Background: Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] is an innovative, evidence-based and effective psychotherapy for post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD]. As with other psychotherapies, the effectiveness of EMDR contrasts with a limited knowledge of its underlying mechanism of action. In its relatively short life as a therapeutic option, EMDR has not been without controversy, in particular regarding the role of the bilateral stimulation as an active component of the therapy. The high prevalence of EMDR in clinical practice and the dramatic increase (...) in EMDR research in recent years, with more than 26 randomized controlled trials published to date, highlight the need for a better understanding of its mechanism of action. Methods: We conducted a thorough systematic search of studies published until October 2017, using PubMed, ScienceDirect, Web of Knowledge and Scopus databases that examined the mechanism of action of EMDR or provided conclusions within the framework of current theoretical models of EMDR functioning. Results: Seventy-five studies were selected for review and classified into three overarching models; (i) psychological models (ii) psychophysiological models and (iii) neurobiological models. The evidence available from each study was analysed and discussed. Results demonstrated a reasonable empirical support for the working memory hypothesis and for the physiological changes associated with successful EMDR therapy. Recently, more sophisticated structural and functional neuroimaging studies using high resolution structural and temporal techniques are starting to provide preliminary evidence into the neuronal correlates before, during and after EMDR therapy. Discussion: Despite the increasing number of studies that published in recent years, the research into the mechanisms underlying EDMR therapy are still in its infancy. Studies in well-defined clinical and non-clinical populations, larger sample sizes and tighter methodological control are further needed in order to establish firm conclusions. (shrink)
Excerpt from Geschichte Der Neuern Philosophie Von Bacon Von Verulam Bis Benedict Spinoza 3 3. 5 n. N. Nad; ebenfo tvenig. 262 11 u. Fl. Bor l. Bon. 350 5 D. 11. Innern unbeen. 362 11 n. O. Il. Darin harum. 363 4 u. Ber eufì l. Ben eift. 366 17 n. 0. Ft. Leben l. 2eben. 397 6 5. U. Feblfdﬂiefienbeì1 l. Fel;lfdyiefienben. 411 11 0. Ft. Fein I. Ein. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of (...) rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)
Organizational sensemaking is crucial for resource planning and crisis management since facing complex strategic problems that exceed their capacity and ability, such as crises, forces organizations to engage in inter-organizational collaboration, which leads to obtaining individual and diverse perspectives to comprehend the issues and find solutions. This online qualitative survey study examines how Norwegian Sea Rescue Society employees perceived the concept of an organizational crisis and how they sensed their co-workers react to it. The scope was the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, (...) a global event affecting all countries and organizations and responding similarly globally. Data were collected during the Fall of 2020. The instrument of choice was the Internal Crisis Management and Crisis Communication survey. The results showed that the overall sample strongly believed in their organization’s overall resilience level. However, a somewhat vague understanding of roles and responsibilities in a crisis where detected, together with some signs of informal communication, rumor spreading, misunderstanding, frustration, and insecurity. This study contributes to the academic field of organizational research, hence crisis management and sensemaking, and could be valuable to managers and decision-makers across sectors. Increased knowledge about how employees react to a crisis may help optimize internal crisis management planning and utilize robust mitigation and response strategies. (shrink)
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th Conference on Computability in Europe, CiE 2011, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, in June/July 2011. The 22 revised papers presented together with 11 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected with an acceptance rate of under 40%. The papers cover the topics computability in analysis, algebra, and geometry; classical computability theory; natural computing; relations between the physical world and formal models of computability; theory of transfinite computations; and computational linguistics.
I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)
C-systems were defined by Cartmell as models of generalized algebraic theories. B-systems were defined by Voevodsky in his quest to formulate and prove an initiality conjecture for type theories. They play a crucial role in Voevodsky’s construction of a syntactic C-system from a term monad. In this work, we construct an equivalence between the category of C-systems and the category of B-systems, thus proving a conjecture by Voevodsky.
Thought, according to Hegel, is not only the product of a faculty of a subject, or a means by which a thinking subject tries to grasp a world that is alien to him. It is also the very structure of the world, that is disclosed to a subject through the thinking activity of a subject. The fundamental question that crosses the whole post-Kantian philosophy is that of the relation between thought and reality, i.e. the question of whether reality depends on (...) the categorial requirements imposed by the thinking subject, or whether reality maintains some form of independence from the thinking subject. Seen from this standpoint, Hegel can be read both as an author who radicalizes Kant’s transcendental perspective, and also as a critic of that perspective. In other words, he can be seen as an idealist: according to Hegel, any philosophy is idealist if it claims that something finite, qua finite, is essentially connected with something other. He can also be seen as an anti-idealist: insofar as his philosophy aims to overcome a hyper-transcendentalist perspective, i.e. it is so since it rejects idealism as subjective idealism. Moreover, Hegel’s anti-idealism can be characterized as realism. This is because, if we admit that overcoming transcendentalism without falling back again on a pre-critical conception of thought and of reality involves an idea of thought which is not reducible to a "mentalistic" conception of it, we need to conceive of thought as something that is not alien to reality. Hegel conceives of thought as intimately connected with the world, as its own rational structure. This “realism” of thought is what makes Hegelian idealism, so to speak, anti-idealistic. Through this "realism" of thought Hegel pursues two goals. On the one hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought, according to which a subject talks and relates to a reality that is always only a construction of him, and so it is necessarily the simulacrum of something that remains inaccessible in its truth. On the other hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a conception of reality characterized merely as alien and opposite to thought itself, and which is the counterpart of the subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought. By pursuing these two goals it should be gained a conception of reality which could warrant some form of objectivity, but which cannot be equated with the substantialistic conception of the pre-Kantian metaphysics. (shrink)
If I lead a life of virtue, that may well be good for you. But will it also be good for me? The idea that it will—or even must—is an ancient one, and its appeal runs deep. For if this idea is correct then we can provide everyone with a good reason—arguably the best reason—for being virtuous. However, for all the effort which has been invested in defending the idea, by some of the best minds in the history of philosophy, (...) it remains unproven. Worse, in this skeptical age hardly anyone really believes it. I don't really believe it either, at least not in its strongest forms, but I think that the question is nonetheless worth examining. Even if we cannot show that virtue and self-interest coincide, we can at least measure the breadth of the gap between them. (shrink)
Commercial success of big data has led to speculation that big-data-like reasoning could partly replace theory-based approaches in science. Big data typically has been applied to ‘small problems’, which are well-structured cases characterized by repeated evaluation of predictions. Here, we show that in climate research, intermediate categories exist between classical domain science and big data, and that big-data elements have also been applied without the possibility of repeated evaluation. Big-data elements can be useful for climate research beyond small problems if (...) combined with more traditional approaches based on domain-specific knowledge. The biggest potential for big-data elements, we argue, lies in socioeconomic climate research. (shrink)
We generalize the construction of lattice-valued models of set theory due to Takeuti, Titani, Kozawa and Ozawa to a wider class of algebras and show that this yields a model of a paraconsistent logic that validates all axioms of the negation-free fragment of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
Recent evidence suggests that probabilistic grammars may be modulated by communication mode and genre. Accordingly, the question arises how complex language users’ lectal competence is, where complexity is proportional to the extent to which choice-making processes depend on the situation of language use. Do probabilistic constraints vary when we talk to a friend compared to when we give a speech? Are differences between spoken and written language larger than those within each mode? In the present study, we aim to approach (...) these questions systematically. Guided by theorizing in cognitive (socio)linguistics and using logistic regression based on corpus materials, we analyzed the dative alternation with give (The government gives farmers money vs. The government gives money to farmers) in four broad registers of English: spoken informal, spoken formal, written informal, and written formal. Corpus analysis was supplemented with a scalar rating experiment. Results suggest that language users’ probabilistic grammars vary as a function of register. (shrink)
L.A. Paul has recently argued that, on the standard model of rationality, individuals cannot make rational decisions about whether to have a child or not. In this paper, I show that Paul’s arguments do not plausibly demonstrate that the standard model of rationality precludes rational decisions to have a child. I argue that there are phenomenal and non-phenomenal values that can be used to determine the value that having a child will have for us and, in turn, that can be (...) used to make rational decisions about whether to have a child or not. I also argue that we can have an approximate idea of what it is like for us to have a child, even before we have a child and that, on the standard model, this is sufficient to make rational decisions to have a child. (shrink)
There is an argument according to which there must be something nonrelationally valuable for anything to be of value. The chains of dependence between values must come to an end, and humanity meets the specifications. I explore alternatives to terminating a regress in nonrelational value and give reason to reject the “borrowing” conception of relational value that drives the argument. I doubt that the nonrelational value of humanity can be secured by an argument from the structure of value, but I (...) am optimistic about the prospects for explaining our value relationally and give reason to favor a reflexive relational model. (shrink)
One dark and rainy night, Yuso sexually assaults and tortures Zelan. In escaping from the scene of his crime, he falls heavily and becomes an impotent paraplegic. Instead of treating his fate as divine retribution for his wicked acts, Yuso sees it as sheer bad luck. He shows no remorse for what he has done, and vainly hopes that he will recover his powers, which he now treats as involuntarily hoarded resources to be used on less rainy days. In the (...) presence of others, he pretends that he has turned over a new leaf. He asks for religious and educational books, hoping to make up for his poor education and deprived social background. But he immediately discards them when he is alone in favor of the pornographic magazines which he has bribed a nurse to smuggle in for him. His deception and various obscene acts committed in the hospital are exposed; by the time he comes up for trial, everyone knows that he is still a lustful, sadistic, and unrepentant man. Most retributivists have a sufficient justification for punishing Yuso independently of the social consequences of his punishment. Two features of the case might cause some difficulties. First, Yuso has already experienced considerable suffering and deprivation both before and after his crime, and retributivists might disagree about the relevance of the suffering to his punishment. Secondly, Yuso is unrepentant, and it is unlikely that punishment will change him. This might, as we shall see, create a problem for those who think that the justifying aim of punishment is the moral reform of the offender. (shrink)
This book provides an invaluable overview of the reach of logic. It provides reference to some of the most important, well-established results in logic, while at the same time offering insight into the latest research issues in the area. It also has a balance of theory and practice, containing essays in the areas of modal logic, intuitionistic logic, logic and language, nonmonotonic logic and logic programming, temporal logic, logic and learning, combination of logics, practical reasoning, logic and artificial intelligence, abduction, (...) theorem proving and goal-directed reasoning. It will be invaluable reading for researchers and graduate students in logic and computer science, and a fabulous source of inspiration for research students in search of a topic for a PhD in logic and theoretical computer science. (shrink)
We investigate the possibility of arguing for or against the philosophical position that mathematics is an _epistemic exception_ on the basis of agreement data from the mathematical peer review process and argue that Cohen’s \(\kappa \), the standard agreement measure used for inter-rater agreement, is unable to detect epistemic exceptionality from peer review data.
We argue that mathematical knowledge is context dependent. Our main argument is that on pain of distorting mathematical practice, one must analyse the notion of having available a proof, which supplies justification in mathematics, in a context dependent way.
Police officers often encounter potentially dangerous situations in which they strongly rely on their ability to identify threats quickly and react accordingly. Previous studies have shown that practical experience and targeted training significantly improve threat detection time and decision-making performance in law enforcement situations. We applied 90-min traditional firearms training as a control condition and a specifically developed intervention training to police cadets. The intervention training contained theoretical and practical training on tactical gaze control, situational awareness, and visual attention, while (...) the control training focused on precision and speed. In a pre- and posttest, we measured decision-making performance as well as response preparation and execution to evaluate the training. Concerning cognitive performance training, the number of correct decisions increased from pre- to posttest. In shoot scenarios, correct decisions improved significantly more in the intervention group than in the control group. In don’t-shoot scenarios, there were no considerable differences. Concerning the training of response preparation and execution in shoot scenarios, the intervention group’s response time, but not hit time, decreased significantly from pre- to posttest. The control group was significantly faster than the intervention group, with their response and hit time remaining constant across pre- and posttest. Concerning the training of tactical action control, the intervention group performed significantly better than the control group. Moreover, the intervention group improved the tactical handling of muzzle position significantly. The results indicate that a single 90-min session of targeted gaze control and visual attention training improves decision-making performance, response time, and tactical handling of muzzle position in shoot scenarios. However, these faster response times do not necessarily translate to faster hit times – presumably due to the motor complexity of hitting an armed attacker with live ammunition. We conclude that theory-based training on tactical gaze control and visual attention has a higher impact on police officers’ decision-making performance than traditional firearms training. Therefore, we recommend law enforcement agencies include perception-based shoot/don’t-shoot exercises in training and regular tests for officers’ annual firearm requalification. (shrink)
The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy.
Panentheism seems to be an attractive alternative to classical theism. It is not clear, though, what exactly panentheism asserts and how it relates to classical theism. By way of clarifying the thesis of panentheism, I argue that panentheism and classical theism differ only as regards the modal status of the world. According to panentheism, the world is an intrinsic property of God – necessarily there is a world – and according to classical theism the world is an extrinsic property of (...) God – it is only contingently true that there is a world. Therefore, as long as we do not have an argument showing that necessarily there is a world, panentheism is not an attractive alternative to classical theism. (shrink)
In his article in this issue, " 'How do Mādhyamikas Think?' Revisited," Tom Tillemans reflects on his earlier article "How do Mādhyamikas Think?" (2009), itself a response to earlier work of ours (Deguchi et al. 2008; Garfield and Priest 2003). There is much we agree with in these non-dogmatic and open-minded essays. Still, we have some disagreements. We begin with a response to Tillemans' first thoughts, and then turn to his second thoughts.Tillemans (2009) maintains that it is wrong to attribute (...) to Nāgārjuna or to his Mādhyamika followers a strong dialetheism, according to which some contradictions of the form p ∧ ¬p are to be accepted. He argues that, nonetheless, a weak dialetheism may be implicit in the .. (shrink)
We look at bimodal logics interpreted by cartesian products of topological spaces and discuss the validity of certain bimodal formulae in products of so-called cardinal spaces. This solves an open problem of van Benthem et al.
ABSTRACTDot-probe studies usually find an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli only in anxious participants, but not in non-anxious participants. In the present study, we conducted two experiments to investigate whether attentional bias towards angry faces in unselected samples is moderated by the extent to which the current task requires social processing. In Experiment 1, participants performed a dot-probe task involving classification of either socially meaningful targets or meaningless targets. Targets were preceded by two photographic face cues, one angry and one (...) neutral. Angry face cues only produced significant cueing scores with socially meaningful targets, not with meaningless targets. In Experiment 2, participants classified only meaningful targets, which were either socially meaningful or not. Again, mean cue... (shrink)
In climate science, climate models are one of the main tools for understanding phenomena. Here, we develop a framework to assess the fitness of a climate model for providing understanding. The framework is based on three dimensions: representational accuracy, representational depth, and graspability. We show that this framework does justice to the intuition that classical process-based climate models give understanding of phenomena. While simple climate models are characterized by a larger graspability, state-of-the-art models have a higher representational accuracy and representational (...) depth. We then compare the fitness-for-providing understanding of process-based to data-driven models that are built with machine learning. We show that at first glance, data-driven models seem either unnecessary or inadequate for understanding. However, a case study from atmospheric research demonstrates that this is a false dilemma. Data-driven models can be useful tools for understanding , specifically for phenomena for which scientists can argue from the coherence of the models with background knowledge to their representational accuracy and for which the model complexity can be reduced such that they are graspable to a satisfactory extent. When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. (shrink)
It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy of (...) language and related A-theorists’ criticisms to acknowledge that semantic atensionalism can hardly stand, but have also maintained that what is essential for the B-theory is ontological atensionalism, which can be independently defended. Here it is argued that the B-theorists have been too quick in abandoning semantic atensionalism: they can still cling to it. (shrink)
Most people believe that some optimific acts are wrong. Since we are not permitted to perform wrong acts, we are not permitted to carry out optimific wrongs. Does the moral relevance of the distinction between action and omission nonetheless permit us to allow others to carry them out? I show that there exists a plausible argument supporting the conclusion that it does. To resist my argument, we would have to endorse a principle according to which, for any wrong action, there (...) is some reason to prevent that action over and above those reasons associated with preventing harm to its victim. I argue that it would be a mistake to value the prevention of wrong acts in the way required to resist my argument. (shrink)
A common assumption within the migration ethics literature is that it is only states that have the power to admit foreigners to their territory. However, this assumption misses something important. While it is true that it is states that have the ultimate power to admit, other actors can possess a derivative power from the laws that states put in place. By establishing a system of work visas, for instance, states lend private corporations, and other employers, the power to nominate foreigners (...) for admission by making job offers. For many foreigners, a job offer is what they require to start a new life in a new country. The question then arises how corporations should use this derivative power? One might assume that they should use it as they typically do: to pursue their business interests and by doing so (we hope) benefit their stakeholders including the state and its citizens. However, could there not be other reasons, besides profit seeking, to offer refugees a visa-conferring job? If hiring refugees does not greatly harm their business, it is arguable that corporations could be obliged to use their derivative power to do so on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, some corporations also seem to be obliged to use this power on grounds of corrective justice. This paper advances these possibilities. It has three sections. First, I will look at how much discretion corporations have in terms of employment and migration laws in some European countries. Second, I will present an argument for why corporations are morally permitted to facilitate admission for refugees by offering them a visa-conferring job. In the final section, I will then defend a stronger claim, namely that corporations are possibly obliged to do so on humanitarian grounds or on grounds of corrective justice. (shrink)
This volume contains fourteen essays, all of which were written by Ebersole over a period of seven years, on various epistemological problems. A few of the essays have appeared before as journal articles, but the bulk of the essays are here printed for the first time. The essays deal with three principle topics: sense-datum theories of perception, memory and the past, and the possibility of knowledge of existence without experience. In style and approach, the essays can be characterized as belonging (...) to the school of analytic philosophy, dealing with philosophical problems with an emphasis on the use and function of relevant linguistic expressions. Although some of the essays are interesting, readers of Wittgenstein will find the material all too familiar.--R. L. M. (shrink)
Will stakeholder theory continue to transform how we think about business and society? On the occasion of this journal’s 60th anniversary, this review article examines the journal’s role in shaping stakeholder theory to date and suggests that it still has transformative potential. We conducted a bibliometric analysis of co-citations in the literature from 1984 to 2020. Reporting these results, we examine the field’s evolving structure. Contextualized theoretically as an accomplishment of institutional work—the creation of a meaningful and innovative field ideology—this (...) structure is remarkable for how it integrates ethical and behavioral arguments, invites engagement from adjacent domains, and arrives at important insights for business and society. We advance a research agenda consistent with this larger institutional project. (shrink)
The existence of God is once again the focus of vivid philosophical discussion. From the point of view of analytic theology, however, people often talk past each other when they debate about the putative existence or nonexistence of God. In the worst case, for instance, atheists deny the existence of a God, which no theists ever claimed to exist. In order to avoid confusions like this we need to be clear about the function of the term 'God' in its different (...) contexts of use. In what follows, I distinguish between the functions of 'God' in philosophical contexts on the one hand and in theological contexts on the other in order to provide a schema, which helps to avoid confusion in the debate on the existence or non-existence of God. (shrink)
We investigate Turing cones as sets of reals, and look at the relationship between Turing cones, measures, Baire category and special sets of reals, using these methods to show that Martin's proof of Turing Determinacy (every determined Turing closed set contains a Turing cone or is disjoint from one) does not work when you replace “determined” with “Blackwell determined”. This answers a question of Tony Martin.
We do not believe that logic is the sole answer to deep and intriguing questions about human behaviour, but we think that it might be a useful tool in simulating and understanding it to a certain degree and in specifically restricted areas of application. We do not aim to resolve the question of what rational behaviour in games with mistaken and changing beliefs is. Rather, we develop a formal and abstract framework that allows us to reason about behaviour in games (...) with mistaken and changing beliefs leaving aside normative questions concerning whether the agents are behaving “rationally”; we focus on what agents do in a game. In this paper, we are not concerned with the reasoning process of the (ideal) economic agent; rather, our intended application is artificial agents, e.g., autonomous agents interacting with a human user or with each other as part of a computer game or in a virtual world. We give a story of mistaken beliefs that is a typical example of the situation in which we should want our formal setting to be applied. Then we give the definitions for our formal system and how to use this setting to get a backward induction solution. We then apply our semantics to the story related earlier and give an analysis of it. Our final section contains a discussion of related work and future projects. We discuss the advantages of our approach over existing approaches and indicate how it can be connected to the existing literature. (shrink)