Uniform sequential continuity, a property classically equivalent to sequential continuity on compact sets, is shown, constructively, to be a consequence of strong continuity on a metric space. It is then shown that in the case of a separable metric space, uniform sequential continuity implies strong continuity if and only if one adopts a certain boundedness principle that, although valid in the classical, recursive and intuitionistic setting, is independent of Heyting arithmetic.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction I II.

In the informal setting of Bishop-style constructive reverse mathematics we discuss the connection between the antithesis of Specker’s theorem, Ishihara’s principle BD-N, and various types of equicontinuity. In particular, we prove that the implication from pointwise equicontinuity to uniform sequential equicontinuity is equivalent to the antithesis of Specker’s theorem; and that, for a family of functions on a separable metric space, the implication from uniform sequential equicontinuity to uniform equicontinuity is equivalent to BD-N.

This international collection forms a response from 22 educators to our changing political environment and to the reassessment they provoke of the principles shaping educational thought and practice. The philosophical discussion, however, remains clearly rooted in the world of educational practice and its political content.

This paper notes the critical response that the ‘competence movement’ has received from writers in philosophy of education and argues for a more positive assessment of what it offers in relation to: (i) the place of practical competence in a liberal education, (ii) the meritocratic principles underlying the competence movement, (iii) the ‘transparency’ of expectations in assessment, and even (iv) the element of practical competence in moral performance. It emphasises, however, that not all versions of ‘competence’ can be defended (...) in these terms and that this requires a more generic and cognitively laden concept of personal and professional competence. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal (...) by narrowly constructed counterexamples, but I argue that the current result is more robust. It affects a broad family of accounts, and provokes a wider doubt about the possibility of successful execution of the naturalistic project. (shrink)

We examine, from a constructive perspective, the relation between the complements of S, T, and S ∩ T in X, where X is either a metric space or a normed linear space. The fundamental question addressed is: If x is distinct from each element of S ∩ T, if s ϵ S, and if t ϵ T, is x distinct from s or from t? Although the classical answer to this question is trivially affirmative, constructive answers involve Markov's principle and (...) the completeness of metric spaces. (shrink)

It is shown, within constructive mathematics, that the unit ball B1 of the set of bounded operators on a Hilbert space H is weak-operator totally bounded. This result is then used to prove that the weak-operator continuity of the mapping T → AT on B1 is equivalent to the existence of the adjoint of A.

It is proved, within Bishop's constructive mathematics , that, in the context of a Hilbert space, the Open Mapping Theorem is equivalent to a principle that holds in intuitionistic mathematics and recursive constructive mathematics but is unlikely to be provable within BISH.

It is well known that in Bishop-style constructive mathematics, the closure of the union of two subsets of ℝ is ‘not’ the union of their closures. The dual situation, involving the complement of the closure of the union, is investigated constructively, using completeness of the ambient space in order to avoid any application of Markov's Principle.

There is growing evidence that mutations can arise in non‐dividing cells (both bacterial and mammalian) in the absence of chromosomal replication. The processes that are involved are still largely unknown but may include two separate mechanisms. In the first, DNA lesions resulting from the action of endogenous mutagens may give rise to RNA transcripts with miscoded bases. If these confer the ability to initiate DNA replication, the DNA lesions may have an opportunity to miscode during replication and thus could give (...) rise to apparently ‘adaptive’ mutations. A second mechanism is suggested by recent work in starved bacteria, showing that there is much more turnover of chromosomal DNA than has been previously thought. This could permit polymerase errors to lead to mutations in non‐dividing cells. Such cryptic DNA synthesis, which may essentially replace existing DNA rather than duplicating it, could, in principle, act as an additional source of variability on which selection may act, initially in the absence of cell division. In mammals such processes would undoubtedly have implications for germ cell mutagenesis and carcinogenesis. (shrink)

It is shown that in any model of constructive mathematics in which a certain omniscience principle is false, for strongly extensional functions on an interval the distinction between sequentially continuous and regulated disappears. It follows, without the use of Markov's Principle, that any recursive function of bounded variation on a bounded closed interval is recursively sequentially continuous.

The anti-Specker property, a constructive version of sequential compactness, is used to prove constructively that a pointwise continuous, order-dense preference relation on a compact metric space is uniformly sequentially continuous. It is then shown that Ishihara's principle BD-ℕ implies that a uniformly sequentially continuous, order-dense preference relation on a separable metric space is uniformly continuous. Converses of these two theorems are also proved.

The central question addressed in this paper is about the ethics of engaging with educational development in countries perceived as undemocratic or as failing to respect human rights. More particularly, it examines the nature of the arguments that are brought to bear on this issue. It suggests that these are essentially consequentialist in character and hence fall prey to many of the limitations of such consequentialism, including the unpredictability of what will unfold, the indeterminacy of the consequences and the complex (...) balance sheet of benefits and loss that might be anticipated. The paper also suggests some unease about the way judgements of the acceptability or otherwise of political processes are made across international boundaries and the presumptions of a ‘democratic’ western perspective. The observation of these complexities of principle and fact take the argument into the territory of case-based ethical judgement and the world of casuistry. (shrink)

The notions of permutable and weak-permutable convergence of a series|$\sum _{n=1}^{\infty }a_{n}$|of real numbers are introduced. Classically, these two notions are equivalent, and, by Riemann’s two main theorems on the convergence of series, a convergent series is permutably convergent if and only if it is absolutely convergent. Working within Bishop-style constructive mathematics, we prove that Ishihara’s principle BD-|$\mathbb {N}$|implies that every permutably convergent series is absolutely convergent. Since there are models of constructive mathematics in which the Riemann permutation theorem for (...) series holds but BD-|$\mathbb{N}$|does not, the best we can hope for as a partial converse to our first theorem is that the absolute convergence of series with a permutability property classically equivalent to that of Riemann implies BD-|$\mathbb {N}$|. We show that this is the case when the property is weak-permutable convergence. (shrink)

It is shown that, relative to Bishop-style constructive mathematics, the boundedness principle BD-N is equivalent both to a general result about the convergence of double sequences and to a particular one about Cauchyness in a semi-metric space.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:92 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY is a great deal to blame for the wrongheaded views that got about in the ancient world concerning this gifted Alexandrian thinker; and in the whole business there is more than a hint of clash between Eastern and Western temperament. When, in dealing with modern critics of Origen, he roundly castigates the scholarly ghettoism that goes on, one is in complete sympathy. Kerr for instance (...) gets scolded for not quoting De Lubac. Lutheran scholars and Catholic, Germans perhaps and French, will tend to approach Origen with preformed conclusions. They have too often written within an exceedingly limited scholarly tradition. Fair enough. People have not any excuse for ignoring one another's contributions. Evidences of this sort of thing, with conspicuous faults on both sides (Lutheran and Catholic, that is) are not far to seek, God knows. One is not so happy however when the faint suggestion is made, particularly in the appendix, that it is only to students with the proper dispositions that Origen will yield up his message. That one must believe with Origen, so to speak. It may be the enthusiasm of the moment, or the undue influence of Origen's own attitude to holy writ; but this could be a disastrous line of argument. It comes perilously near to the reasons Julian the Apostate gave for excluding Christians from the Hellenist schools. And it smacks too much of Hellenistic ideas about doctrine for the multitude and for the initiate. Incidentally Crouzel argues that Origen, contrary to the accepted beliefs about him, was singularly free of this sort of thing. Some of his supposedly esoteric doctrines are found in the most popular of his compositions, and vice versa. In all it is a book calculated to set students of Origen thinking, and searching. DENIS MEEIIAN Valyermo Priory Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection. Edited and translated by Allan Wolter, O.F.M. (The Nelson Philosophical Texts; Edinburgh: Nelson, 1962. Pp. xxiii + 198. Latin text and translation, 162 parallel pages. SOs., $6.50.) Minor, sometimes indirect, causes have kept the name of John Duns Scotus in the minds of many philosophers of the twentieth century. The dependence of Gerard Manly Hopkins' notion of inscape on Duns Scotus' doctrine on intuitive cognition and individuation is a case in point. Another and more direct instance is that of the concurrence of some modern theories on free will with the exposition of Scotus. Those whose interest in Duns Scotus has been piqued by some allusion invariably ask the question, where can one get something in English by the man? The answer still is, the man has had quite a few expositors but not many translators. The latest of such expositions is Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, B. Bonansea's translation of an Italian work by E. Bettoni. The only complete work of Duns Scotus in English translation is his small opus presenting a demonstration of the existence of God: The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus, (St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: 1949), translated by Evan Roche, O.F.M. Allan Wolter is presently engaged in producing a new translation with more extensive notes, since the original translation is out of print. A small selection from Scotus' Oxford Commentary is contained in Richard McKeon's Selections from Medieval Philosophers, Vol. II. The reason for the scarcity of translations has been the lack of a definitive edition of BOOK REVIEWS 93 Scotus's works. No one wanted to undertake an extensive translation from insufficiently edited texts, especially when a definitive text was thought to be imminent. A commission was appointed thirty-six years ago to do for John Duns Scotus what had been done so magnificently for his Franciscan predecessor, St. Bonaventure. The first definitive edition of the opera ornnia of a Scholastic in the period of Scholastic revival was published by Franciscan scholars at Quaracchi near Florence: the Opera Ornnia Sancti Bonaventurae (1882-1901) in nine volumes. The same scholars, under the leadership of E. Longpr~, O.F.M., turned their attention to the works of Scotus. The problems facing the commission were admittedly much greater. Manuscripts had to be gathered, authenticated, compared. Work went slowly... (shrink)

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between (...) logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, theknowledge normand thetruth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative. (shrink)

The Bridge Principle states that one shouldn’t assert a sentence that is indeterminate relative to possibilities that are still live options. This principle serves as a bridge between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. I argue that, given the phenomenon of vagueness, the bridge principle cannot be true as formulated. An alternative formulation of the Bridge Principle is offered.

Is logic normative for belief? A standard approach to answering this question has been to investigate bridge principles relating claims of logical consequence to norms for belief. Although the question is naturally an epistemic one, bridge principles have typically been investigated in isolation from epistemic debates over the correct norms for belief. In this paper we tackle the question of whether logic is normative for belief by proposing a Kripkean model theory accounting for the interaction between (...) logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions and using this model theory to show which bridge principles are implied by epistemic norms that we have independent reason to accept, for example, the knowledge norm and the truth norm. We propose a preliminary theory of the interaction between logical, doxastic, epistemic and deontic notions that has among its commitments bridge principles expressing how logic is normative for belief. We also show how our framework suggests that logic is exceptionally normative. (shrink)

In this essay, I call attention to Kant’s and Whewell’s attempt to provide bridging principles between a priori principles and scientific laws. Part of Kant’s aim in the Opus postumum (ca. 1796-1803) was precisely to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of natural science (on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) see section 1) and physics by establishing intermediary concepts or ‘Mittelbegriffe’ (henceforth this problem is referred to as ‘the bridging-problem’). I argue that the late-Kant (...) attempted to show that the concept of ‘moving force’, an intermediary concept derived from a priori principles, could be given empirical content so that concrete scientific knowledge is arrived at. Thus, the late-Kant wished not only to show that proper scientific laws are necessary a priori (as he had shown in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) but also that intermediary concepts could be derived from a priori principles which, when interpreted empirically, resulted in the specific forces as established by physics (see section 2). Of course, William Whewell never knew about Kant’s Opus postumum and his attempt to bridge the gap between the metaphysical foundations of science and physics. However, it is striking that Whewell had similar concerns about the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as Kant himself. According to Whewell, the Kantian project was incomplete because it did not show how ‘modifications’ (in the sense of concretizations) of a priori principles could result in empirical laws (section 3). Next, it will be argued, by taking into account several of Whewell’s philosophical notebooks which have scarcely been studied systematically, that Whewell’s doctrine of Fundamental Ideas grew out of his dissatisfaction with the Kantian project with respect to the bridging problem and that his own philosophical position should be seen as an attempt to bypass the bridging-problem. (shrink)

Logic appears to be normative for rational belief. The thesis of the normativity of logic holds that indeed logic has such a normative status. Gilbert Harman has questioned it, thereby giving rise to what has been called “Harman's skeptical challenge”. MacFarlane has clarified that in order to answer this challenge and support the normativity of logic, one needs a “bridge principle” that appropriately connects logical entailments and norms for belief, as well as relevant desiderata for the evaluation of candidate (...) bridge principles. Steinberger has identified a list of desiderata, on the basis of which he has proposed his own bridge principle and shown the inadequacy of previous proposals. This paper argues that Steinberger's list is in need of revision and his principle is unsatisfactory, and then puts forward a revised list of desiderata and a new bridge principle in support of the normativity of logic. (shrink)

Recent attempts to develop and apply digital ethics principles to address the challenges of the digital transformation leave organisations with an operationalisation gap. To successfully implement such guidance, they must find ways to translate high-level ethics frameworks into practical methods and tools that match their specific workflows and needs. Here, we describe the development of a standardised risk assessment tool, the Principle-at-Risk Analysis (PaRA), as a means to close this operationalisation gap for a key level of the ethics infrastructure (...) at many organisations – the work of an interdisciplinary ethics panel. The PaRA tool serves to guide and harmonise the work of the Digital Ethics Advisory Panel at the multinational science and technology company Merck KGaA in alignment with the principles outlined in the company’s Code of Digital Ethics. We examine how such a tool can be used as part of a multifaceted approach to operationalise high-level principles at an organisational level and provide general requirements for its implementation. We showcase its application in an example case dealing with the comprehensibility of consent forms in a data-sharing context at Syntropy, a collaborative technology platform for clinical research. (shrink)

John Searle’s argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called "counts-as" relation, found in the expression "X counts as Y in (context) C," provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the "counts as" relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.

One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure, there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other words, with respect (...) to cases of disagreement under full disclosure, I will argue that there is a necessary connection between interpersonal permissiveness and its intrapersonal counterpart. Specifically, I claim that a plausible principle of correct argumentation supports such a bridge. (shrink)

How should we understand validity? A standard way to characterize validity is in terms of the preservation of truth (or truth in a model). But there are several problems facing such characterizations. An alternative approach is to characterize validity epistemically, for instance in terms of the preservation of an epistemic status. In this paper, I raise a problem for such views. First, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is factive, such as being in a position to know or (...) having conclusive evidence for, then the account runs into trouble if we endorse certain familiar logical principles. Second, I argue that if the relevant epistemic status is non-factive, such as is rationally committed to or has justification for believing, then a similar problem arises if we endorse the logical principles as well as a sufficiently strong epistemic “level-bridging” principle. Finally, I argue that an analogous problem arises for the most natural characterization of validity in terms of rational credence. (shrink)

Fitch’s Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch’s result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any ‘level-bridging principle’ suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the “Moorean contradiction” commonly thought to underlie the result is (...) in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current understanding of Fitch’s result and widens the range of modalities of philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied. Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch’s result which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig. (shrink)

Academic publications of empirical public health research often entail recommendations for moral action that address practitioners and policy makers. These recommendations are regularly based on implicit moral judgments with the underlying reasons not explicitly stated. In this paper, we elaborate on the moral relevance of such judgments and the need to explain them in order to account for academic argumentation. We argue for an explicit reporting of bridge principles to increase the transparency of the reporting of public health (...) research. The reporting of bridge principles can inform readers, support them in understanding the relationship between empirical and normative claims in a specific paper, and may pave new ways for the rigorous reporting of empirical research that has moral implications. Furthermore, it can be used to classify studies to systematically address the justification for their argumentation. (shrink)

Advances in AI research have brought increasingly sophisticated capabilities to AI systems and heightened the societal consequences of their use. Researchers and industry professionals have responded by contemplating responsible principles and practices for AI system design. At the same time, defense institutions are contemplating ethical guidelines and requirements for the development and use of AI for warfare. However, varying ethical and procedural approaches to technological development, research emphasis on offensive uses of AI, and lack of appropriate venues for multistakeholder (...) dialogue have led to differing operationalization of responsible AI principles and practices among civilian and defense entities. We argue that the disconnect between civilian and defense responsible development and use practices leads to underutilization of responsible AI research and hinders the implementation of responsible AI principles in both communities. We propose a research roadmap and recommendations for dialogue to increase exchange of responsible AI development and use practices for AI systems between civilian and defense communities. We argue that generating more opportunities for exchange will stimulate global progress in the implementation of responsible AI principles. (shrink)

This article presents the ethical concept of service as a way of specifying higher ethical principles in business practice. We set out from the work of a number of scholars who have found some shared ethical principles for doing business in a context of cultural diversity. Love, benevolence, consideration, and other related concepts are considered to be important guiding concepts for business but it is not clear how they are to be operationalized. We argue that the ethical concept (...) of service can act as a bridge for bringing those higher principles into business practice. The article explains and refines the ethical concept of service, which has received little attention. In particular, we address the ethical ambiguity implicit in the common meaning of service, explain how service shows love in business, and offer an account of how service provides ethical growth through virtue. Finally, this work presents a variety of examples from business which illustrate how the ethical concept of service can be put into practice. To achieve the aim of this study we draw inspiration from Catholic social teaching. This source provides useful insights into service and can be understood and accepted without requiring that particular faith. (shrink)

The goal of this unique text is to provide an "experience" that would facilitate a better transition for mathematics majors to the advanced proof-based courses required for their major. If you "love mathematics, but I hate proofs" this book is for you. Example-based courses such as introductory Calculus transition somewhat abruptly, and without a warning label, to proof-based courses, and may leave students with the unpleasant feeling that a subject they loved has turned into material they find hard to understand. (...) The book exposes students and readers to the fundamental nature and principles of constructing mathematical proofs and in the context of main courses required for the major, e.g., probability, linear algebra, real analysis, and abstract algebra. Four short chapters, each chapter focusing on a particular course, provide a short but rigorous introduction. Students then get a preview of the discipline, its focus, language, mathematical objects of interests, and common methods of proof presented in those courses. Because which ideas apply to which future courses may not be obvious in many transition courses, this structure addresses this need. The book may also be used as a review tool at the end of course and for readers who want to learn the language and scope of the broad disciplines of linear algebra, abstract algebra, real analysis, and probability, before transitioning to these courses. (shrink)

Despite the increase in the research field of ethics in artificial intelligence, most efforts have focused on the debate about principles and guidelines for responsible AI, but not enough attention has been given to the “how” of applied ethics. This paper aims to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics by identifying how companies are applying those guidelines and principles in practice. Through a qualitative methodology based on 22 semi-structured interviews and (...) two focus groups, the goal of the current study is to understand how companies approach ethical issues related to AI systems. A structured analysis of the transcripts brought out many actual practices and findings, which are presented around the following main research topics: ethics and principles, privacy, explainability, and fairness. The interviewees also raised issues of accountability and governance. Finally, some recommendations are suggested such as developing specific sector regulations, fostering a data-driven organisational culture, considering the algorithm’s complete life cycle, developing and using a specific code of ethics, and providing specific training on ethical issues. Despite some obvious limitations, such as the type and number of companies interviewed, this work identifies real examples and direct priorities to advance the research exploring the gap between practice and principles in AI ethics, with a specific focus on Spanish companies. (shrink)

Efforts to bridge emotion theory with neurobiology can be facilitated by dynamic systems (DS) modeling. DS principles stipulate higher-order wholes emerging from lower-order constituents through bidirectional causal processes cognition relations. I then present a psychological model based on this reconceptualization, identifying trigger, self-amplification, and self-stabilization phases of emotion-appraisal states, leading to consolidating traits. The article goes on to describe neural structures and functions involved in appraisal and emotion, as well as DS mechanisms of integration by which they interact. (...) These mechanisms include nested feedback interactions, global effects of neuromodulation, vertical integration, action-monitoring, and synaptic plasticity, and they are modeled in terms of both functional integration and temporal synchronization. I end by elaborating the psychological model of emotion–appraisal states with reference to neural processes. (shrink)

We reflect on the nature of corporate codes of conduct is this article. Based on John Austin’s speech act theory, four characteristics of a performative concept of corporate codes will be introduced: 1) the existential self-performative of the firm identity, 2) which is demanded by and responsive to their stakeholders; 3) Because corporate codes are structurally threatened by the possibility of failure, 4) embracing the code not only consists in actual corporate responsible behaviour in light of the code, but in (...) the incessant recapturing of the code in the struggle of firms against the possible incongruence between their ethical principles and their actual responsible behaviour. A performative concept of corporate codes helps to bridge classical dichotomies like individualist versus collectivist approaches of moral agency and restrictive versus empowering ethics, and opens a new perspective on the interaction between individual ethical behaviour and the corporate institutionalisation of codes. (shrink)

This paper examines an argument by Schaffer (2017) that aims to prove how, contrary to what many philosophers hold, there is no special explanatory gap occurring in the connection between the physical and the phenomenal. This is because a gap of the same kind can be found in every connection between a more fundamental and a less fundamental level of reality. These gaps lurk everywhere in nature. For Schaffer, they can be bridged by means of substantive metaphysical principles such (...) as grounding principles. He thus puts forward a version of grounding-based physicalism, which is supposed to provide this kind of substantive bridge principle. My main contention is as follows: even if Schaffer’s argument indeed proves the existence of a gap in every connection between fundamental and derivative entities, and such gaps can be bridged by means of grounding principles, a different gap remains open in the psycho-physical connection. (shrink)

Ontological principles are needed in order to bridge the gap between medical and biological information in a robust and computable fashion. This is essential in order to draw inferences across the levels of granularity which span medicine and biology, an example of which include the understanding of the roles of tumor markers in the development and progress of carcinoma. Such information integration is also important for the integration of genomics information with the information contained in the electronic patient (...) records in such a way that real time conclusions can be drawn. In this paper we describe a large multi-granular datasource built by using ontological principles and focusing on the case of colon carcinoma. (shrink)

Recent literature has paid attention to a demarcation problem for evolutionary debunking arguments. This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief justified, or debunk it as unjustified. I examine the so-called ‘Milvian Bridge principle’ A new science of religion, Routledge, New York, 2012; Sloan, McKenny, Eggelson Darwin in the 21st century: nature, humanity, and God, University Press, Notre Dame, 2015)), which offers exactly such a called for regulative metaepistemic (...) norm. The Milvian Bridge principle suggests that the metaepistemic norm is: adaptive reliability for truth of cognitive processes that the existence of corresponding truth-making facts evolutionary theory justifies. I argue that the Milvian Bridge principle is problematic on a number of counts, something that is shown via spiraling ‘companions in guilt arguments’. Finally, I consider ‘the core reductionist objection’ to the critique of the Milvian Bridge principle and offer a response. I conclude that the Milvian Bridge principle is destabilized. (shrink)

With the existing commitments to climate change mitigation, global warming is likely to exceed 2°C and to trigger irreversible and harmful threshold effects. The difference between the reductions necessary to keep the 2°C limit and those reductions countries have currently committed to is called the ‘emissions gap’. I argue that capable states not only have a moral duty to make voluntary contributions to bridge that gap, but that complying states ought to make up for the failures of some other (...) states to comply with this duty. While defecting or doing less than one’s fair share can be a good move in certain circumstances, it would be morally wrong in this situation. In order to bridge the emissions gap, willing states ought to take up the slack left by others. The paper will reject the unfairness-objection, namely that it is wrong to require agents to take on additional costs to discharge duties that are not primarily theirs. Sometimes what is morally right is simply unfair. (shrink)

A common view relating compositional semantics and the objects of assertion holds the following: Sentences φ and ψ expresses the same proposition iff φ and ψ have the same modal profile. Following Dummett, Evans, and Lewis, Stanley argues that this view is fundamentally mistaken. According to Dummett, we must distinguish the semantic contribution a sentence makes to more complex expressions in which it occurs from its assertoric content. Stojnić insists that views which distinguish the roles of content and semantic value (...) must nevertheless ensure a tight connection between the two. But, she contends, there is a crucial disanalogy between the views that follow Lewis and the views that follow Dummett. Stanley’s Dummettian view is argued to contain a fatal flaw: On such views, there is no way to secure an appropriate connection between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content. I will review the background issues from Dummett, Evans, Lewis, and Stanley, and provide a principled way of bridging the gap between semantic value and a theoretically motivated notion of assertoric content. (shrink)

Among Japanese nurses ethics is perceived as being distant and unrelated to their practice, although this is filled with ethical concerns and the making of ethical decisions. The reasons for this dissociation are the primacy of western values in modern Japanese health care systems and the suppression of Japanese nurses’ indigenous ethical values because of domination by western ethics. A hermeneutic study was conducted to listen to the ethical voices of Japanese nurses. Seven ethical concerns were revealed. Although some of (...) these concerns may seem to share similar values with western ethical principles, the basis for the concerns was unique and rooted in the Japanese cultural value system. The meanings of each concern are explicated in conjunction with related background meanings. Listening and trying to understand these nurses’ voices in their own context suggests a way of bridging the gap between abstract and universal ethics and practical and local ethics. (shrink)

“Dialectic” has been a matter of growing interest in contemporary philosophy. The present article analyzes dialectical methods and positions them by reference to two paradigmatic texts of German idealism and analytic philosophy, i.e. J.G. Fichte’s Science of Knowing (1804) and J. McDowell’s Mind and World. Both dialectical approaches will be interpreted with regard to their contribution in the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism: both Fichte and McDowell claim that philosophical positions and logical terms stand in a dualistic relationship to one (...) another, on the one hand, but are separated by a gulf, on the other. I will argue that for McDowell dialectic seems to be an alternative to one-sided reductionisms as well as to normal anti-reductionistic holism. Furthermore, for Fichte dialectic is an adequate method for describing the relationship of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself. Both see in dialectic a technique for bridging the gulf between binary opposite terms of logic as well as mutually exclusive positions, such as mind and world, subject and object, or idealism and realism. (shrink)

The project ‘Te Kore Rongo Hungaora’/‘Uncontainable Second Nature’ is predicated on a bridge between Māori and European cultures. Based on this view, works from art and science were re-contextualized as cultural texts symbolic of belief systems. The project was conceived and curated for exhibitions in Istanbul and Rio de Janeiro. Discipline was not viewed as fixed, but fluid in a transformational environment. Five themes were selected from within European and Māori world-views: cosmological context, all is energy, life emerged from (...) water, anthropic principle and integrated systems. The selected works addressed more than one of these thematic regions. While aspects of thinking might be shared across a cultural boundary, the agreement is only at the level of summary of view, rather than at the level of detail. This distinction is important in moving human thinking forward to an integrated condition particularly where negotiating hybridity is concerned. Certainly knowledge is advanced in a sense, and cultural bridging can be observed in practice at several New Zealand organizations such as the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research, the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences and the Department of Conservation which all employ staff whose position entails observance and care of Māori perspectives on subjects under investigation and study. The connection between the work of Kaumatua (elder) Dr Te Huirangi Waikerepuru and Zoologist Mike Paulin in the exhibitions was semantic rather than computational. Here the function of metaphor in uniting what were previously considered divergent world-views becomes apparent. Myth is often reported as distinctive to a specific culture, however, considering interconnections ignites a more expansive view of culture and consciousness. (shrink)

The current state of the relationship between metaphysics and the philosophy of science might appear to be one best described as ‘hostility on both sides’. In an attempt to bridge this gap, French and McKenzie have suggested a two fold strategy: on the one hand, if metaphysics is to be taken to have something direct to say about reality, the implications of physics need to be properly appreciated; on the other, one does not have to agree with the claim (...) that a prioristic metaphysics should be dismissed or even discontinued, since we should value scientifically disinterested metaphysics as a ‘toolbox’ for philosophers of science. It is in the context of this strategy that I want to approach the issue of understanding the symmetry principles that feature in the Standard Model of modern physics. I shall suggest that the dispositional analysis of laws is incapable of accommodating such principles. However, there are other tools in the metaphysical toolbox that one can draw upon to help capture the nature of such symmetries corresponding to the second part of the above strategy. (shrink)

While Walls to Bridges is a broad and comprehensive work, the actualization of a Global Ethic is concrete-not abstract. Professor Küng's vision into the future, built on the expanding Global Ethic is an inspiring read and a call to action for all. What is similar among the world's religious ideologies? What's next in the evolution of the global ethic? Professor and theologian Hans Küng has devoted much of his life to answering these questions. Küng achieved global notoriety in the 60's (...) when he became the first major Roman Catholic theologian of the 20th century to question the notion of papal infallibility. For this, he was stripped of his license to teach as a Roman Catholic theologian but continued teaching as a tenured professor of Ecumenical Theology at the University of Tübingen, Germany. In the 1990s, Küng initiated a project subsequently referred to as the Movement for a "Global Ethic." After massive world-wide research into past and present ethical principles, he spelled out clearly the foundational ethical principles that the world's religions and ideologies, past and present, de facto held/hold in common, that is: The minimal code of behavior that everyone in fact accepts (e.g., "Do not lie, steal, kill innocent persons....") This English translation of The Global Ethic Handbook is a culmination of the "Movement" Küng began in the 90s. He describes his vision for a Global Ethic and takes the reader through the essential aspects of a Global Ethic, including its social, political, legal, economics, communications, esthetics, and philosophical applications. It even describes his translation of the Global Ethic/Weltethos into musical compositions-indeed, a full-blown opera! (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “A Computational Constructivist Model as an Anticipatory Learning Mechanism for Coupled Agent–Environment Systems” by Filipo Studzinski Perotto. Upshot: Constructivist theory gives a nice high-level account of how knowledge can be autonomously developed by an agent interacting with an environment, but it fails to detail the mechanisms needed to bridge the gap between low levels of sensorimotor data and higher levels of cognition. AI workers are trying to bridge this gap, using task-specific engineering (...) approaches, without any principled theory to guide them; they could use help from psychologists. (shrink)

The present paper surveys the three most prominent accounts in contemporary debates over how sound reduction should be executed. The classical Nagelian model of reduction derives the laws of the target-theory from the laws of the base theory plus some auxiliary premises (so-called bridge laws) connecting the entities of the target and the base theory. The functional model of reduction emphasizes the causal definitions of the target entities referring to their causal relations to base entities. The new-wave model of (...) reduction deduces not the original target theory but an analogous image of it, which remains inside the vocabulary of the base theory. One of the fundamental motivations of both the functional and the new-wave model is to show that bridge laws can be evaded. The present paper argues that bridge laws—in the original Nagelian sense—are inevitable, i.e. that none of these models can evade them. On the one hand, the functional model of reduction needs bridge laws, since its fundamental concept, functionalization, is an inter-theoretical process dealing with entities of two different theories. Theoretical entities of different theories (in a general heterogeneous case) do not have common causal relations, so the functionalization of an entity—without bridge laws—can only be executed in the framework of its own theory. On the other hand, the so-called images of the new-wave account cannot be constructed without the use of bridge laws. These connecting principles are needed to guide the process of deduction within the base theory; without them one would not be able to recognize if the deduced structure was an image of the target theory. (shrink)

The sixth chapter focuses on the evolution of Cartesianism in the last quarter of the seventeenth century in Leiden and Amsterdam, against the background of the emergence of alternative views in natural philosophy capable of replacing it as a dominant paradigm, namely, the experimental philosophy of Robert Boyle and the mathematical-experimental approach of Huygens and Newton. The last evolution of Cartesianism is reconstructed in this chapter by considering the ‘Cartesian empiricism’ of Burchard de Volder, and the reflections on the language (...) of philosophy and practical disciplines by De Raey in Amsterdam, where he moved in 1669. In 1675 De Volder established the Leiden Theatrum physicum. There he performed experiments in order to teach the principles of a mechanical philosophy largely inspired by Descartes but open to the use of experimental and mathematical evidences in the formulation of natural laws. A similar approach was in fact assumed in the same years by Wolferd Senguerd, who used the Theatrum to perform experiments in pneumatics to teach some of the principles of his eclectic worldview, encompassing some Cartesian principles (such as that of the circularity of movement), but also rejecting the vortex theory. Yet, only De Volder developed a foundational theory for the basic principles of mechanicism, namely, the assumption that every phenomenon can be explained by the notions of matter and movement alone. This was the result of a movement internal to Cartesianism, as De Volder not only reacted (positively) to the emergence of an experimental-mathematical natural philosophy, but was also involved in the defence of Cartesianism against the Censura philosophiae cartesianae of PierreDaniel Huet (1689), in which Descartes’s metaphysics is rejected as inconsistent given its very foundation on doubt and cogito. The intermingling of these different issues resulted, in De Volder’s hands, in a further de-metaphysicisation of physics – as metaphysics cannot provide a justification for the laws of motion – and in the narrowing of the scope of foundationalism, which can only sanction the psychological character of clarity and distinction as a criterion for internal truth, defined in terms of indubitability only. Accordingly, for De Volder metaphysics cannot demonstrate, on a Cartesian basis, that phenomena are actually ruled by the principles of mechanism: insofar as, for him, metaphysics has a prominent reflective role, and loses its status as justification of the absolute truth of scientific statements. This process can be labelled as the transition from foundationalism to philosophy of science and does not characterise only his ‘Cartesian empiricism’. In Amsterdam, De Raey was, over the same years, developing his Cogitata de interpretatione (1692), embodying one of the first, self-standing philosophical considerations of language. Still maintaining his separation thesis, and attacking Hobbes and the radical Cartesians, in this text he aimed to clarify how words meaning sensory data and abstract notions (such as those of mathematics) can be used in philosophy. Rather than setting a method for how to use mental faculties, De Raey aimed, at the end of his career, to provide an updating of the linguistic meanings of scientific vocabulary, namely, a reflection rather than a justification of science. (shrink)

The computational program for theoretical neuroscience initiated by Marr and Poggio (1977) calls for a study of biological information processing on several distinct levels of abstraction. At each of these levels — computational (defining the problems and considering possible solutions), algorithmic (specifying the sequence of operations leading to a solution) and implementational — significant progress has been made in the understanding of cognition. In the past three decades, computational principles have been discovered that are common to a wide range (...) of functions in perception (vision, hearing, olfaction) and action (motor control). More recently, these principles have been applied to the analysis of cognitive tasks that require dealing with structured information, such as visual scene understanding and analogical reasoning. Insofar as language relies on cognition-general principles and mechanisms, it should be possible to capitalize on the recent advances in the computational study of cognition by extending its methods to linguistics. (shrink)