This book examines a fundamental social paradox: although less equality certainly entrenches injustice, more equality may nevertheless protect the advantages that one group enjoys over fellow citizens. Their studies confront us with vivid cases where equality for some is preferred to equality for all.

The essays examine specimens of social intolerance drawn from a broad field of history and culture: Classical Greece, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and America. Themes include women’s legal rights; humanitarian law; legitimized child sacrifice; discrimination against racial and religious minorities; religious animosity; Just War morality; theological discord; philosophical antagonism.

The basis of this collection of essays is the reading of a common topic from different perspectives. The contributors compare and contrast not only positions, but also methods of learning. They examine theories of just war in diverse cultural contexts and their disciplinary settings.

The role of the Golden Rule in various systems of thought, both religious and philosophical, invites study. How the logic of a given system interprets the Golden Rule demands analysis. Objective data deriving from empirical study of nature and society deserve close examination.

This paper studies Wittgenstein’s later observations on moral disagreements. First, it examines the practice of reason-giving and justification in moral disa-greement. It argues that, for Wittgenstein, moral reasons are descriptions which are used to justify a moral evaluation. Second, it explains that the adequacy and conclusiveness of moral reasons and justifications are dependent on their appeal to whomever they are given, not on how the world is. Third, it shows that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the inconclusiveness of moral reasons and jus-tification (...) do not entail a commitment to moral relativism. Lastly, it shows how Wittgenstein’s observations can be used in future investigations to develop a new picture of deep moral disagreements. (shrink)

Philosophers writing on the subject of human action have found it tempting to introduce their subject by raising Wittgenstein's question, 'What is left over if you subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?' The presumption is that something of particular interest is involved in an action of raising an arm that is not present in a mere bodily movement, and the philosopher's task is to specify just what this is. Unfortunately, such (...) an approach does not take us very far, since a person could properly be said to raise his (or her) arm while asleep or hypnotized even though he (or she) would not be performing an action in the sense of 'action' with which philosophers are particularly concerned. To avoid this kind of difficulty I shall approach the subject of human action is a more academic way: I shall expound some important rival theories of human action, and introduce the relevant issues by commenting critically on those theories. One of the issues I eventually introduce is a metaphysical one. A theory of action makes sense, I contend, only on the assumption that there are such 'things' as actions (or events). After considering some key arguments bearing on the issue I conclude that, as matters currently stand in philosophy, a metaphysically noncommittal attitude toward actions and events seems justified. (shrink)

Since the introduction of mathematical population genetics, its machinery has shaped our fundamental understanding of natural selection. Selection is taken to occur when differential fitnesses produce differential rates of reproductive success, where fitnesses are understood as parameters in a population genetics model. To understand selection is to understand what these parameter values measure and how differences in them lead to frequency changes. I argue that this traditional view is mistaken. The descriptions of natural selection rendered by population genetics models are (...) in general neither predictive nor explanatory and introduce avoidable conceptual confusions. I conclude that a correct understanding of natural selection requires explicitly causal models of reproductive success. *Received May 2006; revised December 2006. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Kansas State University, 201 Dickens Hall, Manhattan, KS 66506; e‐mail: [email protected] . (shrink)

Gathering thoughts -- Teachers who inspired me -- What am I? : Montessori? Steiner? eclectic? : Is it important? -- Which comes first? : a philosophical framework, theory and research evidence : what do teachers and other practitioners need to bring out their best work -- Working with principles which are interpreted and embedded in articulated practice -- The importance of parent partnership and the development of moral values and self-discipline -- Play : a very complex thing -- Finding how (...) to position myself in relation to play -- Inclusion : commonalities, differences"fragmentation or wholeness?"-- Cultivating creativity -- Remaining a generalist rather than becoming a specialist within one area of early childhood education -- Changing political climates -- How best to train teachers of young children -- Remaining a Froebelian but still exploring why and wondering "will I always be one?". (shrink)

In their target article, “Proposed Principles for International Bioethics Conferencing: Anti-Discriminatory, Global, and Inclusive,” Jecker et al. (2024) highlight the growing international scope o...

The book examines what advocates of the law of karma mean by the doctrine, various ways they interpret it, and how they see it operating. The study investigates and critically evaluates the law of karma's connections to significant philosophical concepts like causation, freedom, God, persons, the moral law, liberation, and immortality. For example, it explores in depth the implications of the doctrine for whether we are free or fatalistically determined, whether human suffering can be reconciled with cosmic justice, the nature (...) of the self, and the character of moral experience. (shrink)

(1998). Constitutional conscience: Criminal justice and public interest ethics. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 33-41. doi: 10.1080/0731129X.1998.9992056.

Over the course of his work, Graham Oppy developed numerous important criticisms of versions of the cosmological argument. Here I am not concerned with his specific criticisms of cosmological arguments but rather with his claim that cosmological arguments per se are not good arguments, for they provide no persuasive reason for believing the conclusion that God exists and are embedded in theories that already affirm the conclusion. I explore what he believes makes an argument good, contend that cosmological arguments can (...) have functions within worldviews other than persuasion, and consider his recent modifications of the discussion that address competing worldviews. (shrink)

The version uploaded to this site is a late draft. The paper arises both from William L. Rowe's classic 1979 discussion of the problem of evil, argues that there exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse, and also from Steven Wykstra's response, in the course of which he argues for the following Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA): "On the basis (...) of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim 'It appears that p' only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different in some way discernible by her." My paper discusses CORNEA, and proposes a replacement principle. (shrink)

Locates in Schelling a new understanding of our relation to nature in philosophy.

Why do states who are committed to the principle of civilian immunity and the protection of non-combatants end up killing and injuring large numbers of civilians during their military operations? Bugsplat explains this paradox through an in-depth examination of five conflicts fought by Western powers since 1989.

« Ce guide offre aux étudiants en formation initiale à l'enseignement, au personnel enseignant en poste, à leurs formateurs et aux directions d'établissement scolaire les ressources nécessaires pour se frayer un chemin à travers les cadres éthiques et légaux complexes qui réglementent le quotidien de la pratique enseignante. ».

One of America's foremost philosophers reflects on the discipline and its relation to everyday life.

Offers a compelling vision of how to achieve and conduct a liberal but democratic society through the ideal of Neutrality--between people and ideas of the good--and using the tool of Neutral dialogue.

The second edition of The Great Psychotherapy Debate has been updated and revised to include a history of healing practices, medicine, and psychotherapy, an expanded theoretical presentation of the contextual model, an examination of therapist effects, and a thorough review of the research on common factors such as the alliance, expectations, and empathy.

"When Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his seminal work Democracy in America (1835), he regarded democracy as the future of the West. Subsequent events, from the collapse of communism to the recent popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, seem to confirm his prescience. But a closer look at the history of democracy from the 1830s down to the present reveals a far more complicated picture. In fact, author Chilton Williamson Jr. concludes, the future appears rather unpromising for (...) democratic institutions around the world. After Tocqueville traces that history and examines that future. Williamson shows that in Europe democracy has tended toward socialism, in America toward nationalism. Indeed, the definitions and concepts of "democracy" have become so varied that the very term democracy is in effect meaningless--something upon which people have never been able to agree, and never will"--. (shrink)

The paper has two related aims. One is to outline a proposal for a spatially motivated model of discourse, called Discourse Space Theory. The other is to use this framework to explore, in a relatively formalised way, the spatial basis of the conceptual complexities arising in the uses of the English progressive verb form. The theory utilises an abstract space in three dimensions. Verb stems are associated with Aktionsart schemas; aspectual forms like the progressive are viewed as operations on these (...) schemas. The proposal is that geometric concepts, specifically coordinate systems and vectors, can provide a motivated formalism for investigating conceptual structures generated by a human discourse processor. (shrink)

A survey of moral theology from its biblical origins to the eve of the Reformation, demonstrating that Reformed moral sensibilities were received and developed from the greater church tradition.

Volume 1: A-B -- Volume 2: C-E -- Volume 3: F-I -- Volume 4: J-O -- Volume 5: P-R -- Volume 6: S-X.

In Philosophy as Frustration: Happiness Found and Feigned from Greek Antiquity to Present Bruce Silver argues that traditional philosophical views of happiness, as well as recent psychological theories of happiness, are at odds with themselves and with important accounts of a truly happy life.

Foreword -- 1. The War Within -- 2. The Cult of Experience -- 3. The Long March -- 4. America's Transformers -- 5. American Restoration -- 6. Twenty-twenty Vision -- Acknowledgments.