In recent years the formerly quite strong interest in patient compliance has been questioned for being too paternalistic and oriented towards overly narrow biomedical goals as the basis for treatment recommendations. In line with this there has been a shift towards using the notion of adherence to signal an increased weight for patients’ preferences and autonomy in decision making around treatments. This ‘adherence-paradigm’ thus encompasses shared decision-making as an ideal and patient perspective and autonomy as guiding goals of care. What (...) this implies in terms of the importance that we have reason to attach to (non-)adherence and how has, however, not been explained. In this article, we explore the relationship between different forms of shared decision-making, patient autonomy and adherence. Distinguishing between dynamically and statically framed adherence we show how the version of shared decision-making advocated will have consequences for whether one should be interested in a dynamically or statically framed adherence and in what way patient adherence should be assessed. In contrast to the former compliance paradigm (where non-compliance was necessarily seen as a problem), using observations about (non-)adherence to assess the success of health care decision making and professional-patient interaction turns out to be a much less straightforward matter. (shrink)
The first-order theory of the lattice of recursively enumerable closed subsets of an effective topological space is proved undecidable using the undecidability of the first-order theory of the lattice of recursively enumerable sets. In particular, the first-order theory of the lattice of recursively enumerable closed subsets of Euclidean n -space, for all n , is undecidable. A more direct proof of the undecidability of the lattice of recursively enumerable closed subsets of Euclidean n -space, n ⩾ 2, is provided using (...) the method of reduction and the recursive inseparability of the set of all formulae satisfiable in every model of the theory of SIBs and the set of all formulae refutable in some finite model of the theory of SIBs. (shrink)
On 18–19 May 2018, a symposium was held in the Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies at the University of Aberdeen to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the death of Ronald W. Hepburn (1927–2008). The speakers at this event discussed Hepburn’s oeuvre from several perspectives. For this book, the collection of the revised versions of their talks has been supplemented by the papers of other scholars who were unable to attend the symposium itself. Thus this volume contains contributions from (...) eighteen notable scholars of different disciplines, ranging from contemporary aesthetics and art theory through to philosophical approaches to religion, education and social anthropology. It also includes a bibliography of Hepburn’s writings. The essays were first published in two special issues of the Journal of Scottish Thought, vols. 10–11 (2018–2019). -/- Ronald William Hepburn was born in Aberdeen on 16 March 1927. He went to Aberdeen Grammar School, then he graduated with an M.A. in Philosophy (1951) and obtained his doctorate from the University of Aberdeen (1955). His tutor at Aberdeen was Donald MacKinnon (1913– 1994), a Scottish philosopher and theologian, the author of A Study in Ethical Theory (1957) and The Problem of Metaphysics (1974). Hepburn taught as Lecturer at the Department of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen (1956–60), and he was also Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy at New York University (1959–60). He returned from the United States as Professor of Philosophy at Nottingham University. In 1964, he was appointed as a Chair in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and between 1965 and 1968 he was also Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Cambridge. From 1975 until his retirement in 1996, he held the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. He died in Edinburgh on 23 December 2008. His philosophical interests ranged from theology and the philosophy of religion through moral philosophy and the philosophy of education to art theory and aesthetics. Notably, Hepburn is widely regarded as the founder of modern environmental and everyday aesthetics as a result of the influence of papers in the 1960s which pioneered a new approach to the aesthetics of the natural world. (shrink)
Whether attempts should be punished as severely as the completed crime poses fundamental problems concerning the proper goals of the criminal law and the philosophy of punishment. An answer to this question would require an assessment of the significance of the fact that harm occurs as a result of conduct. Does the occurrence of harm give us any reason for distinguishing between completed offenses and attempts? Contemporary theory is almost united in the view that the occurrence of harm does not (...) mark a moral distinction. Yet, there does seem to be a common intuition that a person is somehow more blameworthy if his conduct results in harm than if it does not. This distinction in gravity between attempts and the completed crime is also recognized in the law; most United States’ jurisdictions provide a lesser punishment for attempts. (shrink)
The logic E4 is related to Brady’s BN4 in a similar way to which Anderson and Belnap’s logic of entailment E is related to their logic of the relevant implication R. In ‘A companion to Brady’s 4-valued relevant logic: the 4-valued logic of entailment E4’, quoted in this paper, three alternatives to BN4 and another three to E4 are summarily introduced in a couple of pages as the only alternatives containing Routley and Meyer’s basic logic B, provided some conditions are (...) fulfilled. The aim of this note is to prove BN4 and its three alternatives are the same logic up to some point, since they are functionally equivalent to each other, as it is the case with E4 and its three alternatives, which are also functionally equivalent to each other; to some extent, E4 is superior to BN4, since the latter is functionally included in the former, but not conversely. (shrink)
This paper surveys the various forms of Deduction Theorem for a broad range of relevant logics. The logics range from the basic system B of Routley-Meyer through to the system R of relevant implication, and the forms of Deduction Theorem are characterized by the various formula representations of rules that are either unrestricted or restricted in certain ways. The formula representations cover the iterated form,A 1 .A 2 . ... .A n B, the conjunctive form,A 1&A 2 & ...A n (...) B, the combined conjunctive and iterated form, enthymematic version of these three forms, and the classical implicational form,A 1&A 2& ...A n B. The concept of general enthymeme is introduced and the Deduction Theorem is shown to apply for rules essentially derived using Modus Ponens and Adjunction only, with logics containing either (A B)&(B C) .A C orA B .B C .A C. (shrink)
We provide a semantics for relevant logics with addition of Aristotle's Thesis, ∼(A→∼A) and also Boethius,(A→B)→∼(A→∼B). We adopt the Routley-Meyer affixing style of semantics but include in the model structures a regulatory structure for all interpretations of formulae, with a view to obtaining a lessad hoc semantics than those previously given for such logics. Soundness and completeness are proved, and in the completeness proof, a new corollary to the Priming Lemma is introduced (c.f.Relevant Logics and their Rivals I, Ridgeview, 1982).
We present an algebraic-style of semantics, which we call a content semantics, for quantified relevant logics based on the weak system BBQ. We show soundness and completeness for all quantificational logics extending BBQ and also treat reduced modelling for all systems containing BB d Q. The key idea of content semantics is that true entailments AB are represented under interpretation I as content containments, i.e. I(A)I(B) (or, the content of A contains that of B). This is opposed to the truth-functional (...) way which represents true entailments as truth-preservations over all set-ups (or worlds), i.e. (VaK) (if I(A, a) = T then I(B, a)= T). (shrink)
A major question for the relevant logics has been, “Under what conditions is Ackermann's ruleγ from -A ∨B andA to inferB, admissible for one of these logics?” For a large number of logics and theories, the question has led to an affirmative answer to theγ problem itself, so that such an answer has almost come to be expected for relevant logics worth taking seriously. We exhibit here, however, another large and interesting class of logics-roughly, the Boolean extensions of theW — (...) free relevant logics (and, precisely, the well-behaved subsystems of the 4-valued logicBN4) — for which γ fails. (shrink)
This volume contains thirty-one papers grouped under the following headings: "The Nature of Philosophy," "Man and Knowledge," "God and Religious Knowledge," "Ethics," "Law," and "Texts." A few of the papers discuss the Augustinian tradition. Munoz-Alonso, Blondel, and Sciacca are mentioned as men who have renewed for our time the thought of Augustine. The papers on St. Bonaventure include an analysis by John O. Riedl of some of Bonaventure’s texts on Dionysius the Areopagite, a comparison and contrast by Bernardino Bonansea of (...) the position of Bonaventure and Thomas on the question of creation from eternity, a study by Ewert Cousins of Bonaventure’s dynamic self-diffusive God, and a discussion of his symbolic theology by Leonard Bowman. Scholars will be interested in the report of Ignatius Brady on the Quaracchi edition of Bonaventure’s writings, as well as in the report of James P. Reilly, Jr. on the Leonine Commission’s work on the texts of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)
The logics BN4 and E4 can be considered as the 4-valued logics of the relevant conditional and (relevant) entailment, respectively. The logic BN4 was developed by Brady in 1982 and the logic E4 by Robles and Méndez in 2016. The aim of this paper is to investigate the implicative variants (of both systems) which contain Routley and Meyer’s logic B and endow them with a Belnap-Dunn type bivalent semantics.
Machine generated contents note: 'The sublime'. A short introduction to a long history Timothy M. Costelloe; Part I. Philosophical History of the Sublime: 1. Longinus and the ancient sublime Malcolm Heath; 2...And the beautiful? revisiting Edmund Burke's 'double aesthetics' Rodolphe Gasche; 3. The moral source of the Kantian sublime Melissa Meritt; 4. Imagination and internal sense: the sublime in Shaftesbury, Reid, Addison, and Reynolds Timothy M. Costelloe; 5. The associative sublime: Kames, Gerrard, Alison, and Stewart Rachel Zuckert; 6. The 'prehistory' (...) of the sublime in early modern France: an interdisciplinary perspective a Madeleine Martin; 7. The post-Kantian German sublime Paul Guyer; 8. The postmodern sublime: presentation and its limits David B. Johnson; Part II. Disciplinary and Other Perspectives: 9. The 'subtler sublime': in modern Dutch aesthetics John R. J. Eyck; 10. The first American sublime Chandos Michael Brown; 11. The environmental sublime Emily Brady; 12. Religion and the sublime Andrew Chignell and Matthew C. Halteman; 13. The British romantic sublime Adam Potkay; 14. The sublime and the fine arts Theodore Gracyk; 15. Architecture and the sublime Richard Etlin. (shrink)
As it is well known, in the forties of the past century, Curry proved that in any logic S closed under Modus Ponens, uniform substitution of propositional variables and the Contraction Law, the naïve Comprehension axiom trivializes S in the sense that all propositions are derivable in S plus CA. Not less known is the fact that, ever since Curry published his proof, theses and rules weaker than W have been shown to cause the same effect as W causes. Among (...) these, the Contraction rule or the Modus Ponens axiom, for example, are to be noted. But, moreover, as Brady has proved, even the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom or the Generalized Contraction rule give rise to “Curry’s Paradox” under the same circumstances as W does. In some previous work by us, “weak relevant model structures” are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure MCL built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. We have proved that wr-ms only verify logics with the “depth relevance condition”. The aim of this paper is to show how to falsify gMPa and gRW in certain wr-ms. In particular, it will be shown that gMPa is falisfied in any wr-ms and gRW in any wr-ms verifying Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic B+. (shrink)
In  N. Belnap presented an 8-element matrix for the relevant logic R with the following property: if in an implication A → B the formulas A and B do not have a common variable then there exists a valuation v such that v(A → B) does not belong to the set of designated elements of this matrix. A 6-element matrix of this kind can be found in: R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, V. Plumwood and R.T. Brady . Below we prove (...) that the logics generated by these two matrices are the only maximal extensions of the relevant logic R which have the relevance property: if A → B is provable in such a logic then A and B have a common propositional variable. (shrink)