Ben shu yi jian ming e yao de bi chu xiang du zhe ti gong le yi fu quan jing shi de xi fang mei xue li shi hua juan.Qi nei rong han gai cong gu xi la,Luo ma zhi dao 20 shi ji de xi fang mei xue si xiang he li lun cheng guo,Qi zhong yi li lun xing tai de mei xue si xiang wei zhu gan,Tong shi she ji wen xue yi shu yi ji (...) she hui feng shang suo ti xian de shen mei yi shi. (shrink)
Based on the strict definitions of concepts, such as deduction, the deduction rule and the deduction system, the form axiom, the substantive axiom, this article clearly shows the essence of the deductive reasoning, namely “Related attribute and the related restriction relations, which are conveyed in what the main concept of the deduction refers to, must be contained in those conveyed in what the premise proposition refers to”。Then puts forward the theorem “contradiction can not be derived from the strict deduction system”, (...) and gives the proofs. (shrink)
Di 1 ce. Cang shan ji, zi cang ji shi, "Xin zi xue" gou xiang -- di 2 ce. Zhi yan lu -- di 3 ce. Shang lin ji -- di 4 ce. Cun ya tang yi gao jiao bu -- di 5 ce. Nan Song yi min shi ren qun ti yan jiu, Zhuangzi shi ri tan -- di 6 ce. Zhuangzi shu mu ti yao -- di 7 ce. Zhuangzi xue shi (yi) -- di 8 ce. Zhuangzi xue (...) shi (er) -- di 9 ce. Zhuangzi xue shi (san) -- di 10 ce. Zhuangzi xue shi (si) -- di 11 ce. Zhuangzi xue shi (wu) -- di 12 ce. Zhuangzi xue shi (lu) -- di 13 ce. Zhuang xue shi lüe -- di 14 ce. Zhuangzi quan ping (shang) -- di 15 ce. Zhuangzi quan ping (xia) -- di 16 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (yi) -- di 17 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (er) -- di 18 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (san) -- di 19 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (si) -- di 20 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (wu) -- di 21 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (lu) -- di 22 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (qi) -- di 23 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (ba) -- di 24 ce. Zhuangzi zuan yao (jiu) -- di 25 ce. Zhuangzi jin gu (shang) -- di 26 ce. Zhuangzi jin gu (xia) -- di 27 ce. Mengzi jin gu -- di 28 ce. Mozi jin gu -- di 29 ce. -- Xunzi jin gu -- di 30 ce. Zhou Han wen chao -- di 31 ce. Shu jing lüe ying. (shrink)
ObjectivesWuhan is the city where coronavirus disease was first reported and developed into a pandemic. However, the impact of the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic on medical staff burnout remains limited. We aimed to identify the prevalence and major determinants of burnout among medical staff 1 year after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan, China.Materials and MethodsA total of 1,602 medical staff from three hospitals in Wuhan, China, were included from November 1–28, 2021. Chi-square tests were conducted to compare the (...) prevalence of burnout across groups based on sociodemographic and professional characteristics. A multivariate analysis was performed using a forward stepwise logistic regression model.ResultsApproximately 37.39% of the medical staff experienced burnout 1 year after COVID-19 pandemic. Emotional exhaustion was the most common symptom of burnout, with 1,422 participants reporting a severe EE. Burnout was associated with insufficient social support and “neutral” or “dissatisfied” patient-physician relationships. Respondents who participated in the care of COVID-19 patients had a higher risk of burnout symptoms than those who did not participate. In particular, mental resilience was negatively associated with burnout among the medical staff.ConclusionNearly two-fifths of the participants had symptoms of burnout, with reduced personal accomplishment being the predominant symptom 1 year after COVID-19. Healthcare organizations should regularly measure and monitor burnout among the medical staff. In addition, creating positive work environments and improving the mental resilience of medical staff may be effective ways to reduce burnout. (shrink)
This paper demonstrated the influences of initiation, development, turn-down, and reinitiation of the dynamic capability of an entrepreneurial firm in the solar energy industry. The focus is on the impact of entrepreneurial hubris, which may affect the decision of ambidexterity that can vitalize dynamic capability. The findings indicate that, when the major decision maker has the trait of hubris, the decision-making process may be overly arbitrary, and a decision of being exploratory or exploitative alone is likely to be made. On (...) the contrary, when the founder entrepreneur is aware of the hubris and shares decisive power, the decision of being ambidextrous as a dynamic capability is more freely achieved. This paper contributes by discovery of the cognitive-based microfoundation of entrepreneurial ventures and linkage of such microfoundation to organizational ambidexterity. (shrink)
The ideas of fixed points (Kripke in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 53–81, 1975; Martin and Woodruff in Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox. Clarendon Press, London, pp 47–51, 1984) and revision sequences (Gupta and Belnap in The revision theory of truth. MIT, London, 1993; Gupta in The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic. Blackwell, London, pp 90–114, 2001) have been exploited to provide solutions to the semantic paradox and have achieved admirable (...) success. This happy situation naturally encourages one to look for other philosophical areas of their further applications where paradoxical results seem to follow from intuitively acceptable principles. In this paper, I propose to extend the use of these ideas to give two new treatments of abstract objects. Sections 1 and 2 below check several abstractionist theories and their main defects. Section 3 shows how the two ideas can be applied to generate consistent theories of abstract objects without any ad hoc restriction on any principle. (shrink)
In order to reply to the contemporary skeptic’s argument for the conclusion that we don’t have any empirical knowledge about the external world, several authors have proposed different fallibilist theories of knowledge that reject the epistemic closure principle. Holliday, 1–62 2015a), however, shows that almost all of them suffer from either the problem of containment or the problem of vacuous knowledge or both. Furthermore, Holliday suggests that the fallibilist should allow a proposition to have multiple sets of relevant alternatives, each (...) of which is sufficient while none is necessary, if all its members are eliminated, for knowing that proposition. Not completely satisfied with Holliday’s multi-path reply to the skeptic, the author suggests a new single-path relevant-possibility theory of knowledge and argues that it can avoid both the problem of containment and the problem of vacuous knowledge of a certain sort while rejecting skepticism about the external world. (shrink)
Against the backdrop of economic internationalization and market globalization, the world has witnessed faster competitive contents with a more dynamic market environment, a more rapid technological innovation, and more diverse customer needs. Thus, for every enterprise especially led by entrepreneurs, the focus is to maintain the sustainability of competitive advantages and dynamically transform core capacity to avoid rigidity. This paper introduces the process of the deepened rigidity in WS Co. Company, which occurs due to the wrong cognition of Dr. S (...) and his teams who managed or failed to respond to the rigidity encountered by the company during different periods. The rigidity of its capacity is believed to be caused by the cognitive errors of the entrepreneur and his team facing every period of potential rigidity, which makes them fail to deal with it, thus leading to complete rigidity. This paper intends to explain how rigidity takes shape from the cognitive aspect of senior managers, which may serve as illuminations for the similar enterprises led by entrepreneurs. (shrink)
Gideon Rosen proposes a view called "modal fictionalism" which Rosen thinks has all the benefits of modal realism without its ontological costs. Whereas modal realists have a paraphrase r(0) of a modal claim "0", modal fictionalists claim that the correct translation of "0" is rather the result of prefixing "according to the hypothesis of a plurality of worlds" to r(0). Rosen takes the prefix to be primitive and defines other modal notions in terms of it. Bob Hale, however, thinks the (...) fictionalist's project suffers from a "simple" dilemma. The purpose of this paper is to show that Rosen is right in taking the prefix as primitive and Hale is wrong in thinking fictionalism as being threatened by the dilemma. (shrink)
In several articles, Putnam claims that the direct reference theory (DRT) he endorses has startling consequence for the theory of necessary truth and essentialism, for if DRT is correct, so he claims, it follows that things belonging to natural kinds have their deep structures necessarily. Inspired by Donnellan, Nathan Salmon tries to spell out what Putnam seems to have in mind when making the claim, and Salmon calls the result "the OK mechanism". Salmon shows, in the OK mechanism, it is (...) not DRT, but some other essentialism-entailing premise, that has the claimed startling consequence. In this paper, I argue that Salmon's OK is not the right interpretation of Putnam's intended mechanism. Instead, I present Putnam's intention as the OK* mechanism, and show that, in OK*, DRT does have the startling consequence for the theory of necessary truth and essentialism when supplemented only with other metaphysically innocent, purely empirically verifiable premises. (shrink)
This essay is a study of Non-actualism, the thesis that there are objects which do not exist. There are several difficulties surrounding this thesis. First, there is the question about how to make sense of this very thesis. Second, there is the problem about what evidences there are for such a thesis. Third, there is a serious doubt about whether such thesis can be held consistently. ;The first question is usually claimed to be answered by Non-actualists by distinguishing two kinds (...) of quantifiers: existential quantifiers and a "broader" sort of quantifiers. My suggestion in this essay is, however, that there is a more ordinary use of the phrase "there is" which makes the Non-actualist thesis perfectly intelligible. After clarifying what I mean by "Non-actualism", especially after clarifying what the phrase "there is" is used to mean, I go on to check what evidences there are for such a doctrine. In the literature, three different sorts of evidences are usually cited by Non-actualists to defend their positions: fictional talk, modal talk, and our experiences about things not existing. I reject the first two but endorse the last one mainly on the ground that non-actual talk is subject to different interpretations and is only remotely related to ontological issues. However, there still is a threat of inconsistency for those Non-actualists who want to defend their positions from the empirical or phenomenological aspect. In this essay, I distinguish three kinds of paradoxes that a Non-actualist has to solve, and show their independence. I call them, separately, the Sosein Paradox, the Sein Paradox and the Cardinality Paradox. Further, I show that most Non-actualist theories which are designed mainly to solve these paradoxes do not really accomplish their task. But, to our surprise, there is a Meinongian thought which solves these paradoxes quite naturally, even though it did not aim at such a solution when it was developed. And I attribute this theory to Butchvarov. (shrink)
Disagreeing with most authors on vagueness, the author proposes a solution that he calls ‘three-valued semantic pluralism’ to the age-old sorites paradox. In essence, it is a three-valued semantics for a first-order vague language with identity with the additional suggestion that a vague language has more than one correct interpretation. Unlike the traditional three-valued approach to a vague language, three-valued semantic pluralism can accommodate the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and the phenomenon of penumbral connection when equipped with ‘suitable conditionals’. The (...) author also shows that three-valued semantic pluralism is a natural consequence of a restricted form of the Tolerance principle ) and a few related ideas, and argues that ) is well-motivated by considerations about how we learn, teach, and use vague predicates. (shrink)
I show in this paper how Putnam’s model-theoretical argument can be modified so as to generate a new general tool for Nominalism. I call such a tool “Ockham’s New Razor”. Section I illustrates how the model-theoretical technique that I have in mind can be applied to argue against Meinongian theories. Section II shows how the technique can be generalized to other cases as well. It also contains a brief discussion of the major assumption in the technique. Section III discusses possible (...) objections to my so-called “Ockham’s New Razor”. (shrink)
