The COVID-19 pandemic has led a number of countries to introduce restrictive ‘lockdown’ policies on their citizens in order to control infection spread. Immunity passports have been proposed as a way of easing the harms of such policies, and could be used in conjunction with other strategies for infection control. These passports would permit those who test positive for COVID-19 antibodies to return to some of their normal behaviours, such as travelling more freely and returning to work. The introduction of (...) immunity passports raises a number of practical and ethical challenges. In this paper, we seek to review the challenges relating to various practical considerations, fairness issues, the risk to social cooperation and the impact on people’s civil liberties. We make tentative recommendations for the ethical introduction of immunity passports. (shrink)

With evidence of vaccine hesitancy in several jurisdictions, the option of making COVID-19 vaccination mandatory requires consideration. In this paper I argue that it would be ethical to make the COVID-19 vaccination mandatory for older people who are at highest risk of severe disease, but if this were to occur, and while there is limited knowledge of the disease and vaccines, there are not likely to be sufficient grounds to mandate vaccination for those at lower risk. Mandating vaccination for those (...) at high risk of severe disease is justified on the basis of the harm principle, as there is evidence that this would remove the grave public health threat of COVID-19. The risk–benefit profile of vaccination is also more clearly in the interests of those at highest risk, so mandatory vaccination entails a less severe cost to them. Therefore, a selective mandate would create fairness in the distribution of risks. The level of coercion imposed by a mandate would need to be proportionate, and it is likely that multiple approaches will be needed to increase vaccine uptake. However, a selective mandate for COVID-19 vaccines is likely to be an ethical choice and should be considered by policy-makers. (shrink)

Liberty-restricting measures have been implemented for centuries to limit the spread of infectious diseases. This article considers if and when it may be ethically acceptable to impose selective liberty-restricting measures in order to reduce the negative impacts of a pandemic by preventing particularly vulnerable groups of the community from contracting the disease. We argue that the commonly accepted explanation—that liberty restrictions may be justified to prevent harm to others when this is the least restrictive option—fails to adequately accommodate the complexity (...) of the issue or the difficult choices that must be made, as illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic. We introduce a dualist consequentialist approach, weighing utility at both a population and individual level, which may provide a better framework for considering the justification for liberty restrictions. While liberty-restricting measures may be justified on the basis of significant benefits to the population and small costs for overall utility to individuals, the question of whether it is acceptable to discriminate should be considered separately. This is because the consequentialist approach does not adequately account for the value of equality. This value may be protected through the application of an additional proportionality test. An algorithm for making decisions is proposed. Ultimately whether selective liberty-restricting measures are imposed will depend on a range of factors, including how widespread infection is in the community, the level of risk and harm a society is willing to accept, and the efficacy and cost of other mitigation options. (shrink)

Sometimes, offering someone beneficial care is likely to thwart the similar or more serious medical needs of more people. For example, when acute shortage is strongly predicted to persist, providing the long period on scarce intensive care that a certain COVID‐19 patient needs is sometimes projected to block several future COVID‐19 patients from receiving the shorter periods on intensive care that they will need. Expected utility is typically higher if the former is denied intensive care. A tempting initial account of (...) such cases is that consequentialism supports denying care to that patient and nonconsequentialism supports providing that care. This paper argues that the consequentialist case is more complicated than it may initially seem and that nonconsequentialism sides more readily with denial of the beneficial treatment. It also shows that when denying it would directly enhance public health by a lot, either ethical approach would normally recommend denying it. Practical implications are discussed, including how to address conscientious objection to this shared recommendation. (shrink)

The rapid development and roll-out of COVID-19 vaccines has been a surprising success of the pandemic and has likely saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Although most people were eager to receive a vaccine, many jurisdictions introduced mandates to ensure rapid uptake in the population, especially among key workers including healthcare workers. In some instances, individuals who can prove they have recovered from COVID-19 have been exempt from vaccine mandates, but in other cases such exemptions have not been made. Pugh (...) et al argue that such exemptions for those already immune ought to be included in COVID-19 vaccine mandates.1 They review the evidence on infection-induced and vaccine-induced immunity and show that that there is not evidence that vaccines offer better protection against severe COVID-19 or of SARS-CoV-2 infection. They argue that to treat people differently based on the source of their COVID-19 immunity is wrongful discrimination, with this discrimination bringing harms in the form of unjust restriction of liberty and negative consequences such as lost employment. I agree with Pugh et al ’s view that, given the available evidence, infection-induced immunity to SARS-CoV-2 ought to be treated as equivalent to vaccine-induced immunity for the purposes of most COVID-19 vaccine mandates. However, their article highlights the need for clarity in the rationale for mandates. This clarity is necessary to be able to identify when exemptions are appropriate. It may be the case that in some instances infection-induced immunity ought not to be grounds for exemption. Pugh et al ’s argument also suggests that collection of data on infection-induced immunity may be a requirement for ethical vaccine mandates. To be confident in such exemptions, we need evidence that infection-induced immunity is comparable to vaccine-induced immunity in the …. (shrink)