Up against capacity‐based approaches to animal ethics, Cora Diamond has put the idea of animals as our fellow creatures. The aim of this article is to explore the implications of this concept for our treatment of fish. Fish have traditionally been placed at the borders or even outside of the moral community, although there is growing evidence that they have perceptual and social capacities comparable to animals that are considered morally significant. Given that a fellow creature's approach is not primarily (...) concerned with capacities, fish may pose a challenge: Can fish be seen as our fellow creatures, and if so, on what grounds? In exploring these questions, we defend Diamond against Jeff McMahan's critique of her account and its implications that the fellow creature‐concept is reducible to either capacities or special relationships and leaves no room for argument‐based moral reform. We suggest that moral attention is key to grasping the moral significance of fish and discuss how scientific research can support such attention. In so doing, we demonstrate how Diamond's approach to animal ethics provides a viable alternative to the dominant animal ethics approaches. Finally, we indicate how this approach can be useful for discussions on industrial fish farming. (shrink)

Background As more people are living longer, they become frail and are affected by multi-morbidity, resulting in increased demands from the ambulance service. Being vulnerable, older patients may have reduced decision-making capacity, despite still wanting to be involved in decision-making about their care. Their needs may be complex and difficult to assess, and do not always correspond with ambulance assessment protocols. When needing an ambulance, older patients encounter ambulance clinicians who are under high workloads and primarily consider themselves as emergency (...) medical care providers. This situates them in the struggle between differing expectations, and ethical conflicts may arise. To resolve these, providing ethical care, focussing on interpersonal relationships and using ethical competence is needed. However, it is not known whether ambulance clinicians possess the ethical competence required to provide ethical care. Thus, the aim of this study was to deductively explore their ethical competence when caring for older patients with reduced decision-making ability. Methods A qualitative deductive and exploratory design was used to analyse dyadic interviews with ambulance clinicians. A literature review, defining ethical competence as comprising ethical sensitivity, ethical knowledge, ethical reflection, ethical decision-making, ethical action and ethical behaviour, was used as a structured categorization matrix for the analysis. Results Ambulance clinicians possess ethical competence in terms of their ethical knowledge, highlighting the need for establishing an interpersonal relationship with the older patients. To establish this, they use ethical sensitivity to interpret the patients’ needs. Doing this, they are aware of their ethical behaviour, signifying how they must act respectfully and provide the necessary time for listening and interacting. Conclusions Ambulance clinicians fail to see their gut feeling as a professional ethical competence, which might hinder them from reacting to unethical ways of working. Further, they lack ethical reflection regarding the benefits and disadvantages of paternalism, which reduces their ability to perform ethical decision-making. Moreover, their ethical knowledge is hampered by an ageist approach to older patients, which also has consequences for their ethical action. Finally, ambulance clinicians show deficiencies regarding their ethical reflections, as they reflect merely on their own actions, rather than on their values. (shrink)

Selectionist evolutionary theory has often been faulted for not making novel predictions that are surprising, risky, and correct. I argue that it in fact exhibits the theoretical virtue of predictive capacity in addition to two other virtues: explanatory unification and model fitting. Two case studies show the predictive capacity of selectionist evolutionary theory: parallel evolutionary change in E. coli, and the origin of eukaryotic cells through endosymbiosis.

This article takes its point of departure in a research project studying the psychosocial problems of living with HIV. The project was intended to participate in changing practices dealing with these problems. It became a project including many differently situated and intersecting personal and generalized perspectives. The article researches the development of the HIV project as a contribution to discussions related to Participatory Action Research and Practice Research. In mainstream approaches methodological indications are often presented as rules to follow in (...) order to ensure the quality of the obtained knowledge. But situated historical and societal processes are involved in the effectuation of the HIV project, like they are in any other project. Researching the project heightens the awareness of the necessity of reflecting on situated and historical issues of power and marginalization and on the positions of the researcher in a given field of research. Methodological flexibility may also be necessary in order to encompass different perspectives. Such reflections and strategies are necessary precisely to ensure the development of knowledge and practice alike. (shrink)

We describe our clinical experience in treating patients with Tourette syndrome and other tic disorders using infra-low frequency neurofeedback, often in conjunction with cognitive behavior therapy. Following a narrative description of our approach, we present outcome data for 100 successive cases. Many of the children and adolescents that we have treated since 2005 did not derive sufficient benefit from standard treatment for Tourette syndrome and other tic disorders. In our clinical experience, based on extensive before- and after- testing and symptom (...) tracking, this patient group derived significant additive benefit from complementary neurofeedback treatment. The majority of trainees attained a higher level of functioning and were able to live up to their potential in a way they were not able to prior to neurofeedback treatment. (shrink)

Background:Many frail older persons who die in Swedish nursing homes need assisted bodily care. They must surrender their bodies to the authority of assistant nurses, which may affect their autonomy and dignity of identity. While assistant nurses claim to support older persons’ wishes, older persons claim they have to adapt to assistant nurses' routines. The provider–receiver incongruence revealed here warrants investigation.Aim:To describe the elements of assisted bodily care, as performed in a nursing home.Research design:Data were collected through thirty-nine observations of (...) assisted bodily care, analyzed with qualitative content analysis.Participants and research context:Seventeen older persons and twenty-two assistant nurses from a Swedish nursing home.Ethical considerations:The research was conducted in line with the Declaration of Helsinki, further approved by the regional ethics committee.Findings:Findings show that assisted bodily care consists of assistant nurses’ practical work, performed at a high tempo. Assistant nurses still attempt to adapt this work to the older persons’ wishes for self-determination, taking into account their day-to-day state of health. In spite of time pressure and occasional interruptions, there is room for consideration and affection in assisted bodily care.Discussion:Assistant nurses try to promote older persons’ dignity of identity, but sometimes fail, possibly due to lack of time. They nevertheless seem to know the older persons well enough to adapt the assisted bodily care according to their preferences and to support self-determination. This indicates that openness to older persons’ lifeworlds may be more important than the amount of time available.Conclusion:Nursing home contexts might benefit from adopting a person-centered palliative care perspective, highlighting the value of relationships and shared decision-making. If so, older persons and assisted nurses could agree on practices and goals in assisted bodily care beforehand. Such routines may be time-saving and beneficial to all. (shrink)

Background: Worldwide, older persons lack access to palliative care. In Sweden, many older persons die in nursing homes where care is provided foremost by assistant nurses. Due to a lack of beds, admission is seldom granted until the older persons have complex care needs and are already in a palliative phase when they move in. Objective: To describe assistant nurses’ perspectives of providing care to older persons at the end of life in a nursing home. Research design: Data were collected (...) in semi-structured individual interviews and analyzed with inductive qualitative content analysis. Participants and research context: Seven assistant nurses from a nursing home in Sweden were randomly selected. Ethical consideration: The research was approved by the local ethics committee. Results: Three main categories emerged; “Death a natural part of life”; “The older person’s well-being”; and “Care in the moment of death”; and seven sub-categories. The assistant nurses described themselves as knowing the older persons well enough to provide good end-of-life care. This was achieved by making small-talk while providing daily care. Relying on experience-based knowledge, they strove to provide end-of-life care built upon respect and engagement with the ambition to strengthen older persons’ dignity, for example, by lowering the tempo of care at the end of life, in spite of organizational restrictions. Discussion: The assistant nurses offered attentive end-of-life care, focusing upon bodily care. The existential needs of the older persons were not foregrounded. Conclusion: To develop their work, and to promote an ethical foundation for such care, assistant nurses might need support and education to be able to offer a care more in line with the aims of palliative care. Furthermore, the organization of care needs to promote, not impede, the realization of this development. (shrink)

When Gödel developed his functional interpretation, also known as the Dialectica interpretation, his aim was to prove consistency of first order arithmetic by reducing it to a quantifier-free theory with finite types. Like other functional interpretations Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation gives rise to category theoretic constructions that serve both as new models for logic and semantics and as tools for analysing and understanding various aspects of the Dialectica interpretation itself. Gödel’s Dialectica interpretation gives rise to the Dialectica categories , in: Contemp. (...) Math., vol. 92, Amer. Math. Soc., Providence, RI, 1989, pp. 47–62] and J.M.E. Hyland in [J.M.E. Hyland, Proof theory in the abstract, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 114 43–78, Commemorative Symposium Dedicated to Anne S. Troelstra ]). These categories are symmetric monoidal closed and have finite products and weak coproducts, but they are not Cartesian closed in general. We give an analysis of how to obtain weakly Cartesian closed and Cartesian closed Dialectica categories, and we also reflect on what the analysis might tell us about the Dialectica interpretation. (shrink)

Drawing upon the literature on action research and case-study research, this paper discusses similarities and differences between these two forms of research practice. The paper also highlights some of the criticisms and challenges action researchers face. It suggests ways in which action researchers may enhance the discussability of action research by: (a) increasing the transparency of their research processes, (b) declaring the intellectual frameworks brought into action research projects, (c) discussing transferability of findings, and (d) defining accumulation of results. This (...) may require an extension to scientific discourse. In particular, the paper suggests that action researchers could change the ways in which action research results are reported to increase their reach among a wider audience. (shrink)

For us, narrative care is grounded in pragmatist philosophy and focused on experience. Narrative care is not merely about acknowledging or listening to people's experiences, but draws attention to practical consequences. We conceptualize care itself as an intrinsically narrative endeavour. In this article, we build on Lugones' understanding of playfulness, particularly to her call to remain attentive to a sense of uncertainty, and an openness to surprise. Playfulness cultivates a generative sense of curiosity that relies on a close attentiveness not (...) only to the other, but to who we each are within relational spaces. Generative curiosity is only possible if we remain playful as we engage and think with experiences and if we remain responsive to the other. Through playfulness, we resist dominant narratives and hold open relational spaces that create opportunities of retelling and reliving our experiences. Drawing on our work alongside older adults, as well as people who work in long‐term care, we show the possibilities of playfulness in the co‐composition of stories across time. By intentionally integrating playfulness, narrative care can be seen as an intervention, as well as a human activity, across diverse social contexts, places and times. (shrink)

It is illegitimate to read any ontology about "race" off of biological theory or data. Indeed, the technical meaning of "genetic variation" is fluid, and there is no single theoretical agreed-upon criterion for defining and distinguishing populations (or groups or clusters) given a particular set of genetic variation data. Thus, by analyzing three formal senses of "genetic variation"—diversity, differentiation, and heterozygosity—we argue that the use of biological theory for making epistemic claims about "race" can only seem plausible when it relies (...) on the user’s own assumptions about race; the move from biological measures to claims about “race” inevitably amounts to a pernicious reification. We also excavate assumptions in the history of the technical discourse over the concept of "race" (e.g., Livingstone's and Dobzhansky's 1962 exchange, Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin 1972, as well as contemporary discussions of cladistic "race", and "races" as clusters). We show that claims about the existence (or non-existence) of "race" are underdetermined by biological facts, methods, and theories. Biological theory does not force the concept of "race" upon us; our social discourse, social ontology, and social expectations do. We become prisoners of our abstractions at our own hands, and at our own expense. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes three concepts of "race": bio-genomic cluster/race, biological race, and social race. We map out realism, antirealism, and conventionalism about each of these, in three important historical episodes: Frank Livingstone and Theodosius Dobzhansky in 1962, A.W.F. Edwards' 2003 response to Lewontin (1972), and contemporary discourse. Semantics is especially crucial to the first episode, while normativity is central to the second. Upon inspection, each episode also reveals a variety of commitments to the metaphysics of race. We conclude by interrogating (...) the relevance of these scientific discussions for political positions and a post-racial future. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technological successes, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories. Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, and continue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics, biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabit comparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climate science, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic Information Science (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, help supply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions. Moving from their (...) knowledge-producing representational functions to their interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. -/- This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these views answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the best characterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehension of the core structure of a scientific theory? How are these three views ultimately related? (shrink)

This book addresses nothingness as not only the untangible presence of an emotional, cultural, social, or even political void that is felt on an existential level, but has some solid foundations in reality. The death of a loved one, the social isolation of an individual, or the culture shock one may experience in another country are examples of situations in which an external sense of absence mirrors an internal psychological and philosophical sense of nothingness. Not much has been explicitly written (...) on nothingness in the history of psychology. On the other hand, nothingness seems to be implicitly embedded in many scholars' work. This duality of explicitly and implicitly expressed ideas about nothingness reveals how psychology finds inspiration in philosophy, and vice versa. The book aims to illustrate how the concept of the presence of absence--nothingness--fills a void in contemporary psychological theorizing. (shrink)

A cursory observer of Cree Indians in the small Canadian community we will describe would conclude that they are an “ acculturated “ but “deviant” company of persons. They give the appearance of being acculturated in that there is little in evidence of the distinctive culture they once had. White members of the community see nothing in visible Indian behavior which evokes the image of Charles Russell's noble warrior savages. To the contrary, whites regard Indians as social outcasts and renegades, (...) and base this judgment on that Indian behavior they choose to see. Indians drink to excess, men and women alike; they get in fights and get arrested by the police; they panhandle; and they break all sorts of rules governing the conduct of respectable people in respectable public places. All of this whites abhor, and use to explain Indian authorship of Indians’ social and economic marginality. If they wished to, so the argument goes, Indians could easily better themselves— they merely and simply want in initiative. (shrink)

Compassion is often understood as central to nursing and as important to ensure quality nursing and healthcare. In recent years, there has been a focus on strategies in nursing education to ensure compassionate nurses. However, it is not always clear how the concept of compassion is understood. Theoretical conceptualisations that lie behind various understandings of compassion have consequences for how we approach compassion in nursing education. We present some ways in which compassion is often understood, their philosophical underpinnings and the (...) consequences these understandings can have for nursing education. We argue that it is useful for nursing education to understand compassion as a cognitive emotion and discuss how such an understanding can inform educational approaches to compassion. (shrink)

Map making and, ultimately, _map thinking_ is ubiquitous across literature, cosmology, mathematics, psychology, and genetics. We partition, summarize, organize, and clarify our world via spatialized representations. Our maps and, more generally, our representations seduce and persuade; they build and destroy. They are the ultimate record of empires and of our evolving comprehension of our world. This book is about the promises and perils of map thinking. Maps are purpose-driven abstractions, discarding detail to highlight only particular features of a territory. By (...) preserving certain features at the expense of others, they can be used to reinforce a privileged position. -/- _When Maps Become the World_ shows us how the scientific theories, models, and concepts we use to intervene in the world function as maps, and explores the consequences of this, both good and bad. We increasingly understand the world around us in terms of models, to the extent that we often take the models for reality. Winther explains how in time, our historical representations in science, in cartography, and in our stories about ourselves replace individual memories and become dominant social narratives—they become reality, and they can remake the world. -/- Available on The University of Chicago Press website, etc. (shrink)

Two families of mathematical methods lie at the heart of investigating the hierarchical structure of genetic variation in Homo sapiens: /diversity partitioning/, which assesses genetic variation within and among pre-determined groups, and /clustering analysis/, which simultaneously produces clusters and assigns individuals to these “unsupervised” cluster classifications. While mathematically consistent, these two methodologies are understood by many to ground diametrically opposed claims about the reality of human races. Moreover, modeling results are sensitive to assumptions such as preexisting theoretical commitments to certain (...) linguistic, anthropological, and geographic human groups. Thus, models can be perniciously reified. That is, they can be conflated and confused with the world. This fact belies standard realist and antirealist interpretations of “race,” and supports a pluralist conventionalist interpretation. (shrink)

I analyze the importance of parts in the style of biological theorizing that I call compositional biology. I do this by investigating various aspects, including partitioning frames and explanatory accounts, of the theoretical perspectives that fall under and are guided by compositional biology. I ground this general examination in a comparative analysis of three different disciplines with their associated compositional theoretical perspectives: comparative morphology, functional morphology, and developmental biology. I glean data for this analysis from canonical textbooks and defend the (...) use of such texts for the philosophy of science. I end with a discussion of the importance of recognizing formal and compositional biology as two genuinely different ways of doing biology – the differences arising more from their distinct methodologies than from scientific discipline included or natural domain studied. Ultimately, developing a translation manual between the two styles would be desirable as they currently are, at times, in conflict. (shrink)

A scientific explanatory project, part-whole explanation, and a kind of science, part-whole science are premised on identifying, investigating, and using parts and wholes. In the biological sciences, mechanistic, structuralist, and historical explanations are part-whole explanations. Each expresses different norms, explananda, and aims. Each is associated with a distinct partitioning frame for abstracting kinds of parts. These three explanatory projects can be complemented in order to provide an integrative vision of the whole system, as is shown for a detailed case study: (...) the tetrapod limb. My diagnosis of part-whole explanation in the biological sciences as well as in other domains exploring evolved, complex, and integrated systems (e.g., psychology and cognitive science) cross-cuts standard philosophical categories of explanation: causal explanation and explanation as unification. Part-whole explanation is itself one essential aspect of part-whole science. (shrink)

Scientists use models to understand the natural world, and it is important not to conflate model and nature. As an illustration, we distinguish three different kinds of populations in studies of ecology and evolution: theoretical, laboratory, and natural populations, exemplified by the work of R.A. Fisher, Thomas Park, and David Lack, respectively. Biologists are rightly concerned with all three types of populations. We examine the interplay between these different kinds of populations, and their pertinent models, in three examples: the notion (...) of “effective” population size, the work of Thomas Park on /Tribolium/ populations, and model-based clustering algorithms such as /Structure/. Finally, we discuss ways to move safely between three distinct population types while avoiding confusing models and reality. (shrink)

This article began as a review of a conference, organized by Gerhard Schlosser, entitled “Modularity in Development and Evolution.” The conference was held at, and sponsored by, the Hanse Wissenschaftskolleg in Delmenhorst, Germany in May, 2000. The article subsequently metamorphosed into a literature and concept review as well as an analysis of the differences in current perspectives on modularity. Consequently, I refer to general aspects of the conference but do not review particular presentations. I divide modules into three kinds: structural, (...) developmental, and physiological. Every module fulfills none, one, or multiple functional roles. Two further orthogonal distinctions are important in this context: module-kinds versus module-variants-of-a-kind and reproducer versus nonreproducer modules. I review criteria for individuation of modules and mechanisms for the phylogenetic origin of modularity. I discuss conceptual and methodological differences between developmental and evolutionary biologists, in particular the difference between integration and competition perspectives on individualization and modular behavior. The variety in views regarding modularity presents challenges that require resolution in order to attain a comprehensive, rather than a piecemeal and fragmentary, evolutionary developmental biology. (shrink)

Darwin's ideas on variation, heredity, and development differ significantly from twentieth-century views. First, Darwin held that environmental changes, acting either on the reproductive organs or the body, were necessary to generate variation. Second, heredity was a developmental, not a transmissional, process; variation was a change in the developmental process of change. An analysis of Darwin's elaboration and modification of these two positions from his early notebooks (1836-1844) to the last edition of the /Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication/ (1875) (...) complements previous Darwin scholarship on these issues. Included in this analysis is a description of the way Darwin employed the distinction between transmission and development, as well as the conceptual relationship he saw between heredity and variation. This paper is part of a larger project comparing commitments regarding variation during the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

August Weismann is famous for having argued against the inheritance of acquired characters. However, an analysis of his work indicates that Weismann always held that changes in external conditions, acting during development, were the necessary causes of variation in the hereditary material. For much of his career he held that acquired germ-plasm variation was inherited. An irony, which is in tension with much of the standard twentieth-century history of biology, thus exists – Weismann was not a Weismannian. I distinguish three (...) claims regarding the germ-plasm: (1) its continuity, (2) its morphological sequestration, and (3) its variational sequestration. With respect to changes in Weismann’s views on the cause of variation, I divide his career into four stages. For each stage I analyze his beliefs on the relative importance of changes in external conditions and sexual reproduction as causes of variation in the hereditary material. Weismann believed, and Weismannism denies, that variation, heredity, and development were deeply intertwined processes. This article is part of a larger project comparing commitments regarding variation during the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Reification is to abstraction as disease is to health. Whereas abstraction is singling out, symbolizing, and systematizing, reification is neglecting abstractive context, especially functional, historical, and analytical-level context. William James and John Dewey provide similar and nuanced arguments regarding the perils and promises of abstraction. They share an abstraction-reification account. The stages of abstraction and the concepts of “vicious abstractionism,” “/the/ psychologist’s fallacy,” and “the philosophic fallacy” in the works of these pragmatists are here analyzed in detail. For instance, in (...) 1896 Dewey exposes various fallacies associated with reifying dualistic reflex arc theory. The conclusion prescribes treatments (pluralism and assumption archaeology) for de-reifying ill models (i.e., universalized, narrowed, and ontologized models) in contemporary scientific fields such as cognitive science and biology. (shrink)

All eyes are turned towards genomic data and models as the source of knowledge about whether human races exist or not. Will genomic science make the final decision about whether racial realism (e.g., racial population naturalism) or anti-realism (e.g., racial skepticism) is correct? We think not. We believe that the results of even our best and most impressive genomic technologies underdetermine whether bio-genomic races exist, or not. First, different sub-disciplines of biology interested in population structure employ distinct concepts, aims, measures, (...) and models, producing cross-cutting categorizations of population subdivisions rather than a single, universal bio-genomic concept of "race." Second, within each sub-discipline (e.g., conservation biology, phylogenetics), genomic results are consistent with, and map multiply to, racial realism and anti-realism. Indeed, racial ontologies are constructed conventionally, rather than discovered. We thus defend a /constructivist conventionalism/ about bio-genomic racial ontology. Choices and conventions must always be made in identifying particular kinds of groups. Political agendas, social programs, and moral questions premised on the existence of naturalistic race must accept that no scientifically grounded racial ontology is forthcoming, and adjust presumptions, practices, and projects accordingly. (shrink)

Analytical categories of scientific cultures have typically been used both exclusively and universally. For instance, when styles of scientific research are employed in attempts to understand and narrate science, styles alone are usually employed. This article is a thought experiment in interweaving categories. What would happen if rather than employ a single category, we instead investigated several categories simultaneously? What would we learn about the practices and theories, the agents and materials, and the political-technological impact of science if we analyzed (...) and applied styles, paradigms, and models simultaneously? I address these questions in general and for a specific case study: a brief history of systematics. (shrink)

Evo-Devo exhibits a plurality of scientific “cultures” of practice and theory. When are the cultures acting—individually or collectively—in ways that actually move research forward, empirically, theoretically, and ethically? When do they become imperialistic, in the sense of excluding and subordinating other cultures? This chapter identifies six cultures – three /styles/ (mathematical modeling, mechanism, and history) and three /paradigms/ (adaptationism, structuralism, and cladism). The key assumptions standing behind, under, or within each of these cultures are explored. Characterizing the internal structure of (...) the cultures is necessary for understanding how they collaborate or compete, and how they are fragmented or integrated, in the rich interdisciplinary /trading zone/ (Galison 1997) of Evo-Devo. Evo-Devo is an important example of how science can progress through a radical plurality of perspectives and cultures. (shrink)

Schaffner’s model of theory reduction has played an important role in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. Here, the model is found to be problematic because of an internal tension. Indeed, standard antireductionist external criticisms concerning reduction functions and laws in biology do not provide a full picture of the limits of Schaffner’s model. However, despite the internal tension, his model usefully highlights the importance of regulative ideals associated with the search for derivational, and embedding, deductive relations among mathematical (...) structures in theoretical biology. A reconstructed Schaffnerian model could therefore shed light on mathematical theory development in the biological sciences and on the epistemology of mathematical practices more generally. *Received November 2006; revised March 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 1156 High St., Santa Cruz, CA 95064; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)