The dissertation critically examines Husserl's transcendental idealism as a response to epistemological skepticism. Contrary to prevailing interpretations, I argue that Husserl intended to formulate a non-reductive, idealist justification of empirical knowledge. I take the standard phenomenalistic interpretation of Husserl's idealism to be right in discerning his basic concern with the refutation of skepticism, but wrong in construing the transcendental reduction as an ontological reduction of the natural world to "ideal" sets of transcendental experiences. On the other hand, recent "neutrality views" (...) which hold that phenomenological epoche requires the permanent suspension of ontological commitments seem to confuse Husserl's quasi-verificationist critique of traditional metaphysics with the positivistic critique of all metaphysics. I suggest instead that Husserl's epistemological program be understood as an attempt to ground transcendentally, i.e. on the basis of apodictic and presuppositionless evidences, our ordinary beliefs about the world. In this light, Husserl's Weltvernichtung argument for the presuppositionlessness of consciousness can be seen as a necessary precondition of the transcendental justification of empirical knowledge. ;To clarify Husserl's genetic phenomenology, I adopt Dagfinn Follesdal's interpretation of the noema as a Fregean Sinn. I distinguish two levels of 'constitution' to show how Husserl traces back the sense and being of the objective world to the synthetic activity of the transcendental subject. The resolution of transcendental analogues of skeptical doubts by means of Husserl's analysis of 'retroactive cancellation' completes, in general outline, the grounding of the "verificationism" of the natural attitude. However, I argue that the anti-skeptical force of 'retroactive cancellation' depends on conceiving the relationship between the conscious subject and the world in a way that renders Weltvernichtung unintelligible. Husserl's transcendental idealist response to the skeptic accordingly leads to a dilemma: either one maintains the presuppositionlessness of consciousness but abandons the critique of skepticism for a descriptive study of the transcendental structures of experience; or one attempts to reformulate Husserl's phenomenological verificationism while abandoning the goal of absolute grounding. (shrink)

Departing from the disconcerting fact that the only passage where Kant mentions court practice is in a chapter on art, the essay undertakes a reconstruction of Kant’s esthetics. As to beauty, the judgment of taste appears as a judgment on the ability to judge, and it is universally valid not because it is true, but because it is communicable. Kant’s notion of art turns out to be the autonomous discourse of taste as his notion of morality stands for autonomy of (...) man and his notion of law for autonomy of civil society. However, Kant’s esthetical experience of the sublime as appearance of what neither mind nor senses grasp breaks up harmony and autonomy and unjudges judgment. At this point, the essay uncovers an intrinsically destabilizing force of Kant’s ‚reason‘, traces the consequences for the judicial judgment and gives a perspective to philosophy of law within a differentiated society. (shrink)

Kant's progressive philosophy of history is an integral aspect of his critical system, yet it is often ignored or even treated as an embarrassment by contemporary scholars. In this article, I defend Kant and argue for the continuing relevance of his regulative assumption of historical progress. I suggest, furthermore, that the first-person stance of practical belief exemplified in Kant's conception of hope offers new resources for thinking about the relationship between the ideal and the real in political theory.

I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.

Business ethics educators strive to produce graduates who not only grasp the principles of ethical decision-making, but who can apply that business ethics education when faced with real-world challenges. However, this has proven especially difficult, as good intentions do not always translate into ethical awareness and action. Complementing a behavioral ethics approach with insights from social psychology, we developed an interventional class module with both online and in-class elements aimed at increasing students’ awareness of their own susceptibility to unconscious biases (...) and, consequently, unethical behaviors. We deployed this intervention within a problem-based learning course, in which students completed real-world projects for actual business clients. Our results suggest that although students appeared universally aware of the importance of ethical issues in business and generally espoused intentions to act ethically, those who received the intervention were significantly more likely to recognize their own susceptibility to perpetuating unethical business behavior and to identify ethical issues specific to their real-world projects. These results have important implications for behavioral ethics pedagogy and provide a de-biasing interventional approach for bridging classroom knowledge with real-world skills. (shrink)

In what follows I will briefly address (1) Mahowald's work on Josiah Royce, (2) her advocacy for "cultural feminism" and its implications for American philosophy and work still to be done, (3) her promotion of a critical pragmatism and the need to provide a pragmatist critique not only of gender injustice but all forms of injustice, and (4) Mahowald's argument for the strategy of "standpoint theory," a strategy that offers great promise for future work in American philosophy.

This article is concerned with a central but neglected aspect of Weber's theory of authority: the distinction between different motives of obedience. Weber's list of motives of "Fügsamkeit" raises an important problem: it seems to be incoherent. Since Weber was a very systematic author this is rather astonishing. More important: this problem questions the special status of the belief in legitimacy and the important role this belief in supporting and stabilizing authority. In other words, the problem questions the foundations of (...) Weber's sociology of authority. Since Weber himself doesn't say very much about this topic it is necessary to reconstruct the typology of motives of obedience. My reconstruction is supposed to meet Weber's intentions. I argue that the main point of Weber's classification is the differentiation between normative and non-normative motives of obedience. This reconstructed typology is coherent and allows us to explain the special status of the belief in legitimacy. This not only sheds some new light on a central part of Weber's sociology of authority but also opens some systematically important perspectives. A general typology of motives of compliance in asymmetric social relationships can be constructed. This typology has important advantages to other theoretical conceptions and allows for a substantial contribution to the sociology of authority. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 10, October 2019, Page 93-94.

What is the relation between monetary policy and inequalities in income and wealth? This question has received insufficient attention, especially in light of the unconventional policies introduced since the 2008 financial crisis. The article analyzes three ways in which the concern central banks show for inequalities in their official statements remains incomplete and underdeveloped. First, central banks tend to care about inequality for instrumental reasons only. When they do assign intrinsic value to containing inequalities, they shy away from trade-offs with (...) the standard objectives of monetary policy that such a position entails. Second, central banks play down the causal impact monetary policy has on inequalities. When they do acknowledge it, they defend their actions by claiming that it is an unintended side effect, that it is temporary, and/or that any alternative policy would fare even worse. The article appeals to the doctrine of double effect to criticize these arguments. Third, even if one accepts that inequalities should be contained and that today’s monetary policies exacerbate them, is it both desirable and feasible to make containing inequalities part of the mandate of central banks? The article analyzes and rejects three attempts on the part of central banks to answer this question negatively. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 188-206.

Eating disorders are debilitating diseases that have twin impacts on the body and mind and are associated with a number of physiological and psychological comorbidities (Blinder, Cumella, and Sanathara 2006; Casiero and Frishman 2006), including increased suicide risk (Arcelus et al. 2011; Lipson and Sonneville 2020). In addition, eating disorders are growing in prevalence (Gilmache et al. 2019) and impact women at much higher rates than men (Bearman, Martinez, and Stice 2006), especially in adolescence (Spriggs, Kettner, and Carhart-Harris 2021). (...) Anorexia nervosa (AN) is a particularly devastating eating disorder, with one of the highest mortality rates of any psychiatric disorder (Sullivan 1995). Despite the severity of the condition, current treatments for AN are limited in their efficacy (Khalsa et al. 2017). Based on the growing body of evidence demonstrating the short-term and long-term efficacy of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for the treatment of other mental illnesses, I argue that research into psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for AN should be funded. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kinship across Borders: A Christian Ethic of Immigration by Kristin E. HeyerVictor CarmonaKinship across Borders: A Christian Ethic of Immigration By Kristin E. Heyer WASHINGTON, DC: GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012. 198 PP. $29.95Heyer renders an important service to the discipline, which has not seen a book-length account of a Christian immigration ethic since Dana Wilbanks’s Recreating America (1996). In Kinship across Borders, Heyer provides a nuanced and comprehensive (...) theological ethical analysis of undocumented immigration and argues that “a Christian immigration ethic calls believers to promote structures and practices marked by kinship and justice” (4). To that end, she advances four distinct theses in as many chapters—interpretations of personhood, sin, family, and solidarity—each appropriating a specific resource from the Christian tradition in order to reorient immigration policies from a “paradigm centered on national interest, expediency, or economic efficiency” to one that is person centered (4). Her project challenges American Christians to reckon with their responsibility in advancing structures and furthering ideologies that sustain forced migrations, including economic refugees, in the Western Hemisphere.Chapter 1 relies on Margaret Farley’s “obligating features of person-hood”—namely, autonomy and relationality—to identify the prevailing immigration paradigm, which views immigrants as economic commodities, security threats, and/or foreigners to be assimilated (21). This paradigm reflects internalized ideologies and a series of external structures that weaken the personal agency of immigrants who, in significant ways, “are unable to [End Page 194] determine the direction their lives will take” (22). Chapter 2 turns to Catholic social encyclicals and liberation theology to develop a dialectical interpretation of personal and social sin. Heyer posits that though persons are responsible for their actions, they “remain subject to external [structural] influences” that limit the ways in which they may exercise their agency (46). She uses this idea not to accuse undocumented immigrants but rather to highlight the sinful ideological blinders that often limit American Christians’ capacity to act hospitably towards them. “Given the relationship between the United States and sending countries in geographic, economic, and political terms,” she writes, “US citizens may be willfully negligent of or indirectly responsible for the conditions that give rise to undocumented migration across their borders” (46).Chapters 3 and 4 provide robust accounts of cross-border kinship in the context of the family and globalization, with their rich visions of human relationships that break open the prevailing immigration paradigm. For example, though familismo among Latin American immigrants may lend itself to restrict women’s personal agency, it nevertheless offers an “extensive and malleable understanding of kinship networks, … [with] boundaries among members that remain fluid and transcend genetics,” thus broadening the relationships within which to flourish (82). To address global kinship, Heyer develops an account of institutional, incarnational, and conflictual solidarity that breaks free from the tendency to frame the immigration debate in the United States as a purely domestic issue that lacks meaningful global implications. Chapter 5 concludes the book by identifying implications for reorienting immigration policy and rhetoric as well as Christian ethics so that they better account for the immigrant experience by developing the necessary resources, including a more robust understanding of moral agency in the midst of marginalization.The argument is strongest in chapters 2 and 3, which develop a crisp critical analysis of the sources and insightful interpretations of often overlooked ones, including immigrants’ experiences. Furthermore, Heyer adeptly engages multiple US Hispanic theologians and Christian ethicists in ways that sharpen her argument throughout. The argument is weakest in chapter 5 because it does not fully integrate earlier insights on cross-border familial and global kinship while accounting for civic kinship. I strongly recommend Kinship across Borders for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students taking courses on Catholic social thought, Protestant social ethics, and theology and/or ethics of migration. [End Page 195]Victor CarmonaOblate School of TheologyCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Der Begriff "Zweite Natur", der schon in der Antike Verwendung findet, nimmt in den philosophischen Debatten der Gegenwart eine Schlusselstellung ein. Auch wenn er in verschiedenen Traditionszusammenhangen jeweils anders gedeutet wird, soll mit dem Begriff doch immer das Problem gelost werden, wie sich Natur und Freiheit, kausale Notwendigkeit und menschlicher Geist zueinander verhalten. In der auf Marx zuruckgehenden Tradition wird mit "Zweiter Natur" in kritischer Absicht der historischen Umstand bezeichnet, dass sich die geschichtliche Entwicklung weiterhin ohne vernunftige Planung und daher (...) wie ein blinder Naturprozess vollzieht; in der sich auf Hegel berufenden und an Aristoteles anschliessenden Tradition wird mit "Zweiter Natur" die Tatsache umrissen, dass sich viele unserer kognitiven und moralischen Verhaltensweisen als Resultate von Gewohnheitsbildungen verstehen lassen und daher so etwas wie eine kunstliche Natur im Ganzen unserer Lebensweise darstellen; und schliesslich wird in einer dritten, eher auf Nietzsche und Freud zuruckgehenden Tradition mit dem Verweis auf unsere "Zweite Natur" die Aufmerksamkeit darauf gelenkt, dass in das menschliche Verhalten immer auch Zwange unserer biologischen Natur hineinragen und dieses daher wie von aussen beeinflussen oder gar bestimmen. Der Kongress der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung vom 14. - 17. Juni 2017 in Stuttgart suchte zur Aufklarung des Verhaltnisses dieser drei mit dem Begriff der "Zweiten Natur" verknupften Assoziationsfelder beizutragen. In elf Kolloquien, deren Beitrage dieser Band nun veroffentlicht, wurde im Lichte verschiedener Disziplinen diskutiert, wie die Beziehung zwischen menschlicher Freiheit und Natur angemessen aufzufassen ist; das Themenspektrum reichte dabei von historischen Auseinandersetzungen mit einzelnen Traditionen und Epochen bis zur Behandlung der Rolle der "Zweiten Natur" in der Asthetik, der Sozialphilosophie, der Psychoanalyse und der Anthropologie. Erganzt wurde dieser thematische Bogen durch drei Plenarvortrage und einem Forum freier Kurzvortrage, auf dem NachwuchswissenschaftlerInnen ihre Uberlegungen zur Fragestellung des Kongresses vorstellen konnten. Der Band bietet damit einen sowohl historischen wie systematischen Uberblick uber einen philosophischen Schlusselbegriff der Gegenwart. (shrink)

Les clôtures symboliques des Algériennes : la virginité ou l’honneur social en question. Liée à l’honneur de la famille, la virginité est une question qui a toujours hanté l’esprit des jeunes filles algériennes. Toutes sortes de pratiques sont envisagées par la société pour la préserver. La plus connue est celles du rbat (action de nouer), dit teskar (action de fermer) ou encore tesfah (action de blinder). Au moyen de techniques ritualisées, elle consiste en la « fermeture » symbolique de (...) l’hymen avant la puberté et son « ouverture » symbolique la veille du mariage. La « chemise tachée du sang de la vierge » doit en être la preuve indéniable : elle authentifie que l’honneur de la famille, du groupe, est intact. Lorsque, pour diverses raisons, l’hymen fait défaut, la société déploie toutes sortes de stratégies palliatives. Aujourd’hui, le certificat de virginité et la reconstitution de l’hymen par la chirurgie plastique, l’hyménorrapie ou l’hyménoplastie, viennent renforcer la pratique symbolique du rabt. La question fondamentale que je pose dans cet article est : peut-on envisager de casser la clôture « malléable » de cette « vaste prison » des femmes afin que les Algériennes puissent intégrer la société en tant qu’individus et non en tant qu’emblèmes de l’honneur de la famille? (shrink)

Als im Jahr 1992 die Frage aufgeworfen wurde, ob der französische Philosoph Jacques Derrida den Ehrendoktortitel der University of Cambridge verliehen bekommen sollte, lehnte ein Teil der Jury-Mitglieder die Vergabe ab. Man könne nicht, so hieß es damals, einen Denker würdigen, der in seinen Schriften vormalig Gedankenspiele inszeniere und »überall seine eigenen Urteile wieder umstößt«. Die zuletzt zitierten Worte wurden so nicht geäußert, da sie aus dem dritten Jahrhundert von dem griechischen Philosophen Porphyrius stammten und gegen den 〉theoretischen Gründungsvater〈 des (...) Christentums, Paulus, gerichtet waren. Porphyrius war in seiner Kritik an Paulus nicht weniger kleinlich als die oben erwähnten Jurymitglieder. Es sei die Inkohärenz eines Denkens, das er bei Paulus kritisiere und das »jeder Bildung entbehre«. Denn »beinahe wie ein Schwert wetzt er [Paulus] seine Zunge und zerstückelt ohne Schonung die Glieder des Gesetzes, er, der an vielen Stellen den Gehorsam gegen das Gesetz eingeschärft und das Leben nach demselben für lobenswert erklärt hat.«. (shrink)

Spinozas und Humes Staatstheorien werden zuerst unter dem Aspekt der Staatsvertragstheorie verglichen, die von Hume kritisiert worden ist, während Spinoza sie zunächst vertreten hat. Es wird gezeigt, daß Spinoza, indem er diese Theorie später fallen ließ, ein Selbstkorrektur vorgenommen hat, weil die Staatsvertragstheorie unter Spinozas metaphysischen Prämissen haltlos ist. Spinoza und Hume werden dann unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Legitimität staatlicher Machtausübung verglichen. Hier liegen beide insofern nahe beieinander, als sie die Legitimität von Herrschaft auf die Erfüllung gewisser allgemeiner Staatszwecke gründen; (...) andererseits besteht die Differenz, daß Spinoza den bürgerlichen Gehorsam allein durch die überlegene Macht des Staates gewährleistet sieht, während Hume die These vertreten hat, daß die Autorität der Regierung niemals allein auf Macht, sondern vor allem auf der Überzeugung der Bürger von ihrem generellen Nutzen beruht. (shrink)

Transformative researchers have the potential to contribute to both personal and societal transformation. In this article, I argue that the two are intertwined and that personal transformation is a necessary component of research that is designed to support change at the societal level in the form of furthering human rights and social justice. I describe a transformative framework that examines assumptions related to ethics, the nature of reality, epistemology, and methodology that can guide researchers who choose to address both the (...) personal and societal levels of transformation. Ethically, researchers need to examine who they are and who they are in relation to the community in which they are working. This process goes beyond self-examination to a critical analysis of the cultural blinders that might obscure our ability to contribute to positive impacts. I put forth the hypothesis that if we design our research so that it explicitly addresses issues of discrimination and oppression that the probability of personal and social transformation increases. (shrink)