The concept of compactness is a necessary condition of any system that is going to call itself a finitary method of proof. However, it can also apply to predicates of sets of formulas in general and in that manner it can be used in relation to level functions, a flavor of measure functions. In what follows we will tie these concepts of measure and compactness together and expand some concepts which appear in d'Entremont's master's thesis, "Inference and Level." We (...) will also provide some applications of the concept of level to the "preservationist" program of paraconsistent logic. We apply the finite level compactness theorem in this paper to get a Lindenbaum flavor extension lemma and a maximal "forcibility" theorem. Each of these is based on an abstract deductive system X which satisfies minimal conditions of inference and has generalizations of 'and' and 'not' as logical words. (shrink)

A systematic guide to product design and safety from an ethical engineering perspective This hands-on textbook offers a holistic approach to product safety and engineering ethics across many products, fields, and industries. The book shows, step by step, how to “design in” safety characteristics early in the engineering process using design for product safety (DfPS) methods. Written by a P.E. and skilled educator with industry experience, Engineering Ethics and Design for Product Safety addresses all aspects of the product system from (...) the perspective of an active product-safety engineering manager. You will get detailed case studies, real-world examples, and side discussions that provide a deep dive into key topics. Coverage includes: Product safety Engineering ethics Product-safety components Hazards, risks, accidents, and outcomes A product-design process Product-safety engineering Engineering-design guidance Product-safety facilitators Product-safety engineering methods Product-safety defects and recalls. (shrink)

__Improving Education Together _offers a step-by-step guide to Labor-Management-Community (LMC) collaboration, an intervention that has successfully improved student outcomes in a wide variety of school districts across the country._ The authors illustrate how a culture of collaboration between labor, management, and community stakeholders can be built using readily available tools for needs assessment, root-cause analysis, team norms, brainstorming, consensus-building, and long-term planning. _Improving Education Together _offers detailed examples of how districts across the country—including Massachusetts, Maryland, and Illinois—have successfully implemented the (...) LMC approach, along with resources and strategies employed and lessons learned from obstacles and setbacks encountered along the way. Timely, useful, and accessible, this guide will appeal to a broad audience of school leaders, board members, and community leaders eager to learn more about how to collectively lead and manage school district change that is sustainable and results in improved teaching and learning. (shrink)

This book is a methodological guide for the emerging, interdisciplinary science of virtue traits and their value. The authors situate this emerging empirical field in the history of psychology, critically survey existing work, defend the scientific validity of virtue science, and develop a general model that can guide, unify, and catalyze future research. In addition, chapters discuss how philosophy and philosophers can contribute to empirical inquiry and how a mature science of virtue could inform moral philosophy. The book is co-authored (...) by two psychologists and a philosopher who pursued joint empirical work on fairness and then began to discuss larger methodological issues raised by that collaboration. -/- o Expected publication date: January 31, 2024 o Paperback ISBN: 1108747981. (shrink)

Variability in the emotion regulation (ER) strategies one uses throughout daily life has been suggested to reflect adaptive ER ability and to act as a protective factor in mental health. Moreover, psychological inflexibility and persistent negative affect (or affective inertia) are key features of depression and other forms of mental illness and are often further exacerbated by rigid or overly passive regulatory behaviours. The current study investigated the hypothesis that ER variability might serve as a protective factor against depressive symptoms (...) and affective inertia. Using experience-sampling (N = 213), we tested whether two indictors of ER variability (between- and within-strategy SDs) were related to depressive symptoms and affective inertia. We found that people with higher between-strategy variability and within-strategy variability (specifically for reappraisal and distraction) reported fewer depressive symptoms. Both within- and between-strategy variability were negatively related to negative affective inertia. Between-strategy variability and negative affective inertia had unique effects on depression, when used as simultaneous predictors. Altogether, this study provides further evidence for the utility of ER as a factor buffering against depressive symptoms and particularly for the use of variable ER strategies. (shrink)

The last two decades have produced unprecedented successes in the fields of artificial intelligence and machine learning (ML), due almost entirely to advances in deep neural networks (DNNs). Deep hierarchical memory networks are not a novel concept in cognitive science and can be traced back more than a half century to Simon's early work on discrimination nets for simulating human expertise. The major difference between DNNs and the deep memory nets meant for explaining human cognition is that the latter are (...) symbolic networks meant to model the dynamics of human memory and learning. Cognition-inspired symbolic deep networks (SDNs) address several known issues with DNNs, including (1) learning efficiency, where a much larger number of training examples are required for DNNs than would be expected for a human; (2) catastrophic interference, where what is learned by a DNN gets unlearned when a new problem is presented; and (3) explainability, where there is no way to explain what is learned by a DNN. This paper explores whether SDNs can achieve similar classification accuracy performance to DNNs across several popular ML datasets and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. Simulations reveal that (1) SDNs provide similar accuracy to DNNs in most cases, (2) SDNs are far more efficient than DNNs, (3) SDNs are as robust as DNNs to irrelevant/noisy attributes in the data, and (4) SDNs are far more robust to catastrophic interference than DNNs. We conclude that SDNs offer a promising path toward human-level accuracy and efficiency in category learning. More generally, ML frameworks could stand to benefit from cognitively inspired approaches, borrowing more features and functionality from models meant to simulate and explain human learning. (shrink)

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are popular for classifying large noisy analogue data. However, DNNs suffer from several known issues, including explainability, efficiency, catastrophic interference, and a need for high‐end computational resources. Our simulations reveal that psychologically‐inspired symbolic deep networks (SDNs) achieve similar accuracy and robustness to noise as DNNs on common ML problem sets, while addressing these issues.

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, les recherches sur la gauche américaine se sont multipliées, parmi lesquelles différents ouvrages consacrés aux militantes africaines-américaines, qui démontrent combien le rôle qu’elles ont joué au sein du mouvement noir de libération américain a été trop longtemps passé sous silence. Keisha N. Blain, professeure d’histoire et d’Africana Studies à Brown University est l’auteure de Set the World on Fire: Black nationalist women and the global struggle for fr...

The profound reinterpretation of human nature wrought by evolutionary theory deeply challenges standard approaches to ethics. In this ground-breaking book, Aristotelian and evolutionary understandings of human social nature are brought together to provide an integrative, psychological account of human ethics. Fowers explores seven domains of sociality—attachment, intersubjectivity, imitation, cooperation, social norms, group membership, and social hierarchy—moving on to identify and elaborate a set of natural human goods that are inherent in these social domains, such as friendship, justice, belonging, and social (...) harmony. The book emphasizes the profound ways that human identity and action are immersed in an ongoing social world. These goods are the elements that comprise human flourishing, or living a good human life. (shrink)

Although fairness is a key moral trait, limited research focuses on participants' observed fairness behavior because moral traits are generally measured through self-report. This experiment focused on day-to-day interpersonal fairness rather than impersonal justice, and fairness was assessed as observed behavior. The experiment investigated whether a self-reported fairness trait would moderate a situational influence on observed fairness behavior, such that individuals with a stronger fairness trait would be less affected by a situational influence than those with a weaker fairness trait. (...) We used an iterated resource game in which participants could withdraw resources as they chose, and we manipulated the number of resources bogus players withdrew. The number of resources participants withdrew was the behavioral measure of fairness. Results confirmed the expected moderation of the unfairness manipulation by a fairness trait on observed behavior. Those reporting a stronger fairness trait were unaffected by the manipulation, whereas those reporting a weaker fairness trait were more strongly influenced. (shrink)

Abstract: Numerous scholars have claimed that positive ethical traits such as virtues are important in human psychology and behavior. Psychologists have begun to test these claims. The scores of studies on virtue do not yet constitute a mature science of virtue because of unresolved theoretical and methods challenges. In this article, we addressed those challenges by clarifying how virtue research relates to prosocial behavior, positive psychology, and personality psychology and does not run afoul of the fact–value distinction. We propose the (...) STRIVE-4 model of virtue to help resolve the theoretical and methodical problems, unify extant research, and fruitfully guide future research.___________** For PDF you can email: bradcokelet [at] ku [dot] edu **. (shrink)

Fowers et al. recently made a general argument for virtues as the characteristics necessary for individuals to flourish, given inherent human limitations. For example, people can flourish by developing the virtue of friendship as they navigate the inherent human dependency on others. This general argument also illuminates a pathway to flourishing during the COVID-19 pandemic, the risks of which have induced powerful fears, exacerbated injustices, and rendered life and death decisions far more common. Contexts of risk and fear call for (...) the virtue of courage. Courage has emerged more powerfully as a central virtue among medical personnel, first responders, and essential workers. Longstanding inequalities have been highlighted during the pandemic, calling for the virtue of justice. When important personal and public health decisions must be made, the central virtue of practical wisdom comes to the fore. Wise decisions and actions incorporate the recognition of relevant moral concerns and aims, as well as responding in fitting and practical ways to the specifics of the situation. Practicing courage, justice, and practical wisdom illuminates a path to flourishing, even in a pandemic. (shrink)

This book advances a novel justification for the idea of "public reason": citizens within diverse societies can realize the ideal of shared political autonomy, despite their adherence to different religious and philosophical views, by deciding fundamental political questions with "public reasons." Public reasons draw upon or are derived from ecumenical political ideas, such as toleration and equal citizenship, and mutually acceptable forms of reasoning, like those of the sciences. This book explains that if citizens share equal political autonomy—and thereby constitute (...) "a civic people"—they will not suffer from alienation or domination and can enjoy relations of civic friendship. Moreover, it contends that the ideal of shared political autonomy cannot be realized by alternative accounts of public justification that eschew any necessary role for public reasons. In addition to explaining how the ideal of political autonomy justifies the idea of public reason, this book presents a new analysis of the relation between public reason and "ideal theory": by engaging in "public reasoning," citizens help create a just society that can secure the free compliance of all. It also explores the distinctive policy implications of the ideal of political autonomy for gender equality, families, children, and education. (shrink)

John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing on an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ (...) account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier. (shrink)

Works in Sanskrit that deal with governance and ethics are an important repository for moral precepts of kingship. Classic examples of this form of political advice literature, recounted through the fables of animals, are the Pañcatantra and the Hitopadeśa. In various recensions and myriad translations, these works spread throughout Asia. Authors writing in Arabic and Persian displayed a fascination for these texts, beginning significantly with the work of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and his famous translation, Kalīla wa-Dimna. This article treats the transmission (...) of Sanskrit advice literature in the early modern period into Persian and Rekhta. It considers how this literature was translated in the contexts of Muslim imperial and British colonial rule, and asks what it reveals about the relationship between language, knowledge, and politics in South Asia. (shrink)

A robust critical literature argues that psychology is animated by powerful, but unacknowledged commitments to a culturally based vision of the human good in spite of its ideal of value neutrality. Inasmuch as such commitments seem ineliminable, it seems preferable to address questions of the good directly rather than by tacitly absorbing cultural views. This article explores the human good directly and explicitly within an Aristotelian framework to foster a critical conversation on the good life in psychology. The framework takes (...) human flourishing as the overarching good. Flourishing consists in ongoing participation in characteristic human goods such as knowledge and belonging. Aristotle presented two distinctions in types of goods or ends. First, some ends are chosen for themselves and some are means to other ends. Following Aristotle's function argument, goods such as knowledge and belonging are chosen for themselves because they directly express key features of human nature . I term these goods constitutive because the activities constitute the end. Instrumental goods are means to other ends . Second, some goods can be pursued and possessed by individuals and some goods can only be pursued and achieved in concert with others. The latter are shared goals such as friendship and democracy. Virtues or excellences are the personal strengths that make it possible to pursue these goods. In this Aristotelian framework, there are many characteristic human goods, each of which can be pursued in many ways, indicating that there is no single correct form of the good life. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Susan Okin criticizes John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ because it does not apply principles of justice directly to gender relations within households. We explain how one can be a ‘political liberal feminist’ by distinguishing between two kinds of justice: the first we call ‘legitimacy justice’, conceptions of which apply to the ‘legally coercive structure’ of society; the second we call ‘ethos justice’, conceptions of which apply to citizens’ ‘non-coercive’ relations. We agree with Okin that a society in which most persons act (...) in accordance with ‘gender equal’ ethos justice is morally superior to one in which most persons do not. A shared commitment to a particular conception of ethos justice, however, cannot be required by a conception of legitimacy justice. A political liberal feminist is committed to promoting gender equality with respect to both legitimacy justice and ethos justice, but recognizes that different means are necessary to do so. (shrink)

Does the practice of psychology make a significant and positive contribution to human welfare and the struggle for a good society? This book presents a reinvigorating look at psychology and its societal purpose, offering a bold new philosophical foundation from which professionals in the field can deeply examine their work.

Some theorists—including Elizabeth Anderson, Gerald Gaus, and Amartya Sen—endorse versions of 'public reason' as the appropriate way to justify political decisions while rejecting 'ideal theory'. This chapter proposes that these ideas are not easily separated. The idea of public reason expresses a form of mutual 'civic' respect for citizens. Public reason justifications for political proposals are addressed to citizens who would find acceptable those justifications, and consequently would comply freely with those proposals should they become law. Hence public reasoning involves (...) 'local ideal theorizing': the justification of political proposals includes their consideration and evaluation under conditions of compliance with them by the citizens to whom those justifications are addressed. Local ideal theorizing, moreover, can lead to 'full ideal theorizing', wherein citizens outline and evaluate an amended version of their society’s 'basic structure'. This argument is illustrated by some recent empirical work on inequality within the United States. (shrink)

This article contextualizes and critiques the recent increase in interest in virtue ethics and the good life in psychology. Theoretically, psychologists' interests in virtue and eudaimonia have followed the philosophical revival of these topics, but this work has been subject to persistent, disguised commitments to the ideologies of individualism and instrumentalism. Moreover, psychologists' tendency to separate the topics of virtue and eudaimonia is described and critiqued as theoretically misguided, particularly because Aristotle, the originator of these concepts, saw them as mutually (...) entailing one another. Historically, psychology turned away from the topic of virtue in tandem with the popular cultural interest in favor of personality rather than character. The article concludes with a brief overview of Aristotle's account of eudaimonia as the overarching human good consisting of participation in characteristically human goods through virtuous activity. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In this article I revise and defend a core feature of political liberalism, namely, the idea that principles of political justice should be limited in their scope of application to what John Rawls calls the ‘basic structure of society.’ I refer to this feature as the ‘basic structure restriction’ of political liberalism. According to my account of the basic structure restriction, the basic structure includes all and only those institutions that have a profound effect on the lives of all citizens, (...) and thus those institutions that citizens would want to organize as parts of a fair system of social cooperation. Moreover, maintaining the basic structure as a fair system of social cooperation vis-à-vis all citizens requires the exercise of coercive political power. This account of the basic structure, which I call the ‘legitimacy of coercion account,’ shows that limiting the basic structure to those institutions that are maintained by legally coercive means is not arbitrary, contrary to the claims of critics like G. A. Cohen. Furthermore, by recognizing explicitly that there exist certain institutions – and, in particular, the family – that ought to be regulated partially by coercively maintained principles, my formulation of the basic structure provides a more satisfactory account of the way in which principles of justice should apply to the family than does Rawls’s most considered account. Finally, I explain how my account of the basic structure can incorporate many of S. M. Okin’s proposed policies for promoting gender equality in society. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies’, as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of toleration. A number of critics have (...) claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle’. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’. A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’, which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues. Key Words: civic respect • international relations • justice • political liberalism • Rawls • toleration. (shrink)

During the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, it was crucial that providers take steps to protect patients by managing HIV with the perspective of ‘HIV exceptionalism’. However, in 2020, the social and historical barriers erected by this concept, as demonstrated in this patient’s case, are considerably impeding progress to end the epidemic. With significant medical advances in HIV treatment and prevention, the policies informed by HIV exceptionalism now paradoxically perpetuate stigma and inequities, particularly for people of colour. To improve overall (...) HIV care, the medical community must move past HIV exceptionalism by liberalising diagnostics, instituting clinician implicit bias training and advocating to fully decriminalise HIV non-disclosure. (shrink)

Interest in the nature and importance of ‘childhood goods’ recently has emerged within philosophy. Childhood goods, roughly, are things that are good for persons qua children independent of any contribution to the good of persons qua adults. According to Colin Macleod, John Rawls’s political conception of justice as fairness rests upon an adult-centered ‘agency assumption’ and thus is incapable of incorporating childhood goods into its content. Macleod concludes that because of this, justice as fairness cannot be regarded as a complete (...) conception of distributive justice. In this paper I provide a political liberal response to Macleod’s argument by advancing three claims. First, I propose that political liberalism should treat leisure time as a distinct ‘primary good.’ Second, I suggest that leisure time should be distributed via the ‘basic needs principle’ and the ‘difference principle’ for all citizens over the course of their complete lives, including their childhoods. Third, the provision of leisure time in this way supports the realization of childhood goods for citizens. (shrink)

Contemporary empirical research on virtues has been promising, but limited in depth and value by investigators’ reliance on global self-report questionnaires obtained at a single time-point. These questionnaires require respondents to summarize their trait features in very broad state-ments or focus narrowly on specific behaviors. Properly understood, virtues are partly constitut-ed by appropriate motivations in response to the real-world environment and integrated with the actor’s self—features that are not accessible using the predominant research methods. Our central aim is to deepen (...) virtue research with intensive longitudinal measurement of virtu-ous activity, which includes behavior, motivation, self-congruence, and situational factors. We will assess participants’ real-world activity four times per day over a 14-day period with respect to two pervasive virtues: fairness and kindness. We will then conduct narrative interviews with a subset of participants about virtue in their lives. We will assess motivation in three ways and the integration of the behavior with the self in three ways. These innovative methods will enable us to use cutting-edge psychological methods to investigate sophisticated philosophic questions about whether and how people's capacity for virtuous activity depends on their achieving self-integration - both across time and across personal contexts. (shrink)

The first principle of Rawls’s conception of justice secures a set of ‘basic liberties’ equally for all citizens within the constitutional structure of society. The ‘worth’ of citizens’ liberties, however, may vary depending upon their wealth. Against Rawls, Cohen contends that an absence of money often can directly constrain citizens’ freedom and not simply its worth. This is because money often can remove legally enforced constraints on what citizens can do. Cohen’s argument – if modified to apply to citizens’ ‘moral (...) powers’ rather than ‘negative liberty’ – threatens a core feature of Rawls’s conception of justice, as it is unclear why the parties within the ‘original position’ would endorse the lexical priority of the first principle over the ‘difference principle’ if both principles similarly shape citizens’ freedom. I concede Cohen’s point regarding the relation between freedom and money but argue that it is not fatal to Rawls’s conception of justice if the ‘basic needs principle’ is understood to enjoy lexical priority over the first principle and is modified to include a right to adequate discretionary time. Nonetheless, Cohen’s argument helpfully highlights the infelicitous nature of Rawls’s terminology with respect to liberty: the basic needs principle, the first principle and the difference principle all should be understood as shaping citizens’ freedom to exercise their moral powers. (shrink)

John Rawls claims that the kind of citizenship education required by political liberalism demands ‘far less’ than that required by comprehensive liberalism. Many educational and political theorists who have explored the implications of political liberalism for education policy have disputed Rawls's claim. Writing from a comprehensive liberal perspective, Amy Gutmann contends that the justificatory differences between political and comprehensive liberalism generally have no practical significance for citizenship education. Political liberals such as Stephen Macedo and Victoria Costa maintain that political liberalism (...) requires a form of citizenship education that is far more demanding than that suggested by Rawls. Gordon Davis and Blain Neufeld, in contrast, defend Rawls's position. These different views have implications for the content of mandatory citizenship education, understanding of the ‘common school ideal,’ and the scope for educational choice within the framework of political liberalism. However, the differences between Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa, on the one hand, and Davis and Neufeld, on the other, might be attributable, at least in part, to their different foci. Gutmann, Macedo, and Costa focus on non-ideal theory, specifically the contemporary American context, whereas Davis and Neufeld begin, as does Rawls, within ideal theory, and consider non-ideal circumstances from that perspective. (shrink)

We solve a longstanding problem by providing a denotational model for nondeterministic programs that identifies two programs iff they have the same range of possible behaviours. We discuss the difficulties with traditional approaches, where divergence is bottom or where a term denotes a function from a set of environments. We see that making forcing explicit, in the manner of game semantics, allows us to avoid these problems.We begin by modelling a first-order language with sequential I/O and unbounded nondeterminism. Then we (...) extend the model to a calculus with higher-order and recursive types, by adapting standard game semantics. Traditional adequacy proofs using logical relations are not applicable, so we use instead a novel hiding and unhiding argument. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that John Rawls’s account of political liberalism requires a conception of mutual respect that differs from the one advanced in A Theory of Justice. We formulate such a political liberal form of mutual respect, which we call ‘civic respect.’ We also maintain that core features of political liberalism – in particular, the ideas of ‘the burdens of judgment’ and ‘public reason’ – do not commit political liberalism to an ideal of personal autonomy, contrary to claims (...) made by various commentators. Furthermore, we maintain that teaching the idea of ‘public reason’ to students in civic education courses does not threaten their ‘ethical integrity.’ On the basis of these points, we maintain – against political and educational theorists like Eamonn Callan and Amy Gutmann – that political liberalism permits a wider range of educational policy options, including some ‘school choice’ policies, than most forms of comprehensive liberalism. We conclude the article by considering some such policies. (shrink)

Suggests that contemporary marriage is at the heart of a serious cultural paradox that renders it strongly valued, but rather brittle. Scientific and therapeutic approaches to this dilemma have had limited success in resolving this problem because professionals have accepted and promoted the popular aspiration of personal fulfillment through marriage, which may have engendered the fragility of marriage. The author provides a brief hermeneutic account designed to make the incoherence of contemporary marriage more intelligible, and to clarify the moral dimension (...) of psychology. Marital research illustrates how a hermeneutic perspective can guide a specific research domain in becoming more responsive to the essential social and ethical concerns that animate it. Suggestions for how researchers can explore why marriage is so central to modern life are offered. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Scientists, engineers, and healthcare professionals are currently developing a variety of new devices under the category of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs). Current and future applications are both medical/assistive (e.g., for communication) and non-medical (e.g., for gaming). This array of possibilities comes with ethical challenges for all stakeholders. As a result, BCIs have been an object of both hope and concern in various media. We argue that these conflicting sentiments can be productively understood in terms of personhood, specifically the impact of BCIs (...) on what it means to be a person and to be recognized as such by others. To understand the dynamics of personhood in the context of BCI use and investigate whether ethical guidance is required, a meeting entitled "BCIs and Personhood: A Deliberative Workshop" was held in May 2018. In this article, we describe how BCIs raise important questions about personhood and propose recommendations for BCI development and governance. (shrink)