Ever since Kant asked: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that (...) it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions. (shrink)

Teachers in vocational education face two problems. (1) Learning involves the ability to transcend and modify learned knowledge to new circumstances. How should vocational education prepare students for future, unknown tasks? (2) Students should strive to produce work of good quality. How does vocational education help them develop their faculty of judgment to differentiate between better and worse quality? These two ques- tions are tightly interwoven. The paper compares the didactics of philosophy and sloyd. Both developed independently, but their solutions (...) to how one advances the capacity for reflective judgment are similar. Central to this capacity is not merely devising efficient means to work towards pre-existing aims, but to reflect in practice on what one’s aim are and should be. This implies reflection on what future problems, as well as solutions to them, demand of us cognitively, socially and morally. (shrink)

Interactions and conversations with children, caretakers and other pedagogues take central stage in early childhood education. In this article, we investigate how future teachers in early childhood education reflect on dialogues and their own participation in practical conversation training from Philosophy for Children. We discuss these in the light of the triad address-responsiveness-responsibility, which has been considered central to genuine dialogues in dialogical ethics. In our study, the students´ express discomfort at the need to discuss matters in a manner that (...) is new to them, but also think that this form of conversation helps them to listen more actively to others. This insight about the difficulty of listening, and the possibility of developing into better listeners, is of significance in the formation of their professional identity and practice. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how to conceptualise the kind of difficulties students in early childhood education encountered in articulating their thoughts and in listening to others in the initial stages of a CoI. With examples from their course diaries, we illustrate what sense it makes to consider the thinking the CoI promotes as centrally embodied, extended, embedded and enacted. We consider their difficulties, not as external obstacles to expressing their thought, but as difficulties that are internal to thinking (...) itself, in the sense that thinking implicates the skillful participation in a shared practice that involves us as embodied human beings, enculturated in a context that carries much of the meaning of our situation, engaged in activities that are centrally social, and dependent on interaction with others, who on a fundamental level shape what it is possible for us to think. (shrink)

This article clarifies the fundamental difference between empirical and conceptual questions in education. In the ongoing debate about the role of philosophy of education, many authors either unreflectively assume or actively demand that philosophy of education should try to adapt to science. Through a discussion of the possibilities of a child to open up to educational processes the article illustrates how philosophical reflection on education fundamentally differs in character from empirical approaches. It suggests that one important task for philosophy of (...) education is to clarify what questions can be answered empirically from those that are constitutive of our understanding of education. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is used as a central starting point in this article. (shrink)