The philosophical tradition in the West has always subjected life to conceptualdivisions and questions about meaning. In Vital Nourishment, François Jullien contends that althoughthis process has given rise to a rich history of inquiry, it proceeds too fast. In their anxietyabout meaning, Western thinkers since Plato have forgotten simply to experience life. In thisinstallment of his continuing project of plumbing the philosophical divide between Eastern andWestern thought, Jullien slows down, and, using the third and fourth century B.C.E. Chinese (...) thinkerZhuanghi as a foil, begins to think about life from a point outside of Western inquiry.The questionof how to "feed life," or nourish it, is the point of departure for the Chinese traditionthat Jullien locates in Zhuanghi. Life passes through each of us, and we have a duty to becomeamenable to its ebbs and flows. We must cultivate a sense of being adequate to it so that we canhouse it. Exploring notions of breath, energy, and immanence, Jullien reopens a vibrant space ofintellectual exchange between East and West. In doing so, he refuses to commit to a rigid frameworkof meaning, and his text unfolds as an elegant process that mirrors the very type of thought heexplores. Pointing out that it seems intellectually and politically imperative today to reinvigorateWestern thought with ideas from the East, Jullien seeks to create a space of mutual inquiry thatmaintains the integrity of both Eastern and Western thinking. Vital Nourishment is both a richintellectual historical journey and a text very much attuned to the philosophical politics of thepresent.François Jullien is Professor at the Université Paris VII-Denis Diderot and director at theInstitut de la Pensée Contemporaine. He is the author of Detour and Access: Stratgies of Meaning inChna and Greece, The Propensity of Things: Toward a History of Efficacy in China, and In Praise ofBlandness: Proceeding from Chinsese Thought and Aesthetics, all published by Zone Books. (shrink)

The emergence of modern sciences in the seventeenth century profoundly renewed our understanding of Nature. For the last three centuries new ideas of Nature have been continuously developed by theology, politics, economics, and science, especially the sciences of the material world. The situation is even more unstable today, now that we have entered an ecological mutation of unprecedented scale. Some call it the Anthropocene, but it is best described as a new climatic regime. And a new regime it certainly is, (...) since the many unexpected connections between human activity and the natural world oblige every one of us to reopen the earlier notions of Nature and redistribute what had been packed inside. So the question now arises: what will replace the old ways of looking at Nature? This book explores a potential candidate proposed by James Lovelock when he chose the name "Gaia" for the fragile, complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth. The fact that he was immediately misunderstood proves simply that his readers have tried to fit this new notion into an older frame, transforming Gaia into a single organism, a kind of giant thermostat, some sort of New Age goddess, or even divine Providence. In this series of lectures on "natural religion", Bruno Latour argues that the complex and ambiguous figure of Gaia offers, on the contrary, an ideal way to disentangle the ethical, political, theological, and scientific aspects of the now obsolete notion of Nature. He lays the groundwork for a future collaboration among scientists, theologians, activists, and artists as they, and we, begin to adjust to the new climatic regime. (shrink)

Rabattement -- De l'incommensurable -- Évitement -- Il y a de l'incommensurable (la jouissance, l'intime, la mort) -- Dé-commensurabiliser -- Ce qui n'est pas de ce monde, mais qui n'est d'un autre monde -- Un concept peut'il changer la vie? (l'incommensurable déploie l'existence).

In this highly insightful analysis of Western and Chinese concepts of efficacy, François Jullien subtly delves into the metaphysical preconceptions of the two civilizations to account for diverging patterns of action in warfare, politics, and diplomacy. He shows how Western and Chinese strategies work in several domains (the battlefield, for example) and analyzes two resulting acts of war. The Chinese strategist manipulates his own troops and the enemy to win a battle without waging war and to bring about victory (...) effortlessly. Efficacity in China is thus conceived of in terms of transformation (as opposed to action) and manipulation, making it closer to what is understood as efficacy in the West. Jullien’s brilliant interpretations of an array of recondite texts are key to understanding our own conceptions of action, time, and reality in this foray into the world of Chinese thought. In its clear and penetrating characterization of two contrasting views of reality from a heretofore unexplored perspective, A Treatise on Efficacy will be of central importance in the intellectual debate between East and West. (shrink)

François Jullien, the leading philosopher and specialist in Chinese thought, has always aimed at building on inter-cultural relations between China and the West. In this new book he focuses on the following questions: Do universal values exist? Is dialogue between cultures possible? To answer these questions, he retraces the history of the concept of the universal from its invention as an aspect of Roman citizenship, through its neutralization in the Christian idea of salvation, to its present day manifestations. This (...) raises the question of whether the search for the universal is a uniquely Western preoccupation: do other cultures, like China, even have a notion of the universal, and if so, how does it differ from ours? Having considered the meaning of the concept in the East and West, Jullien argues that, if communication between cultures is to be meaningful, facile assumptions of universal values and complacent relativism need to be examined. It follows, therefore, that dialogue between cultures should not begin with issues of identity and difference, but rather by considering divergence and profusion. By no longer simply assuming universality, we allow for greater self-reflection. This wide-ranging and engaging study will be of particular interest to students and scholars of philosophy and of Chinese culture and society. It will also appeal to a wider readership interested in contemporary thought and the challenges of communication between East and West. (shrink)

« Du beau, on n'a cessé, au fil des siècles, de remettre en question les critères et les conceptions; de faire varier les définitions. Mais s'est-on jamais interrogé sur ce préalable, déposé dans la langue, celui de pouvoir dire simplement: « le beau »? A-t-on jamais sondé, en effet, sur quel socle enfoui « le beau » est juché? Lui, la grande cheville ouvrière de notre métaphysique: nous apprenant à quitter la diversité du sensible pour l'unitaire de l' « idée (...) »; comme aussi, en retour, nous frappant d'effroi - d'émoi - par son absolu faisant irruption à mème le visible. Seule issue restante, dès lors, depuis que les dieux sont morts, pour nous forger un salut. Or la pensée chinoise n'a pas isolé - abstrait - « le beau ». En faisant travailler cet écart, je souhaite dégager d'autres possibles ne se rangeant pas sous la monopolisation du beau; par suite, explorer d'autres fécondités que l'art contemporain, en guerre ouverte avec le beau, peut rencontrer. De quoi du moins sortir le beau des lieux communs qui l'épuisent: pour le rendre à son étrangeté. » François Jullien. (shrink)

On voudrait croire que, quand les choses en viennent enfin à s'accorder, c'est là le bonheur... Or, c'est précisément quand les choses se recoupent complètement et coïncident que cette adéquation, en se stabilisant, se stérilise. La coïncidence est la mort. C'est par dé-coïncidence qu'advient l'essor. Dieu lui-même dé-coïncide d'avec soi, en mourant sur la Croix, pour promouvoir la vie vivante. Dans la faille de la dé-coïncidence, une initiative est à nouveau possible, se déployant en liberté. Or, comme l'Age classique a (...) fait de l'adéquation la définition même de la vérité, ou de la coïncidence avec la Nature le grand précepte de l'art comme de la morale, il est revenu à la modernité de rompre avec ce confort de la pensée. François Jullien fait jouer ici le concept de "dé-coïncidence" dans la Bible, la peinture, la littérature, la philosophie, pour montrer comment il est à la source de l'art et de l'existence. (shrink)

Un soupçon s'est insidieusement levé, un matin : que la vie pourrait être tout autre que la vie qu'on vit. Que cette vie qu'on vit n'est plus peut-être qu'une apparence ou un semblant de vie. Que nous sommes peut-être en train de passer, sans même nous en apercevoir, à côté de la "vraie vie". Car nos vies se résignent par rétractation des possibles. Elles s'enlisent sous l'entassement des jours. Elles s'aliènent sous l'emprise du marché et de la technicisation forcée. Elles (...) se réifient, enfin, ou deviennent "chose", sous tant de recouvrements. Or, qu'est-ce que la "vraie vie"? La formule, à travers les âges, a vibré comme une invocation suprême. De Platon à Rimbaud, à Proust, à Adorno. La "vraie vie" n'est pas la vie belle, ou la vie bonne, ou la vie heureuse, telle que l'a vantée la sagesse. Elle n'est surtout pas dans les boniments du "Bonheur" et du développement personnel qui font aujourd'hui un commerce de leur pseudo-pensée. La vraie vie ne projette aucun contenu idéal. Ce ne serait toujours qu'une redite du paradis. Elle ne verse pas non plus dans quelque vitalisme auto-célébrant la vie. Mais elle est le refus têtu de la vie perdue ; dans le non à là pseudo-vie. La vraie vie, c'est tenter de résister à la non-vie comme penser est résister à la non-pensée. En quoi elle est bien l'enjeu crucial - mais si souvent délaissé - de la philosophie. (shrink)

A fresh and erudite reflection on Christianity and its relevance today.

Quand on avance dans la vie, il est une question qu'on ne peut plus, peu à peu, ne pas se poser : pourquoi est-ce que je continue de vivre? Cette question, on peut la maintenir au niveau bas du développement personnel, affublé en "sagesse", et du marché du bonheur. Ou bien l'affronter philosophiquement pour y chercher une issue plus ambitieuse qui soit la promotion d'une "seconde" vie. Une seconde vie est une vie qui, du cours même de la vie, se (...) décale lentement d'elle-même et commence de se choisir et de se réformer. Pour y accéder, il faudra penser ce que sont des vérités, non pas démontrées, mais décantées à partir de la vie même ; ou comment, de l'expérience accumulée, on peut à nouveau essayer ; ou comment la lucidité est ce savoir négatif (de Pecq!) qui nous vient malgré nous, mais qu'on peut assumer ; ou comment la vie peut ouvrir, non sur une conversion, mais sur une vie dégagée. Ou comment un second amour, fondé, non plus sur la possession, mais sur l'infini de l'intime, peut débuter. Puis-je, non plus répéter ma vie, mais la reprendre, et commencer véritablement d'exister?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

François Jullien explores what it means when we say something is beautiful. Bringing together ideas of beauty from both Eastern and Western philosophy, Jullien challenges the assumptions underlying our commonly agreed upon definition of what is beautiful and offers a new way of beholding art. Looking specifically at how Chinese texts have been translated into Western languages, Jullien reveals how the traditional Chinese refusal to isolate or abstract beauty is obscured in translation in order to make the (...) works more understandable to Western readers. Creating an engaging dialogue between Chinese and Western ideas, Jullien reasseses the essence of beauty. (shrink)

Mathematics stand in a privileged relationship with aesthetics: a relationship that follows two main directions. The first concerns the introduction of mathematical considerations into aesthetic discourse. For instance, it is common to mention the mathematical architecture of certain artistic productions. The second leads from aesthetics to mathematics. In this case, the question is that of the role and meaning that aesthetic considerations may assume in mathematics. It is indeed a widely held view among mathematicians, of whatever socio-historical context, not only (...) to see their discipline as presenting a strong aesthetic dimension, but also to consider that this dimension plays a fundamental role in the process of developing and understanding mathematics. The main ambition of this paper is to show how Nelson Goodman’s aesthetics can be used to justify this point of view and to propose a thesis concerning the aesthetic functioning of mathematics. This first result allows to resituate Goodman’s aesthetics within a very classical tradition that will be described. Finally, the underlying ambition is to show the keys provided by Goodman’s theory for the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

En politique, comme en poésie, les Chinois privilégient l'expression allusive, la formulation détournée. Et au face à face, ils préfèrent la subtilité d'un abord de biais. Ils "chinoisent", dit-on d'ailleurs, parce qu'on ne comprend pas comment ils procèdent. A travers l'analyse de quelques-uns des grands textes de la pensée chinoise les Entretiens de Confucius, le Mencius, etc. François Jullien montre qu'il s'agit, en fait, d'une stratégie du sens particulière, qui a son efficacité propre. Par là même, il nous conduit (...) à revenir sur quelques-uns de nos partis pris théoriques : celui notamment qui prétend cerner au plus près l'objet du discours, en tant que vérité, comme celui qui interprète le détour de la parole à partir d'un dédoublement entre la chose et l'Idée. Détours et retours : ce travail devient alors un cheminement patient, un voyage au lointain pays de la "subtilité" qui, finalement, se révèle une invitation à remonter dans notre propre pensée. (shrink)

Is that where western philosophy -- What is it to enter (a way of thought)? -- The elsewhere of China -- Thinking before or beside? -- The first sentence -- A first Chinese sentence -- Commentary -- Hebraic entry -- Hellenic entry -- Undoing our alternatives -- Where would the beginning begin? -- Neither God nor myth: what other possibility? -- When myth holds no interest, when God holds no monopoly -- Greek tool/Chinese formulation -- Translation -- Is there still (...) tradition? -- A shift of the truth. (shrink)

Dans son choix grec, la philosophie a pensé la vie, mais non pas vivre ; et le religieux, qui prenait en charge la question du vivre, est aujourd'hui en retrait. De là que vivre soit laissé en friche, abandonné au prêche ou bien au truisme ; et que prospèrent le Développement Personnel et le marché du Bonheur vendant vivre comme du ± tout positif?.00Or vivre est paradoxal, s'étendant du vital au vivant. Il est à la fois la condition de toutes (...) les conditions : être en vie ; et l'aspiration de toutes nos aspirations : vivre enfin! Nous sommes en vie, mais nous n'accédons pas pour autant à vivre. Car la vie d'elle-même rabat la vie. De là que nous puissions être nostalgiques de la vie au sein même de la vie - ou que ± la vraie vie est absente?.00Or, c'est à travers cette inanité même de ± la vie? que nous pourrons voir transparaître à l'envers l'inouï de vivre débordant le déjà vécu et l'ouvrant à de l'± in-vécu?, quitte à s'y heurter à de l'invivable ; et, puisque vivre n'est, au fond, qu'ouvrir des possibles, nous pourrons alors rouvrir des possibles dans nos vies, au lieu de les laisser s'étioler.00Car répéter qu'il faut ± cueillir le jour?, ± profiter de la vie?, n'a pas prise sur la vie. Traçons donc plutôt, pour nous y repérer, une carte de ces possibles intensifs entre lesquels décider vivre.00Vivre y reparaît alors dans sa ressource, dans son essor, dans son ± matin?, dégagé de ce qui l'enlisait, au fil des jours, et l'emmurait.00Telle est la ± transparence du matin?, en amont de tous les enseignements de la morale.0F. J. (shrink)

Entre ces deux grands termes rivaux, l'être et le vivre, exister est le verbe moderne qui fait lever un nouveau possible. Mais comment décrire l'existence sans plus construire - comme la philosophie l'a fait de l'Etre - en s'en tenant au ras du vécu? Je cherche ici des concepts qui décolleraient le moins de l'expérience : on reste dans l'adhérence au vital ou on en désadhère. Car exister, c'est d'abord résister. Sinon ma vie s'enlise ; ou bien elle peut basculer. (...) Elle s'amorce et se résorbe. Elle reste prise dans le " dur désir de durer " ou bien je peux en émerger. Car si vivre, c'est déjà dé-coïncider d'avec soi (sinon c'est la mort), exister est ce verbe nouveau qui, détaché de l'Etre, se promeut en ressource. " Ex-ister ", c'est en effet, littéralement, " se tenir hors " - il faudra dire de quoi. Ou comment émerger du monde, mais dans le monde, sans verser dans l'au-delà de la métaphysique? De là se dégage une nouvelle éthique qui ne prêche pas : vivre en existant. F. J. (shrink)

Dans quels termes penser quand le monde est en voie de penser dans les mêmes? Face aux principaux concepts de la pensée européenne, je suis allé chercher en Chine des cohérences à mettre en vis-à-vis, dont je fais des concepts, ceux-ci laissant paraître d'autres possibles. Il ne s'agit donc pas de «comparer». Mais de cueillir les fruits d'un déplacement théorique, dont je dresse ici le bilan, en explorant d'autres ressources à exploiter ; comme aussi, par le dévisagement mutuel engagé, de (...) sonder respectivement notre impensé. Au lieu donc de prétendre identifier des «différences» qui caractériseraient les cultures, je cherche à y détecter des écarts qui fassent reparaître du choix et remettent en tension la pensée. C'est seulement à partir d'eux, en effet, qu'on pourra promouvoir un commun de l'intelligible qui ne soit pas fait de slogans planétarisés. En retour, les entrées de ce lexique introduiront autant de dérangements qui pourront faire réagir les pratiques de l'art comme de la psychanalyse ; qui permettront de réinterroger de biais la pensée du politique comme du management. Et voici que, en dessinant une sortie de la «question de l'Etre», c'est du même coup une nouvelle pensée du vivre que capte, dans ses mailles, ce filet. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

La Chine est ailleurs, est-elle " autre "? Cet ailleurs de la Chine se constate dans la langue comme dans l'Histoire. Quant à l'altérité, elle est à construire patiemment en nouant le dialogue entre deux civilisations, la chinoise et l'européenne, qui se sont développées si longtemps sans contact entre elles. C'est à ce travail que se livre François Jullien, essai après essai, ou chemin faisant, sans postuler d'altérité ni d'identité de principe. A la fois pour fournir des concepts à (...) la connaissance de la Chine et relancer la philosophie en l'interrogeant du dehors chinois. A l'occasion de cette Réplique, François Jullien récapitule le chemin parcouru, ou sa " méthode ", et les résultats acquis. Il montre du même coup comment, à partir du dévisagement réciproque des cultures, ouvrir la voie d'un auto-réfléchissement de l'humain qui nous délivre de l'humanisme mou et de sa pensée faible. (shrink)

This new English translation of François Jullien's work is a compelling summation of his thinking on the comparison and divergences between Western and Chinese thought. Jullien argues that Western thinking is preoccupied with the question of 'being', whereas Chinese thought concerned itself principally with that of 'living'. Organised as a lexicon around some 20 concepts that juxtapose Chinese and Western thought, including propensity (vs causality), receptivity (vs freedom), maturation (vs modelisation),between (vs beyond) and resource (vs truth). Jullien (...) explores the ways the two traditions have evolved, and how many aspects of Chinese thought developed in isolation from the West, revealing a different way of relating to the world and the fault lines of western thinking. (shrink)

In giving landscape the name 'mountain-water', the Chinese language provides a powerful alternative to Western biases. Francois Jullien invites the reader to explore reason's unthought choices, and to take a fresh look at our more basic involvement in the world.

Qu'est-ce qu'entrer dans une pensée? Qui ne souhaiterait par exemple entrer, le temps d'une soirée, dans une pensée aussi extérieure à la nôtre que la chinoise? Mais on ne peut y entrer en tentant de la résumer, ou d'en présenter des notions, ou d'y distinguer des écoles, voire en en traçant l'histoire. Car on reste toujours dépendant, pour le faire, de nos perspectives implicites et de nos concepts. On n'a pas encore quitté sa pensée. Donc on n'a pu entrer dans (...) l'autre. C'est pourquoi je proposerai ici, à titre de travaux pratiques, de commencer par lire une simple phrase de chinois : les premiers mots du Yi King sur le commencement. De la lire du dedans : dans son énoncée et dans son commentaire. Comme aussi du dehors, qu'il soit de la Bible, de la Grèce et de nos prochains et plus lointains Orients. S'érige alors progressivement un seuil qui fait entrer. Du même coup, se répartissent, de part et d'autre, divers possibles de la pensée. Et surgit soudain devant nous une tâche immense : concevoir une histoire de l'avènement de l'esprit qui ne relève plus de la seule Europe. (shrink)

"Lettre à l'Autre. Comment empêcher que la présence, en s'instaurant, s'installe? Qu'elle s'enlise de ce qu'elle se réalise et s'abîme dans la durée? Les Amants en sont menacés..."--Page 4 of cover.

Notre vie, ne la passons-nous pas en quête inassouvie de l'Autre? De l'autre, enfin, qui soit autre. Or ce tout autre n'est pas à attendre de quelque Là-bas espéré, d'un lointain fantasmé : la pensée ne fera toujours que tourner en rond dans cet imaginaire projeté. Mais il se découvre si près, à portée, dans ce que l'on a trop placidement, paresseusement, assimilé. L'inouï ne tombe pas de quelque ciel féerique, mais s'extrait de ce qu'on foule si négligemment d'instants banals. (...) L'opposé lui-même n'est plus autre, car il ne confronte plus à de l'inconnu : il est désormais posé devant, "en face", diamétralement aligné, et même dramatiquement érigé ; mais déjà assigné, inerte et rangé - l'opposé déjà s'entend avec son autre. De là qu'il faudra, je crois, procéder de façon inverse. Chercher de l'autre, non pas dans ce qui s'annonce à l'antipode, dans le rôle du contraire, qui déjà est complémentaire. Mais plutôt en ouvrant un écart au sein de ce qu'on croirait semblable, le plus à proximité, apparemment le plus apparenté : pour y sonder ce qui s'y fissurerait secrètement d'un autre possible. Ainsi, déjà, entre le "plaisir" et la "jouissance" - eux qu'on croyait accolés. Car c'est en émergeant d'un tel écart qu'un Autre - Toi - peut être rencontré. Penser l'autre: n'est-ce pas là ce qui peut relancer la philosophie et, d'abord, nous fait accéder à l'existence?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The author meditates on Far Eastern thought and philosophy to analyze concepts that can be folded into a complete philosophy of living, including the idea of the moment, the ambiguity of the in-between, and what he calls the "transparency of morning.".

L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Dante.--La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull'Inchoatio formae.--Alberto Magno e san Tommaso.--La posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all'averroismo.--L'anima umana secondo Sigieri.--Anima e corpo nel pensiero di san Tommaso.--L'aristotelismo della scolastica e i francescani.--Individualità e immortalità nell'averroismo e nel tomismo.

Giordano Bruno.--La cena de le ceneri.--De la causa, principio e uno.--De l'infinito, universi e mondi.--Spaccio de la bestia trionfante.--De gli eroici furori.--Accusa e condanna di Bruno.--Nota bibliografica (p. 313-315).

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

A precursor to the hard problem of consciousness confronts nihilism. Like physicalism, nihilism collides with the first-personal fact of what perception and action are like. Unless this problem is solved, nature’s inclusion of conscious experience will remain, as Chalmers warns the physicalist, an “unanswered question” and, as Jacobi chides the nihilist, “completely inexplicable". One advantage of Kant’s Copernican turn is to dismiss the question that imposes this hard problem. We need not ask how nature is accompanied by the first-person standpoint (...) because “I think” is an apperceptive form of thinking that must be able to accompany any cognition of nature. Kant’s formal conception of apperception worries Fichte in his Nova Methodo lectures. This conception arguably cannot exhaust the ground of experience, for it does not show why we posit objects “at all". For Fichte, it is our agency that first opens a world of objects, viz., as subjects, means, ends, and obstacles. In what follows, I argue that, for Fichte, the I poses no hard problem because it collides exclusively with nihilistic views like Spinozism, which are refuted by a properly transcendental idealist conception of apperception, according to which the first-person standpoint is the absolute ground of our experience of nature. If transcendental idealism refutes nihilism, nature is no more explicable than that there is something it is like for me to perceive and act. In Section 1, I show why Kantian apperception is necessary for possible experience. In Section 2, I reconstruct Fichte’s argument that a modified conception of apperception refutes guises of nihilism, thereby solving the hard problem of consciousness. In Section 3, I suggest that transcendental idealism undermines Chalmers’ proposed solution to and Dennett’s dismissal of this problem. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

This chapter challenges Cantor’s notion of the ‘power’, or ‘cardinality’, of an infinite set. According to Cantor, two infinite sets have the same cardinality if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. Cantor showed that there are infinite sets that do not have the same cardinality in this sense. Further, he took this result to show that there are infinite sets of different sizes. This has become the standard understanding of the result. The chapter challenges this, arguing (...) that we have no reason to think there are infinite sets of different sizes. It begins with an initial argument against Cantor’s claim that there are infinite sets of different sizes and then proceeds, by way of an analogy between Cantor’s mathematical result and Russell’s paradox, to a more direct argument. (shrink)

In the Vocation of Man, Fichte makes the striking claim that life is eternal, rational, our true being, and the final cause of nature in general and of death in particular. How can we make sense of this claim? I argue that the public lectures that compose the Vocation are a popular expression of Fichte’s pre-existing commitment to what I call immortalism, the view that life is the unconditioned condition of intelligibility. Casting the I as an absolutely self-active or living (...) power enables his philosophical account of both the intelligibility of objects and of what it means to die. This explains his characterization of the Wissenschaftslehre as a system in which ‘all is act, movement, and life’. In Sect. 1, I explain the context of Jacobi’s use of ‘caput mortuum’ as a term for the thing in itself. In Sects. 2 and 3, I reconstruct two immortalist arguments from Fichte’s Jena period. The first is that the I’s self-activity rules out the existence of the thing in itself and thereby vanquishes ‘death’s head’. The second is that, insofar as the I charges us with the moral perfection of nature, it is the final cause of our entire life, including its end. This is to say that the I puts our every moment into question, even our last. In Sect. 4, I use these immortalist arguments to interpret the striking claim from the Vocation. (shrink)

First, the approaches of 'Diskursethik' (Discourse ethics) and of Modern Political Economy are described. While the latter investigates political decision processes, the former is concerned with the discourse process which takes place before a decision is made. This is shown by using referenda as an example. The discourse which takes place before referenda obviously does not conform to the ideal conditions defined in Diskursethik, but discourse and decisions in the context of referenda come nearer to the intentions of Diskursethik and (...) Political Economy than other decision procedures which are used in representative democracies. (shrink)

In the last years, a theological turn had a pervasive influence in the reception of Carl Schmitt’s writings. According to this view, his thought has a strong, substantial religious foundation. With regards to understanding not only Schmitt’s position but also his current influence in authoritarian countries, this essay argues that this interpretation is misleading and proposes a different and comprehensive analysis of Schmitt’s concept of political theology that replaces it in a political-legal framework. Against the theological reading, it argues that (...) Schmitt’s concept of “political theology” refers to his own conception of legal theory as an attempt to relegitimize authority in a secular context. As “political theology,” this legal theory is designed to overcome normativism and parliamentarism by “substantializing” the legal form. Using Schmitt’s post-1933 works as an example, the essay shows that, as theology translates faith into a written doctrine, legal theory must, according to Schmitt, substantialize the legal form by translating the political idea into jurisprudence. Hence, this article concludes that Schmitt’s theory might be described as “political theology” but only in a formal, ideological sense. It is part of an authoritarian theory that is not religious but uses theology to revive an appearance of absolute legitimacy. (shrink)

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

Throughout his career, Schelling assigns knowledge of the absolute first principle of philosophy to intellectual intuition. Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition raises two important questions for interpreters. First, given that his doctrine undergoes several changes before and after his identity philosophy, to what extent can he be said to “hold onto” the same “sense” of it by the 1830s, as he claims? Second, given that his doctrine of intellectual intuition restricts absolute idealism to what he calls a “science of reason”, (...) which he says cannot prove the absolute’s existence, what other doctrine does he require in order to prove this? I will answer these questions by tracing the shifts in Schelling’s doctrine of intellectual intuition from the 1790s to the 1830s and drawing out its evolving methodological role within his science of intelligibility. (shrink)

In this strikingly original contribution to our understanding of Chinese philosophy,Françle;ois Julien, a French sinologist whose work has not yet appeared in English usesthe Chinese concept of shi - meaning disposition or circumstance, power or potential - as atouchstone to explore Chinese culture and to uncover the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking.A Hegelian prejudice still haunts studies of ancient Chinese civilization:Chinese thought, never able to evolve beyond a cosmological point of view, with an indifference toany notion of (...) telos, sought to interpret reality solely on the basis of itself. In thisgroundbreaking study, prejudices toward the simplicity and "naiveté" of Chinese thought, Hegelianand otherwise, are dismantled one by one to reveal the intricate and coherent structure underlyingChinese modes of thinking and representing reality.Jullien begins with a single Chinese term, shi,whose very ambivalence and disconcerting polysemy, on the one hand, and simple efficacy, on theother, defy the order of a concept. Yet shi insinuates itself into the ordering and conditioning ofreality in all its manifold and complex representations. Because shi neither gave rise to anycoherent, general analysis nor figured as one of the major concepts among Chinese thinkers, Jullienfollows its appearance from one field to another: from military strategy to politics; from theaesthetics of calligraphy and painting to the theory of literature; and from reflection on historyto "first philosophy."At the point where these various domains intersect, a fundamental intuitionassumed self-evident for centuries emerges, namely, that reality - every kind of reality - may beperceived as a particular deployment or arrangement of things to be relied upon and worked to one'sadvantage. Art or wisdom, as conceived by the Chinese, lies in strategically exploiting thepropensity that emanates from this particular configuration of reality. (shrink)

This volume explores the reception of John Dewey's ideas in various historical and geographical settings such as Japan, China, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Spain, Russia, and Germany, analyzing how and why Dewey's thought was interpreted in various ways according to mediating local discursive and ideological configurations and formations.