We study the influence of the individual behaviour of animals on predator-prey models. Populations of preys and predators are divided into sub-populations corresponding to different activity classes. The animals are assumed to do many activities all day long such as searching for food of different types. The preys are more vulnerable when doing some activities during which they are very exposed to predators attacks rather than for others during which they are hidden. We study activity sequences of the animals and (...) also the effect of a change in the average individual behaviour of the animals on Lotka-Volterra prey-predator interactions. Numerical simulations are realized for the whole sets of equations (governing the subpopulations) and are compared to the simulations of the reduced sets of equation (governing the populations). We look for the validity of the method with respect to a scaling factor which measures the differences between the two time scales associated to the fast-varying variables and to the slow-time varying global variables. It is shown that when the two time scales differ of about two orders of magnitude, the approximation is satisfying. (shrink)

We study the case of two sibling species ofHippolais(Aves). Very little differences can be observed in the morphology of both species. The breeding area of these species are complementary. Roughly, one species breeds North and East of Europe (Hippolais icterina) while the other breeds South and West of Europe (Hippolais polyglotta). There exitst a narrow zone of sympatry passing through Burgundy. Since several years, it has been observed that this area of sympatry was moving in the North-East direction at a (...) European scale. This means that progressivelyH. icterina is declining and is replaced byH. polyglotta. Some assumptions can be made in order to explain this evolution, for instance competition or predation. Series of observations concerning the diets of nestlings of both species have been realized. These observations show some differences in the diet compositions. The breeding success of the two species has been studied. Numerical simulations of a competition model taking into account the observed differences between the food types eaten by the two species are presented. These simulations do not explain the regression ofH. icterina. Then, we present numerical simulations of a predation model with one predator attacking the nestlings of both species. These simulations show that with time one of the two preys must extinct. Predation rather than competition seems to be the right explanation. (shrink)

The emergence of modern sciences in the seventeenth century profoundly renewed our understanding of Nature. For the last three centuries new ideas of Nature have been continuously developed by theology, politics, economics, and science, especially the sciences of the material world. The situation is even more unstable today, now that we have entered an ecological mutation of unprecedented scale. Some call it the Anthropocene, but it is best described as a new climatic regime. And a new regime it certainly is, (...) since the many unexpected connections between human activity and the natural world oblige every one of us to reopen the earlier notions of Nature and redistribute what had been packed inside. So the question now arises: what will replace the old ways of looking at Nature? This book explores a potential candidate proposed by James Lovelock when he chose the name "Gaia" for the fragile, complex system through which living phenomena modify the Earth. The fact that he was immediately misunderstood proves simply that his readers have tried to fit this new notion into an older frame, transforming Gaia into a single organism, a kind of giant thermostat, some sort of New Age goddess, or even divine Providence. In this series of lectures on "natural religion", Bruno Latour argues that the complex and ambiguous figure of Gaia offers, on the contrary, an ideal way to disentangle the ethical, political, theological, and scientific aspects of the now obsolete notion of Nature. He lays the groundwork for a future collaboration among scientists, theologians, activists, and artists as they, and we, begin to adjust to the new climatic regime. (shrink)

La quête de repères identificatoires est probablement l'une des plus vieilles entreprises que l'humanité s'est donnée pour asseoir son histoire et construire sa mémoire. Toutes les sociétés, toutes les civilisations, fussent les pires totalitarismes, ont besoin d'une genèse héroïque — et donc exemplaire — pour fonder leurs origines. Une geste destinée à justifier leur présent ; un point de départ qui fixe un "avant" et un "après" et qui fait qu'à partir d'un événement créateur, selon la formule maintes fois annoncée, (...) toujours contredite : "rien ne sera plus jamais comme avant". On a tous besoin d'un père, tous besoin d'un géniteur, individuel ou collectif. Cette qualité peut naturellement se décliner sous différentes formes : le "père fondateur" est, selon les cas, un homme, une femme, un événement, un discours, un livre... Cet ouvrage se propose donc d'explorer ce concept, en croisant différentes approches : la linguistique, l'histoire, la philosophie, la littérature et le droit. (shrink)

Treize spécialistes dans diverses disciplines - histoire, théologie, philosophie, sociologie, économie, musicologie, linguistique, esthétique... - considèrent, sous l'angle des différentes sciences humaines, la manière dont les vivants se représentent la mort, ainsi que les comportements des vivants vis-à-vis des défunts. Cette mise en questions de la mort, où les auteurs réfléchissent sur notre devoir de vivants de borner le monde des morts, comporte deux grandes parties : l'une centrée sur le religieux (Bible, Coran, bouddhisme, le recul de l'Église catholique et (...) les rituels malgaches de retournement des morts, ou la question du suicide assisté...), l'autre plus profane avec des travaux sur la mort en république laïque et une étude économique sur le marché de la mort en France, puis un développement important sur la mort dans l'art (le cas de Gunther von Hagens, plastineur allemand dont les œuvres d'art sont des cadavres, le Dies Irae, la mort en bandes dessinées, ou encore la mort vue par Brassens, Brel et Ferré). (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

The Italian Dominican Ptolemy of Lucca figures among the most significant political theoreticians of the Middle Ages. In his De regimine principum, a continuation of Thomas Aquinas’ De regno, Ptolemy paints a highly original picture of civil happiness. Taking the Roman Republic as his model, Ptolemy praises the “political” government that is presented as a sufficient condition for felicitas civilis, and this through the virtue of its citizens, the balance of its forces, and the harmonious and active collaboration of the (...) various groups that constitute the community. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

Contrasting the properties of conscious and unconscious processes is crucial for understanding how consciousness occurs in the brain. In this chapter, we review the theoretical framework and empirical methods used to delineate and contrast conscious vs. unconscious perception. After outlining the main approaches to measure unconscious influences on brain and behavior, we describe some of the psychophysical tools employed to render stimuli unconscious, including the depletion of sensory signals, attentional resources, and vigilance states. We then provide an overview of the (...) extent and limits of unconscious perception, and conclude on the future of the contrastive approach to the study of consciousness. (shrink)

L'origine dell'anima umana secondo Dante.--La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull'Inchoatio formae.--Alberto Magno e san Tommaso.--La posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all'averroismo.--L'anima umana secondo Sigieri.--Anima e corpo nel pensiero di san Tommaso.--L'aristotelismo della scolastica e i francescani.--Individualità e immortalità nell'averroismo e nel tomismo.

Giordano Bruno.--La cena de le ceneri.--De la causa, principio e uno.--De l'infinito, universi e mondi.--Spaccio de la bestia trionfante.--De gli eroici furori.--Accusa e condanna di Bruno.--Nota bibliografica (p. 313-315).

Fichte assigns ‘intellectual intuition’ a new meaning after Kant. But in 1799, his doctrine of intellectual intuition is publicly deemed indefensible by Kant and nihilistic by Jacobi. I propose to defend Fichte’s doctrine against these charges, leaving aside whether it captures what he calls the ‘spirit’ of transcendental idealism. I do so by articulating three problems that motivate Fichte’s redirection of intellectual intuition from being to acting: (1) the regress problem, which states that reflecting on empirical facts of consciousness leads (...) only to further facts and so cannot yield a first principle; (2) the rhapsody problem, which states that the categories form a haphazard set and so lack necessity unless they derive from a first principle; and (3) the nihilism problem, which states that a first principle cannot lie outside our cognition of it, lest it be the cause of our cognition and, being first, the cause of all our actions, reducing us to machines. Crucially, Fichte’s three motivating problems are in fact aspects of a single problem. Leaving any aspect unsolved spoils putative solutions to the other two. Consequently, Fichte requires a single unified solution to all three, which his doctrine of intellectual intuition provides. (shrink)

A precursor to the hard problem of consciousness confronts nihilism. Like physicalism, nihilism collides with the first-personal fact of what perception and action are like. Unless this problem is solved, nature’s inclusion of conscious experience will remain, as Chalmers warns the physicalist, an “unanswered question” and, as Jacobi chides the nihilist, “completely inexplicable". One advantage of Kant’s Copernican turn is to dismiss the question that imposes this hard problem. We need not ask how nature is accompanied by the first-person standpoint (...) because “I think” is an apperceptive form of thinking that must be able to accompany any cognition of nature. Kant’s formal conception of apperception worries Fichte in his Nova Methodo lectures. This conception arguably cannot exhaust the ground of experience, for it does not show why we posit objects “at all". For Fichte, it is our agency that first opens a world of objects, viz., as subjects, means, ends, and obstacles. In what follows, I argue that, for Fichte, the I poses no hard problem because it collides exclusively with nihilistic views like Spinozism, which are refuted by a properly transcendental idealist conception of apperception, according to which the first-person standpoint is the absolute ground of our experience of nature. If transcendental idealism refutes nihilism, nature is no more explicable than that there is something it is like for me to perceive and act. In Section 1, I show why Kantian apperception is necessary for possible experience. In Section 2, I reconstruct Fichte’s argument that a modified conception of apperception refutes guises of nihilism, thereby solving the hard problem of consciousness. In Section 3, I suggest that transcendental idealism undermines Chalmers’ proposed solution to and Dennett’s dismissal of this problem. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

First, the approaches of 'Diskursethik' (Discourse ethics) and of Modern Political Economy are described. While the latter investigates political decision processes, the former is concerned with the discourse process which takes place before a decision is made. This is shown by using referenda as an example. The discourse which takes place before referenda obviously does not conform to the ideal conditions defined in Diskursethik, but discourse and decisions in the context of referenda come nearer to the intentions of Diskursethik and (...) Political Economy than other decision procedures which are used in representative democracies. (shrink)

This chapter challenges Cantor’s notion of the ‘power’, or ‘cardinality’, of an infinite set. According to Cantor, two infinite sets have the same cardinality if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. Cantor showed that there are infinite sets that do not have the same cardinality in this sense. Further, he took this result to show that there are infinite sets of different sizes. This has become the standard understanding of the result. The chapter challenges this, arguing (...) that we have no reason to think there are infinite sets of different sizes. It begins with an initial argument against Cantor’s claim that there are infinite sets of different sizes and then proceeds, by way of an analogy between Cantor’s mathematical result and Russell’s paradox, to a more direct argument. (shrink)

In the Vocation of Man, Fichte makes the striking claim that life is eternal, rational, our true being, and the final cause of nature in general and of death in particular. How can we make sense of this claim? I argue that the public lectures that compose the Vocation are a popular expression of Fichte’s pre-existing commitment to what I call immortalism, the view that life is the unconditioned condition of intelligibility. Casting the I as an absolutely self-active or living (...) power enables his philosophical account of both the intelligibility of objects and of what it means to die. This explains his characterization of the Wissenschaftslehre as a system in which ‘all is act, movement, and life’. In Sect. 1, I explain the context of Jacobi’s use of ‘caput mortuum’ as a term for the thing in itself. In Sects. 2 and 3, I reconstruct two immortalist arguments from Fichte’s Jena period. The first is that the I’s self-activity rules out the existence of the thing in itself and thereby vanquishes ‘death’s head’. The second is that, insofar as the I charges us with the moral perfection of nature, it is the final cause of our entire life, including its end. This is to say that the I puts our every moment into question, even our last. In Sect. 4, I use these immortalist arguments to interpret the striking claim from the Vocation. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Schelling assigns knowledge of the absolute first principle of philosophy to intellectual intuition. Schelling's doctrine of intellectual intuition raises two important questions for interpreters. First, given that his doctrine undergoes several changes before and after his identity philosophy, to what extent can he be said to “hold onto” the same “sense” of it by the 1830s, as he claims? Second, given that his doctrine of intellectual intuition restricts absolute idealism to what he calls a “science of reason”, (...) which he says cannot prove the absolute’s existence, what other doctrine does he require in order to prove this? I will answer these questions by tracing the shifts in Schelling’s doctrine of intellectual intuition from the 1790s to the 1830s and drawing out its evolving methodological role within his science of intelligibility. (shrink)

This volume explores the reception of John Dewey's ideas in various historical and geographical settings such as Japan, China, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Spain, Russia, and Germany, analyzing how and why Dewey's thought was interpreted in various ways according to mediating local discursive and ideological configurations and formations.

Au cours des quatre derniers siècles, les projets de pacification permanente de l’Europe, ou du monde entier, ont constitué un véritable genre littéraire. À un premier niveau, le plus superficiel, le livre offre une vue panoramique de ces projets, depuis le « Grand Dessein » attribué à Henri IV jusqu’à la Charte de l’ONU, en passant par les propositions de William Penn, de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre, d’Emmanuel Kant, du comte de Saint-Simon et de tant d’autres, célèbres, moins connus ou oubliés. (...) De règle, ces auteurs sont qualifiés, non sans condescendance, d’utopistes : à un deuxième niveau, le livre est une critique de cet usage paresseux, et les traite comme membres de la famille des réformateurs radicaux. Ayant dressé, chacun à son époque, un réquisitoire sans indulgence contre l’état existant des rapports entre les nations, ils en proposent une réorganisation profonde. Ennemis de l’ordre international établi - un désordre intolérable à leurs yeux -, ils se font les architectes d’un monde nouveau, le meilleur des mondes possibles, dont ils précisent le mode de construction. Si différents soient-ils, leurs écrits se prêtent à être classifiés en un petit nombre de catégories : à un troisième niveau, le livre est un essai typologique. Il suggère une conceptualisation du « système international parfait » qui comporte cinq grands modèles et permet donc de répartir l’ensemble des auteurs passés en revue dans cinq traditions intellectuelles, dont la plus récente est longue de deux siècles et la plus ancienne de sept. (shrink)

Since international trade leads to prosperity, most economics are in favor of globalization. This basic conviction is shared in this paper. Several standard arguments brought forward by critics of globalization - e.g. the claims that globalization increases poverty, destroys jobs, undermines the welfare state, enables international corporations to seize power and leads to environmental degradation and uniform culture - are shown to be invalid. Nevertheless, compared to orthodox economists, a more critical view of globalization is proposed in this paper, and (...) several shortcomings of globalization are discussed. These shortcomings are the unidirectional trade liberalization at the expense of developing countries, international organizations, like the IMF of World Bank, representing narrow economic interests and, above all, the lack of 'global governance'. Therefore, the implementation of functional overlapping competing jurisdiction is put forward. It is argued that the alternative proposition of a world government is dangerous, and global solidarity ineffective. (shrink)

In Intuition et idéalités: Phénoménologie des objets mathématiques (2020), Dominique Pradelle questioned the nature of mathematical knowledge–the status of math.

In the last years, a theological turn had a pervasive influence in the reception of Carl Schmitt’s writings. According to this view, his thought has a strong, substantial religious foundation. With regards to understanding not only Schmitt’s position but also his current influence in authoritarian countries, this essay argues that this interpretation is misleading and proposes a different and comprehensive analysis of Schmitt’s concept of political theology that replaces it in a political-legal framework. Against the theological reading, it argues that (...) Schmitt’s concept of “political theology” refers to his own conception of legal theory as an attempt to relegitimize authority in a secular context. As “political theology,” this legal theory is designed to overcome normativism and parliamentarism by “substantializing” the legal form. Using Schmitt’s post-1933 works as an example, the essay shows that, as theology translates faith into a written doctrine, legal theory must, according to Schmitt, substantialize the legal form by translating the political idea into jurisprudence. Hence, this article concludes that Schmitt’s theory might be described as “political theology” but only in a formal, ideological sense. It is part of an authoritarian theory that is not religious but uses theology to revive an appearance of absolute legitimacy. (shrink)

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

The concept of facticity denotes conditions of experience whose necessity is not logical yet whose contingency is not empirical. Although often associated with Heidegger, Fichte coins ‘facticity’ in his Berlin period to refer to the conclusion of Kant’s metaphysical deduction of the categories, which he argues leaves it a contingent matter that we have the conditions of experience that we do. Such rhapsodic or factical conditions, he argues, must follow necessarily, independent of empirical givenness, from the I through a process (...) of ‘genesis.’ I reconstruct Fichte’s argument by tracing the origin of his neologism, presenting his Jena critique of Kant’s rhapsodic appeal to the forms of judgment, and illustrating the Jena period’s continuity with the Berlin period’s genetic method, while noting a methodological shift whereby Fichte directs his critique against his own doctrine of intellectual intuition in order to eliminate its ‘factical terms.’. (shrink)

Fichte argues that the conclusion of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories is correct yet lacks a crucial premise, given Kant’s admission that the metaphysical deduction locates an arbitrary origin for the categories. Fichte provides the missing premise by employing a new method: a genetic deduction of the categories from a first principle. Since Fichte claims to articulate the same view as Kant in a different, it is crucial to grasp genetic deduction in relation to the sorts of deduction that (...) Kant offers. I propose to interpret genetic deduction as the simultaneous fulfillment of two tasks: answering the question quid facti by deriving the categories from the I and answering the question quid juris by establishing our entitlement to the categories as conditions of experience. While the second task represents Fichte’s agreement with Kant’s transcendental deduction, the first reflects his correction of Kant’s metaphysical deduction. (shrink)

In the Freedom essay, Schelling charges that (1) idealism fails to grasp human freedom’s distinctiveness and that (2) this failure undermines idealism's attempt to refute pantheism, as exemplified by Spinoza. This raises two questions, which I will answer in turn: what, for Schelling, is distinctive of human freedom; and how does the idealists’ failure to grasp it render them unable to refute pantheism? To answer these questions, I will reconstruct Schelling’s argument that freedom has the distinctness of being the unconditioned (...) condition of the world’s intelligibility. My reconstruction will illustrate how Schelling’s notion of freedom as primal will grounds the alleged primacy of practical reason as Kant and Fichte conceive it. I will then consider three objections to Schelling’s argument. Throughout, I will develop the Schellingian idea that freedom is enacted in an unprethinkable decision that cannot be anticipated by any law or principle. (shrink)

Human beings under some conditions tend to systematically overestimate their possibilities, under others to underestimate what is possible for them. This behaviour can be explained by differentiating between an ipsative possibility set (which includes what individuals consider relevant for themselves) and on objective one. These two possibility sets do not necessarily coincide. The difference may firstly be due to psychologicol processes as well as factors such as tradition and ideology. The difference may secondly be strategically designed by the individuals themselves (...) knowing that they otherwise reach less utility. The approach stresses that it is essential to determine the possibility sets within which individuals rationally decide between alternatives. (shrink)

Human beings under some conditions tend to systematically overestimate their possibilities, under others to underestimate what is possible for them. This behaviour can be explained by differentiating between an ipsative possibility set (which includes what individuals consider relevant for themselves) and on objective one. These two possibility sets do not necessarily coincide. The difference may firstly be due to psychologicol processes as well as factors such as tradition and ideology. The difference may secondly be strategically designed by the individuals themselves (...) knowing that they otherwise reach less utility. The approach stresses that it is essential to determine the possibility sets within which individuals rationally decide between alternatives. (shrink)

Democracies find it difficult, and sometimes impossible to get through projects desired by a large share of the population because these are strongly opposed by local residents (NIMBY: Not In My BackYard). As a solution for these conflicts, economists proposed offering (monetary) compensation to the citizens of the host community. Experiences with many different projects and countries reveal, however, that monetary payments are incapable of solving the NIMBY-problem. A monetary offer to accept an otherwise undesired project undermines civic virtue. This (...) crowding-out effect is empirically demonstrated using the search for a nuclear repository in Switzerland. A satisfactory strategy to overcome the NIMBY-problem takes into account the procedure, the time sequence, as well as the type of compensation offered. (shrink)

Strong forces lead to a withering of academia as it exists today. The major causal forces are the rankings mania, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of ‘university’, and inadequate organizational forms for modern research. Academia, in a broader sense understood as ‘the locus of seeking truth and learning through methodological inquiry’, will subsist in different forms. The conclusion is therefore pessimistic with respect to the academic system as it presently exists (...) but not to scholarly endeavour as such. However, the transformation predicted is expected to be fundamental. (shrink)

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen’s idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given (...) of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies’ test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett’s notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable. (shrink)