A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Carruthers offers a promising model for how know the propositional contents of own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Developmental psychologists have long argued that the capacity to distinguish moral and conventional transgressions develops across cultures and emerges early in life. Children reliably treat moral transgressions as more wrong, more punishable, independent of structures of authority, and universally applicable. However, previous studies have not yet examined the role of these features in mature moral cognition. Using a battery of adult-appropriate cases (including vehicular and sexual assault, reckless behavior, and violations of etiquette and social contracts) we demonstrate that these features (...) also distinguish moral from conventional transgressions in mature moral cognition. Each hypothesized moral transgressions was treated as strongly and clearly immoral. However, our data suggest that although the majority of hypothesized conventional transgressions also form an obvious cluster, social conventions seem to lie along a continuum that stretches from mere matters of personal preference (e.g., getting tattoos or wearing black shoes with a brown belt) to transgressions that are treated as matters for legitimate social sanction (e.g., violating traffic laws or not paying your taxes). We use these findings to discuss issues of universality, domain-specificity, and the importance of using a well-studied set of moral scenarios to examine clinical populations and the underlying neural architecture of moral cognition. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett explores the intellectual significance of Daniel C. Dennett's 45 years of philosophical research, while providing a critical and constructive overview of Dennett's stance-based methodology and his claims about metal representation, consciousness, cultural evolution, and religion.

Inspired by the success of generative linguistics and transformational grammar, proponents of the linguistic analogy (LA) in moral psychology hypothesize that careful attention to folk-moral judgments is likely to reveal a small set of implicit rules and structures responsible for the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded capacity for making moral judgments. As a theoretical hypothesis, LA thus requires a rich description of the computational structures that underlie mature moral judgments, an account of the acquisition and development of these structures, and an (...) analysis of those components of the moral system that are uniquely human and uniquely moral. In this paper we present the theoretical motivations for adopting LA in the study of moral cognition: (a) the distinction between competence and performance, (b) poverty of stimulus considerations, and (c) adopting the computational level as the proper level of analysis for the empirical study of moral judgment. With these motivations in hand, we review recent empirical findings that have been inspired by LA and which provide evidence for at least two predictions of LA: (a) the computational processes responsible for folk-moral judgment operate over structured representations of actions and events, as well as coding for features of agency and outcomes; and (b) folk-moral judgments are the output of a dedicated moral faculty and are largely immune to the effects of context. In addition, we highlight the complexity of the interfaces between the moral faculty and other cognitive systems external to it (e.g., number systems). We conclude by reviewing the potential utility of the theoretical and empirical tools of LA for future research in moral psychology. (shrink)

An extraordinary, if circumscribed, positive shift has occurred since the mid-twentieth century in the perceived status of Hugh Everett III's 1956 theory of the universal wave function of quantum mechanics, now widely called the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI). Everett's starkly new interpretation denied the existence of a separate classical realm, contending that the experimental data can be seen as presenting a state vector for the whole universe. Since there is no state vector collapse, reality as a whole is strictly deterministic. Explained (...) jointly by the dynamical variables and the state vector, “this reality is not the reality we customarily think of, but is a reality composed of many worlds,” wrote Everett's colleague Bryce DeWitt. In this essay, I account briefly for the change of status in conventional scientific terms, yet chiefly in extended terms of three sets of ideas that I argue can be understood to affect believability in both scientific and religious contexts, illuminating helpfully the MWI phenomenon, and its engagement with theology: orthodoxy and heresy, language and reference, and faith and agnosticism. One's orientation relative to the variable content of these dynamic, socially oriented categories helps to make belief in ideas as metaphysically challenging as Everettian Quantum Mechanics, or particular ideas about God, either more or less believable. The categories will have the same function in a theology engaging Everett's theory, and in any theology at all written in a society deeply marked by what I further argue is a subtle, powerful, and pervasive mode of quasi-scientific thinking we can call societal constructive agnosticism, of which anyone doing theology today must be aware. (shrink)

Hugh Everett’s “Universal Wave Theory Formulation of Quantum Mechanics”, though endorsed and promoted by his mentor John Wheeler, was dismissed by the mainstream in quantum mechanics. Why was it sidelined by those who endorsed the Copenhagen interpretation and John von Neumann’s approach to the famous measurement problem? Everett’s theory was taken up later by Bryce DeWitt under an interpretation, the many worlds universe theory, that is not actually how Everett interpreted his own formulation. I argue that by looking at (...) science as a social institution according to Ian C. Jarvie’s critique of Karl Popper’s view of science as a “Republic,” we can see how Everett was sidelined: external pressures of the Cold War and McCarthy and internal pressures of Big Science and the “military-industrial complex.”. (shrink)

The author assumes that the biological evolution must reflect itself also in the energetic processes of the organism. Several concept are discussed, in view of a characterization of the energetic economy of the organism. Two of these are thought to have particular significance related to evolution: the energetic efficiency and the capacity for energetic production . E is the ratio of the performed useful work to the amount of energy “spent”; P is the ratio of the performed useful work to (...) the product of the mass of the living system and time. An evolution of both E and P during the animal phylogenesis is assumed. The evolution of E is generally evident at the level of more elementary metabolic processes, while that of P at the level of more complex functions or of the organism as a whole. In many cases, the increase of P is associated with a decrease of E. The main evolutionary feature of biological energetic economy is the increase of the capacity for energetic production. This holds true even if the increase of P can be achieved only at the expense of a reduction of the energetic efficiency, of a “waste” of energy, especially in the most highly developed systems of the organism.L'évolution biologique doit se refléter, selon l'avis de l'auteur, aussi dans les processus énergétiques de l'organisme. On discute quelques notions qui pourraient caractériser l'économie énergétique de celui-ci. Deux de celles-ci ont une signification évolutive particulière: le rendement énergétique et la capacité de production énergétique . E est le rapport du travail util effectué à la quantité d'énergie “dépensée”; P est le rapport du travail util effectué au produit de la masse du système vivant avec de le temps. L'auteur considère qu'il y a une évolution des deux grandeurs au cours de la phylogénèse animale. L'évolution d'E se manifeste spécialement au niveau des processus métaboliques élémentaires, tandis que celle de P au niveau des fonctions plus complexes ou de l'organisme entier. Dans beaucoup de cas, l'accroissement de P entraîne une diminution de E. Le trait évolutif principal de l'énergétique biologique c'est l'accroissement de la capacité de production énergétique, même si cela suppose une réduction du rendement, une “dissipation” d'énergie, surtout dans les systèmes les plus développés de l'organisme.Die biologische Evolution soll sich, nach dem Erachten des Verfassers, auch in den energetischen Vorgange des Organismus kundtun. Es werden einige Begriffe erörtert, welche den Energiehaushalt des Organismus kennzeichnen können. Zwei von diesen Begriffen haben eine besondere entwicklungsgeschichtliche Bedeutung: die energetische Leistung und das Vermögen zur Energieproduktion . E ist das Verhältnis der geleisteten nützlichen Arbeit zur verbrauchten Energiemenge; P ist das Verhältnis der nützlichen Arbeit zum Produkt von Masse des lebenden Systems und Zeit. Der Verfasser ist der Meinung, dass es eine Evolution von E und P während der tierischen Phylogenesis gäbe. Die Evolution von E äussert sich meist in der Ebene der elementaren metabolischen Vorgänge, hingegen die von P an komplexeren Funktionen. In zahlreichen Fällen, vermindert E während P wächst. Die evolutive Grundzug der biologischen Energetik ist das Anwachsen der Fähigkeit zur Energieproduktion, sogar wenn dieses nur auf Kosten einer Verminderung der energetischen Leistung, einer „Vergeudung“ der Energie verwirklichen kann. (shrink)

Examining the process of action at a distance, we arrive at the following conclusions: (a) The virtual photons and mesons transmitting Coulomb and nuclear forces, respectively, do not arise from “temporary violations of energy conservation,” but, on the contrary, exactly embody the potential energy corresponding to the relevant forceF that they transmit on their collision with the charged particles or nucleons via the formula Δp=FΔt. (b) In the case of an attractive force, the energy of these photons and mesons is (...) negative. The way this comes about is made clear by a more detailed investigation of Feynman's notion of “traveling backward in time.” (c) The action corresponding to, e.g., a virtual photon's appearance is exactly one quantumh, which fact is responsible for the unobservability of such photons. Some consequences of the revised conception of potential energy for, e.g., the tunnel and the Bohm-Aharonov effect are mentioned. (shrink)

Using a neutron interferometer and the phase difference calculated from spatial discrete quantum mechanics, a test for discrete quantum theory may implemented by measuring the X spin polarization and its variation with position.

It is shown that the Maxwell-Lorentz equations can be deduced from the law of Biot-Savart by simply performing some theoretical experimentations.