By definition irony is surprising, an undermining of assumptions in comparing alternative scenarios. It should, therefore, contribute to innovative planning, especially when questioning assumptions is important. Using creative thinking about new types of international conflict as examples, this article considers roles of irony in developing innovative plans. The research compares a detailed analysis of Bernard Shaw's prescient insights at the beginning of WWI to current discourses on international conflicts. The Shaw study identifies the overt irony in an early essay (...) about the Great War, using a protocol designed to isolate ironies in comparisons of expected and unexpected situations (scripts and script anomalies). It then examines the integration of the identified ironies with nonironic thinking in Shaw's 1914 proposal for a Western European mutual defense pact. This example shows how irony can be part of a complex and ongoing thought process, playing pivotal roles in the movement from widely held assumptions to innovative plans. The discussion then considers the importance of such ironic thinking in current American discourse. (shrink)

Jecker, et al., argue against rejecting a location for an international bioethics conference based on a “litmus test” for several reasons, ranging from the practical to the theoretical. However, th...

Debates over health care have focused for so long on economics that the proper goals for medicine seem to be taken for granted; yet problems in health care stem as much from a lack of agreement about the goals and priorities of medicine as from the way systems function. This book asks basic questions about the purposes and ends of medicine and shows that the answers have practical implications for future health care delivery, medical research, and the education of medical (...) students. The Hastings Center coordinated teams of physicians, nurses, public health experts, philosophers, theologians, politicians, health care administrators, social workers, and lawyers in fourteen countries to explore these issues. In this volume, they articulate four basic goals of medicine — prevention of disease, relief of suffering, care of the ill, and avoidance of premature death — and examine them in light of the cultural, political, and economic pressures under which medicine functions. In reporting these findings, the contributors touch on a wide range of diverse issues such as genetic technology, Chinese medicine, care of the elderly, and prevention and public health. The Goals of Medicine clearly demonstrates the importance of clarifying the purposes of medicine before attempting to change the economic and organizational systems. It warns that without such examination, any reform efforts may be fruitless. (shrink)

Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling is one of the most widely read works of Continental philosophy and the philosophy of religion. While several commentaries and critical editions exist, Jeffrey Hanson offers a distinctive approach to this crucial text. Hanson gives equal weight and attention to all three of Kierkegaard’s "problems," dealing with Fear and Trembling as part of the entire corpus of Kierkegaard's production and putting all parts into relation with each other. Additionally, he offers a distinctive analysis (...) of the Abraham story and other biblical texts, giving particular attention to questions of poetics, language, and philosophy, especially as each relates to the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Presented in a thoughtful, well-informed, and fresh manner, Hanson’s claims are original and edifying. This new reading of Kierkegaard will stimulate fruitful dialogue on well-traveled philosophical ground. (shrink)

On a rainy day in May 1988, a lowland gorilla named Willie B. stepped outdoors for the first time in twenty-seven years, into a new landscape immersion exhibit. Born in Africa, Willie B. had been captured by an animal collector and sold to a zoo. During the decades he spent in a cage, zoos stopped collecting animals from the wild and Americans changed the ways they wished to view animals in the zoo. Zoos developed new displays to simulate landscapes like (...) the Amazon River basin and African forests. Exhibits similar to animals' natural habitats began to replace old-fashioned animal houses. But such displays are only the most recent effort of zoos to present their audiences with an authentic experience of nature. Since the first zoological park opened in the United States in Philadelphia in 1874, zoos have promised their visitors a journey into the natural world. And for more than a century they have been popular places for education and recreation: every year more than 130 million Americans go to zoos to look at the animals and enjoy a day outdoors. The first book-length history of American zoos, Animal Attractions examines the meaning of nature in the city by looking at the ways zoos have assembled and displayed their animal collections. Situated literally and culturally in the American middle landscape, zoos are concrete expressions of longstanding tensions between wildness and civilization, science and popular culture, education and entertainment. In their efforts to promote nature appreciation, they reveal much about how our culture envisions the natural world and the human place in it and how these ideas have changed. (shrink)

This chapter assesses realistic social implications of emulation (em). It takes the somewhat unusual approach of using basic social theory, in addition to common sense and trend projection, to forecast future societies. Em cities are likely toxic to ordinary humans, who, controlling most of the rest of the Earth, mostly live comfortably on their em‐economy investments. Em's extended lifespans induce greater wealth inequality among ems. Ems focus their identity less on individual personalities and abilities, and more on being part of (...) a particular team. While copy clans coordinate to show off common clan abilities, individual ems focus on showing their identities, abilities, and loyalties as team players. The analysis in this chapter suggests that lives in the next great era might be as different from what we are accustomed to as ours are from farmers' lives, or farmers' from foragers'. (shrink)

In Morality Bernard Williams confronts the problems of writing moral philosophy, and offers a stimulating alternative to more systematic accounts which seem nevertheless to have left all the important issues somewhere off the page.

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical motives for (...) his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

Descartes has often been called the 'father of modern philosophy'. His attempts to find foundations for knowledge, and to reconcile the existence of the soul with the emerging science of his time, are among the most influential and widely studied in the history of philosophy. This is a classic and challenging introduction to Descartes by one of the most distinguished modern philosophers. Bernard Williams not only analyzes Descartes' project of founding knowledge on certainty, but uncovers the philosophical motives for (...) his search. With acute insight, he demonstrates how Descartes' _Meditations _are not merely a description but the very enactment of philosophical thought and discovery. Williams covers all of the key areas of Descartes' thought, including God, the will, the possibility of knowledge, and the mind and its place in nature. He also makes profound contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and philosophy generally. With a new foreword by John Cottingham. (shrink)

Providing theoretical and applied analyses of Michel Henry's practical philosophy in light of his guiding idea of Life, this is the first sustained exploration of Henry's practical thought in anglophone literature, reaffirming his centrality to contemporary continental thought. This book ranges from the tension between his methodological insistence on life as non-intentional and worldly activities to Henry's engagement with the practical philosophy of intellectuals such as Marx, Freud, and Kandisky to topics of application such as labor, abstract art, education, political (...) liberalism, and spiritual life. An international team of leading Henry scholars examine a vital dimension of Henry's thinking that has remained under-explored for too long. (shrink)

We have been discussing some of the fundamental features of the classical calculus of probability. The equiprobability of rival events was seen to be a major assumption of the calculus. Moreover, it is an assumption which the pure mathematician need not bother to justify. He need only present his formal system as follows.

Generic language (e.g., “tigers have stripes”) leads children to assume that the referenced category (e.g., tigers) is inductively informative and provides a causal explanation for the behavior of individual members. In two preregistered studies with 4- to 7-year-old children (N = 497), we considered the mechanisms underlying these effects by testing how correcting generics might affect the development of these beliefs about novel social and animal kinds (Study 1) and about gender (Study 2). Correcting generics by narrowing their scope to (...) a single individual limited beliefs that the referenced categories could explain what their members would be like while broadening the scope to a superordinate category (Study 2) uniquely limited endorsement of gender norms. Across both studies, correcting generics did not alter beliefs about feature heritability and had mixed effects on inductive inferences, suggesting that additional mechanisms (e.g., causal reasoning about shared features) contribute to the development of full-blown essentialist beliefs. These results help illuminate the mechanisms by which generics lead children to view categories as having rich inductive and causal potential; in particular, they suggest that children interpret generics as signals that speakers in their community view the referenced categories as meaningful kinds that support generalization. The findings also point the way to concrete suggestions for how adults can effectively correct problematic generics (e.g., gender stereotypes) that children may hear in daily life. (shrink)

This book presents the thought of the Kyoto School in comparison with continental philosophers better known in the West and addresses the affiliation of some of its members with the militarism of the 1930s and 1940s.

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction (...) decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed. (shrink)

Creativity is something that everyone talks about but how did this concept originate? With roots in nineteenth century philosophy, our current idea of creativity has emerged largely from psychological theories since the early twentieth century. Michael Hanchett Hanson has woven together the history of the development of the psychological theories of creativity with social constructivist views of power dynamics and pragmatic insights into the use of this powerful concept. Worldmaking: Psychology and the Ideology of Creativity provides an engaging and (...) thought-provoking analysis of interest to anyone who uses the idea of creativity, from psychologists and philosophers to artists, educators and business leaders. (shrink)

Motivated by a characterization of weakly compact cardinals due to Todorcevic, we introduce a new cardinal characteristic, the C-sequence number, which can be seen as a measure of the compactness of a regular uncountable cardinal. We prove a number of ZFC and independence results about the C-sequence number and its relationship with large cardinals, stationary reflection, and square principles. We then introduce and study the more general C-sequence spectrum and uncover some tight connections between the C-sequence spectrum and the strong (...) coloring principle U(. . .), introduced in Part I of this series. (shrink)

We investigate questions involving Aronszajn trees, square principles, and stationary reflection. We first consider two strengthenings of introduced by Brodsky and Rinot for the purpose of constructing κ‐Souslin trees. Answering a question of Rinot, we prove that the weaker of these strengthenings is compatible with stationary reflection at κ but the stronger is not. We then prove that, if μ is a singular cardinal, implies the existence of a special ‐tree with a cf(μ)‐ascent path, thus answering a question of Lücke.

How I became a philosopher -- To love, to love me, to love us.

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)

Viale introduced covering matrices in his proof that SCH follows from PFA. In the course of the proof and subsequent work with Sharon, he isolated two reflection principles, CP and S, which, under certain circumstances, are satisfied by all covering matrices of a certain shape. Using square sequences, we construct covering matrices for which CP and S fail. This leads naturally to an investigation of square principles intermediate between □κ and □ for a regular cardinal κ. We provide a detailed (...) picture of the implications between these square principles. (shrink)

With all the research on mind/brain connections these days -- Your brain in lust or love! While gambling or feeling envious! While meditating, praying, or having an out-of-body experience! -- it’s natural to wonder about ’big questions’ about the relationships among the mind, the brain, and God. For instance, some people have taken the findings that some spiritual experiences have neural correlates to mean that the hand of God is at work in the brain. Others have interpreted the same research (...) to mean that spiritual experiences are "just" neural, and thus evidence against the existence of God or other supernatural forces. These debates are updated versions of longstanding philosophical and religious wrestlings with how God and nature might or might not intertwine. What’s your own gut view, right now, as a kind of snapshot: Do you think that God is involved in some way in your thoughts and feelings? In your most intimate sense of being? In this essay, we’ll explore what mind, brain, and. (shrink)

This book contributes to current bioethical debates by providing a critical analysis of the philosophy of human death. Bernard N. Schumacher discusses contemporary philosophical perspectives on death, creating a dialogue between phenomenology, existentialism, and analytic philosophy. He also examines the ancient philosophies that have shaped our current ideas about death. His analysis focuses on three fundamental problems: (1) the definition of human death, (2) the knowledge of mortality and of human death as such, and (3) the question of whether (...) death is nothing to us or, on the contrary, whether it can be regarded as an absolute or relative evil. Drawing on scholarship published in four languages and from three distinct currents of thought, this volume represents a comprehensive and systematic study of the philosophy of death, one that provides a provocative basis for discussions of the bioethics of human mortality. (shrink)

When attempting to answer the question, in the context of clinical healthcare, one might be tempted to leap to either of two rather obvious, but seemingly contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, we might have a general impression of religion not making much of a distinctive and clear difference, at least in the actions and outcomes of most cases of clinical interaction. Those of us in the bioethics world of discourse are likely to think only of the less common cases (...) of Christian Scientists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Orthodox Jews, or certain religious groups who seem to the majority of the population to hold especially sectarian, if not beliefs about medical matters. The so-called mainstream religious groups do not get much attention because they largely don't cause much trouble ; they have learned to bracket their religious commitments from at least any professional settings ; or they don't hold views entailing consequences any different from those of most nonbelieving, generally upright individuals. Furthermore, although religious believers may have some distinctive views, these views don't often noticeably manifest themselves in distinctive or significant ways. (shrink)

We continue our study of strongly unbounded colorings, this time focusing on subadditive maps. In Part I of this series, we showed that, for many pairs of infinite cardinals $\theta < \kappa $, the existence of a strongly unbounded coloring $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is a theorem of $\textsf{ZFC}$. Adding the requirement of subadditivity to a strongly unbounded coloring is a significant strengthening, though, and here we see that in many cases the existence of a subadditive strongly unbounded coloring (...) $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is independent of $\textsf{ZFC}$. We connect the existence of subadditive strongly unbounded colorings with a number of other infinitary combinatorial principles, including the narrow system property, the existence of $\kappa $ -Aronszajn trees with ascent paths, and square principles. In particular, we show that the existence of a closed, subadditive, strongly unbounded coloring $c:[\kappa ]^2 \rightarrow \theta $ is equivalent to a certain weak indexed square principle $\boxminus ^{\operatorname {\mathrm {ind}}}(\kappa, \theta )$. We conclude the paper with an application to the failure of the infinite productivity of $\kappa $ -stationarily layered posets, answering a question of Cox. (shrink)

_Explores Schelling’s Essay on Human Freedom, focusing on the themes of freedom, evil, and love, and the relationship between his ideas and those of Plato and Kant._.

[Anne:] “I can't, I'm in the depths of despair. Can you eat when you are in the depths of despair?”“I've never been in the depths of despair, so I can't say,” said Marilla.“Weren't you? Well did you ever try to imagine you were in the depths of despair?”” No, I didn't.”“Then I don't think you can understand what it's like. It's a very uncomfortable feeling indeed. When you try to eat a lump comes right up in your throat and you (...) can't swallow anything, not even if it was a chocolate caramel.”—L.M. Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables.Emotion, as a “suprarational” property, transcends rationality in that it can be thought of as a group, contextual rather than as a solely individual trait, and thus is a higher order property, as the above quote suggests. This proposal arises from a metatheoretical analysis of models available to broach questions of emotion. I use metatheoretical in the sense of both the context of theory production and the theory of theory. From the first arose the idea that emotion, through the use of irrationality, has surfaced as a working equivalent to inexplicability or rational relativity, and can be modelled more adequately as suprarational, with a unique nature in its own right. The latter led me to propose that the concept of emotion as contextual, a higher order group level property, is possible and tentatively profitable. (shrink)

Parallogic models the relationship between mind and context. It, as does the excerpt above, suggests that systems of logic are context specific and therefore parallel. This model points out that perceived departures in mental process, reasoning, may be more apparent than real. It also suggests a new way to conceive of mental illness by separating breakdowns in mental process from shifts in mental process.

Epistemic decolonization, in its various conceptual formulations and presentations, could be taken to hold promise for either the completion of the anti-colonial struggle or the self-re-discovery of the formerly colonized and oppressed. In Africa this project has had a long history as both a counter to hegemonic histories of claimed Western epistemological superiority as well as theories of racism and racist practices against black people of African descent. What is not entirely clear are the precise achievements of decolonial thought and (...) practice. I interrogate the relevance, use and continuation of decoloniality as a genre of thought and practice on the African continent against the background of the perennial problems of material underdevelopment and stifled political spaces that render the supposed beneficiaries of decolonization hopeless subjects who continue to be disempowered and oppressed in their own home. This interrogation is to be carried alongside another inquiry aimed at evaluating the achievements of African philosophy as a form of epistemic decolonization. If African philosophy is a form of decolonization, as it should be, it should be able to clearly demonstrate its achievements and how they have had an effect on broader goals of decolonizing and empowering inhabitants of the African continent. (shrink)

For Henry the question ‘Can the truth be learned?’ is as much an aporia as it was for Kierkegaard, and both thinkers ask this question not in order to solve some abstract or pedantic epistemological issue but because the truth they seek is the one that is appropriate to human beings and their salvation. This paper examines Henry’s and Kierkegaard’s answers to the question of how the truth is learned, and in the course of this examination will necessarily have occasion (...) to compare the two thinkers’ accounts of paradox and the phenomenality of Christ, two themes that bring into focus the nature of truth in both thinkers. The paper begins with an analysis of Henry’s theory of two truths, one of the world and the other of life. These two truths collide in the crucial eleventh chapter of I Am the Truth, which elucidates Henry’s understanding of paradox and the role it plays in his phenomenology. Finally, the paper entertains some questions for his theory that a Kierkegaardian might raise. Throughout it can be seen that despite his appreciation of Kierkegaard, Henry’s account of paradox and the specific mode of revelation that is appropriate to the Christ deviates from the Dane’s theory. Furthermore, it would seem that in a similar fashion their understandings of what counts as a paradox ultimately differ in such a way that Henry’s supposed paradoxes turn out to be by his own admission merely apparent, whereas for Kierkegaard (and perhaps in this respect his theory is a bit closer to ordinary intuitions about what it means for a truth to be paradoxical), paradox is an ineradicable feature of the highest kind of truth as reason confronts it. The thesis then that for Henry paradox and the tension between two kinds of truth are merely apparent whereas for Kierkegaard they are intensified is not merely of interest in establishing a proper reading of each respective thinker; it affects our understanding of the phenomenological notions of world, truth, and the absolute as well as establishing divergences of considerable theological interest. What is at stake is the exact status of the kind of truth phenomenology will privilege and the bearing that this question has upon the nature of the world and phenomenality. (shrink)

Originally published in 1910, Principia Mathematica led to the development of mathematical logic and computers and thus to information sciences. It became a model for modern analytic philosophy and remains an important work. In the late 1960s the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University in Canada obtained Russell's papers, letters and library. These archives contained the manuscripts for the new Introduction and three Appendices that Russell added to the second edition in 1925. Also included was another manuscript, 'The Hierarchy of (...) Propositions and Functions', which was divided up and re-used to create the final changes for the second edition. These documents provide fascinating insight, including Russell's attempts to work out the theorems in the flawed Appendix B, 'On Induction'. An extensive introduction describes the stages of the manuscript material on the way to print and analyzes the proposed changes in the context of the development of symbolic logic after 1910. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there can be genuine (as opposed to merely verbal) disputes about whether a sentence form is logically true or an argument form is valid. I call such disputes ?cases of deviance?, of which I distinguish a weak and a strong form. Weak deviance holds if one disputant is right and the other wrong, but the available evidence is insufficient to determine which is which. Strong deviance holds if there is no fact of the matter. (...) In section 2 I argue that weak deviance need not be trivial and may even be interesting. Section 3 considers what it could mean to say that logic is determined by a theory, especially a theory of meaning, an idea that arises in section 2. In section 4 I discuss the dispute between classical and relevance logicians over entailment and argue that it is a case of strong deviance. Finally, in section 5 I show that the result of the previous section is not absolute but relative to the background logic used in reaching it. (shrink)

We give a formalism for approximate isomorphism in continuous logic simultaneously generalizing those of two papers by Ben Yaacov [2] and by Ben Yaacov, Doucha, Nies, and Tsankov [6], which are largely incompatible. With this we explicitly exhibit Scott sentences for the perturbation systems of the former paper, such as the Banach‐Mazur distance and the Lipschitz distance between metric spaces. Our formalism is simultaneously characterized syntactically by a mild generalization of perturbation systems and semantically by certain elementary classes of two‐sorted (...) structures that witness approximate isomorphism. As an application, we show that the theory of any ‐tree or ultrametric space of finite radius is stable, improving a result of Carlisle and Henson [8]. (shrink)

The main idea -- The functioning of a neuron -- Brain structure and function -- The general structure of the neural network -- Instincts, emotions, free will -- The nature of mental objects -- The rise and essence of (self-)consciousness -- Artificial intelligence -- Cognitive limitations of man.

Part I. Phenomenology -- Phenomenology and the return to beginnings -- Delimitations: phenomenology and the end of metaphysics -- Part II. Sallis's Plato interpretation -- Being and logos: reading the Platonic dialogues -- Chorology: on beginning in Plato's Timaeus -- Platonic legacies -- Part III. Art/Sallis -- Stone -- Shades-of painting at the limit -- Topographies -- Part IV. Sallis and other thinkers -- The gathering of reason -- Spacings-of reason and imagination in texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel -- Echoes: (...) after Heidegger -- Crossings: Nietzsche and the space of tragedy -- Part V. Sallis speaks directly -- Double truth -- Force of imagination: the sense of the elemental -- On translation -- The Sallis/Derrida dialogue -- Derrida's "Tense" and Sallis's The verge of philosophy. (shrink)

Peu de philosophes contemporains choisissent de faire vivre leurs outils critiques grâce au terreau d'une association, d'un collectif. C'est le cas de Bernard Stiegler, qui a fondé Ars Industrialis en 2005. Le manifeste de l'association, Réenchanter le monde (Flammarion, 2005 ; 7400 ventes en Champs), devait connaître un grand retentissement. Depuis, les travaux et contributions fleurissent (de l'économiste André Gréau au comédien Robin Renucci, en passant par les spécialistes des digital studies), et Ars Industrialis franchit un cap en s'associant (...) à des collectivités locales (Nantes) ou en nouant des partenariats internationaux (Grande-Bretagne, Allemagne). Cet ouvrage fournit une synthèse de tous ces travaux en proposant un vocabulaire philosophique à la fois ambitieux et accessible. Qu'est-ce le marketing - le psychopouvoir - et pourquoi est-il un des dangers majeurs de notre époque? En quoi la technique influence-t-elle des fonctions aussi capitales que la mémoire ou l'écriture? Quelle nouvelle vision de l'éducation devons-nous mettre à jour depuis l'avènement du numérique? Que sont la bêtise et l'intelligence? Comment aider la transformation de citoyens passifs et débordés en amateurs, acteurs et membres d'une communauté de goûts et de savoirs? Faire attention propose, dans ces courts essais-définitions, le manifeste d'une époque charnière qui voit définitivement s'éloigner le monde ancien, tout en souhaitant mettre les outils de l'extrême contemporain au service d'un nouvel humanisme. (shrink)

Aujourd'hui nous vivons un nouveau stade de la longue histoire de l'évolution technique de l'humanité : le stade du capitalisme hyperindustriel. Depuis le XXe siècle, l'homme n'a cessé de vivre les bouleversements des conditions de la temporalité, c'est-à-dire aussi bien de son individuation. Ce nouveau stade induit déjà une profonde transformation de nos existences. Loin de disparaître, l'industrialisation se poursuit et se renforce, elle investit de nouveaux champs, invisibles, qui vont des nanostructures jusqu'aux fondements neurologiques de l'insconscient, en passant par (...) les biotechnologies : les champs de l'hypermatériel, où la matière est toujours déjà une forme, où la forme est toujours déjà une information et où l'" immatériel " apparaît pour ce qu'il est : une fable qui enfume les esprits. Bernard Stiegler formule à nouveaux frais les enjeux des technologies culturelles et cognitives, mais aussi des biotechnologies et des nanotechnologies. Elles ne vont pas sans péril pour l'humanité, pour le " devenir non inhumain " de l'espèce humaine, comme il l'écrit. Demain, l'homme sera-t-il désemparé de lui-même, de sa conscience et de sa libido, ou saura-t-il exister avec les technologies de l'hypermatériel? S'il se laisse subsumer, s'il laisse son désir être capté par les puissantes machines et réseaux qui cherchent déjà à instaurer un psychopouvoir, l'une des conséquences pourrait bien être l'auto-destruction du capitalisme, déjà bien engagé sur cette pente. Bernard Stiegler n'est pas un technophobe. Il n'en est que plus autorisé à nous alerter. (shrink)

The paper examines the view that Nietzsche's perspectivism about practical judgments, understood as a form of internalism about practical reasons, implies that any legitimate criticism of judgments emanating from a foreign perspective must be in terms that are internal to this perspective. Insofar as it is thought to be motivated by certain general theoretical strictures of perspectivism, this view is incoherent. The paper argues that, on the contrary Nietzsche's recourse to a strategy of internal criticism is motivated by his own (...) particular commitment to preserving the freedom of spirit of his interlocutors. The paper concludes with a discussion of how freedom of spirit is preserved by internal criticism, and how the nature of freedom of spirit affects the particular form such criticism will assume. (shrink)