplifies the viscosity of (...)
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  37. With Reference to Reference.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1983 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 42 (2):336-340.
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  38. Art in the Advancement of Understanding.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):1 - 12.
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  39.  66
    The Mark of a Good Informant.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (3):319-331.
    Edward Craig and Michael Hannon agree that the function of knowledge is to enable us to identify informants whose word we can safely take. This requires that knowers display a publicly recognizable mark. Although this might suffice for information transfer, I argue that the position that emerges promotes testimonial injustice, since the mark of a good informant need not be shared by all who are privy to the facts we seek. I suggest a way the problem might be alleviated.
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  40. The epistemic efficacy of stupidity.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):297 - 311.
    I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, (...)
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  41. Unnatural science.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):289-302.
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  42. Trustworthiness.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):371-387.
    I argue that trustworthiness is an epistemic desideratum. It does not reduce to justified or reliable true belief, but figures in the reason why justified or reliable true beliefs are often valuable. Such beliefs can be precarious. If a belief's being justified requires that the evidence be just as we take it to be, then if we are off even by a little, the belief is unwarranted. Similarly for reliability. Although it satisfies the definition of knowledge, such a belief is (...)
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  43.  92
    Making Manifest: The Role of Exemplification in the Sciences and the Arts.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (3):399-413.
    Exemplification is the relation of an example to whatever it is an example of. Goodman maintains that exemplification is a symptom of the aesthetic: although not a necessary condition, it is an indicator that symbol is functioning aesthetically. I argue that exemplification is as important in science as it is in art. It is the vehicle by which experiments make aspects of nature manifest. I suggest that the difference between exemplars in the arts and the sciences lies in the way (...)
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  44.  98
    Education and the Advancement of Understanding.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3:131-140.
    Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. It is a matter of how commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought. It is advanced by bootstrapping. We start with what we think we know and build from there. This makes education continuous with what goes on at the cutting edge of inquiry. Methods, standards, categories and stances are as important as facts. So something like E. D. Hirsch’s list of facts every fourth grader should know is (...)
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  45.  27
    Unnatural Science.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):289.
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  46.  41
    On question-begging and analytic content.Z. Elgin Samuel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1149-1163.
    Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I argue that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.
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  47.  15
    Understanding: Art and Science.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1991 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16 (1):196-208.
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  48.  45
    Counterfactual Logic and the Necessity of Mathematics.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (1):97-115.
    This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, who seek to establish that mathematics is committed to its own necessity. I demonstrate that their assumptions collapse the counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. This collapse entails the success of counterfactual strengthening, which is controversial within counterfactual logic, and which has counterexamples within pure and applied mathematics. I close (...)
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  49.  5
    Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):161-180.
    It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics, I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each (...)
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  50.  12
    Epistemology’s Ends, Pedagogy’s Prospects.Catherine Z. Elgin - 1999 - Facta Philosophica 1 (1):39-54.
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